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Abstract. From Drill to Doctrine. Forging the British Army's Tactics 1897-1909 
This thesis examines the development of the Anny's tactics from the 1897-8 
"l 
Frontier Campaigns until the publication of Field Service Regulations (FSRs) 1909.-
It scrutinises how the 3 tactical factors of firepower, mobility and protection, 
together with experience from the NW Frontier, the South African War and 
Manchuria caused British tactics to develop. The thesis shows that the Anny's 
attitude towards low-level initiative developed significantly. Increased firepower 
made tactical extension essential. This prevented commanders controlling and made 
subordinate initiative vital. Developing initiative among subordinates caused the 
Anny's disciplinary, educational and training systems to alter. 
The thesis finally examines doctrine's development, a system of fundamental 
principles designed to guide commanders, who now had to use initiative, in 
increasingly complex combat. This was caused by greater firepower, longer ranges, 
smokeless ammunition and wider extensions. This thesis demonstrates that the Anny 
developed doctrine in the modem sense. Consequently changes occurred in the staff 
system, professional education and general training. 
The thesis argues that the Anny's firepower grew quantitatively and 
qualitatively with the introduction of independent and Indirect Fire. Weapons were 
now developed doctrinally. The Anny attached great significance to mobility and 
manoeuvre, seeing these as the means whereby it could defeat superior numbers. 
Cavalry roles developed to stress operational level manoeuvre rather than battlefield 
shock. It examines protection, arguing that the need for tactical extension and 
fieldcraft, both impelled by greater firepower, enforced initiative. 
The thesis argues that contemporaries felt that the 3 wars all taught broadly 
2 All other abbreviations are in the Glossary. 
3 
similar lessons and that the resulting doctrine matched the short war which armies 
expected. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Now all you recruities what's drafted today, 
You shut up your rag-box an' 'ark to my lay, 
And I'll sing you a soldier as far as I may. 
Outline 
Between 1897-1909 the British Anny advanced from drill to doctrine. During this 
period it fought its largest 19th Century Frontier campaign and the South African War, 
while scrutinising both these conflicts and the Russo-Japanese War for lessons. More or 
less simultaneously significant technical change occurred, principally the first extensive 
use of smokeless ammunition, magazine rifles and QF artillery. All increased firepower 
thus affecting mobility and protection. This thesis examines these 3 fundamental tactical 
factors, how they changed and their influence on tactics. 
This introduction states the thesis' proposition, examines the contemporary 
contexts and constraints on the Anny, current scholarship on British tactics pre-1914 
and the thesis' methodology. It analyses tactics, two forms of war, manoeuvre and 
attrition, which affected how tactics developed, and finally outlines the chapters. 
The Thesis' Proposition 
This thesis aims to understand why British tactics changed and why the Anny in 
1909 emphasised mobility and manoeuvre rather than firepower and attrition. It aims to 
prove that between 1897-1909 the Anny made a reasonably coherent attempt to develop 
tactical doctrine for major warfare. No longer could subordinates receive exact, timely 
orders in the teeth of enemy fire; instead, often out of communication with superiors, 
they had to use initiative guided by doctrine. This adoption of doctrine, which Chapter 9 
outlines, was very significant. It demanded analysis to develop, thus having implications 
for the staff, the body charged with examining issues systematically. Furthennore 
doctrine implies that judgement is required for the exercise of command, rather than 
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applying drill-derived rules. This in tum affected training and education, while these 
factors and discipline were altered to instil initiative. 
There is no doubt that flaws existed in British tactics in 1909. Firepower and 
consequently attrition were not accorded the recognition that 1915-1918 was to 
demand. I But the context must be borne in mind, a small regular army~ financially 
stretched, strategically poised between Europe and Empire, later committed to 
continental campaigning but denied conscription. Thus, given that increasing numbers 
was impossible, manoeuvre had to be used rather than firepower-dominated attrition. 2 
British tactics in 1909 were designed to defeat superior numbers. Firepower was not 
devalued; indeed the Army improved its marksmanship and increased weapon numbers. 
It emphasised protection and technology. The Army's tactical preparations, generally 
coherent, were based on examination of evidence derived from the 3 wars. The resulting 
doctrine matched the type of war expected. Scholars working back from the trenches 
have criticised this, but then as now the future is obscure.3 
Contexts and Constraints 
1899-1902 had demonstrated both that Britain was diplomatically isolated and that 
the Army's performance was poor. Reform was imperative. Financial stringency 
exacerbated by heavy expenditure between 1899-1902, the growth of naval which 
overtook military spending, and the pressures, political and economic, following the 
1906 Election and the rise of the Labour Party, dominated the period. The Army had to 
maintain expensive global deployments and give drafting priority to overseas units; 
British-based units consequently resembled in Wolseley's graphic words: 'squeezed 
lemons.' This damaged training, yet conscription was politically and logistically 
I Gen Famdale History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery (Woolwich 1986), Annex B. 
1 DMO (1996),pp 4-21-22. 
3 PA Towle The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War (KCL 1973). pp 385-6. 
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impossible. Major contingencies ranged from amphibious operations on the American 
seaboard, combat across the prairies, colonial warfare versus a European power, war in 
Afghanistan against Russia and European warfare in varying permutations. Minor 
commitments ranged from: 'Birr to Bareilly, ... Hong Kong and Peshawar.,-l As the 
German threat strengthened, the Army's focus switched towards continental warfare, 
though its integration in French plans was limited until 1911. But, unlike the RN, it was 
unable to call the legions home. A very real constraint was that the Army began the 
period which this thesis covers with a very undeveloped staff system. 5 These contexts 
influenced the Army, they cannot be analysed fully in this thesis, but should be 
remembered. 
Current Scholarship 
Scholarship has focused on the establishment of the GS, Brodrick's and Arnold 
Foster's attempted reforms of the Army's structure and war-planning.6 There has been 
no comprehensive examination of British tactics before 1914. Scholarship has 
concentrated on tactics from 1914, tending to work backwards when analysing prewar 
tactics. But contemporaries were unaware of the course of the First World War, while 
Bloch had forecast that sustained, mass warfare was impossible.7 
Dr Samuels' Command or Control, the main work on pre-1914 tactics, cannot 
examine British tactics fully as it covers both British and German tactics between 1888-
1918.8 His thesis is that British over-rigidity caused 1916-18' s tactical mistakes. He 
contrasts this with greater German flexibility. His book is based on 2 case studies, the 
4 R Kipling Verse Definitive Edition (1977), P 429. 
S Professor Bond The Victorian Army and the Staff College (1972), pp 153-4. 
6 Professor Gooch The Plans of War (1974), Professor Spiers Haldane An Army Reformer (Edinburgh 
1980). 
7 IS Bloch Modern Weapons and Modern War ( 1900). P xi. 
I Dr Samuels' Command or Control (1995). It examines British tactics pre-1914 between pp 34-60. 1914-
18 occupies pp 82-269. Given this disparity, it is argued that Samuels has worked backwards from 1914-
18. His work has not analysed British development of initiative and manoeuvre pre-1914. 
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battles ofThiepval and St Quentin, which distort his conclusions on pre-1914 tactics. 
Both were atypical of attrition's strengths against better-trained enemies. Great 
firepower and tactical surprise inflicted heavy blows as 14 July 1916 or Messines 
showed. However correct Samuels' thesis maybe for 1915-17, it does not automatically 
apply beforehand. 1914-15 forms a tactical watershed and some of his criticisms, 
overcontrol and rigidity, were due to wartime circumstances rather than prewar error. 9 
The other important work is Professor Travers' The Killing Ground 1900-1918. 
This blames many 1914-1918 failures on 'internal' factors, ie mental rigidity and 
technological neglect, principally of firepower. Travers' analysis can be criticised: firstly 
artillery rearmament, Indirect Fire's introduction, the development of aircraft and 
motorization impugn his criticisms that the British neglected technology. Nor does 
Travers demonstrate that other European armies were significantly better at 
incorporating new equipments than Britain. to Secondly he attributes failure to learn 
from South Africa to: 'a surprisingly widespread belief in [ its] abnormality.' 11 Many 
contemporaries, far from exclusively British, commented on this. South Africa was far 
more open than Western Europe, thus favouring firepower at the expense of movement 
under fire, and mobility when not fighting; the Boers' irregular character, their strategic 
failure to mount an immediate all-out invasion and their selection of Natal as their 
objective rather than the more politically-promising Cape Colony, their initial reluctance 
to assault, their eccentric artillery tactics and their high mobility. 12 All were exceptional 
by European standards, while the vast size of South Africa, roughly equivalent to 
Western Europe, favoured mobility, only constrained by poor communications and the 
'Gen Falkenhayn General Headquarters /9/4-/9/6 (1919). p 74 suggests that British tactical problems 
between 1914-16 were caused by insufficient trained cadres. 
10 AR Millett & W Murray Military Effectiveness I (Boston 1988), pp 84-5 for German defects. They 
claim the French were the most technically backward of the major armies in 1914, Ibid P 212. 
\I The Killing Ground 1900-/9/8 (1993), p 44. 
12 Eg Gen von der Goltz 'The Military Lessons of the South African War' NR XLII (1903). pp 372-5. 
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resulting logistical difficulties. These factors unsurprisingly made contemporaries 
reluctant to draw lessons. This posed particular problems for cavalry tactics. Opponents 
of shock emphasised that there were few charges; traditionalists argued that, as the 
British did not face cavalry, deducing shock's redundancy was unsound. 
Griffiths' Battle Tactics of the Western Front, Weller's Weapons and Tactics, 
Myatt's The British Infantry 1660-1945, Carver's Britain's Army in the 20th Century 
and The Boer War, Ramsay's Command and Cohesion and Simpson's Directing 
Operations focus on general themes or 1914-18 rather than prewar tactics. 13 Scholarly 
works on broader themes can err. D'Ombrain's War Machinery and High Policy's claim 
that the 18 Pounder was the last significant British innovation before 1914 ignores the 
introduction of howitzers, motorization and aircraft. 14 
Coverage of tactical developments in the arms is imperfect; the most significant 
contribution covering mainly artillery is Bidwell and Graham's Firepower. This argues 
that artillery was neglected, but it does not examine the contemporary constraints on the 
arm, while its pre-1914 coverage is small. 15 Scales' Artillery in Small Wars does not 
analyse 1897-1909 in depth. 16 Scales suggests that the British neglected Indirect Fire but 
ignores conflicting evidence. His argument that the RA erred after 1900 by basing its 
tactics on small wars, which South Africa was not numerically, downplays Manchuria's 
influence. 17 Gen Bailey's Field Artillery and Firepower does not examine developments 
before 1914 in depth, while Dr Marble's thesis focuses from 1914. 18 Cavalry are well 
Il Battle Tactics of the Western Front (New Haven 1994); Weapons and Tactics (1966); The British 
Infantry 1660-1945 (poole 1983); Britain's Army in the 20th Century. (1998) and The Boer War (1999); 
Command and Cohesion (Westport 2002), Directing Operations (Stroud 2006). 
14 War Machinery and High Policy' (1973), P 150 fn 23. 
IS Firepower (1982). 
16Artillery in Small Wars (Ann Arbor 1976). 
17 Scales does not cite Maj Geddes Notes on Japanese and Rwsian A rtillery in Manchuria ( 1907) and 
Notes upon Rwsian Artillery Tactics in the War of 1904-5 ( 1907). 
II Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis 2004); The Infantry cannot do with a Gun Less (KCL 1999). 
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covered; the historiography includes Dr Badsey's thesis Fire and the Sword, 
concentrating on the fire versus shock controversy, and Anglesey's History 
of the British Cavalry. Infantry are poorly served with most emphasis post-1914, a 
noticeable feature of English and Gudmundsson's On Infantry. Priestley's The Signals 
Service in the European War of 1914-1918 concentrates on 1914-18. Brig Gen Baker-
Brown's volume of The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers does not link changes 
to wider themes. 19 
Initiative has hardly been tackled as Dr Sheffield's Leadership in the Trenches 
focuses from 1914.20 Professor Holden-Reid summarises British doctrine masterfully 
but, though giving an invaluable overview, he cannot examine 1897-1909 in depth in an 
annexe to a manual.21 
Analysis of wars in the period is flawed. Dr Moreman has scrupulously examined 
Frontier operations but his work is not intended to consider the 1897-8 Campaigns' 
wider tactical relevance.22 The Times History of the War in South Africa contains much 
useful material but was written to stimulate reform and consequently has biases. 
Furthermore the work, completed in 1909, does not provide perspective. Dr Towle's 
The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War on British Military and Naval Thought lacks 
wider tactical context and therefore does not appreciate certain developments fully. He, 
like others, has seen Manchuria through the prism of 1914-18, distorting some of his 
conclusions.23 
Clearly there are gaps in the historiography. There is no broad study linking 
increased firepower to changes in mobility, protection and developing initiative. The 
next section briefly summarises the thesis' methodology. 
19 (Cambridge 1986); IV /899-/9/3 (1986); (Chatham 1921); IV (Chatham 1952). 
20 (KCL 1973); (2000). 
11 ADP 2 Command (1995),pp 2-A-1 to A-13. 
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Methodology 
The thesis tries to work forward towards 1914 rather than backwards from the 
trenches. It uses military theory to give context to tactical alterations, but has tried to 
avoid imposing current concepts anachronistically. It is primarily concerned with the 
development of ideas. Here it must be stressed that between injunction and 
implementation there is a wide gap. In a largely regimentally-based Army, change took 
time and was incomplete in 1914. 
Much has been made of personalities' malign influences: here Professor Travers' 
illuminating work seems to miss the prime question, were these worse in the British 
than in other armies? This would be hard to maintain; L 'Affaire and Les Fiches 
disrupted the French, friction between Bulow and Kluck damaged German effectiveness 
in 1914, while there were tensions within the German Army and state. Whether 
Samsonov thrashed Rennenkampf on Mukden station is immaterial, but there were 
serious flaws in Russia and its Army.24 This thesis has avoided personalities, looking at 
the military basis for change. 
Tactics and Tactical Factors 
Many factors influence tactics, ie the conduct of combat. Basically, however, 
tactics have 3 fundamental constituents: firepower, mobility and protection.25 These 
three are interdependent; changing one affects the others. Before 1914 firepower 
increased forcing more attention to protection; Infantry had to extend, entrench and use 
ground and cover to the utmost. This was a new emphasis for armies, which until then 
had fought in relatively close-order and discouraged individual fieldcraft. 
22 The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare 1849-1947 (1998). 
13 Capt Liddell-Hart The British Way in Warfare (1932). pp 122-3. 
240 Porch The March to the Marne (Cambridge 1981), Chapters 4-7; EO Brose The Kaiser·s Army 
(Oxford 2001), pp 5-6; Millett &Murray Effectiveness pp 81-2; Maj Gen Knox With The Russian Army 
1914-1917 (1921), pp xxxiv-v. 
2' FM Wavell The Good Soldier (1948), P 72. 
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Before 1897 commanders felt that soldiers were unreliable when extended while 
less effective firearms demanded physical concentration to generate the necessary 
firepower. Black powder ammunition meant that concealment was lost as soon as fire 
was opened.26 Cavalry shock action was becoming problematic due to greater firepower. 
but many argued that dynamic manoeuvre could defeat well-armed, well dug-in enemies 
by exploiting their static nature. But to defeat defensive firepower the attacker needs 
more firepower to restore his own mobility, thus the RA was significantly strengthened 
from 1900. These interrelated factors and their effects are complex and are therefore 
best described in a generic example which could be drawn from any date from 1908, the 
introduction of the Anny's first grenade, until Afghanistan in 2007. 
An Infantry section advances to mop up snipers harassing sappers repairing a road. 
The section prepares for battle, adjusts camouflage and extends. Soldiers deploy some 
10 yards apart; this enhances protection and enables ground to be used for cover, but 
thus separated, the corporal cannot control each soldier exactly. Individual initiative is 
vital, individual determination essential, because, so separated, individuals can evade 
danger at the expense of their task and their comrades. In dispersed combat isolation is 
real, the sense of uncertainty against an unseen enemy using smokeless ammunition 
oppressive.27 When soldiers fought shoulder to shoulder casualties were often heavy, 
but there was at least the close presence of comrades.28 Obedience was all and the 
dilemmas of decision were spared soldiers, and for that matter many officers. Extension 
had and for that matter continues to have implications for discipline, leadership and 
morale. 
26 Chapter 2, Capt Gawne A Summer Night's Dream (Kansas City nd), pp 19-20. The book, attributed to 
Meckel, was influential in Germany. 
27 Col Marshall Men Against Fire (Gloucester 1978), pp 44-5. Marshall's methodology has been severely 
criticised but few combatants would disagree with this point. 
28 J Keegan The Face of Battle (1976), p 183: Maj Oen Thompson 'Falklands' OCFW 2007. 
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$ 4.; "' 
The section enters a thicket; on entering it the formation contracts automatically. 
Leaving it the soldiers, unprompted, extend and, on the commander's order, dash to a 
sunken lane which offers a covered approach to their objective. As they emerge from it 
a shot rings out and those moving go through the drill: 'dash, down, crawl, observe, 
sights, fire.' Though called a drill and practised till responses are instinctive, this differs 
radically from that conducted upon the square under the RSM. Individuals must think 
for themselves; decide where to get most cover, from whence their weapons can be most 
effective and how best to cooperate with their comrades in executing their mission. 
The sniper has betrayed his position and those covering their comrades' 
movement return fire forthwith. The corporal shouts a brief order, fire redoubles while 
two infantrymen dash to a wall flanking the sniper's hide. Here we see fire countered by 
greater firepower, affording protection and consequently unscathed movement. They 
close on the hide, covered by the wall and their comrades' fire, till a well-thrown 
grenade kills the sniper. The action has taken some 30 minutes from start-line to 
objective. 
This skirmish hardly rates a line even in a unit history but encapsulates the 
interplay of firepower, protection and mobility.29 The section camouflaged up and 
extended, maximising protection and reducing the effects of enemy firepower even 
before crossing their start-line. The advancing infantrymen used ground for cover, thus 
increasing protection. Ease of movement had to be balanced against exposure. As the 
ground became open, they instinctively extended, contracting when entering denser 
cover. We observe the commander first using the lane, not just for protection, it hid the 
section, but also for faster movement. Both generated surprise. Then, when forced to 
cross open ground, he deployed men to cover the rest across. We note the prompt return 
29 R Holmes Firing Line (1985), P 3 notes the lack of tactical detail in many histories. 
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of fire and the intelligent individual reactions. Movement was directed at weakness, the 
enemy's flank, fulfilling the commander's aim, and thus becoming manoeuvre. 
Manoeuvre maximised surprise and surprise provided protection. When soldiers moved, 
fire increased, pinning the sniper down, unable to reply or withdraw. This integration of 
fire and manoeuvre is tactically key.3o In short the 3 fundamentals of fire, protection and 
mobility were combined to defeat the enemy. The proportions of each factor varied as 
the ground and the threat changed. 
Theoretically overwhelming firepower alone could have killed the sniper. An 
arsena.l of artillery ammunition would have been needed, crippling logistics if all actions 
were so fought. Furthermore, in an age before RT, the time needed would have been 
significantly greater. A non-gunner may remark that the likely endstate, far from being a 
clean kill, would probably have been an array of ready-made defensive positions, 
themselves no mean obstacle to movement. 31 Another alternative would have been to 
sap forward, maximising protection, but wasting time. A charge, bald-headed, reckless 
of cover and covering fire, might have saved time, though not casualties. But it could 
not have catered for the unexpected. Few tactical situations demand one only of the 
three fundamentals; reliance on two may not guarantee success, indeed in combat there 
are no certainties, only probabilities. 
Tensions exist between the three tactical factors, had the section been armed with 
a couple of field guns, its firepower would have been greatly strengthened but its ability 
to move and use cover would have declined. Maximising mobility by discarding 
ammunition would have weakened firepower while overemphasising protection would 
have ensured that the section never crossed their start-line. 
)0 Brig Gen Edmonds MOFB 1914 I ( 1922), p 9. 
31 Literally the sticking point 1915-17. 
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There are other deductions. Firstly the skinnish was based on orders and fitted into 
a higher plan. Due to prior training, individuals understood this and cooperated to 
achieve their mission. The commander did not have to order individuals exactly what to 
do; initiative and training oiled the tactical mechanism. Their task, an advance over 
relatively open country against a dug-in, hidden enemy, has proved one, if not the 
hardest tactical problem of 20th Century land warfare. We should note that time, a factor 
of great tactical importance, was well used. The section neither procrastinated, 
stymieing the sappers, perhaps delaying a division and allowing the enemy time to react, 
nor rushed, risking unnecessary casualties. 
Another observation is that the corporal did not literally lead; he commanded not 
through his physical position but more subtly by leadership. This combination of 
example, persuasion and compUlsion fundamentally differed from the Napoleonic era 
when officers physically led and social status told.32 In the magazine rifle era, 
professional ability was essential as commanders were generally unable to lead 
physically, while combat was becoming more complex.33 Prior training enabled soldiers 
to cooperate amid combat's chaos. When initiative was not required and when 
command was relatively easy, training could consist of drill; now doctrine was needed 
to guide both tactics and training. The corporal and his section did not consciously apply 
doctrine; nevertheless doctrine was present in the skirmish. 
Tactical combat in the rough period 1890-1942 faced a crisis in the means of 
command. Increased firepower demanded dispersion, but primitive tactical 
communications constrained superior commanders from controlling and hence 
J2 FM Slim Courage (1957),p 38; J Keegan The Face of Boule (1976), pp 168,186-190. 
J) Commanders can of course still lead physically, but effective forward command is hard, given dispersal 
and the consequent difficuJties of controlling reserves and fire. As Chapter 3 describes, Symons, Buller 
and Methuen met this problem in 1899. All became casualties from being too far forward. 
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initiative, delegated downward. Chapters 7 and 9 examine these points. 
The above example illustrates low-level tactics. At higher levels the tensions 
inherent between firepower, mobility and protection give rise to two fundamental forms 
of combat: manoeuvre and attrition.34 The former favours movement, initiative, 
surprise, timing and risk-taking, the latter numbers, firepower and more methodical, 
managerial tactics with risks reduced. To understand why British tactics developed in 
the way that they did, it is necessary to examine these two forms of war. 
Attrition v Manoeuvre 
The relationship between manoeuvre and attrition is important for this thesis. 
States with professional armies tend not to plan long, high-intensity attritional wars, the 
costs being too high, unless there are strong, countervailing reasons. Generally attrition 
tends to be adopted as an expedient when manoeuvre is unattainable, because of terrain, 
force ratios, inadequate skills or for strategic reasons.35 High-intensity attrition 
emphasises numbers and firepower and tends to be positional and linear, stressing 
setpiece attack and defence.36 Attrition is dominated by combat's mathematics so when 
exchange rates are more or less equivalent, numbers prevail. Strategy will ultimately 
decide whether attrition is adopted, but attrition's decisive level is the tactical where 
combat occurs and where casualties are inflicted.37 
Attrition's emphases subtly alter command and staffwork. Essentially attrition 
means firepower's application on an enemy, often static in position, thus tactical skills, 
34 DMO (1989). pp 22-3. 
35 RT Foley German Strategy and the Path to Verdun (Cambridge 2005). pp 124-5. Dr W Philpott 'Total 
War' OCFW 2007. 
36 M van Creveld, KS Brower & S Canby Air Power and Manuever Warfare (Honolulu 2002), p 9. 
37 FW Lanchester Aircraft in War (1916) and Brig Bidwell Modern Warfare (1973) outline combat's 
mathematics; Ibid pp 67-68 for manoeuvre and fire. Malkasian emphasises that combat is not only means 
of attrition, citing Wellington's withdrawal to Torres Vedras. A History of Modern Wars of Attrition 
(Westport 2002). p 6. This was arguably manoeuvre. Malkasian defines attrition as slow by nature and 
piecemeal. stressing firepower as a significant tool. He cites other types of attrition, here high-intensIty 
attrition between roughly comparable forces on the battlefield is meant. 
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risktaking and the like, are less critical than in manoeuvre.38 In attrition firepower 
dominates, thus the managerial processes of assembling and generating it tend to 
predominate. Here America, with its strong managerial ethos, an unrivalled ability to 
mass produce weapons and an engineering bias at West Point, has tended towards 
attrition in fighting its wars. Dumping ammunition and developing logistic facilities for 
attrition take months; here the Somme's preparations are instructive.39 Monash, an ex-
civil engineer, proved adept at attritional warfare. It is hard to see Rommel, an arch-
manoeuverist, meticulously planning down to section-level like Monash.4o These 
factors tend to favour central control in attrition. Another reason for central control in 
attrition is that fIrepower, the means of causing casualties and the dominant tactical 
factor, is most effective when concentrated. This is particularly the case with artillery, 
which saw centralised structures develop faster from 1914 then they had between 1902-
1913.41 This thesis does not argue that the RA were consciously preparing for attrition, 
but longer-range weapons demanded greater central control. 
Contrastingly manoeuvrist doctrine emphasises creativity, with commanders 
making decisions on inadequate intelligence in order to maintain tempo. But attrition 
also demands skill; the British development of artillery C3I structures and CB tactics in 
1916-17 was a lengthy, scientific process differing from the Germans' emphasis on 
infiltration. Historians have contrasted British and German infantry tactics rather than 
comparing the latter with British artillery tactics. Artillery-dominated attrition aimed to 
38 EN Luttwak Strategy (Cambridge 1987), pp 92-3. 
39 Brig Gen Edmonds MOFB 1916 I (1932), Chapter X; Ibid pp 301-2; Malkasian's caveats should be 
noted but fundamentally the Sonune was attritional, Attrition pp 37-8,47. 
40 EN Luttwak& S Koehl The Dictionary of Modern War (NY 1991 ),p 67. Attrition is often attractive as 
risk is reduced and outputs are measurable. R Beaumont War. Chaos and History (Westport 1994), pp 
137-8 for the managerial aspects of McNamara's influence on attrition in Vietnam 
41 R Lewin Rommel as Military Commander (1968), P 4; G Serle John Monash (Melbourne 1982), p 287. 
Divisional commanders typically think 2 down ie at battalion level, DMO p72; Monash thought 5 down. 
suggesting tight control. Time would preclude this in high-tempo manoeuvre; Brig Bidwell Gunners al 
War ( 1970), P 128. 
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defeat Gennan tactical skills industrially and sCientifically.42 
Manoeuvre and attrition differ in other ways. One substantial difference is that 
manoeuvre battles are generally based on a clear, central command aim. Manoeuvre 
plans to concentrate on enemy weaknesses; consequently all forces must support this. 
This reinforces the importance of all-arms cooperation in manoeuvre. Manoeuvre relates 
particularly to war's operational level where campaign aims are decided as Knox and 
Murray suggest: 'Seekt believed that movement was the essence of operations.' Here 
Seekt, who developed the Germans' 1939-45 doctrine, was referring to war's 
operationalleve1.43 Seekt contrasted manoeuvre and attrition: 
[t]he soldier who seeks a decision in mobility, rapidity and inspiration, has grave 
doubts whether armed masses can ever secure such a decision, and whether 
nations in arms can avoid finishing in the trenches once more. 
Seekt implies a relationship between manoeuvre, surprise and creativity. He also 
suggests the importance of human factors, echoing Clausewitz. Incidentally Seekt 
fostered initiative during his period as head of the German Anny. Chapter 7 argues that 
initiative is needed to facilitate manoeuvre; Seekt stressed it for similar reasons.44 
Numbers may not favour mobile forces. In several manoeuvre battles the victorious, 
albeit more mobile force, has been inferior. This fact reinforces the importance of aims, 
staffwork and coordination as, unlike in attrition, numbers cannot compensate for 
errors.
45 This also suggests why inter-arm cooperation is important in manoeuvre. There 
is also the technical factor. Manoeuvre forces require sappers to bridge rivers, artillery 
to cover movement and to provide depth fire, mobile forces to exploit, infantry to seize 
42 DMO ( 1989).p 49; Farndale Artillery Annexes H&L; Samuels Command has no index entry for CB. 
4) Tire Dynamics 0/ Military Revoluh'on /300-2050 (Cambridge 200 I). P 185; JS Corum The Roots of 
Blitzkrieg (Lawrence 1992), Chapter 4. 
44 Thoughts 0/ a Soldier (1930),p 73; Gen von Clausewitz On War ( 1993 ).p 101; S Bungay 'The Road to 
Mission Conunand' BAR 137(2005), P 26. 
45 BR Posen The Sources 0/ Military Doctrine (Ithaca 1984). Table 2 p 83. Examples include COMPASS 
and SICHELSCHNITT. described in R Holmes Army Battlefield Guide ( 1995). Chapter 4. and Jackson· s 
Valley Campaign; J Keegan Intelligence in War (2006). Chapter 3. 
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ground, with signals to articulate the whole, all coordinated in dynamic manoeuvre by 
the staff. Attrition's brutal fonnula: 'guns conquer, infantry occupy' suggests that inter-
arm cooperation, however desirable, is fundamentally subordinate in the 
materialschlacht. 46 
Attrition essentially involves tactical destruction, while in manoeuvre the enemy 
may be beaten by dislocation at the operational level based on combining aim, mobility, 
tempo and surprise. This reduces but does not completely eliminate the need for combat. 
It therefore follows that the commander's aim is critical in manoeuvre.47 When attrition 
dominates, though aims are important, they are somewhat less so and numbers have 
enhanced significance. 
Dynamic manoeuvre, say a cavalry action, though contemporaries might cite an 
air/attack helicopter/air manoeuvre mission, demands initiative and stresses time in a 
way that attritional, positional warfare, say a siege, does not. 48 In siege warfare, though 
time is important, Wellington's sieges were botched by the need for speed, but it is 
measured in days rather than manoeuvre's minutes.49 Siege warfare is dominated by 
fire; consequently immense logistic preparations are needed, risking surprise. This is 
another reason why manoeuvre may emphasise numbers less than attrition does. In 
attrition time for logistic preparations allow communications to be established, plans 
rehearsed and control imposed.so Here the Somme's rigid barrage programmes and 
setpiece attacks are suggestive. Of these General Farndale commented mordantly: 'time-
46 A Home The Price of Glory (1962), P 137. 
47 A Home To Lose a Battle (1969), pp 323,328-330. There is of course combat in manoeuvre, but the 
fighting and casualties in SICHELSCHNITI relative to GERICHT are suggestive. For the importance of 
the commander's aim in manoeuvre, see Capt Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestine II (1930), 
Chapter 21 or Manstein's effect on SICHELSCHNITT. Maj Ellis The War in France and Flanders 
(1953), pp 339-41. 4. A Green Writing the Great War (2003). p 70 for 76 pages and 365 instructions that took 3 days to 
condense into a brigade operation order in 1916. 
49 It Col Maude Cavalry: its past and future (1903). pp x-xi. 
50 Eg the spectrum of control lines; MOFB 1917 I Maps (1940), Map 5. 
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tables kill initiative.' Generally less initiative is needed in attritional, positional warfare 
than in manoeuvre;51 in attrition material superiority aims to compensate for inferior 
skills and initiative. But firepower does enforce low-level initiative through dispersion 
and cut communications. The explanation is that in manoeuvre initiative is inherent; in 
attrition it is a consequence of firepower. 52 
The attritional battles of 1916-17 contrast with the confused mobile actions 
around Tobruk in 1941-2. There command was hard for both sides, imposed control 
from the rear nearly impossible. 53 In 1916-18 numbers proved decisive, but at Gazala, 
despite superior numbers, the British lost. German training, tempo, all-arms 
cooperation, and, by extension, doctrine proved decisive. Contrastingly attrition in 
1916-7 eroded superior German training and c2. 54 Suggestively the Germans, obligated 
by geography and likely numerical inferiority to emphasise manoeuvre, developed 
modem doctrine. 55 In manoeuvre combat the relationship between success and 
numerical superiority is more subtle than attrition's mathematics. Smaller forces move 
faster, command is simpler and logistics are less complex.56 Superior mobility 
transformed into manoeuvre may enable smaller forces to defeat larger ones. But there 
are many risks and a point at which numbers ultimately prevail. 
The relationships suggested above are broad, there are elements of attrition in 
manoeuvre and the reverse. Firepower is often needed to kickstart manoeuvre, while 
SI Edmonds MOFB 1916 I p 296; History of the {RAJ Western Front (Woolwich 1986), pp 142-3 details 
the 7000 miles of buried and 43,000 surface-laid cable. 
S2 Brig Gen Edmonds & Lt Col Maxwell-Hyslop MOFB 1918 V (1947), P 577. 
S3 Green Great p 70; Bidwell Gunners p 163. 
54 FM Carver Tobrok (1972), pp 267-8,273; M van Creveld Fighting Power (Pennsylvania 1983), pp 30-1 
citing Truppenfuhrong 1936. These emphasise doctrine as well as initiative; Capt Miles MOFB 1916 II 
~ 1938), pp 555-6. 
S Cdt Colin The Transfomrations of War (1912), pp 109-10; Gen Clausewitz On War (1993), p 792. 
56 Crude speeds are not faster but smaller traffic volumes, orders that have to percolate less far increase 
tempo. eg Jackson's Valley Campaign. Carver contrasts Gennan with more sluggish British C3 at Gazala. 
Tohruk. pp 262,263-4. Smaller forces are easier to provide with advanced equipments, eg British 
motorization pre-1914. 
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manoeuvre makes fire more effective. 57 
The next section outlines the chapters and their contents. South Afric~ a seminal 
experience for the Anny, has been given 4 chapters; one examines general issues, the 
other chapters analyse firepower, mobility and protection. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2. The 1897-8 Frontier Campaigns 
This chapter assesses British tactics in 1897. They were dominated by control, 
much low-level training was monotonous drill and the implications of growing 
firepower were largely ignored. IDB 1896, the only all-arms tactical manual, 
overemphasised control, ignored fieldcraft and downplayed initiative. 
In Tirah the British discovered that their tactics were inadequate against rifle-
armed foes. Consequently they introduced looser formations and greater low-level 
initiative. Artillery organisations and shooting improved to counter enhanced enemy 
firepower and fieldcraft. The reaction to increased enemy firepower blended firepower, 
mobility and protection. Tirah was a precursor to South Africa. 
Chapter 3 South Africa 
The chapter sets the scene for later ones analysing the war. It looks at the pattern 
of operations in South Africa. The exhaustive examination of the war for lessons has 
been under-researched. This investigation was substantial, probing, but in the spirit of 
the time was partly left to individuals and semi-official bodies. South African operations 
were more complex than many have realised. Too many mistakes have been ascribed to 
stupidity or conservatism, while conditions there have not been fully appreciated. The 
Boers, using magazine rifles, technically superior artillery, high mobility and careful 
attention to protection, were formidable foes. They combined these 3 fundamental 
57 WS Lind Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder 1985).p 21. 
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tactical elements effectively. Part of the British tactical problem stemmed from 
insufficient artillery, a longstanding defect, cavalry weaknesses exacerbated by the open 
terrain, part from the circumstances of mobilization and the sea-movement of animals to 
South Africa which impaired mobility. 
Buller's troops, obliged by insufficient mobility to attack frontally, learnt lessons, 
especially on howitzers, machine guns and integrating fire to cover attacks that Roberts' 
forces were less exposed to. But Roberts' organisational changes maximised mobility, 
while he ensured that it was fully exploited. During the guerrilla phase extra emphasis 
was given to mobility. The war taught that, to counter enhanced enemy firepower, the 
British needed more firepower, principally additional artillery, extra mobility to 
outmanoeuvre the enemy, better protection to defeat hostile fire and initiative to oil the 
tactical mechanism. 
Chapter 4 Firepower 
The chapter analyses South Africa's firepower lessons. Boer fire and the resulting 
casualties shocked the British. Broadly the Army concluded that more firepower was 
needed to counter greater enemy fire. Consequently British artillery was significantly 
enhanced both quantitatively and qualitatively. South African experience influenced the 
weapons used between 1914-18, the SMLE, the Vickers machine gun, the 13, 18 and 60 
Pounders, and the 4.5" Howitzer. QF artillery rearmament was one of the Army's largest 
peacetime programmes before 1914. Practical marksmanship was emphasised, 
independent fire replaced volleys, and artillery used more Indirect Fire. 
Chapter 5 Mobility and Manoeuvre 
The chapter analyses South Africa's mobility lessons. Exceptionally nearly all 
Boers were mounted. To counter high Boer mobility, Roberts reorganised his mounted 
troops and transport. After the war the Army substantially improved its mobility. This 
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was not caused by a reactionary cavalry clique but was a reasoned response to overcome 
entrenched firepower. The Cavalry retrained after the war while animal management 
and transport improved. 
Essentially the Army aimed to use superior mobility to remedy numerical 
inferiority. In some respects the Army was applying a manoeuverist approach; 
unsurprisingly the most influential contemporary book, Stonewall Jackson, examined 
the defeat of large, less mobile forces by a smaller, speedier one exploiting surprise to 
achieve operational-level results.58 That Henderson, its author, was intimately involved 
with drafting CTrg 1902, reinforces the book's importance. It is argued that the 
Cavalry's roles were shifting from tactical shock towards operational level manoeuvre 
and reconnaissance in the period. 
Chapter 6 Protection 
Increased firepower made protection more essential. Consequently fieldcraft, 
entrenchment, extension and general protection were much improved between 1899-
1902. Protection involves a variety of elements including entrenchment, extension and 
fieldcraft. The Chapter also briefly examines the REs and technology due to the links 
between the two. 
Chapter 7 Initiative 
The Chapter continues Chapter 2's analysis of low-level initiative. Smokeless 
ammunition and greater firepower demanded that initiative was delegated. 59 This change 
was incomplete in 1914; it involved altering regimental cultures, many were resistant to 
change; others, often LI, influenced by their own culture of delegation, adapted more 
swiftly. There was much interest in the LI; this began before 1899 and South Africa 
sa Lt Col Henderson Stonewall Jackson ( 1898). 
'9 RCWSA Evidence I p 45. 
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strengthened it.60 The many works written on scouting after 1902 suggest how initiative 
was being developed in the junior ranks.61 Many argued for higher-calibre recruits to 
meet modern war's demands and recommended increasing pay to obtain them.62 But 
improved soldiers' conditions were instituted for other reasons than just the tactical; 
recruiting and rising civil expectations also featured. Initiative was encouraged and 
education became mandatory for receiving Service Pay. The Anny was moving from 
imposed towards internal discipline fostered by patriotism and education, partly to 
enhance initiative.63 
Chapter 8 The Russo-Japanese War 
The chapter looks at the British analysis of Manchuria's lessons. Broadly the 
British felt that Manchuria's lessons were similar to South Africa's; this is sharply at 
variance with current scholarship. The British criticised both sides' immobility, though 
they partly blamed Manchuria's rough terrain and defects in the Russian cavalry. 64 
Many diagnosed that the Russians had suffered from inertia and poor education, while 
the Japanese victory seemed to be founded largely on morale and initiative. The British 
had suffered from defective human factors between 1899-1902 and had altered their 
own system, thus the Japanese example proved interesting. The British made further 
changes, based on Manchuria, in their treatment of human factors. British reports 
criticised both sides' infantry tactics as primitive. Manchuria encouraged the adoption of 
Indirect Fire, arguably the most significant single tactical development between 1900-
14. But Manchuria was not the only cause; South African experience was significant. 
Manchuria renewed British interest in night operations, siege-warfare and spurred 
development of siege weapons. 
60 FM Roberts 'The Anny-As It Was ... ' 19C LVII( 1905), P 3. 
61Lt Col Baden-Powell Aids 10 Scouring/or NeOs ami Men (Aldershot 1899); Col Furse Scouring (1902). 
61 Eg A Lee 'The Recruiting Question '19C XLIX (190 I). pp 1058-60. 
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The chapter argues that the results of attrition in Manchuria appeared to confinn 
the British emphasis on manoeuvre. There is clearly, however, tension between the 
detailed reports on grenades, entrenchment, artillery's enhanced effects and British 
conclusions on manoeuvre and cavalry. It argues that the Russo-Japanese War was more 
influential tactically than Dr Towle states. 
Chapter 9 Doctrine 
The chapter argues that the Anny started to switch from drill to doctrine, thus 
relying more on principles, judgement and initiative. It scrutinises the relationship 
between doctrine, initiative, manoeuvre and the operational level of war. The chapter 
examines the contents and themes of CTrg 1902, CTrg 1905 and FSRs 1909 to show 
how tactics developed. It looks at the GS' s creation and importance for training and 
doctrine. It argues that a system of training, doctrine and manoeuvre was developed. 
This demanded a significant alteration to the Anny's mental attitudes. 
Chapter 10 Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the thesis' arguments outlined above. It explains why 
British tactics put a premium on manoeuvre and mobility rather than on firepower or 
protection. But it argues that neither of these factors was neglected even though they did 
not receive as much attention as 1915-17 was to demand. It illuminates the relationships 
between attrition and manoeuvre and between doctrine, manoeuvre and initiative. It 
argues that the British stress on cavalry represented a shift towards the operational level 
of war. Current military science suggests that this was not inappropriate. To view the 
British emphasis on cavalry in 1914 as just the product of reactionary internal forces is 
wrong. But that is not to say that such forces did not exist in the Anny. 
bJ Brig Gen Haking Company Training (1913). p 1. 
M Capt Nash 'A BriefSununary of the Manchurian Campaign' PM/ XXXII (1905-6), P 324. 
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Inevitably there are gaps in this work. It lacks comparisons with foreign annies 
and the effects of wider social trends have been under-examined. Some areas where 
further research is needed are outlined in an annexe. 
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Chapter 2 Tactics, Tirah and LI 
For the tale is on the Frontier and from Michni to Mooltan, 
They know that worthy general as that most immoral man. 
Introduction 
As Kipling points out, reputations were lost on the Frontier and if military 
change is measured by generals dismissed, then the 1897-8 Frontier Campaigns were 
influential. Defeat, by general agreement, is more productive of military innovation 
than victory, and though these campaigns in which Imperial forces fought hard, 
sometimes unsuccessfully, were not a rout, yet they gave valuable lessons. They and 
renewed interest in LI culminated in Henderson's lecture 'The Technical Training of 
Infantry.' Henderson and his collaborator, Verner, synthesising the two, proposed 
new Infantry tactics based on initiative, independent fire and fieldcraft. Contrastingly 
IDB 1896 emphasised control, close-order and volleys. 
This chapter briefly examines Infantry tactics in 1897, the LI revival, the 
Campaigns' lessons, their application and finally the links which contemporaries 
made between Tirah, the most tactically-advanced of the 1897-8 Campaigns, and 
South Africa. 
The Campaigns 
The 1897-8 Campaigns were the largest Indian operation between 1881-1914. 
Some saw them as the: 
most arduous contest ... since the great mutiny ... For the first time in our Indian 
history we have ... found ourselves confronted by modem weapons, combined 
with full ability to use them, tactics exactly suited ... to our disadvantage, and a 
knowledge of the art of modem war.· 
Their scale required units, untrained for hill-warfare, to deploy.2 These units, 
unaware of its specialised tactics, tended to follow IDB 1896 and suffered in 
consequence. 
The history of the Campaigns is unimportant for this thesis and is merely 
• USG (29/1198), P 92. 
1 TR Moreman The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Waifarc (1998), P 55. 
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summarised here. Operations began on 10 July 1897 when a column was ambushed 
in the Tochi. Though this rising was quickly quelled, other revolts soon erupted. 
These were generally less demanding than Tirah as the tribes had fewer fireanns and 
the terrain was easier, but there were still some hard-fought actions.3 Later the 
Afridis rebelled, expelling the Khyber garrison. This humiliation triggered the 
invasion ofTirah, the Afridi heartland, but logistic constraints and other continuing 
operations delayed this until mid-October 1897. At 2nd Dargai hard fighting and 
heavy shelling from two divisions' guns were needed to storm the pass, conquered 
with many casualties.4 Thereafter combat degenerated into skirmishes in which 
several British battalions suffered severely. Withdrawal in December resembled a 
defeat, casualties were heavy and operations continued into 1898.5 
Tactical Performance in 1897 
To see why Tirah was significant, it is necessary though hard to establish the 
Army's existing tactical standards. Professors Beckett and Gooch argue that they had 
advanced considerably before 1897.6 There had undoubtedly been change. Wood 
had improved training at Aldershot, some decentralisation had occurred, artillery 
training had been overhauled and major manoeuvres reintroduced. 7 But these 
measures were inadequate judging by performance in 1897 and 1899. A low threat of 
major war, financial stringency and the need to provide colonial drafts damaged 
training in Britain. Military, particularly overseas service was unpopular so recruit-
3 Maj Kemball Operations o/the Tochi Field Force in 1897-98 (Simla 1900); Capt Walters 
Operations o/the Malakand Field Force and the Buner Field Force (Simla 1900); Maj Hoghton 
Operations o/the Mohmand Field Force in 1897 (Simla 1899), Capt Walters Operations o/the Tirah 
Expeditionary Force 1897-8 (Simla 1900). 
4 Capt Edwards 'Recent Frontier Warfare' JUSII XXVII (1898), pp 357-8. Col Hutchinson 'The Story 
ofTirah and the Lessons of the Campaign' JUSII XXVIII (1898), p 249. 
5 RCTTEF Appendix CC; UMlIn/15867 No 890; Capt Shadwell Lockhart's Advance Through Tirah 
(1902), pp 200-4. Later another British unit was mauled, Col Callwell Tirah 1897 (1911), p 95; WPs 
38/11/40; UMIU3/1082 GO 620 Simla 3/6/98 lists 287 killed, 853 wounded, 10 missing. plus sick. 
6 J Gooch 'Britain and the Boer War' p 51 in GJ Andrepoulos and HE Selesky The Aftermath 0/ 
De/eat (New Haven 1994), IFW Beckett The Victorians at War (2003), pp 234-5. 
7 C Williams The Life o/Lieutenant General Sir HE Wood (1892), pp 227-233; WO 279.'4 pp vii-ix. 
LS Amery THWSA VI (1909), p 477; Table 35. 
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calibre was often poor, especially for Infantry. This further encouraged over-control 
by superiors. 
The British emphasis on control, dense fonnations and fire-tactics centred on 
volleys, weakened initiative and were unsuited to the dispersed warfare which 
modem weapons now demanded.8 On manoeuvres a brigade deployed with 10 paces 
between units, the commander controlling: 'up to a late point in the ... attack.' 
Close-order prevented individuals from using cover effectively, while fieldcraft 
training was either poor or non-existent. 'In peace training the idea has prevailed that 
it is not desirable to impress the soldier too much with the care of his own skin.,9 A 
senior officer commented that the 1898 Manoeuvres had: 
constantly afforded examples which proved that there was no adequate 
conception of the power of the modem magazine rifle. 10 
Most colonial particularly many African campaigns were against primitive 
foes, thus reinforcing control-based tactics. This damaged perfonnance against more 
tactically-advanced enemies. The Akers-Douglas Committee assessed that colonial 
warfare had weakened professionalism; careers were generally founded on 
campaigning rather than study. I I General Maurice blamed the Sudan's close-order 
fonnations and volleys for South Africa's initial failures, while Ellison reflected in 
1900: 
the small campaigns of the past [25] years ... had an adverse influence on our 
military system, not only as regards the tactical ideas ... f:revalent prior to 
(1899], but also [on] the actual conduct of ... operations. 2 
Though the Army's tactics were based on the Gennan Army's reassessment of 1870 
and were designed for conventional combat, close-order and volleys suited most 
colonial wars. l3 
ILt Col Barrow Infantry Fire Tactics (Hong Kong 1895), pp 4-5; 'StafTOfficer' 'The War and the 
Drill Book' CR LXXVIII (1900). P 208; Col Mackinnon The Volley and The Instruction of Recruits 
and Trained Soldiers (1897), p 7. 
9 HuPs 50102; 'Curragh Drill Season 1897 ... 9111 July;' Ibid' 8/6197~' 'StatTOfficer' 'War,' p 211. 
10 PRO 30/40/16 'untitled memorandum on weapons .. 
II Col Clarke 'Lessons of the War-VI Training' The! Times 28/2.01 p 8; WO 27919 P 133. 
IJeol Maurice Sir Fredericlc Maurice (1913). p 96: EPs 8704-35-30 'CISOCS' p 6. 
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COs, adjutants and RSMs dominated Infantry training, much was drill, 
appropriate for close-order combat but impairing initiative in dispersed fighting. 14 
That company commanders tended to be relatively junior and that there was little 
effective organisation below company-level further reinforced battalion control. As a 
result many British battalions were over-centralised and thus unready for open-order 
combat. Infantry basic training was governed by: 'regulations which lacked 
commonsense and promoted the machine mentality.' 15 A contemporary summarised 
prewar conditions: 
training was dull, uninteresting, and unpractical; money was ... not 
unfrequently (sic) absolutely withheld for manoeuvres ... while military virtue 
. d d 16 came ... no rewar . 
India had many advantages over Britain: there was more land for exercises, 
more frequent manoeuvres, more chances of action and for juniors to use initiative. 17 
Units were stronger, making training more realistic. The best Indian infantry and 
cavalry, unlike most British units, were trained in skirmishing or in combined fire 
and mounted tactics. That the Army in India was better trained and more tactically 
advanced than that in Britain, yet it suffered in Tirah. This made the lessons of 1897-
8 more salient. IS 
Formations were usually established on mobilization. A Tirah veteran 
commented that a brigade might consist of units: 'from Bangalore, Mhow and 
Peshawar ... the General from Belgaum, with ... staff from anywhere (except ... 
Simla).' There were insufficient pscs and staffwork was unsystematic, exacerbating 
13 Initial German lessons on dispersal were countered by works such as Meckel's A Summer Night's 
Dream; Col Maude analysed this reaction, Notes on the Evolution of Infantry Tactics (1905). 
Similarly RA tactics were based on 1870 but fitted many colonial wars, see Chapter 4. 
14 Omdurman was the last battle in which foot-drill played a significant part, Col Call well Small Wars 
(1906), pp 387-8; Maj Pollock 'The Battle-Drill of Infantry' JRUSI XLII (1898), pp 540-1. 
15 Maude Infantry Tactics. p 88, he excepted LI; BA LIX (1897). pp 575-6; MMPs 212 'Infantry 
Attachment' p 3; Lt Col Pollock 'The Training of the Army' JRUSI XLVII (1903), p 177. 
16 Col Verner 'A French View of Our Army in South Africa.' MM 86(1902), p 387: Maj Gen Russell 
'Our Uneducated Officers' J9C LII (1902), P 91. 
17 BA 88 (l912),p369; Akers-Douglas Report (1902), p 50. Long officer leave and high sickness rates 
allowed subordinates scope. Maj Yate The Life of Lierll. Col John Haughton (1900), P 74; Maj Gen 
Collen RCWSA Evidence II (1903),Qs 21061-7. 
II Maj Yate 'North-West Frontier Warfare' JRUSJ XlI (1898). p 1191. 
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the problem of incoherent organisations. Both were more acute in India, both 
impaired tactical performance, while staff weaknesses prevented thorough 
analysis of tactics. 19 
The Army's only all-arms tactical manual, Part V of IDB 1896, forbade 
'normal' formations, but often generals devised their own, discouraging initiative 
and impairing tactical coordination.20 Henderson commented tellingly: 'in a nonna} 
formation the importance of ground is apt to receive less consideration than the 
maintenance of order, regularity and fire-discipline. ,21 IDB 1896 had no detailed 
instructions on fieldcraft or skirmishing. Battalions which practiced skirmishing, 
principally LI, were censured, despite IDB 1896's advice: 'conditions of modem 
warfare render it imperative that all ranks ... act for themselves. ,22 Many criticised 
the omission of skirmishing from IDB. Col Meysey-Thompson commented: 
after nine year's experience skinnishing as adjutant and five year's experience 
of the "attack" as [CO], that for [LI] work the present system cannot compare 
with the 01d.23 
That the Army's only all-arms tactical manual was an Infantry work probably 
damaged inter-arm cooperation, while its title 'Drill Book' suggests rigidity; it 
contains much drill, relatively little tactics and even less all-arms tactics.24 It implied 
that drill remained useful in combat as Omdurman had demonstrated. Its fire-tactics 
stressed: 'volley firing is the description of collective fire generally employed, while 
independent is the exception.' It defined fire-discipline as the: 'unhesitating 
obedience to ... orders of the fire unit commander [by] the men who deliver the fire.' 
19 Hutchinson 'Tirah' JUSIl, p 254. Geographers will appreciate his irony! 'An Eyewitness' 'The 
Tirah Campaign' FR LXIII (1898),pp 392-4; usa (11/9/97),p 723; CAB 14/17 ClarkelKitchener 
20/9105 p 2. In Britain in 1904-563.45% ofpscs were in staff posts, in India 23.3%. There were 
e,robably fewer pscs serving on the Indian staff in 1897. 
IDB P 129; Glossary. Only IDB 's Part V covered all-arms tactics. Formations with unique tactics 
find cooperation with others hard. 
21 Lt Col Henderson 'The Training of Infantry for Attack' USM XIX (1899),p 504. 
12IDB 1896's 'Drill ofa Section in Extended Order' was mechanical compared to the definition of 
skirmishing see fn 27 below; 'Staff Officer' 'War' p 209 felt that provisos weakened IDB's advice on 
initiative; IDB p 130; Lt Col Verner 'A Red Light Bob on Riflemen' RBC(1899), pp 107-8. 
lJ Reminiscences of the Course. the Camp and the Chase (1898), P 153. 
241DB's Part V 'Combined Tactics' extends between pp107-132; low-level drill pp 1-75. 
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A contemporary castigated the results: 
A fruitful cause of insufficient extension and taking cover is the fetish of volley 
firing. Volleys require control: control means men kept together. 2S 
This damaged initiative, impaired individual fieldcraft and caused unnecessary 
casualties. Veterans later felt that 'Aldershot tactics,' based on control and close-
order, had ill results in South Africa. Against tactically primitive or poorly-armed 
foes, modem weapons, close-order tactics, imposed discipline and logistics prevailed 
as Omdurman had demonstrated. But they failed against small-bore, flat-trajectory 
rifles and the dispersed tactics used by Afridis and Boers. 
The LI Revival 
In contrast to the close-order tactics outlined above, there was a renewal of 
interest in LI in the 1890s. To understand this process, it is necessary to look at LI's 
culture, developed for extended-order combat. This is commonly ascribed to Moore 
and Shorncliffe, though recent scholarship suggests that its origins are more 
complex?6 Whatever the causes, LI, especially those units which had fought in the 
Peninsular Light Division, continued to emphasise the tactical importance of 
companies, initiative, individual marksmanship, 'internal' discipline, education, 
fieldcraft and skirmishing, which an LI officer defined: 
The men follow the lead of their officers, thinking and acting/or themselves 
(sic). By this is meant that they judge where to find cover, how to make the 
best use of it, when to leave their cover, when to fire ... [and] what to fire at.27 
Here the link between fieldcraft, initiative and fire-tactics is made explicit. 
Contemporaries saw skirmishing, inserted in [DB 1889 by a rifleman but later 
deleted, as a specialist LI skill. Skirmishing was becoming essential for all Infantry 
as commanders could no longer control or soldiers survive in the teeth of enemy 
15 MRs 1898 pp 82.79; • Staff Officer' 'War' p 208. 
16 D Gates The British Light Infantry Arm (1987), Chapter 4. 
27 'Col Manningham's Regulations for Rifle Corps' reprinted RBe (1897); Col Plowden '~otes on 
Skimlishing' OXLI (l900).p 286, this used much Tirah material; [SOs] JSI Battalion Oxfordsh,rc Light 
Infantry (Portsmouth 1890), p 37 ordered officers to own a unit work on skirmishing; Glossary. 
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fire. 28 The LI system's qualities of initiative, intelligence and leadership were 
becoming necessary for all infantrymen in dispersed fighting. Consequently LI skills 
indicate tactical change and contemporaries cited them when advocating reform. ~9 
Interest in LI and their tactics increased in the 1890s. It is impossible to prove 
why this occurred but it was possibly a reaction to the reassessment of the tactical 
lessons of 1870-1, which had reimposed close-order and control. But even some LI 
units were poor at fieldcraft, suggesting that the long Victorian peace had weakened 
their tactical heritage. 
The first visible sign of the LI revival was the founding of two regimental 
annuals in the early 1890s, The RBC and The OXLIC. The former inspired the latter. 
Both were more professionally-orientated than most regimental productions; both 
reprinted historically significant works. The OXLIC J 897 republished Gawler's The 
Essentials of Good Skirmishing, possibly because ofTirah. The edition had much 
Frontier material, Tirah had shown that skirmishing was essential, yet IDB J 896 did 
not cover it. Later the editor, Mockler-Ferryman, remarked: 
the principles laid down in [Gawler] are as sound ... as they were when 
written ... forming the foundation of the resuscitated skirmishing in the new 
Infantry Drill (sic). 
This referred to Lt Col Verner who had passed a copy of Gawler's book and other LI 
works to Henderson to aid him in drafting IT J 902.30 
From 1899 non-LI officers, including Henderson and later Roberts, became 
interested in LI methods and there were several books on the LI pioneers. A 
magazine urged: 'it is to this old system of [LI] training that we must look for the 
effectiveness of our military training in the future.' Maude, an ex-sapper, praised the 
28 'Review Infantry Training (Provisional) 1902' RBC (1902), P 159; Lt Col Martin Mountain and 
Savagt' Warfare (Allahabad 1899),p 3. See the comment on IDB 1896's S 47 'Drill ofa Section in 
Extended Order,' fn above. 
~ HuPs 50112 pp 13-15. Hutton served under Hawley who. possibly unconsciously, followed 
Moore's methods. Hutton as Adjutant fell out with an authoritarian CO who rejected his unit's ethos. 
)0 OXLI X(1901),pp 161-2; tne RBCbegan in 1890. The OXLIC in 1893. Verner and Mockler-
Ferryman. the respective editors, toured the Peninsular battlefields together. The laner wrote on 
shooting. see Chapter 4. 
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Peninsular LI and a widely-circulated article stressed the LI system as an example of 
how the Anny could improve its tactical perfonnance.31 This system combined 
training, leadership, education, delegation and 'internal' discipline to develop 
judgement so that initiative was used correctly.32 Later Col Maurice, a non-LI 
officer, stressed the value of Moore's system in training subordinates to use 
initiative. 
The Frontier's Terrain, Enemy and Tactics 
This section examines what was significant tactically in 1897-8 and outlines 
the complex interrelationship between terrain, threat and tactical factors. It provides 
context for later analysis, supporting the argument that Tirah particularly saw 
modem tactical features. 
The first factor was the Frontier's very broken terrain. On Tirah's Marches: 
'higher and steeper' mountains, valleys: 'V -shaped instead of flat-bottomed ... added 
to the difficulties of regular troops. ,33 These features limited movement to frontages 
sometimes only yards wide. Transport, itself pack, usually had to move in single file 
extending column-lengths inordinately.34 Broken terrain and long-range fire had the 
effect of: 'breaking [troops] up into small parties.' This demanded low-level 
initiative, but many juniors were untrained to display it. Terrain militated against 
close-order tactics, replicating firepower's effects in more intense combat. Not that 
tribal firepower was puny. India had not appreciated that 50% of the 30,000 Afridis 
had breech-loading, long-range rifles.35 Greater tribal firepower forced the use of 
cover, ground and covering fire, for, when caught unextended, Imperial casualties 
) I BA LXVIII (1902),p 622; eg ed Maj Gen Maurice Moore 's Diary ( 1904), ed CG Moore-Smith 
Autobiography olLt Gen Sir Harry Smith (1902); Lt Col Maude 'Evolution ofInfantry Tactics' USM 
XXIV (1902),p 18; Col Verner 'A Century of Fighting' MM 82 (1900). Verner was a Rifleman, 
however, and not unbiased. 
12'The Use and Abuse of the Initiative' AR I (1914), pp 5-7. His father had edited Moore's Diary. 
))Tlrc Campaign in Tirah /897-/898 (1898), P 24. 
) .. Brig Gen Egerton Hill Warfare (Allahabad 1899), pp 1-2. In relatively benign terrain a brigade and 
supplies might extend over 5-6 miles; Table 16 shows pack transport's inefficiency. 
lS Maj Call well Small Wars ( 1899), P 254. 
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were often heavy.36 Advances slowed as pickets had to move further out to counter 
long-range fIre. This increased dispersal and made giving covering small arms fire 
harder. This in tum strengthened the tactical importance of artillery, a long-range 
weapon. Dispersal also required more subordinate initiative. Slower picketing 
delayed columns' progress, in turn demanding more food and longer transport-trains, 
themselves more vulnerable to modern rifles. Movement was slowed still further. 
Signalling was more necessary in view of the greater dispersion and broken terrain. 
These factors, which complicated tactics, when combined with the Campaigns' 
greater scale made staffwork more important. However, few pscs served on the staff 
in India and staff arrangements in Tirah were often chaotic.37 
The Campaigns Analysed 
Several generals failed, the Khyber was abandoned temporarily, there were 
grave reservations about the performance of British relative to Indian units, despite 
the formers' magazine rifles, and, by Frontier standards, heavy casualties. The Army 
in India consequently suffered a shock. Henderson reported criticisms of COs' and 
company officers' 'leading,' implying defective initiative.38 Critics denounced bad 
staffwork, poor staff selection, improvised formations and the use of over-large, 
clumsy divisions. They recommended standardising staffwork and formations and 
establishing an Indian staff college. 39 One Tirah brigadier, Kempster, was 
effectively dismissed and a divisional commander probably would have been, but he 
died first. Compared to the many stellenbosched from 1899, these numbers were 
36Capt Siessor The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in Tirah (1900), P 93. 
37 The Matabele used some in 1896, a few were used in the other 1897 campaigns, but their fIre was 
tactically insignifIcant; Hutchinson Tirah pp 227-8 for the problems of attacking uphill against 
sangars containing riflemen; Ca1lwell Tirah p 37. 
31 Col Henderson The Science of War (1905), pp 348-9. He cited IDB /896's qualifIed injunctions on 
initiative immediately beforehand. 
)9 BePs 830/12, p 31; BA XL (1898),pp 258-9; 'Eyewitness' 'Tirah' pp 393-4. In South Africa similar 
criticisms were made of the corps-based organisation; ANG XL (1899), P 100. Siessor Derbyshire.," pp 
62,66 suggests problems at 2ad Dargai. Maj Rodwell Four Banga/ore Lectures (Lahore 1899), p 66 
poor transmission of orders caused Haughton's death. 
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insignificant, but inferior British performance relative to Indian was not, as Col 
Holdich, a Tirah veteran, recounted: 
Time after time has [the jawan] assisted to cover a badly conducted retirement, 
and to help British regiments out of serious difficulties; nor is it ... beyond his 
ken that British regiments have been most severely shaken ... under ... fire.4o 
Churchill warned on the Imperial implications, while articles are peppered with 
criticisms of poor performance during Tirah, though, by modern standards, they were 
veiled.41 Also, as Henderson warned: 
there [on the Frontier] we may have to fight for our very existence ... [I]n 
practicing hill tactics, we shall be preparing for campaigns which may decide 
the fate of England.42 
Many saw war with Russia on the Frontier as the most likely major threat that Britain 
faced. These pressures forced a searching re-evaluation of hill-warfare tactics and 
training. This was not just limited to tribal enemies. 
The number of works on the Campaigns was unprecedented; four official 
histories, many specialist reports and private works resulted.43 There was substantial 
newspaper coverage. Several correspondents later wrote books. Veterans, including 2 
brigadiers, produced explicitly didactic works. Of the more junior commentators, 
Plowden later wrote on skirmishing, stimulated by Tirah, and Rodwell on scouts. 
Lectures, professional articles and changes to the Indian military education system 
supplemented the books. The whole represents the most substantial analysis after any 
19th Century Frontier campaign, suggesting the anxiety aroused. This scale of 
analysis increased the probability that significant tactical change would ensue.44 
40 RPs 7101-23-105 of 12/2/98,7101-23-46; WO 279/9 P 83; UMIL 311083 'Letter 45' for a CO's 
dismissal following misbehaviour during Tirah. 
41UMIL 3/1079 Letter 30 of 24/2/98; Lt Churchill The Story of the Malalcand Field Force (1899), p 
298; ANG XXXVIII(1897), ppl012-3; BA XL(1898), P 125, Slessor Derbyshires pp vi-vii. 
42 RPs 7101-23-105 25/11/97; Henderson Science p 352. 
43Eg the histories, reports such as the artillery reports precised on UMIU71 1 0837 pp 6-1 1, 
UMILn/15896 'M 3820' examining British health and discipline. Most columns prepared logistic 
reports eg UMIUI7/5/18S0-4; Abstract of reports on magazine rifles used in operations in India and 
Egypt 1897-98 (1899). 
44 UMIU171S1371 of26/3/01 for Plowden's Notes on Skirmishing translated into Urdu; Training/or 
Native Infantry Scouts (Lahore 1903). 
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Later hill-warfare manoeuvres held all over India complemented the analysis, with 
the best reported at Attock.45 Most change occurred in India but Tirah affected 
training in Britain. Though commentators were mainly concerned with hill-warfare 
many of their recommendations also applied to conventional combat. 
The Immediate Analysis 
Analysis began during operations and reached the highest level. A formal 
enquiry followed the ambush of a retiring detachment. White, the CinC India, 
criticised the detachment's slow movement, its failure to withdraw by alternate 
companies and that there had been no covering fire. It: 'had straggled off anyhow, , 
thus suffering: 'serious loss ... by a ridiculously small number of Afridis. ,46 Officers 
from brigadiers to half-company commanders had failed to command. This and a 
similar incident caused General Lockhart, CinC TEF, to issue a memorandum 
stressing covering fire, mutual support, both recognising greater tribal firepower, 
controlled withdrawals, fieldcraft, use of ground and faster movement. 47 It also 
recommended extension to save casualties and artillery covering retirements. Despite 
its publication and retraining during operations, weaknesses recurred and special 
orders on protective tactics were issued on 11 December 1897.48 
Veterans assessed the tribesmen as formidable: '[o]ur foe was not a badly 
armed horde but a trained force of skilled fighting men, armed with Lee-Metford 
rifles. ,49 Lockhart remarked: 'we are opposed to perhaps the best skirmishers and 
the best natural shots in the world.' They: 
appear to be as well armed as our own native troops, ... they shoot with 
remarkable accuracy and they are adepts at skirmishing ... There are many ... 
discharged officers and soldiers ... who doubtless impart military training. 
Col Hutchinson described the Afridis as: 'first rate shots. Their ... skirmishing is 
4S BA XL (1898).pp 597-8; UMIUI7/5/358 16/8/00 suggests their pan-Indian scope. 
46 UMIU7/15882; WPs 278/1 of22111/97. 
47 WPs 38/11140 'Withdrawal of3rd Brigade 16111/97;' Ibid 11/37 of 18/11/97. 
48 Yate Haughton p 188. 
49The Bugle (KOYLI) XVIII (1/4/01). p 9. 
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quite extraordinary ... their activity marvellous.' Pollock, a Frontier veteran, 
considered them: 
excellent shots and the finest material for [LI] in the world; whose knowledge 
of hill tactics is excellent, who see faults and know how to take advantage of 
them, and from whom we have much to learn. so 
Churchill remarked: '[t]o the ferocity of the Zulu are added the craft of the Redskin 
and the marksmanship of the Boer'S} Hart, an ex-Tirah brigadier, commented that the 
Afridis: 'excel as skirmishers. ,52 Lt Col Haughton attributed disproportionate 
Imperial casualties to: 'guerrilla tactics ... and their being so well armed (especially 
with Lee-Metfords).' He noted that smokeless ammunition and long-range rifles had 
complicated tactics. Hamilton also highlighted these two factors. Afridi tactics 
emphasised sniping, skirmishing, covering fire, and fieldcraft, Imperial tactics based 
on volleys and close-order were consequently ineffective. Casualty-rolls show that 
injuries from swords and stones were more common in the Malakand. In Tirah most 
were gunshot-wounds, demonstrating that combat there was more advanced.s3 That 
Imperial combatants stressed that they were fighting well-armed ex-Indian Army 
veterans implied conditions approaching conventional combat. Thus the lessons of 
Tirah potentially applied to modem warfare. Praise for Afridi skirmishing, tactics 
which combined low-level initiative, fieldcraft and independent fire, suggests 
Imperial defects in these skills. 54 
Retraining started during Tirah. The Green Howards were briefed on tactics 
before deploying, later training 60 'climbers.' The Sussex instructed 100 mountain 
so UP&SI7/97 5/11197; Hutchinson 'Tirah' JUSI/, p 242: Lt Col Pollock 'Notes on Hill Warfare' 
JUSI/ XXVIII (1898), P 13 7. 
s'Churchill Malalcand, pp 4-5. 
52 Reflections on the Art of War (1901 ),p 342a; 'The Tactical Principles .... India' JUSI/ XXVIII 
P899),p 193. 
1 UMIL 3/1073 'Malakand Despatches' pp 11-16 analyses Malakand casualties, UMIU3/1082 
Letter 94 lists Tirah casualties. Hutchinson Tirah p 230 notes that Afridi tactics had generally changed 
from rushes of swordsmen to sniping. But, as Meade emphasised, volleys and c lose-order tactics were 
effective against primitive tribal tactics, eg Churchill Malakand pp 228-9. But there are suggestions 
tribal assaults there were due to insufficient rifles, UMIU7/15866 'MFF Diary 20-2119/97.' 
s. Yale Haughton pp 224-5; HamPs 1/2J24 HarniltonWilkinson 20/3198. Chapter 3 analyses 
smokeless ammunition's effects. 
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scouts; most British units followed their example. One can deduce that these groups 
enjoyed greater initiative than the average company. The Ghurkha Scouts and 2 
OXLI trained during operations. 55 This scale of retraining during operations was 
unusual. It does not appear to have occurred in the other 1897 Campaigns, suggesting 
both that Tirah was tactically harder and that Imperial performance there was worse. 
Emphasis on scout-training during Tirah suggests the new importance of open-order 
tactics. ,56 
The Later Analysis 
Introduction 
Analysts examined firepower, manoeuvre, (generally involving tactical 
outflanking), and protection, (highlighting fieldcraft). Some scrutinised initiative, 
while several criticised IDB 1896, thus preparing the way for later changes caused by 
South Africa. 
Firepower 
The first lesson was the increase, both quantitative and qualitative, of tribal 
firepower. Hutchinson remarked: 
In former days ...... we have found them ... armed with ... a few Sniders and 
Enfields. The extreme effective range of the best of these weapons was barely 
1000 yards, so that if the flanks of a marching column were protected by 
detachments pushed out half a mile ... the column was fairly safe. But the 
Martini is effective up to a mile and the Lee-Metford up to two (sic).57 
Many Afridis now were as well-armed as the jawans, while tribesmen carrying Lee-
Metfords were better. These weapons fired smokeless ammunition, thus facilitating 
fieldcraft. IA units, carrying black powder firing Martinis, were at a severe 
disadvantage. The Lee-Metford's higher muzzle velocity meant a flatter trajectory. 
more chance of hitting and a longer range. This was a great advantage in mountains. 
5S It Col Franklyn 'Tirah' GHG VII (Aug I 899).pp 66-9; Ibid (Jun 1900).p 51; BA Xl (1898),p 467~ 
'From Our Own Correspondent' 'The Tirah Expeditionary Force' 95 XIV (Apr I 898).p 54~ BA XL 
~898),p 358; COlPs pp 10,13. 
The Malakand and Tochi were smaller. shorter operations so were not equivalent to Tirah. 
Retraining during the 1895 Chitral Expedition has not been traced, but tribal firepower was less there. 
" Hutchinson Tirah pp 225,227. Long columns of pack animals were large, slow targets. 
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Lt Col Martin deduced that tactics were related to enemy weapons, therefore to 
defeat rifle-armed foes demanded greater extension, fieldcraft, covering fire and 
outflanking. 58 Martin's deductions are explored later, but evidence that 
contemporaries saw that increased firepower caused tactical change is important. 
IDB 1896 did not emphasise the growth of defensive firepower or the resulting 
need for covering fire. 59 A consequence of greater tribal firepower was that most 
commentators stressed fire from successive positions both in attack and withdrawal 
to cover movement: 
Perhaps the most important exercise in our training is the covering by fire of 
the ... assaulting unit, without which diversion the attackers are bound to lose 
heavily. 60 
Rodwell noted flat-trajectory fire made hilltops poor defensive positions for riflemen 
as steep slopes allowed the enemy to approach them in dead ground. Plowden 
recommended that: 'a heavy fire from artillery or ... rifle fire must be kept up ... to the 
last moment' to cover attacks. 61 
Volleys, the basis of fire-tactics and fire-discipline, were, as General Blood, 
Commander MFF, stressed: 'not the thing for this work. ,62 Churchill described how: 
[t]ribesmen ... dart from rock to rock ... [B]efore the attention of a section 
could be directed to them and the rifles aimed, ... the target would have 
vanished ... Better results were obtained by picking out good shots and giving 
them permission to fire. 63 
But independent fire demanded individual initiative, snapshooting and LI-style skills, 
for which British troops were untrained. 
Captain Mead, an IA musketry-instructor, made the most detailed examination 
of Imperial marksmanship on the Frontier. He criticised MRs for being: 
S8 Mountain and Savage Warfare (Allahabad 1899),p 1. Operational analysis from the Radfan 
campaign suggests that the minimum engagement range in mountains is 600 yards. 
S9/ DB 1896 pp 66-7 implies covering fire; it hints at increased defensive firepower p 137. 
60 Pollock 'Notes on Hill Warfare' JUSII XXVII (1898),pp 140-1 MWp 11; Gen Gatacre 'A Few 
Notes on the Characteristics of Hill-Fighting' JRUS/ XLIII (1899). p 1072; Plowden Battalion p 15. 
61 Tactical Lectures (Lahore 1903).pp 42-4, given 1899, possibly officially; Glossary; Chapter 3 
til WPs 38/11/27 BloodIWbite 7/10/97. 
61 Churchill Malakand p 285. 
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based on the results of wars of other countries; whilst our own experiences, 
though surely more valuable as being ... more recent ... have been totally 
neglected. 
This suggests 1870's persisting influence. Mead had studied Frontier operations 
carefully. He remarked: 
Our inferiority ... in skirmishing and firing appears to be generally admitted .. .it 
seems almost as ifit was accepted as natural, and as regards ... shooting, without 
a remedy.64 
Mead disagreed, blaming unsuitable training, citing Swat and Omdurman, where, 
against massed enemies, Imperial shooting was good. His point on skirmishing 
suggests contemporary recognition of its importance. Mead blamed the Figure of 
Merit, ammunition shortages and overregulation for poor marksmanship in Tirah. He 
recommended training: 'in firing at vanishing and moving objects ... at unknown 
distances ... under conditions which require great celerity in taking ... aim.' South 
Africa later emphasised snapshooting, involving similar skills and necessary for the 
reasons that Churchill suggests above.65 Mead saw Frontier and conventional war as 
demanding similar fire-tactics and he emphasised firing while skirmishing. This 
naturally demanded individual initiative. 
Machine guns were effective at the Malakand, though less so in Tirah where 
there were few massed targets. Franklyn disliked his gun; it attracted spectators and 
staff officers, both equally objectionable, though the Derbyshires' was: 'beyond all 
praise.' Several trials occurred during Tirah. The trials officer stressed machine guns' 
ability to cover attacks, while Captain de la Bere emphasised their ability to protect 
withdrawals. Both imply increased tribal firepower, while the fact that two articles 
were written on machine guns' performance on the Frontier suggests considerable 
M 'Notes on Musketry Training of Troops' IRUSI XLIII (1899),pp 234.234-6.237: Mackinnon 
Volle),. p 10. 
65 Glossary; Chapter 4. Table 17. 
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interest in them. 66 
Greater tribal fIrepower combined with longer ranges, characteristic of 
mountain warfare, demanded more artillery. Some 21 batteries saw service in 1897-
8, and, for the fIrst time in recent Frontier fighting, field artillery, more powerful than 
mountain, deployed in mobile Frontier operations. This was partly because there was 
insufficient mountain artillery to support all the 1897 operations, but field artillery's 
greater firepower proved valuable. Artillery tactics altered with batteries: 'employed 
in brigade divisions with greater effect than if they had fought as individual units. ,67 
Concentration was needed to counter increased tribal firepower. Its use suggests 
conditions approaching conventional warfare. In one action the GOC RA had 
controlled 6 batteries whose fire: 'completely drove off the enemy. ,68 Rodwell and 
Hutchinson agreed on the value of concentrated gunfIre, implying that conventional 
tactics could apply on the Frontier. In turn some might appreciate that the reverse 
could apply. Rodwell emphasised that shelling should continue for as long as 
possible to protect attacking infantry from enemy fire. However concentration of fire 
and its synchronisation with other arms demanded better coordination and 
staffwork. 69 The Indian IGRA cited another innovation: 
on many occasions during [1897-8] batteries fired for long periods over the 
heads of infantry. It repeatedly happened during Tirah .... [T]he most 
remarkable instance occurred during the Tangai Pass action ... when the 10th 
Field Battery fired 476 rounds ... over the heads of.. .. advancing troops. 
Fire was sometimes within 100 yards of the assaulting infantry. Overhead fire during 
attacks had been rare hitherto. As with machine guns, artillery was probably more 
effective at causing casualties in the other 1897-8 operations, but in Tirah it 
66 Surgeon Major Beevor 'Episodes of the Scottish Regiments in the Indian Frontier War' SL (1898).p 
406; Churchill Malalcandp 109; 95 XIV (4/98),p 51; Capt Carthew-Youston 'Machine Guns' JUSII 
XXVIII (1898),p 217; UMIU7/4823 Letters 128&135; Capt de la Bere 'With Machine Guns in 
Tirah' USM XX (1899).p 168. Slessor Derbyshires p 159. 
67UMIU7/1013931/5/00. 
68 Capt MacMunn 'Artillery in the Indian Campaigns of 1897-8' PRAI XXVI (1899).p 235. 
69Lt Col Rodwell Tactical Lecnlres ( Lahore 1903). pp 46-7 citing Lt Ballard 'Diary of the 10th Field 
Battery RA with the Malakand Field Force' PRAI XXV(l898); Hutchinson Tirah pp 236-7. 
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neutralised enemy fire, saving friendly lives. 70 
1897 -8 revealed that the current mountain gun's shells were too light to inflict 
serious damage and it was too short-ranged to defeat rifle-armed foes. 71 Some felt 
that howitzers were required; Tirah had shown that guns were unable to search into 
cover. Methuen concurred but emphasised that they had neutralised enemy fire. 72 
For the first time in India the whole RA organisation, CRAs, artillery staffs and 
ammunition columns, deployed on operations, giving valuable lessons.73 Service 
journals criticised British neglect of artillery in training. The Frontier had shown its 
increased power. One noted the: 'astonishing revelation of the value offield artillery' 
in Tirah.74 1897-8 began reawakening the British to the power of artillery, an 
important lesson for conventional war. 
Mobility and Manoeuvre 
Cavalry had little value in Tirah, though influential cavalrymen: Baden-Powell, 
Churchill, Gough and Birdwood served there. But the arm was effective in 
the other 1897 Campaigns.75 The Indian IGC recommended arming cavalry with 
Lee-Metfords to match better tribal rifles, recognition of firepower and dismounted 
tactics' importance. Churchill stressed reconnaissance and blending dismounted fire 
and shock tactics.76 Later this combination was to dominate British cavalry tactics, 
though 1899-1902 was the prime factor in causing the change. All that can be 
70 UMIU 7/10837 pp 13,10; overhead fire was used in 1895, HC Thomson The Chitral Campaign 
(1895),p 164; Churchill Malakandpp 291-2; Maj May 'The Problem of the Attack' (AMSI898), p II 
for overhead fire's previous rareness; Chapter 4. 
71Maj Gen Headlam The History of the [RA] III (Woolwich 1940), pp 115-6. 
72Maj Bryan 'The Organisation of Howitzers with Field and Mountain Artillery' USM XXI (1900),p 
488; MePs 'Dargai' p 6. 
73 Headlam RA III, P 114. 
74 BA L1X (1897),p 482; NAA (21/1/99), P 436. 
"Lt Col Ramsay • ... Warfare on the Frontiers ... ' JUSII XIX (1900),p 94; It Gen Baden-Powell 
Indian Memories (1915),p 208; Gen Farrar-Hockley Goughie (1975).p 32. These two secondary 
sources simply show the subjects' presence in Tirah. The latter cites contemporary material; BPs 
6707-19-124-32 letter 1/11/97. 
76 Capt Nevill Campaigns on the North-West Frontier (1912).p 253: JUSJI XXVII (1898).pp 259-262; 
Malakomf pp 256-7. 
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concluded is that the Frontier's influence may have aided this development. 
Tirah's most substantial mobility lesson was to emphasise tactical outflanking. 
This was a relatively new feature in colonial warfare which previously had stressed 
direct frontal attack. This again suggests that Tirah had lessons for conventional 
combat. 77 Hutchinson remarked: 
I simply refer to [Second Dargai] to accentuate the fact that a direct attack, 
unsupported by any demonstration against a flank, must always be so costly ... 
that it should never be resorted to if there is any way out. 
The Germans later blamed many of 1899-1900' s failed frontal attacks on the baleful 
tactical influence of colonial warfare. Tirah taught differently.78 Plowden deduced 
that extra enemy firepower meant that: '[a] flank must be turned,' continuing: 
In these attacks it has become an axiom on the frontier to adopt the same 
methods of approaching the position as the tribesmen ... This is, for the firing 
line to creep singly or in twos and threes from cover to cover. The British 
soldier is not taught this species of skirmishing, but its importance cannot be 
overrated, and even on level grounds in the plains the principles ... should be 
carefully taught. 
This was very similar to Boer stalking tactics. Plowden saw that training would need 
overhauling ifmore sophisticated tactics were to be adopted. Lt Col Martin 
commented that rifle-armed foes demanded that frontal and outflanking attacks 
should be combined.79 British readiness to learn from the enemy suggests the 
importance of improving tactics. 
Another mobility lesson was the critical importance of transport. Weak 
animals, insufficient vets and poor staffwork had hampered both mobility and the 
TEF's readiness. These faults recurred in South Africa with even worse 
consequences.80 
n Maj Callwell Small Wars (1899), P 69, though colonial warfare demanded mobility this was mainly 
logistic rather than involving speed and tempo. Once troops were committed to action, direct attack 
was stressed; Chapter 5. 
?I'The Story ofTirah' JUSII XXVII (1898),p 241; Trans Lt Col Waters GEOHWSA I (1904).p 28. 
79 Lt Col Plowden 'The Battalion on the Frontier' OXLle /899 p 256; Martin Mountain p I. 
10 RCrrEF (Calcutta 1899),pp 46,50, Report [A J °D] Mohmand. Malakand and Buner Fielcl Forces 
(Calcutta 1899), Report [A VD] Tira}, Expeditionary Force /897-98 (Calcutta 1899). 
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Protection 
Tactical centralisation meant that initially fonnations were tight; soldiers 
deployed 1-2 paces apart while skinnishing and at Yz-l pace in extended-order. 81 
This made it hard to use ground; furthennore many soldiers were untrained in 
fieldcraft so cover was often used poorly. Henderson recorded a veteran's views: 
Attention should be particularly directed to the training of infantry in shooting 
from behind cover accurately and rapidly without exposing themselves ... [T]he 
average British infantryman usually exposes half his body ... and frequently 
puts himself into such a position that he can neither aim accurately nor shoot 
quickly. 82 
Snipers frequently inflicted heavy casualties on bunched troops, suggesting that 
firepower had been underestimated. 83 Lockhart's memorandum therefore stressed 
cunning, or what now would be called fieldcraft, invisibility and dispersion. 
Significantly the post-Tirah manual, MW 1900, emphasised using ground for 
protection far more than IDB 1896 had done.84 
The need to pass long transport trains through defiles and to safeguard camps 
reinforced the importance of protection. Initially commanders had not taken into 
account long-range modem weapons when siting pickets. Consequently during Tirah 
pickets pushed further out to counter their fire. But increased firepower allowed 
picket-strengths to be cut. 85 Thinning-out meant that the remaining troops could use 
cover better and were less vulnerable to enemy fire. 86 Signalling became more 
important over such extended distances, Franklyn remarked: 'I always sent out a 
trained signaller and lamp with every picquet.' Unlike in conventional warfare, 
pickets stood fast when attacked, hence they fortified their positions.87 At night they 
81 Pte O'Connor 'With the Malakand Field Force' QOG XVII (1899),p 1455, but his unit were not 
veterans like the PFF; Capt Edwards 'Recent Frontier Warfare' JUSII XXVIII (1898), P 361. 
82 Henderson Science pp 350-1.He apparently had served on the Frontier and South Africa. 
8J UMIL 3/1087 Letter 164 p 19. 
84 Capt Walters OperatiOns of the [TEF] /897-8 (Simla 1900),p 104; Plowden 'Battalion' p 259. 
Withdrawing was dangerous as it generally involved downhill movement with the tribesmen having 
the advantage of height. They had a moral and physical advantage, MW (1900), pp 2,37,8-9. 
"Capt Shadwell Loclchart's Advance Through Tirah (1902), P 155. 
86 Edwards 'Frontier Warfare' p 358. 
17 Col Franklyn 'With the Yorkshire Regiment in Tirah' GHG VIII (Jun 1900), pp 49-52. 
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were largely dependent on their own resources, thus putting a premium on their 
commanders' initiative. 
The Frontier demanded constant alertness; unwary units suffered.88 Churchill 
recommended that officers should dress like their men and carry rifles; he recounted 
the classic Frontier adage of avoiding white stones and officers. Both attracted fire. 
Commanders stressed fieldcraft and using cover; but the lA's rifle, the Martini, fired 
black powder ammunition. A veteran noted the results: 
Nothing could be more marked than the enonnous disadvantage at which 
troops using black powder work as compared with those using cordite. Time 
after time did we see admirable skirmishing or stalking ... simply given away 
by the first round fired, and it is no exaggeration to say that a considerable 
percentage of the casualties incurred by the native troops were due to this cause 
alone. 
This suggests that some Indian units had better fieldcraft training than British troops. 
Fieldcraft and firepower were reassessed during Tirah. In consequence, the Ghurkha 
Scouts, the troops most dependent on good fieldcraft, were hastily issued with Lee-
Metfords. This suggests the new importance of fieldcraft. However their role also 
required more firepower. 89 
Initiative on the Frontier 
Low-level initiative is important for later tactical developments and is therefore 
analysed separately here. Tactical conditions in Tirah particularly, representative of 
modem warfare's dispersion, demanded that all ranks showed initiative. Officers 
could no longer control, while juniors, separated from superiors, had to act 
independently. An Infantry CO contrasted: 
In Tirah a wily foe, armed with the latest breechloader ... opposing to 
disciplined numbers his better knowledge of the ground, [and] an inimitable 
88 IDB 1896 pp 156-7; Rodwell Bangalore Lectures pp 14-5; Lt Col Thomsett With The Peshawar 
Column (1899),p 126; for the continued importance of vigilance on the Frontier. Lt Col Masters 
Bugles and a Tiger (1956), pp 222-4. Writing post-1945 of 19305 Frontier warfare, he emphasised its 
value as training in vigilance and fieldcraft for major war. 
19 Churchill A,talakand p 289. FM Slim UnoffiCial History (1959),p t 12. this advice is a Frontier 
classic; OPs p55; UM1U7/15886 F 21. They were the first Indian troops to be so armed. 
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talent for skinnishing ... In Egypt ... few beneath the rank of Brigadier were 
called upon to show aUght but courage .... In Tirah, no subaltern could tell but 
that ... the lives of his men might not depend on his own initiative.90 
Methuen,judging from Tirah, criticised British units': 'lack of ... initiative,' noting 
later that IA officers were: 'more habituated' to showing it. 91 Others shared 
Methuen's opinion, but even so some Indian units were hide-bound: 
We went into Tirah a "drillbook" regiment. We came out of it with the firm 
conviction that the drillbook, regarded as a traveller's companion for Tirah, 
was considerably out of date. The principle which we found of greatest 
importance was ... the frequent necessity for initiative action by subordinate 
officers.92 
Some commentators analysing the campaigns hardly mentioned initiative. 
Generally they were either Indian or Frontier veterans, who probably saw it as 
inherent in hill-warfare. Instead they stressed fieldcraft, skirmishing, scouts and 
independent fire, all demanding initiative, rather than referring to it directly. There 
were, however, exceptions. Blood exemplified this indirect approach in criticising a 
British unit: 
our officers and men have much to learn in regard to ... seeing to mutual 
support, and to the ground, when they get away from directing authority. All 
the mishaps that have occurred here are traceable to these points-which is 
brought out by the superior smartness of the enemy. Our volley-firing also is 
not the thing for this work.93 
These failures suggest poor initiative, confirmed by Blood's reference to: 'directing 
authority.' Volleys depended on control and close-order, the negation of initiative 
and fieldcraft. Blood also implied that training was defective and he felt that British 
troops lacked tactical cunning, ie initiative. Blood later advocated introducing the 4-
company battalion, as, with the current 8-company unit, when officers reached 
positions of power they had become inert. He also criticised volleys as too 
90 MWp 11; GHG VII (May 1899),p 23. 
91RCWSA Evidence II Q 14268, confirmed by MePs 'Tirah File' 'Oargai' p 6. 
92 Maj Callwell The Tactics of To-Day (Edinburgh 1900),p 133; OPs p50. Ormsby was a Gurkha. 
93 WPs 38/11/27, BloodIWhite 7/10/97. 
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mechanical. 94 
Lockhart's Memorandum implicitly criticised poor initiative by condemning 
over-close formations. Its recommendations on withdrawal also demanded initiative, 
though it did not mention this explicitly.95 Similarly Egerton's Hill Warfare tackled 
initiative indirectly by stressing scouts. Pollock's Notes on Hill Warfare criticised 
set-pattern formations and mechanical firing, but Pollock: 'having spent over twenty 
years on the frontier,' probably did not appreciate that tyros did not understand 
initiative's importance. Plowden did not comment on initiative directly, instead he 
stressed skirmishing, independent fire and use of ground. All required initiative.96 
Though Plowden was not a Frontier veteran, he was an LI officer and thus was more 
attuned to delegation. He commented later: 
Tirah and South Africa ... proved conclusively that tactics which depend on 
the soldier thinking and acting for himself are those best calculated to ensure 
success.
97 
Hutchinson, a Gurkha, condemned set-piece formations and IDB 1896 's rigidity for 
destroying initiative, commenting that in mountains: 
lilt is most necessary, therefore, for every officer to know beforehand what is 
the "general idea," so that even when isolated ... , he may intelligently co-
operate. In no other kind of warfare will company and section commanders 
find such unlimited scope for ... individual initiative ... [E]verything may 
depend on [their] judgement and decision.98 
General Hart, a Tirah brigadier, stressed: 
[l]he difficulty of exercising command in mountain warfare is great. .. much 
reliance must be placed on the intelligence, initiative ... and brave leading of 
subordinate officers. 99 
Major Pearse recommended: 'the intelligent cultivation of [the soldier's] powers, and 
... encouragement of individual skill,' seeing the Gurkha Scouts as the ideal. Pearse 
94 MEPs 'Tirah File· BloodIMethuen 17/5/98; Glossary. 
9S Walters Tirah p 104. 
96 JUSIJ XXVII (1898).pp 146·7;137; 'The Battalion on the Frontier' OXLI(1899),pp 241·71. 
97 OXLle ( 1900). P 283. 
98 Campaig1l, pp 231.234-5. 
99 Ar' pp ~42f, 342d. 
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was neither LI nor a Frontier veteran and was writing in Britain, perhaps suggesting 
that initiative appeared more significant there. tOO Hamilton underlined: 'we must ... 
develop the individuality & skill of ... men ... with the natural aptitude ... for 
scouting.' lOt This demanded initiative. A journal emphasised that in hill-warfare: 
'small bodies are necessarily detached so company officers must be prepared to 
assume responsibility,' implying that they often had not. t02 Martin, a Gurkha and 
Tirah veteran, recommended that junior commanders acted: 'on their own initiative.' 
He also emphasised skirmishing, scouting and that companies were the tactical unit. 
All implicitly recognised delegation, while his last point was an important South 
African lesson. General Gatacre warned: 
A ... commander must recognise ... once on the hills, he must ... relax control of 
his regiment, which owing to accidents of the ground will pass to .... the 
company leaders. When this takes place he will feel, perhaps for the first time, 
the immense importance of so training his officers ... Above all we require 
officers, by careful teaching, to extract ... more intelligence from their men in 
... company training. ' 
Intelligence implies initiative as does Gatacre's emphasis on company training. t03 
Hitherto battalions had been the tactical and training unit, inhibiting low-level 
initiative. Lt Col Franklyn, a Frontier novice, made some of the most explicit 
deductions: 
the tendency of warfare on the [Frontier] is to bring out the individual qualities 
of each soldier and to demand his employment as an individual ... It was soon 
found that volleys are innocuous against a widely extended foe ... [T]he great 
lessons of ... Tirah ... were decentralisation and the necessity of ... 
refurbishing the almost forgotten art of skirmishing. 104 
Franklyn's last point suggests the importance of skirmishing in decentralised combat, 
and that contemporaries linked skirmishing and initiative. A military journal noted 
that the tactical unit in Tirah were companies, in the Sudan brigades. This suggests 
100 • Sharpshooters , JRUSI XLIII (1899), p 1245. 
10lHamPs 1/2124 20/3198. 
101'Mountain Warfare' LX (1898),p 289. 
103 Mountain and Savage Warfare p 2; 'Characteristics', pp 1070,1072. 
104 GHG VIII (Jun 1900),p 52. 
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that Tirah's tactical conditions required substantially more low-level initiative. 
Furthermore as companies became the Infantry tactical unit after 1902, it suggests 
Tirah's greater relevance to modem warfare. lOS AHQ India later realised that the 
wing system was impractical in the face of breech-loading rifles as it was too 
centralised, stunting the development of initiative. Instead double companies were 
needed. 106 
Tirah and LI 
Some commentators argued for LI after Tirah. This suggests the switch 
towards delegated tactics, for their tactics were founded on initiative and extension. 
Tirah also highlighted the importance of scouts and skirmishing, both LI skills. 
Hutchinson made the strongest case, commending the Gurkha Scouts whose: 
careful preparation in peace-time had made them hardy, active, intelligent, self-
reliant, and resolute ... [T]hroughout the expedition, under the bold leading of 
their officers, they were conspicuous by their dash and daring. 
Consequently he recommended reforming Light Companies in battalions. He saw 
them primarily as more effective combatants rather than as specialist scouts. This 
suggests poor Infantry tactical standards in dispersed combat. 107 Pearse, writing in 
Britain, also recommended forming bodies of scouts. He argued that, as 
reconnaissance was the most demanding combat task, special training was essential 
for it. He cited the Boers in 1881 and the Gurkha Scouts to stress sharpshooters' 
value both as scouts and in: 'field duties which require special training, superior 
intelligence, personal activity, self-reliance and skill in shooting.' Again Pearse, like 
Hutchinson, suggests their importance as combatants, implying that general infantry 
standards in open-order tactics were poor. 108 Pearse was not an LI officer so his 
lOS LXI (1898),pp 736-7. 
106 UMIL 3/1102 Letter 212 of 21/12/99 p 3. South Africa may possibly have exerted influence. but 
given the slow process of stafTwork and that India's most recent, direct experience of such weapons 
was in Tirah, it is likely that the latter was decisive, Glossary. 
107 Glossary; Hutchinson Tirah pp 229,239; Ibid p 240. 
101 'Sharpshooters' JRUSI XLIII (1899),p 1245. 
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article suggests growing recognition in Britain ofLI skills' importance and of the 
wider applicability of Frontier lessons. Others recommended scout and shikar 
training as providing excellent instruction in these skills. 109 
Major Yate, writing on Frontier warfare, emphasised the role of LI in hill-
warfare and their special tactical skills. His article began in America, the British LI's 
cradle, commended 13th LI's hill-fighting skills and deduced that systematic training 
was essential for such combat. He praised LI skills and saw the old Light Company 
standard as desirable. He argued that the average soldier had neither the fitness nor 
mountaineering skills necessary for detached combat in hill-warfare. Yate concluded: 
'[g]ood recruits must be well paid, and without good recruits there cannot be a good 
Army.' Roberts also was to emphasise this later. Yate also argued that IDB J 896 had 
insufficient guidance on hill-warfare. 110 Martin stressed that scouts should be trained 
like LI, who, he noted, did far more skirmishing than other infantry. He commented 
that IDB J 896 had: 'practically no instruction on this subject.' III 
The degree of emphasis on skirmishing and LI suggests that tactical conditions 
had changed, that Infantry training was defective and that IDB J 896 did not match 
these new conditions. 
Training and the Manuals 
Commentators felt that many units had been poorly prepared for Tirah. Partly 
they attributed this to the fact that there was no comprehensive manual of Frontier 
warfare. Also IDB J 896's general principles of close-order and volleys were 
inappropriate to hill-warfare. Hutchinson, the Indian DME and thus able to influence 
training, was scathing. 
Regiments new to ... mountain warfare, which have only practised drill-book 
methods of attack and retirement, find themselves seriously handicapped. 
I09Eg Capt Burton 'Shikar as Training for Scouts' JUS/I XXVIII (1899). That it was a favourite 
officer recreation did not lessen its training appeal! It was also stressed after t 902. 
110 'North-West Frontier Warfare' JRUSI XLII (1898).p 1172; Ibid pp 1180,1182, 1192; Glossary. 
III Mountain pp 2-3. 
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He condemned IDB's direction that: 
"retirements should usually be conducted in quick time" and that "in moving 
from cover to cover an upright position must be maintained"! .. .Ifthese are the 
only methods constantly practised on cantonment parade-grounds, it must be 
impossible to shake them off at a moment's notice. 
This suggests that, even in India, training was often stereotyped. Hutchinson felt that 
IDB 1896's: '''attack formations" were entirely inapplicable.' This was unfair as it 
forbade 'normal' formations, but Hutchinson's strong criticisms can only have 
advanced the adoption of more decentralised tactics. 1 12 
At lower levels officers found that IDB 1896 inhibited common-sense. 
Ormsby, a Tirah veteran, recalled: '[the] first day on which we ventured to disregard 
the directions of the Drill Book about retiring in quick time;' consequently his troops 
escaped unscathed. Disobedience caused him considerable trepidation, but later the 
rest of his battalion conformed. 1 13 This suggests how Tirah helped to inculcate 
flexibility. 
Many Tirah veterans stressed the need for realistic training delegated to sub-
units. Pollock urged: 
Take every opportunity of exercising your men in firing at unknown distances: 
nothing trains men for war so much ... [A] hillman is not a white target ... nor 
does he even at 800 yards show even a mark as large as a third class target ... 
Train your men in peace to the manoeuvres they will have to perform in war. 
Forms of attack are very good in their way, but they won't do against hill 
enemies. I 14 
His last comment again implies that 'normal' formations were still common. 
Mead recommended improving training and outlined the changes which Col 
Hill, AAG Musketry India and an ex-Tirah brigadier, had proposed. These included 
less emphasis on volleys, itself encouraging extension and initiative, and more 
IIlThe Campaign in Tirah /897-1898 (1898),p 129; MW 1900 stressed speedy withdrawals p 12. 
113 OPs p 30; Siessor Derbyshires p 44 also stressed IDB 1896's inappropriateness. 
114 'Hill Warfare' JUSIIXXVlII (1898),pp 146-7: Siessor Derbyshires p4 agreed that training had 
been stereotyped hitherto. 
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practical shooting. I IS Hart, Mead's Chairman, another ex-Tirah brigadier, urged 
realistic training delegated to COs. This would have encouraged initiative. Gatacre 
also advocated practical training including field-firing and fieldcraft decentralised to 
companies. Decentralisation would have developed initiative. Plowden trained his 
battalion in skirmishing and fieldcraft after Tirah. 116 
This contemporary emphasis on improving training suggests that hitherto it had 
been poor and over-centralised, as Hart suggests. Criticisms of IDB J 896 probably 
aided tactical change in Britain in 1899. The decentralised training which many 
recommended was better fitted to modem warfare and would have developed 
initiative. 
India's Reaction to Tirah 
This section covers the changes which the 1897-8 Campaigns caused in India. 
It may be argued that these were irrelevant to the British Army. But the Army in 
India had a substantial British element; interchange of personnel between British and 
Indian-based units was common and many Tirah veterans fought in South Africa 
with their linked British-based battalion. The next sections examine the response and 
show how it affected both tactics and weapons. 
Curzon commented that 1899-1901 saw: 'special activity in remodelling and 
improving armament, equipment, mobilization and defences'. Not all of the resulting 
actions derived from the Frontier, but he emphasised that: 
[i]n 1897 the army (sic) was engaged in a series of ... campaigns .... in which 
... numerous defects and shortcomings were laid bare, and the military 
administration is now desirous that the army .... shall profit by the lessons. I 17 
The greatest effect was on firepower, but mobility was carefully examined, largely 
in the context of logistics and animalmastership. Tirah had demonstrated that: 
liS Mead 'Musketry' pp 245. 259. 
116'Hill-fighting' pp 1068-70, 1075-6; 'Skirmishing' pp 289-91. 
117The Indian Army (Oxford 1907), pp 35-7; UMIU7/10139 'Reorganisation Artillery' 2/11'99 p 2. 
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a small fully equipped force which can act at once and strike sharp, prompt 
blows, is more efficient, and far more economical than a large army that can 
only take the field after months of preparation. 
This suggests the importance of tempo, critical in manoeuvre. 118 Changes to 
protection are covered in the Training Section below, as developments in fieldcraft 
were most visible in training. 
Firepower 
The 1897-8 Campaigns were an important factor in India's rearmament 
proposals. The most significant was reequipment with smallbore rifles. Tirah had 
revealed the Martini's growing inferiority to tribal weapons. Many were worn out 
and their black powder ammunition impaired fieldcraft. Other changes included 
provision of 58 machine guns and new mountain guns. I 19 Machine guns had been 
trialled during the 1897-8 Campaigns. Had they been ineffective then, it is unlikely 
that this increase would have been recommended. India's demand for more artillery 
was: 
given additional weight from [1897-8] .... The part played by ... mountain 
batteries against frontier tribes is one of great and increasing importance ... Our 
superiority in small arms is ... rapidly disappearing while ... the power of 
combination and tactical efficiency of the tribesmen is increasing. Under these 
circumstances, we must, in the future, rely largely on ... artillery. 120 
White wished to raise the proportion of guns from 1.93 per 1000 men to 4 to reduce 
casualties and accelerate operational tempo. Significantly he recommended European 
nonns as his desired goal. This suggests tactical transfer from conventional to 
Frontier warfare, recognition that the latter was becoming harder and therefore 
conversely that Frontier lessons might apply in conventional combat. 121 White's 
point that more artillery would accelerate combat is valid as he did not anticipate the 
118 UMIUI7/5/1850, 1851, 1852, 1854, 1856 for commissariat-transport reports, UMIL 3/1090 
Veterinary Report Tirah; UMIL 3/1090 'Preliminary Report Transport Co 1898.' Tirah inspired this 
Committee which later influenced the transport system in 1909, UMIU17/S'1617 P 405; Chapter 5. 
1190PS p55; UMIL 3/1101 'Proposals to Increase Army Efficiency.' 
120 UMIL3/1 079 Letter 31, 24/2198. P 2. 
UI Ibid, Enclosure 2. AG/GOI 311198. 
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tribes deploying it. 122 
Dargai had shown that concentrated artillery fire was needed to support 
infantry in the face of improved firearms. But: 
[t]he full effect of artillery fire ... can not be produced by the casual grouping of 
batteries ... even at the beginning of a campaign; the brigade division should be 
a permanent unit.123 
Britain was also changing to pennanently-organized artillery units, so India did not 
alter just because of Tirah, but doubtless the latter's experience aided refonn in India. 
Training 
Tirah had shown that current training was inadequate for decentralised 
fighting. Possibly this had already been appreciated as White had sent Hutchinson, 
the Indian DME, specifically to Tirah to improve hill-warfare education. 124 In 1898 
a Syllabus of Instruction in Mountain Warfare was issued. This included large-scale 
attacks and withdrawals, suggesting that conditions approaching conventional 
warfare were anticipated. 125 The enemy was to be specially selected to represent an 
'active' force, while in company training scouts were to be chosen. 'Active' suggests 
dynamic and thus realistic training. Its stress on company training implies 
decentralisation from battalions and therefore more scope for initiative. That 
company scouts were to be trained suggests that Hutchinson's ideas on scouts and 
LI-style skills were being implemented. 
Tirah inspired hill-manoeuvres allover India. The best reported were 
held at Attock. 126 The 1899 Attock Manoeuvre Instructions, issued to participants 
beforehand, recommended controlled, independent fire rather than volleys. They saw 
122 When one side is superior in artillery, this statement is correct, though there are logistic caveats; 
but when there is a mutual, equivalent increase of artillery, the likely result is lengthy attrition eg 
1915-17. 
J2)UMIU7/l0 139 M5463/1900 Military Dept 79/1900 3115/00; India' s request to fonn brigade 
divisions effectively antedates South African lessons. given lengthy preliminary staffmg. 
124 UMIU7/15867 FIOA of 27/9/97. 
12$ USG (15/10/98),p 834. 2ad Dargai was an example. 
126 UMIU17/5/358 No 528 1618/00 shows they occurred in Bengal. Others took place at Dalhousie 
and Quetta. 
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a suitable formation for scaling hiIls as scouts leading, foIlowed by an extended line 
with supports close behind. If an attack was decided on, infantry and artiIIery fire 
would cover it, while outflanking and frontal action were to be combined. This 
recognised greater tribal firepower and more conventional tactics. They emphasised 
that depth detachments would protect retirements, showing the value of covering 
fire. 127 
Commanders' suggestions from the manoeuvres were carefuIIy recorded, 
indicating keenness to learn. Commanders emphasised the importance of scouts and 
signalling. The former suggests the greater importance of dispersed tactics and more 
attention to instructing individuals, the latter greater extension. The Attock 
Manoeuvres included field-firing and conventional attacks, though hill-warfare 
predominated. Tactically the main criticisms were bunching, poor fieldcraft, skylined 
soldiers, bad reconnaissance, and inadequate covering fire. Batteries leapfrogged 
during the manoeuvres; previously they had advanced simultaneously so as to 
minimise CB. Leapfrogging in contrast ensured that covering fire was not 
interrupted. 128 All were valuable lessons for conventional war. 
The 1900 Attock Hill Manoeuvres were equally carefully recorded. Tactical 
guidance now recommended advancing on broader frontages to develop more fire 
and to prevent outflanking. No reason is advanced for the change, though similar 
formations were used in South Africa. Criticisms were tart, often involving 
overexposure, bunching and unwariness, while the comment: '[t]his day was 
instructive ... it showed many faults' suggests readiness to learn from mistakes. The 
manoeuvres included field firing; during it Indian units were praised, but a British 
battalion's slowness, poor covering fire and bad fieldcraft were excoriated. All these 
1:!7 DPs 7810-106-40 'Report on the Attock Manoeuvres March 1899'; Ibid pp 58-63; Denning issued 
his own tBctical Dotes, (DPs 7810-106-39), suggesting the manoeuvres' importance. 
III Ibid pp 13-14; pp 14-5; pp29.43-5; pp 37.39; p 41; P 33; Chapter 3. Glossary. 
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points were very relevant to conventional warfare. Again the evidence suggests that 
IA units were better trained than British battalions. The subsequent report 
recommended improved field training, scouts, and signalling. 129 
In summary the Attock manoeuvres appear realistic with many lessons for 
conventional warfare. The obvious care taken suggests the importance of improving 
tactical performance. Much attention was paid to maximising firepower and to 
stressing both infantry and artillery covering fire, while minimising the enemy's 
through fieldcraft and extension. Emphasis on scouts and company training suggests 
more attention to initiative and open-order combat. 
Unit training altered from 1898, the Green Howards described hill-warfare 
schemes against their battalion scouts, using: 'tactics learnt from our Afridi foes,' as: 
'more attractive' than normal exercises, while inter-company hill-warfare training 
was: 'even more interesting.' 130 Interesting training is far more likely to stimulate 
progress and develop initiative than set-piece drills. Furthermore India-wide 
directions issued after Attock underlined that: 
[i]n special practices this summer [OCs] Companies should endeavour to bring 
out the individuality of their men, who in a modem fire fight would, as often as 
not, have to rely on their own judgement. 
India also introduced scout training which would have fostered initiative. That scout 
and hill-warfare training were conducted across India suggests that open-order tactics 
were being adopted. 131 On the basis of the surviving evidence, the training was 
thorough and realistic, suggests that fundamental change was occurring. 132 
Mountain War/are 1900 
Defects revealed during Tirah caused the issue of this new manual: 'based on 
129UMI UI7/5/1807 'Report Attock ... 1900'. Comments were circulated daily; participants' 
suggestions were recorded; Ibid p 2.267 scouts participated; pp 2-10 (Special Peshawar DO 17/1/00): 
fE 35-6: Items 25-30 pp 88-9; Items 31-35 p 89. 
'2nd Bn News' GHG VII (1899),p 106. 
III UMIUI7/5/1807 P 72; AG India No 15010 19n199 on scout training. 
III 'Dalhousie Hill Manoeuvres October-November 1900' OXLIC 1900 P 219; UMIUI7 5''358 
Bengal Command Order 528 of 1618/00 suggests that many others had been held in Bengal. 
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the experience gained in the late frontier campaigns.' This suggests a more analytical 
approach to training. Significantly it was not titled 'Drillbook' as were other 
contemporary manuals, suggesting less tactical rigidity.133 It started with mechanical 
instructions on skirmishing, though noting: 
[i]n teaching skirmishing, the instructor will show his men how to make use of 
cover; he will explain to the section commander that the men should make the 
most of all cover. 
This suggests that using cover was not universal hitherto, while its mention of 
section commanders implies greater emphasis on NCO initiative than IDB 1896. It 
saw that section commanders might need to train their men and that they would 
command without an officer being present. Significantly it included skirmishing 
unlike IDB 1896. This possibly suggests the influence of Hutchinson and others who 
had called for skirmishing's reinstatement MW 1900 described scouts' tasks 
imaginatively, stressing their special training: 'as expert skirmishers over every 
variety of ground.' Again, that this emphasised combat rather than reconnaissance 
suggests poor average tactical standards. This also suggests Hutchinson's influence. 
Rather anachronistically MW 1900 had a long section entitled 'company drill,' 
which began mechanically, but it later advised that NCOs would be: 'required to act 
on their responsibility in directing ... fire,' that wider extensions were necessary, 
while accurate dressing and regular intervals were not. 134 Both suggest that much 
previous training was stereotyped, while the latter comments recognise low-level 
initiative. That MW 1900's section on company training was longer than the 
battalion one suggests that companies were recognised as having greater tactical 
importance. Later this was an important South African deduction. 135 It instructed 
that: 
IJ) MW 1900 (Simla 1900). preface. The skirmishing section was influenced by IDB 1896's Drill of a 
Section in Open Order.' That it used the term 'skirmishing' suggests an LI influence. It is just possible 
that Henderson's 'Technical Training' influenced MW 1900, see below. 
1304 MW 1900, pp 2,4-5,7. 
us Ibid pp 5-13, the ba"alion section covered pp 13-20, but included logistics; Ibid p 9. Chapter -;. 
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section commanders should clearly understand that they must take their own 
section to the front whenever the ground favours it, without any regard to the 
order they were in. 
This implies better use of ground and more NCO initiative. It stressed covering fire, 
recognition of increased enemy firepower. It saw that in open ground against 
enemies anned with breechloaders, extension between 8-12 paces was not excessive, 
a substantial increase on the previous 1-2 pace nonn. Such extensions demanded 
initiative. 
MW 1900's section 'Instruction of the Battalion' stressed reconnaissance; all 
battalions were to have scouts and were to cultivate soldiers' powers of observation. 
Unlike IDB 1896, it endorsed initiative wholeheartedly: 
There is no possibility of laying down a drill, indeed it is very important that 
hard and fast rules should not be made. All ranks should be encouraged and 
taught to act on their own resources ... Junior officers and [NCOs] should be 
taught to act on their own initiative ... Once the general plan has been 
explained ... it will sometimes be found impossible for further orders to be 
conveyed. 136 
Pickets and flanking parties were to be kept small to economise on manpower, again 
implicitly recognising delegation and firepower, while MW stated: '[v]olley-firing in 
hilly country is ... a waste of ammunition.' 137 This was a major change also needing 
low-level initiative. 
MW 1900 summarises India's view of 1897-8's lessons, here its stress on 
skinnishing and scouts is important, and it gives pointers to the other 1898-9 hill 
manoeuvres and unit training. Units, which had been trained in accordance with it, 
would have been better prepared for conventional war. 
1l6lbid P 14. Buller made similar points, see fn 157 below. This has similarities with Hutchinson's 
comment. fn 98. It is possible that Hutchinson drafted MW /900. He had served in Tirah and had 
training responsibilities. 
137lbid pp 13-14; Ibid P 18. 
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Tirah '5 Influence outside India 
Tirah influenced Britain. General Wood, the AG, commenting on 
Hutton's Lessons to be Learntfrom the French & German Manoeuvres of 1897, felt 
hat dense Gennan attack fonnations were possibly wrong, continuing: 
the thought has petplexed me many times in the last month whether we have 
not made a mistake in doing away with skirmishing ... One officer, who has 
been ... in South Africa, wants us to have special skirmishing taught to 
battalions in that country, but it is apparently quite as much wanted on the 
[Frontier] .... [S]ome ... regiments ... are absolutely doing nothing except 
firing volleys, which, at a single man .. are not much value. On the other hand 
we hear of 100 Ghoorkas (sic) having shot at least 100. 138 
That a non-IA officer, the British Army's effective 2ic, criticised tactical 
perfonnance and poor initiative, while praising the Gurkha Scouts, who excelled in 
both skills, suggests Tirah' s influence and the need for change in Britain. Wood later 
selected Ian Hamilton to take over at Hythe. Hamilton had a reputation as a keen 
shot, but Wood may have felt that his Tirah experience would be valuable. 139 At 
Hythe Hamilton criticised: 
the attempts sometimes made by [COs] to control more than anyone man is 
competent to control properly ... [C]ontrol of fire can always, in ... service 
conditions, be sufficiently loosened to admit of the individual initiative of the 
fire unit commanders, and of the intelligent co-operation of the men. 
He later told the RCWSA that his most significant deduction after Tirah was that 
volleys were ineffective. Hamilton's comment in 1898 was less emphatic than his 
statement to the RCWSA but it implies that Hythe was changing. 140 Decentralisation 
was an important lesson for conventional war. 
Henderson and Verner 
Tirah's most significant effect in Britain was on two officers, Lt Cols Verner 
\J8HuPs 50086 WoodlHutton 10/12197. 
\J9 Gen Hamilton Listening/or the Drums (1944),p 27. FM Wood From Midshipman to Field Marshal 
(1906), P 223. Though secondary evidence, the AG was heavily involved with personnel selection. 
Wood's third son was a Tirah veteran; Ibid p 243, Wood also corresponded with Methuen. eg 
WoodlMethuen 28/12197 MePs 'Indian Diary: That Wood. a follower ofWolseley selected a 
prominent member of Roberts' Ring as Hythe's Commandant suggests a strong reason, perhaps 
recent combat service, for selecting Hamilton. 
,.oReport ... Musketry Training ... 1898 (1899).p 45; RCWSA E~'idence I p 112. 
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and Henderson. They collaborated to develop a new tactical model based on Tirah 
and Peninsular LI tactics. Henderson in his lecture 'The Technical Training of 
Infantry,' delivered with Roberts presiding, saw 1897-8 as having significant 
implications for future tactics. He cited a Tirah veteran: 
Some regiments, notably several belonging to the native army, were at home 
from the first. But .... these regiments had received a thorough [LI] training; 
their officers, as almost all the officers of the native army are, were accustomed 
to responsibility .... Anything better than the skirmishing of the Guides, ... [and] 
the 20th PI, I never wish to see. I pity the Russians that come across them in 
their native hills.141 
The last point emphasises the value of skirmishing in conventional combat and that 
Tirah's lessons applied in major wars. The veteran then criticised British troops for 
inertia, bad fieldcraft and tactical naivete. Henderson went on to conclude that 
India's instructions and hill manoeuvres suggested a way ahead for tactics generally. 
He then analysed tactics, concluding that progress demanded that: 
1. Regimental officers, including company commanders, to be left more to 
themselves on field days. 
2. An extended course of physical training ... 
3. Practice as [LI] over difficult ground. 
4. Careful instruction of the individual skirmisher. 
All points involved training, three emphasised subordinate initiative and two covered 
fieldcraft and the use of ground. 142 Henderson compared the Peninsula with the 
Frontier, concluding that there was 'a striking resemblance,' while LI's Peninsular 
successes were based on: 
The correct habits of command instilled into ... regimental officers, and 
... training ... their judgement. .. [T]he system under which the Light Brigade 
became so famous is the most effective means of training the British infantry 
of to-day. 143 
LI tactics applied in continental warfare, particularly in the later stages of attacks and 
in broken ground where: 'much will depend on the intelligence ... skill, and 
141 'Technical Training' pp 9-10; Henderson, Science p 343. 
142 He did not specify what these instructions were, though the Mountain Warfare Syllabus is possible; 
Science p 349; Henderson 'Training' pp 497-8. Ground is covered in point 3 and implicitly in 4. 
'OHenderson Science pp 500-1 t this section was not given in Dublin. 
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... readiness of the individual skinnisher.' Clearly this emphasis on skirmishing and 
initiative was important, but Henderson's most important point was on the LI 
system's master feature: 'inculcating ... co"ect habits of command in the 
regimental officers (sic).' Henderson's analysis had implications for future training 
and initiative, but perhaps the most important was that it foreshadowed the need for 
doctrine which balances initiative and control. 144 
Hitherto Henderson had very much concentrated on the American Civil War 
and 1870. 'Technical Training' which draws heavily on the Peninsula War and LI, 
not to mention Tirah was a new departure for him. Henderson referred to his source: 
I am much indebted to Lieut-Colonel.. .. Verner ... for much information as 
regards the methods of training ... at Shorncliffe, and the character of the Li~t 
Brigade fighting ... as well as .... many ideas as to the fighting of the present.' 45 
Verner did not acknowledge Henderson when introducing A British Rifleman, 
possibly suggesting that he originated the idea. In it Verner remarked: 
the most pressing military problem is how to conduct an attack on troops 
armed ... with magazine rifles, which owing to their flat trajectory and 
extraordinary rapidity and precision of fire, are overwhelming in their effects 
against favourable targets up to 2000 yards. The object-lesson most recently 
before us is ... [Omdurman] , where the absolute impossibility of masses of men 
advancing under modem artillery and rifle fire, although known to students of 
war, was practically demonstrated again to the whole world. The unusually 
heavy losses experienced by our troops in the fighting on the Indian Frontier in 
1897 was mostly due to the able manner which the Afridis ... took advantage of 
the ground and worked in unison (as did the Riflemen at Tarbes ..... ) to assist 
and support one another, and thus to develop their fire so as to obtain the 
maximum value from it with the minimum exposure and loss to themselves. 
The accounts by officers who served in that campaign bear a striking 
resemblance ... ofthe methods of fighting of the Riflemen during the Peninsular 
War. It is notoriously difficult to prophesy, but I...believe that the ... conduct 
of attacks in the future will ... be solved by adopting some system based on the 
methods originated ... by the first regiment of Riflemen. 146 
Verner stressed the Shorncliffe training system, its emphasis on companies and 
its current tactical applicability. Verner's introduction does not appear to have had 
much subsequent influence, but Henderson's 'Technical Training' was widely 
I •• Ibid pp 503; 499. Chapter 9. 
145 'Technical Training' p 12. 
146 Ed Lt Col W Verner, Maj G Simmons A British Rifleman (1899), pp xix -xxi. 
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reprinted, reviewed, amplified and influenced India. 147 That it was given in Ireland 
with Roberts presiding probably accounts for the latter's stress on skinnishing on the 
1899 Irish Manoeuvres. 
Tirah's Influence on Roberts and BuUer 
Tirah influenced both the first 2 Cines South Africa, Roberts and Buller. Both 
held major commands in 1899, Ireland and Aldershot respectively from whence 
many units deployed to South Africa. Roberts commented in 1898: 
During the recent campaign on the ... Frontier ..... our enemies taught us what 
could be done with weapons ... inferior to ours .. [W]e must discard the 
notion ... that only volleys will be ... effective. 
He continued, castigating officers who preferred drill to shooting, who showed: 'their 
inability to understand the extreme importance of Musketry (sic) training.' 148 It is 
possible that Roberts' criticism of volleys was influenced by Ian Hamilton, though 
Roberts had many other sources of information on Tirah. 149 In 1899 Roberts 
emphasised fire at moving targets at unknown distances: 'the kind of shooting that is 
required in skirmishing,' while some soldiers should be trained: 
to be real experts in the use of their arms-men who would be able to act as 
usefully and intelligently as the Gurkha Scouts. 150 
Roberts also urged that officers be trained to accept responsibility in a 
document on the forthcoming 1899 manoeuvres. On the same day he advocated 
better barracks to attract higher-quality recruits as: 
under the conditions of modem war, the man of higher intelligence is three 
times as valuable as his illiterate ... comrade ..... [I]n these days of extended 
formations, great demands are placed upon ... individual intelligence of the 
private soldier, and the better educated a man is, the more valuable he will be. 
There is no direct connection between the two documents, but open-order tactics had 
147 ANG XL (1899), pp 721,817-8; SA LXII (1899). pp 240,263-4; Maj Mayne 'The Training of 
Infantry for the Attack' USM XX (1899); Akers-Douglas Committee Q 6378, Henderson did not 
expand on this. 
141 RPs 7101-23-107 'Alllreland Rifle Meeting Speech 1898.' 
149 See fn 140 above. No confirmatory correspondence survives in the Roberts or Hamilton Papers. 
ISO RPs 7101-23-110-1 'All Ireland Anny Rifle Meeting 29nl99.' 
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been validated in Tirah and demanded higher-quality soldiers, capable of 
initiative. lSI 
That Roberts intended that the 1899 Irish Manoeuvres would train units in 
skirmishing and develop initiative suggests Tirah's influence. 152 This was probably 
due to Henderson's lecture, given in March 1899. Articles in The Times on these 
manoeuvres, inspired by Roberts, stressed initiative, skinnishing and LI. The 
correspondent, almost certainly Henderson, criticised dense attacks and: 'regular and 
precise methods [of the] parade ground,' while noting that battalions in which: 
'company officers are traditionally given a free hand' were better skirmishers. This 
suggests that they were LI. He continued: 
Lord Roberts endorses ... that skirmishing is likely to playa conspicuous part 
even in Continental warfare .. .It is well known that Lord Roberts is as keen on 
good skirmishing ... [as] good marksmanship ... [T]he skirmishing tactics of 
the ... Light Brigade .. form ..... an admirable model for the British Infantry of 
today.IS3 
Skirmishing was: 'not to be learnt in a day' and the Manoeuvres': 'standard was not 
that of the Peninsula or Tirah.' Till all soldiers had individual instruction in using 
cover, casualties would be excessive. He criticised frontal attacks when cover was 
available, recommended that infantry firefights should be longer. This implies that 
more fire would be needed to counter increased enemy firepower. He recommended 
that in close country companies should advance stealthily and surprise the enemy: 
This was the style of fighting in which the ... Light Brigade excelled. These 
are the tactics of the Boer and the Afridi. 
This reference to Boers may have anticipated the forthcoming war or may have 
looked back to 1881, but, as official warnings had already been issued on the South 
African situation, the former is likely.lS4 The correspondent continued: 
lSI Ibid 'Irish Manoeuvres Circular Memorandum' 617199; 'Improvements to Barracks;' Chapter 7 
ISl Col Henderson Akers-Douglas Committee Q 6458. Though Henderson's evidence was years later, 
The' Times' contemporaneous reports cited below support it. 
Ul Time's 31/8199; Evans! Archivist News International 19/11/0 I; career-conscious juniors do not 
lightly attribute opinions to Field Marshals. 
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[w]e want soldiers with wits ... the development of individual intelligence and 
resourcefulness ... must be a main end of regimental training. In this respect, 
however, there is something still to be desired. 
The Irish Manoeuvres had: 'forcibly impressed the importance of training our young 
officers to use their judgement and to rely on their own resources.' The article 
suggests a shift in Roberts' thinking. Previously he had proposed thickening 
formations to control skirmishers. Tirah and Henderson's lecture had probably 
caused this shift. This conclusion is based on negative information and thus is not 
totally satisfactory. 155 
Buller's 1899 'Memorandum on Field Training' made points, which by content 
were probably drawn from Tirah. There is no evidence of a direct link, but at the 
same time as Roberts was emphasising initiative and skirmishing, Buller also did so. 
The coincidence that two major commands were stressing skirmishing at the same 
time possibly suggests that Wolseley and Wood were trying to prepare the Army for 
South Africa. 156 But there is no supporting evidence for this claim and Buller may 
have initiated his Memorandum independently for the same purpose. In it he 
criticised stereotyped infantry formations, stressed modem rifles' firepower and 
mentioned scouts who were then most prominent on the Frontier. Buller also 
highlighted: '[a]t company training commanders should devote more time to practice 
skirmishing.' Buller was a Rifleman and thus familiar with skirmishing but had 
allowed it to be deleted from IDB 1893 despite as AG being responsible for training. 
Tirah probably caused his emphasis on skirmishing as in no other contemporary 
campaign was it so prominent. Though control was needed during range-work, 
Buller impressed: 'once thoroughly taught the soldier should be permitted to use his 
1S4lssued on 18/8/99, LS Amery THWSA VI (1909),p 243. 
ISS 7101-23-100-1 Roberts/Cambridge 5/2/86; the following have been scanned: RPs 7101-23-97-1, 
7101-23-97 -2, 7101-23-100-1-6. This has a letter (21/9/86) on hill fighting, skinnishing is not 
mentioned; 7101-23-100-7, 7101-23-101-1, 7101-23-104 -107.7101-23-110-1, 7101-23-126-2, The 
Rise of Wellington (1895). Roberts was in communication with several IA officers and Hamilton, so 
he had ample information on Tirah. 
1S6 REJ XXIX ( 1899),pp 214-5. It was published on 2/10/99 suggesting that the original was issued 
earlier. Roberts' circular on the Irish Manoeuvres was issued in July 1899. 
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individual intelligence.' He criticised unnecessary movement and exposure, both 
Frontier rather than Sudanese lessons, continuing: 
The stereotyped line is an evil; it is not necessary that a company when 
extended should move in an exact line. The formation should confonn to the 
ground. 157 
Henderson had made similar points when criticising normal fonnations. Buller also 
stressed companies, recommending delegation to their OCs. This occurred at a time 
when battalions were the tactical unit. Buller had not changed this emphasis on 
battalions during his time as AG, suggesting that his tactical thinking had developed 
recently. This further implies that Tirah was the cause, for, as Franklyn noted, the 
tactical unit in the Sudan were brigades. Buller also recommended practicing: 
'dribbling men over bullet-swept ground.' This was a specific Frontier lesson; there 
was no similar exposure in the Sudan. Buller also stressed that soldiers should fire 
directly on seeing the enemy, this recognised soldiers' initiative and was a Frontier 
not a Sudanese lesson. It represented a rejection of volleys. 158 
The Frontier and Modern Warfare 
This section examines contemporary links between the Frontier and modem 
warfare or with South Africa. Hamilton exploited his Tirah experience in South 
Africa, while Fortescue noted that long-range rifle fire's importance had been 
deduced from Tirah. 159 An anonymous article on South Africa, later attributed to 
Henderson, commented: 
much attention had been paid to skirmishing and the reduction of losses by 
offering the very smallest target. The importance of such tactics had been 
driven home by the .. , Frontier; and the regimental officers in South Africa, 
discarding the dense and regular lines of Aldershot and Salisbury, at once 
deployed their men at wide intervals, encouraged them to make use of all 
natural cover, to imitate the Boers in invisibility,I6o 
IH Lt Col Verner 'Infantry Training (Provisional)' RBC 1902 P 159; Buller 'Memorandum' p 215. 
lSI Rodwell Bangalore p 59. Aldershot training was artificial, Tirah would seem the likely source. 
1S9 V Sampson and Oen Hamilton Anti-Commando (1931),p 112, though this is secondary evidence, 
Hamilton had trained his brigade in open-order tactics just beforehand and had written Tactical 
Deductions fro", Tirah suggesting the link; 'Our Anny and Its Critics' MM 83 (1900),p73. 
160'The War in South Africa' EDR CXCI (1900),p274. KT Sturridge Managing the South African War 
(1998),p62 attributes this to Henderson, who naturally was unlikely to underplay his own part. 
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Later the RUSI's Secretary wrote on skinnishing, commenting that it had become 
more appreciated in India after Tirah and that modem warfare required its 
reintroduction. He emphasised Gawler's work. Holden, the Secretary, had no 
regimental background which made him aware of skirmishing or Gawler. This 
suggests that he may have been encouraged to write by the Army. The RUSI had 
close links to the Army establishment. 161 Also in 1900 Rifle Brigade officers 
published The Theory and Practice of Skirmishing. The appearance of 2 works on 
skirmishing in 1899-1900, one of which referred to Tirah, is significant. Skirmishing 
was associated with LI and initiative and indicates the adoption of decentralised 
tactics. These more or less simultaneous pUblications may also suggest an attempt to 
prepare tactically for South Africa. Somewhat later Plowden wrote Notes on 
Skirmishing, based on Tirah and South Africa. He stressed inculcating soldiers with 
initiative. 162 
Methuen, a Tirah veteran, later a divisional commander in South Africa, 
analysed Dargai, concluding: 
The only way to carry a position in these days of quick-firing arms of 
precision, is to push forward at close intervals line after line of men in 
extended order and under perfect control. 
He overestimated commanders' powers of control, but his recommendations on 
extension would have counterbalanced the former. Methuen was using the Frontier to 
make deductions on future conventional war. He also highlighted outflanking, 
questioned volleys' value in European warfare and criticised British shooting. All 
based on his Tirah service: 
In our small Army, it should be our first object to make up for our disparity in 
161 Research at the RUS} has been unable to confum this, but the Anny was represented on the RUS} 
Council, while the RUS!'s secretary was well placed for conducting historical research. 
162 Lt Col Holden 'The Art of Skirmishing' JRUSI XLIV (1900), he was from a non-LI regiment and 
remote from unit service; The Theory and Practice of Skirmishing reviewed RBC (1900), but the work 
has not survived. These works on skirmishing were possibly written in autumn of 1899, suggesting an 
attempt to prepare for South Africa; Notes on Skirmishing (Lahore 1900), reprinted OXLIC (1900). 
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numbers compared to any European Army by using our best energies to 
produce fine shots at moving targets at unknown distances. 163 
Methuen's views were similar to Roberts'. 
In September 1899 the Guards commented that scouts so speeded tactical 
movement that light companies might be introduced into unitS. I64 Given that training 
in Britain was artificial, this implies a link both to Tirah and to Hutchinson's and 
Yate's works. Though scouts are mentioned in IDB 1896, their operational value had 
been proved most recently on the Frontier. It has not been possible to find references 
to infantry scouts in training in Britain between 1897-8. This is negative information 
and thus far from satisfactory. Their comments also suggest that training was 
changing in 1899, possibly due to Buller's Memorandum, which, as Chapter 3 
shows, the Guards were well aware of. 
In Natal Symons introduced Frontier-style training and Smith-Dorrien used 
Tirah's lessons on exercise:65 In 1899 a 'communicated' article 'How to Fight the 
Boers' commented that Boers and Afridis had: 'many characteristics in common,' 
that they were: 'probably about the best skirmishers in the world,' while their tactics 
were: 'almost identical.' The article stressed fieldcraft, extension and scouts. It may 
have been part of an officially inspired attempt to prepare the Army for South Africa. 
Its comment on Afridi skirmishing seems to echo Lockhart's Memorandum, cited 
above. Tainton also emphasised similarities between Afridis and Boers. It would be 
tempting to dismiss this linkage as flimsy, had not Roberts reached similar 
conclusions. 166 
South African combatants stressed Tirah's positive influence. The KOYLI's 
CO felt that: 'experience ... from Tirah' had saved many casualties. Verner praised 
I()l MePs 'Indian Diary' 'Tbe Attack on Dargai' pi; Ibid pp 2-3. 
164 HBM II (1899),p 633; its publication in September suggests a link to Buller's Memorandum. I" Maj Cnun With the [MI] in South Africa (Cambridge 1903),p 8; Gen Smith-Dorrien Memories of 48 
Years Service (192S),p 134. This is secondary, but he probably was able to use contemporary 
documents when writing. 
1M BA LXIII (1899), P 401,2319199; The War and Its Lessons (1900),p 11; RCWSA Evidence II p 64. 
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their perfonnance; two important works concurred. 167 Du Moulin, a Tirah vete~ 
noted that Smith-Dorrien, another Tirah veteran, commanding many others, had 
outsmarted the Boers due to his Frontier experience. Capt Wake recalled that: 
'[p]rofiting from ... Indian hill warfare, the men had been trained to rely in each 
advance on covering fire directed over their heads by those behind them.' This 
suggests that covering fire had been downplayed before 1897. It also shows the 
Frontier's direct effect on training.168 Gen Nicholson, Lockhart's former COS, when 
serving with Roberts felt that: 'Boer tactics closely resemble those of the tribesmen 
on the ... Frontier.,t69 Lt Col May commented that the Boers had been 
underestimated despite Tirah. Callwell compared the 2 campaigns and Maj Norris 
remarked that Tirah could have been tactically beneficial in South Africa. 170 The 
Germans emphasised that the Frontier had showed more modem conditions than 
most colonial wars and that it had demonstrated the need for initiative and 
marksmanship. Balck, who influenced CTrg 1902, concurred. 171 Both had received 
much British help with their works and it is possible that their views reflect official 
British opinion. Even if this was not so, that such astute commentators stressed the 
Frontier's positive effects is significant. Churchill saw many similarities between 
South Africa and the Frontier. A service magazine recommended that scouts, 
modelled on the Gurkhas, should be established. Lt Col Ovens noted the importance 
of scouting in South Africa, citing Tirah's example. l72 Maj Mayne and Lt Garwood 
linked the two campaigns. Dr Miller-Maguire felt that: 'Tirah was more instructive 
167 The Bugle XIX (Jun 1902), p 4;'The Naval Brigade at Graspan' MM LXXXI (1900),p 341 ;Gen 
Mawice BROHWSA I (1906),p 224; Amery THWSA n p 339. 
161 Two Years on Trek (1907),p 12; 'The Capture of Twin Peaks' KRRCC (1909),p 125, MW 1900 P 
8. 
169 PRO/30/4013 NicholsonlArdagh 4/4/00. 
170 A Retrospect on the South African War (1901), pp 1-2; The Tactics o/Today (1900), pp 102,133; 
The South African War (1900), p 49. 
171 Trans Col Waters GEOHWSA I (l904),p 24; 'The Lessons of the Boer War and the Battle-Working 
of the Three Arms' JRUSI XLVIII (1904), P 1277. 
In Hamilton's March pp 90-2,94-5; BA LXIV (1900), p 418: 'Notes on the More Obvious Lessons' 
JUSII XXIX (1900). 
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than South Africa,' while Capt Walton saw a 'remarkable' similarity between their 
lessons. 173 
That many saw the Frontier as significant for modem warfare, or felt it exerted 
a positive effect in 1899-1902, is important. Inevitably the rehearsal of evidence is 
tedious, but that so many made the connection suggests that it was a reasonably 
widespread view. 
Conclusions 
Too few British units fought in Tirah which occurred too soon before 1899 for 
its lessons to be felt across the British Army. South Africa was necessary to drive the 
lessons home, indeed many before 1899 saw them as relevant only to Frontier 
warfare. But Tirah speeded subsequent change. Some key individuals, notably 
Henderson and Roberts, made deductions for general warfare from Tirah, and 
Henderson links Tirah to the Army's 1902 manuals. 
In Tirah the Anny fought formidable foes armed with modem rifles. Some 
appreciated that defence was now more powerful, deducing that outflanking was the 
counter. Firepower's effects were manifested in longer engagement ranges and 
greater dispersion. Individual marksmanship and greater firepower were stressed. 
Firepower in turn demanded fieldcraft, apparently first widely taught after Tirah. 
Fieldcraft required individual initiative. 
Combined with these changes was revival of interest in the LI system. This 
balanced initiative and discipline in dispersed combat. Henderson and Verner 
developed a new tactical model, synthesising Tirah's experience and the LI system. 
Tirah emphasised scouts; they remained a common theme in both professional 
173 The Infantry Weapon and Its Use in War (1903),pp viii-ix; 'Realistic Targetry' JRUSI XL VI 
(1902); 'Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges Part II' USM XXVI (1902); 'The Practical 
Training ... • JUSII XXX (1901),p 261. 
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literature and training till 1914. Partly this reflects the new difficulty of 
reconnaissance, partly the need for greater individual skills in dispersed combat. 
Training is fundamental in implementing tactical change. Hill-manoeuvres 
were valuable for conventional warfare, while Roberts emphasised skinnishing in 
Ireland. Tirah affected Aldershot training. Delegation of training to sub-units 
fostered initiative. The most significant Infantry lessons, drawn mainly from Tirah, 
were independent fire, fieldcraft, use of ground, and skinnishing. Artillery was 
strengthened due to growing tribal firepower, while concentration of artillery fire and 
close support of infantry were emphasised. The Campaigns demonstrated the 
importance of sound animals and well-organised transport for mobility and tempo. 
As will be shown, the learning process after Tirah was similar to South 
Africa's, though smaller. In both similar weaknesses were demonstrated and similar 
remedies proposed. 
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Chapter 3. The South Mrican War 
We have had no end of a lesson. It will do us no end of good! 
Introduction 
This Chapter analyses changes in weapons technology before and the tactical 
results during the South African War. It also examines the course of the war briefly and 
the attempt to learn lessons. This was not new; Tirah had seen a similar, though smaller 
effort, while data had heen gathered after the 1882 Egyptian Campaign. That South 
Africa was the commonest experience of combat for British officers in 1914 broadened 
this process. 1 
Weapons Technology and Tactics 
This section assesses the technological changes and their tactical implications. The 
main change was that South Africa was the first war in which nearly all weapons fired 
smokeless ammunition. As a result, the British, who were generally attacking, 
encountered the empty battlefield as General Lyttelton recalled: 
Few people have seen two battles in succession in such startling contrast as 
Omdurman and Colenso. In the first 50,000 fanatics streamed across the open 
regardless of cover to certain death, while at Colenso I never saw a Boer all day. 2 
There were stark differences between Dervish and Boer tactics and weapons, but 
Callwell suggested the ultimate cause: 
[t]he disappearance of black powder has exerted a far more potent influence in 
moulding tactics ... than the increased power and accuracy or the rapid fire of the 
modem rifle or gun. Concealment .... has gained a ... commanding importance. 
Smokeless ammunition meant that even after weapons opened fire they remained 
hidden. Fieldcraft consequently became much easier and reconnaissance much harder. 
Smokeless ammunition's more energetic propellants led to longer-ranging fire, 
further enhanced by South Africa's very open terrain. Long-range fire exacerbated the 
problems of locating distant, hidden weapon. Defeating them demanded more time, 
I Tables 4&.5. This was not necessarily so for the Indian Army. 
1 FM Lyttelton Eight)' Years (nd). p 212. he wrote much later but his contrast is valid. 
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firepower or both.3 More energetic propellants also resulted in flatter trajectories. The 
Lee-Metford's trajectory was half of the Martini-Henry's, consequently hit-probabilities 
increased. Higher muzzle velocities demanded the introduction of smaller-calibre 
bullets. These weighed less, so soldiers could carry more rounds. Smokeless 
ammunition also meant that there was less smoke-obscuration and barrel-fouling. The 
Lee-Metford and the Mauser, the standard rifles carried by both sides, had magazines. 
The latter was clip loading. 4 All these features meant that fIrepower had increased 
substantially. Chapter 7 examines the implications for command and initiative. 
More effective weapons made entrenchment essential, but smokeless ammunition 
also increased the value of trenches. Increased firepower also meant that defensive 
positions could be extended as fewer troops were needed to hold them. This benefitted 
the Boers who were generally defending tactically. In turn the British needed more 
mobility to outflank such positions. Entrenchment and concealed enemy weapons meant 
that covering fire, itself more important, increasingly had to be applied to areas. For this 
artillery, classically an area weapon, was more effective than rifles. Consequently 
British artillery increased in South Africa's conventional phase both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Artillery's higher trajectories are more effective against trenches than flat-
trajectory small arms, while explosive shells damage structures. 
Howitzers are generically more suitable for firing HE than guns. Furthermore 
howitzers then were the only British fieldpieces firing HE and thus able to destroy 
defences.s This, together with their ability to engage defiladed targets caused the British 
to increase howitzer numbers. But destroying defences requires vast tonnages of shells 
and such volumes of fire were impossible to generate in South Africa. Consequently 
l FW Lanchester Aircraft in Warfare (1916),pp 35-6; Chapter 2. 
• Major Callwell The Tactics of To-Day (1900),pp 6-7; WW Greener The Gun and Its Development 
( 1899), pp 539-40, 664, Glossary; ECR Marks The Evolution of Modern Small Arms and Ammunition 
(1898), P 108. Lt Churchill The Story of the MalaJcand Field Force (1899),p 288 for the flat-trajectory 
Lee-Metford's effects; Table 43; PRO 30/40/16 'untitled memorandum on weapons' saw these technical 
improvements as increasing rifles' firepower ten-fold over single-loaders. 
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many argued that greater mobility was needed to defeat entrenched forces rather than 
artillery with its logistic penalties. This naturally assumed that there was space in which 
to manoeuvre. 
In 1899 most artillery fired smokeless ammunition. Pieces, like British mountain 
guns, which still fired black powder were handicapped. Between 1899-1902 British 
field artillery was at a disadvantage compared to rifles whose relative ranges were 
greater than artillery' s. 6 Later this would encourage Indirect Fire, though, as experts 
predicted, concealed enemy weapons firing Indirect would also have promoted its 
adoption.7 Artillery was poised for the introduction of QF pieces, but except in France a 
true QF fieldgun had not yet emerged. South Africa resulted in great pressure to 
introduce QF artillery in the British Army. 
Tactical Changes 
Generally British military opinion was confident prewar: 'no one, or hardly 
anyone, believed in anything but a "walk over.",8 That the first tactical analysis came 
before fighting began suggests that some commanders realised that British tactics 
needed improving. Three commanders, Colvile, Kelly-Kenny and Roberts drew up 
general tactical instructions just before or at the start of the war. Colvile, issued several 
tactical instructions in this period.9 His first emphasised that all ranks should 
understand their superiors' aims as orders could rarely be transmitted in action. He 
stressed the company-level. Both implied initiative. In an attached document issued at 
Gibraltar, Colvile considered that even company commanders would be unable to 
control their commands completely due to greater enemy firepower. NCOs must 
therefore regulate the rate of advance, again acknowledging initiative. This possibly 
5 There were no HE ruing pieces below corps-level except the 5" Howitzer in 1899, Table 37; Glossary. 
6 Tables 22&23; LS Amery THWSA VI (1909),p 474; Ibid P 482 saw Boer riflemen as the RA's most 
dangerous enemy. Prewar RA tactics emphasising close-range Direct Fire exacerbated this problem. 
7 Tables 22,23&20. Lt Col Emslie 'The Possible Effects on Tactics of Recent Improvements in Weapons' 
lAMS I 899),p 7. Long-ranges promote Indirect Fire due to intervisibilty issues. 
BulPs 2065 M /SS4121 'Lonsdale Hale Memorandum' p 2. 
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reflects the experience of Tirah as NCOs had set the pace there. That Colvile was 
stressing the effectiveness of firepower shows that there had been recent change in 
British tactical thinking. Ardagh had noted that even as late as 1898 firepower had been 
underestimated. This suggests that Tirah may have been the cause; no other recent 
campaign had seen British troops so exposed to modern rifles. 10 
Colvile stressed rapid attacks; long firefights would be disadvantageous against: 
'good and quick shots.' He emphasised using ground and covering fire. Both 
acknowledged greater enemy firepower; Tirah had stressed both. The Germans later 
criticised the British for overemphasising assaults, blaming this bias on colonial 
warfare, but there was some logic in closing rapidly with the Boers. Long firefights 
would allow better Boer marksmanship to tell. II But these tactics demanded heavy 
covering fire, best delivered by artillery, or night attacks. Colvile covered neither. He 
condemned flanking movements under Direct Fire and halting without returning fire. 
Buller's 1899 Memorandum had also emphasised both. 
Colvile stressed combining fire and movement and section commanders' duties, 
implicitly acknowledging low-level initiative, as did his insistence that: 'every man in 
the ranks' was to know his views. Colvile's instruction included an extract from 
Buller's Aldershot Memorandum. That this document had reached Gibraltar, suggests 
that it had been widely distributed, increasing its significance. 12 
Colvile's next document, Infantry on the Offensive, noted that, following 1870, the 
British had developed deep, narrow, 3-line brigade attack formations. Colvile analysed 
this in the light of the conditions anticipated in South Africa. Depth was designed to 
defeat counterattacks, to stiffen the firing line before assaUlting, whilst reserves would 
9 Official Records a/the Guards' Brigade in South Africa (1904), pp 11-20. 
10 Chapter 2; PRO 30/40/16 'untitled memorandum.' Henderson had also underestimated firepower, RPs 
7101-23-46 HendersonIRoberts 1899; Chapter 2. 
II Guards p 12; GEOHSA I (1904),p 28. 
IJ Guards pp 11-13 dated 8/10199; Chapter 2. Gibraltar was not under Buller's command. 
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•• 13 penrut pursUIt or cover retreat. These advantages were probably worth the loss of 
firepower against European enemies. Against Boers, whose accuracy was equal to the 
British and who fired faster, Colvile had doubts. He noted superior Boer mobility, their 
inferior artillery and that they had no cavalry. He concluded that, as the Boers lacked 
bayonets, were ill-disciplined and had never let the British assault before, they would 
fire and then retire. Colvile consequently deduced that the British firing lines probably 
would not have to cross bayonets and so could be thinned-out. This would reduce 
casualties and enhance their ability to use ground. As the Boers would rarely 
counterattack, local reserves could also be cut. The second line, intended for pursuit, 
was unlikely to execute this as all Boers were mounted. Therefore Colvile proposed a 2 
rather than 3-line formation. This would have a much stronger firing line, 15 half 
companies (8 in the original) with the same number as supports. It would deploy on a 
wider frontage, (900 as opposed to 580 yards). This was too narrow, judged by 
formations used later in South Africa, but was greater than current British norms. 
Significantly Colvile had already considered loosening formations before he had much 
information on current Boer tactics. He had already appreciated the effects of greater 
firepower. 
Colvile's last instruction was written while moving to the front and was based on 
official and press sources. 14 Firing lines were not to be reinforced prematurely, this had 
caused great loss, and COs were not to keep excessive reserves. At Elandslaagte Boer 
fire had been effective at over 2000 yards, so extension should occur some 2500 yards 
from them. The British had dispensed with 3 lines there, thus enabling more firepower 
to be generated from a broader, shallower formation. Officers should be cautious in 
exposing themselves, but it was their duty to lead. Colvile clearly saw the need to 
maximise protection and firepower. He also added: 'interference with subordinates 
Il Guards pp 13-17 dated 12111/99. 
14 Ibid pp 18-20 dated 16/11/99. 
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during an action is likely to do more hann than good.' This recognised the difficulties of 
commanders exercising close control under heavy fire and the need for subordinate 
initiative.ls The counter to Boer mobility was a small party and machine gun on the 
exposed flank. Their fire would prevent the Boers withdrawing. This suggests that 
Colvile recognised machine guns' firepower comparatively early. In 1899 they, partly 
due to their perceived mechanical unreliability, were poorly regarded. 16 
No tactical instructions issued by Methuen have survived, but an officer reported 
the changes that he introduced before action: 
an example of [Methuen's] practical methods: officers are to discard their useless 
swords and carry rifles .... to confuse the Boer marksmen. All the old Aldershot 
Drill Book Tactics are to be abolished & we shall adopt very extended order, men 
getting quickly from rock to rock, irregularity of line being sought & "regular 
dressing" being avoided. 17 
'[F]rom rock to rock' suggests Frontier experience as the area of Methuen's advance is 
rolling veldt. There rocks do not provide cover except immediately around kopjes. Also 
Methuen's points suggest recent combat experience against modem weapons. His 
previous career, except his Tirah service, had not stressed low-level tactics. IS 
Furthermore Verner, an advocate of Frontier-style tactics, was on his staff, while the 
KOYLI, one of Methuen's units, had served in Tirah and had benefitted tactically. 
Some of Methuen's units practiced open-order formations before combat: 
we had drummed it into our men that they must keep widely extended so they 
kept about 6 or 10 paces apart while the Grenadiers were crowded to 1 ... & 
suffered accordingly. 19 
IS Three British generals were early casualties: Symons, Buller and Methuen, Chapter 9. 
16 Maj Longstaff & AH Atteridge The Book o/the Machine Gun (1917), pp 137-8. The work is technical 
assessment and is backed by an impressive bibliography. Colvile had served in Uganda and may have 
seen their value there. 
17 BaPs 7807-23 Reel 1 18/11199. 
18 Having visited both the Khyber and Methuen's route, this seems likely. That Methuen was stressing 
irregularity of formation before seeing action in South Africa himself suggests recent combat experience. 
As Chapter 2 argues Tirah was the probable cause; Lt Col Verner 'The Naval Brigade at Graspan' MAl 81 
(1900),p 338 describes kopjes. These are relatively isolated but in the dead ground at their base. extended 
order is unnecessary; Glossary. 
19 Chapter 2; Maj Gen Maurice BROHSA 1 P 224; Amery THWSA II P 339. That both works praise the 
KOYLls suggests a strong impression; BaPs Reel 1 18/11/99. 
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The latter seems to have been an unofficial prewar nonn for British-based units. This 
also suggests that Colvile's instructions were poorly implemented. 
Roberts published tactical instructions soon after arriving at Capetown.20 Already, 
advised by Kitchener, he had demanded more machineguns and was considering 
whether to request QF guns?1 In his fIrst instruction Roberts noted: 'remarkable' Boer 
mobility, marksmanship and entrenchment. Direct attacks would fail, so: '[t]he only 
chance of success lies in being able to turn one or both flanks' or threaten Boer 
communications. Both demanded great mobility, thus Roberts stressed horsemastership 
and mounted reconnaissance. He recommended early deployment from marching 
columns, with 6-8 paces between men. This would increase battalion and company 
commanders' responsibilities so they should have the objective explained to them. This 
implies that they did not previously.22 Roberts emphasised cover and its exploitation to 
enfilade the enemy, suggesting he understood modem firepower. He would judge 
officers: 'by the initiative displayed in seizing rapidly every opportunity to further the 
general scheme of attack.' Henderson's 1899 Lecture may have stimulated his emphasis 
on initiative.23 Roberts noted that the RA had adapted well to local conditions, but he 
stressed the need for thorough artillery preparation of attacks. But he warned that, until 
infantry advanced within 900 yards of the enemy, artillery would have no target as the 
Boers would remain in cover. Consequently fire was to continue: 'until the assault is 
about to be delivered.' More effective artillery support was necessary to combat greater 
defensive firepower. But synchronising artillery fire and assaults demanded better 
signals and staffwork; both were to pose problems for the British. 
Notes for Guidance in South African Warfare is shorter and was pitched at a lower 
20 RPs 7101-23-111-1 COSCM 5 26/1/00. Roberts had the benefits of 'Black Week.' 
21 RobertslLansdowne 27/12199. 
11 Chapter 2 suggests that orders before action were rare. 
lJ GEOHSA I P 245; Chapter 2. 
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level judging by its contents.24 In it Roberts stressed quick cavalry scouting and 
reducing horse loads. Artillery was to exploit its mobility to counter long-range Boer 
guns. Others had deduced this already, possibly explaining Long's action at Colenso. 
Roberts recommended that batteries should advance alternately and were to be well 
separated. This had already occurred at Elandslaagte and differed from normal tactics.25 
Roberts also appreciated the importance of mobility, reorganised his transport to 
increase it and levied more mounted troops as Chapter 5 describes. 
General Kelly-Kenny's Standing Orders and Instructions, issued after December 
1899 began by impressing: 
on all ranks the necessity of bringing common sense to bear in the execution of 
regulations ... Jt is not by blind adherence to the rules of war, ... that success can 
be commanded. It is necessary to consider how far our teaching must be modified 
to meet...-Smokeless powder ... [and] [i]ncreased [enemy] mobility.26 
That Kelly-Kenny cited smokeless ammunition suggests that he had analysed tactics 
carefully. He felt that both these points had to be considered when applying regulations. 
That his orders were addressed to 'all ranks' suggests that he saw low-level initiative as 
important. Smokeless ammunition meant that locating defenders was hard, thus 
strengthening the defence, while Boer mobility would prevent outflanking unless British 
mobility improved. Kelly-Kenny considered that the Boers had selected defensive 
positions well. They were highly mobile, had good combat intelligence and laid 
ambushes effectively. They had neither counterattacked failed British assaults, nor had 
hardly attacked tactically. British attack formations, therefore, should sacrifice depth for 
width. Colvile had also stressed this. The British should use their mobility to tum or 
outflank Boer positions. They should try to kill the Boer horses, thus destroying their 
mobility. In attack the British should seize temporary positions, which could be 
24 RPs 710 1-23-111-1 F69 512100. 
uGEOHSA I pp 60-1: Maj QeD Marshall 'Remarks on Royal Artillery Drills 1899' PRAI XXVI (1899).p 
542; Chapter 2. 
26 GEOHSA I P 248. That the Germans received this suggests access to official British data. 
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entrenched by night. Such methodical tactics were used at Paardeberg. He noted that 
lateral extension increased low-level responsibility so subordinates must display 
initiative.27 Finally he stressed cunning and concealment by all ranks, recognising the 
importance of initiative and fieldcraft. Kelly-Kenny's analysis involved both manoeuvre 
and more positional tactics. That he stressed initiative is significant; his last experience 
of combat had been in Abyssinia and it may indicate that there had been a coordinated 
attempt to introduce more initiative as Chapter 2 suggests. 
There are a number of common strands in the above analysis. Firstly tactics had 
started to change as operations started. Colvile's first instruction suggests that Buller's 
Memorandum had a positive effect. That fieldcraft, extension, and initiative were 
stressed from before the war's start suggests recent combat experience had caused these 
changes. Tirah, rather than the Sudan, was the most likely source. 
The Germans suggest that other generals analysed tactics before operations began. 
On the voyage south Gatacre, Methuen and Clery examined the war's likely course.28 
Warren wargamed river crossings, countering Boer mobility and using artillery in close 
country. He questioned the British ability to outflank the Boers, preferring intense 
shelling and direct assaults. The British should advance through close country to 
counter Boer marksmanship. 
Tactical Change during Operations 
Many commentators have seen British performance in South Africa as 
very poor. Reality was more complex and in certain ways British training and tactics in 
1902 was worse than in 1899.29 Tweebosch in 1902 saw ill-trained, uncohesive troops 
21 There are similarities with Roberts' Instruction of 26/1100; Kelly-Kenny's instruction probably 
followed Roberts'. 
21 GEOHSA I pp 71, 130; W Williams The Life o/General Sir Charles Warren (Oxford 1942).p 253; Ibid 
p 2S 1 reproducing letter WarrenIWolseley 2111199; SM Miller Lord Methuen and The British Army 
~ 999),pp 78-9 citing contemporary material. 
FM Carver 'The Boer War' JRUSIDS 144 (1999), p 80. 
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disintegrate, while Talana and Elandslaagte in 1899 had seen generally good tactics.3o 
The war's first tactical phase, lasting approximately to Bergendal in late August 1900, 
was broadly conventional and generally mobile; the second involved very mobile, 
counter-guerrilla operations, balanced by large static British garrisons on the 
blockhouse lines.31 
Talana was a success, marred by the cavalry's poor performance, despite the fact 
that they had manoeuvred into a potentially decisive position. The infantry attack, made 
in an extended fonnation, covered by gunfire, drove the Boers off a potentially strong 
position. The attack was undoubtedly slower than Symons wished, infantry/artillery 
communications were poor and the RA felt that their support could have been more 
effective. Tempo was further lost when Symons was wounded. This also may explain 
why the artillery did not shell the retreating Boers.32 Still it was a technical victory and 
hit Boer morale. It was the product in part of good training and Frontier experience. The 
Germans praised it. 33 
Elandslaagte was marked by a high casualty ratio of defenders to attackers. 
Hamilton, the infantry commander, was a Tirah veteran and commanded 2 battalions 
with Tirah service. He had practised his brigade in extended-order tactics previously. 
Cavalry reconnaissance located the Boers.34 The plan combined frontal attack, designed 
to pin the Boers down, with outflanking by 3 battalions supported by cavalry. Artillery 
covered the attack effectively; batteries leapfrogged forwards, a tactical innovation. The 
Devons attacked frontally with 3 companies on a 700-yard front. Contemporary British 
30 Report Lieut-General Methuen ... Tweebosch (1902), P 4. 
31 WO 3218079; RCWSA Report pp 72-4. Though troop-densities were low, the lines'lengths meant that 
overall garrisons were large. 
32 Chapter 5; LS Amery THWSA II (1902), pp 170-1; Maurice BROHSA I P 131 states 10 paces extension 
The Times 23/10/99 notes magnificent artillery support and effective fire by 2 maxims. 'Men at the Front' 
Pen Pictures of the War (1900), pp 28-9 describes the artillery's advance; SAD I P 5; Ibid 'Elandslaagte' 
pp 6-8; Maj Gen Headlam The History of the {RAJ III (Woolwich 1940),p 316; MURPs 'RA Report 
Talana. ' 
))Maj Crum With the Mounted Infantry in South Africa (Cambridge 1903),pp 1-2. Crum's unit was in 
South Africa prewar and be stressed their intelligent training, stalking and shooting. He suggests that 
Symons, the GOC, had influenced this; EPs 8704-35-818 pp 56-7 citing Maj Balek; GEOHSA I P 34. 
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nonns would have put nearly 2 battalions on the same distance. Finally cavalry charged 
the retreating Boers successfully, having outflanked them. 
Methuen at both Belmont and Graspan captured Boer positions through a 
combination of night marches, tactical outflanking, generally extended fonnations and 
effective artillery support.35 That the Boer positions were sited on kopjes helped. 
Consequently the defenders' fire was less effective, while the crests furnished an easy 
target for British artillery. Methuen was unable to pursue after his victories as he had 
insufficient mounted troops whose horses were unfit. 36 Command failure marred 
Modder River. Methuen personally advanced too far and was wounded; the ensuing 
switch of command allowed the Boers to withdraw their guns. Here the Boers changed 
tactics, abandoning hilltop positions for lower ground which maximised the effects of 
flat-trajectory fire. At Modder the British found that heavy shelling was necessary to 
counter greater Boer defensive firepower. 
The 3 defeats of 'Black Week' in December 1899: Stonnberg, Magersfontein and 
Colenso were a blow as the early successes had further raised British confidence. 
Colenso, due to incoherent orders, insufficient reconnaissance, divided command, and a 
plan with little inter-fonnation coordination, appears to have been hopeless from the 
start. 37 Indeed some have argued that the battle was intended only as a reconnaissance 
and not an attempt to relieve Ladysmith. Gatacre's force achieved surprise at Stonnberg 
and, but for poor navigation and the troops' tiredness, caused by bad staffwork, nearly 
won.38 At Magersfontein a detachment broke through, but poor communications 
)4 Chapter2; HPs 3155-33 pp 4-6. 
'''Amery THWSA II pp 194-5,189,184 footnote; Chapter 6; GEOHSA I P 80 criticises Methuen for 
making frontal attacks. At Belmont he tried to outflank, Amery THWSA II P 327, similarly at Graspan, 
Miller Methuen pl00, but poor mobility prevented both attempts succeeding. 
l6 Glossary; Maj Baden-Powell War in Practice (1903),pp 121-2 analyses terrain's effect; Maj Gen 
Smith A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa /899-/902 (1919),pp 17,18. 
37 BROHWSA I pp 243-4; Williams Warren p 360; Glossary; BROHWSA I P 259, two batteries fired over 
1000 rounds, the war's heaviest daily expenditure by individual batteries, LS Amery THWSA VI (1909),p 
481; JB Allay Lord Haliburton (1909),p 227. 
lIAmery THWSA II pp 381-2. Gataere's division was fragmented, its stafTwork was poor, Maj Pollock 
With Seven Generals in the Boer War (1900),pp 58-60,66-68. 
82 
prevented exploitatio~ while prior bombardment, as at Colenso, prejudiced surprise; 
Methu~ like Buller at Colenso, failed to use his reserves fully.39 
Buller's outflanking move to Spion Kop was slow. Buller disorganised the 
command system during the operation with adverse results.4o A single brigade assaulted 
the Kop which was exposed to converging Boer fire, while terrain prevented most 
British pieces from replying effectively. Too many troops were crowded onto the 
objective, suggesting that senior officers had underestimated firepower, while C3 
failures contributed to the defeat.41 Buller aborted Lyttelton's attempt, skilfully 
conducted by a KRRC battalion using skills learned on the Frontier, to outflank the 
Boers enfilading Spion Kop. Vaalkrantz was also fought by one brigade more or less in 
isolation, though on more favourable ground. 42 Artillery fire was still poorly 
coordinated with infantry movement; there were no infantry feints, though artillery 
deception was used, while Buller failed to persist in attacking. However artillery was 
centralised and used in mass. Buller's force developed both these tactics later.43 
The relief of Ladysmith saw varied tactical performance. Effective 
infantry/artillery cooperation, massed infantry covering fire, good infantry minor tactics 
and fieldcraft and inter-formation cooperation ensured the speedy clearance of the 
Tugela's south bank. Whether Buller was personally responsible for these tactical 
changes is doubtful. 44 The second phase saw Buller shift his axis into cramped terrain 
39CPS 2/4/12 Foreign Journals ... South Africa p 32. Spion Kop and Vaalkrantz were similarly criticised. 
40 EPs 8704-35-818-54; Ellison blamed Buller's administrative preoccupation; nominally Warren 
commanded, Coke took over his division yet Buller recommended Thomeycroft, CO of a unit, to 
command on Spion Kop where at one stage a divisional and 2 brigade commanders were also present. 
Clery nominally commanded at Colenso. but Buller ordered withdrawal. 
41 B Williams THWSA III (1905).p 256; SKDs (1902), p 38; GEOHSA II (1906). pp 168-70. 
42 Williams THWSA III p 276; KRRCCC(1901). p 92, Lyttelton commended their skirmishing. but he was 
also a rifleman; Capt Wake 'The Capture of Twin Peaks' KRRCC(1909).p 125; SWPs 13/23 
HamiltonIWillcinson 8/3/00. 
4) Lyttelton's brigade received excellent support, Col Stone The Employment of Heavy Artillery in the 
Field (Woolwich 1909),p 24; Williams THWSA III P 314; GEOHSA II pp 211.216-8. 
44 Artillery was to open flJ'e once infantry made the Boers to reveal themselves; Maj Oen Maurice 
BROHSA II (I907).p 447 citing 2 Division Order 18/2/00; Williams THWSA III, pp 504-6; Amery 
THWSA III pp 504-6 attributes these tactics to Lyttelton. Warren also had stressed flJ'e and direct attacks. 
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north of Colenso where British combat power was ineffective as there was insufficient 
room to deploy. Hart's brigade made an isolated attac~ poorly supported by artillery, 
and was penned against the Tugela.45 The last attack saw Buller switch his axis to 
assault Pieter's directly. Here more of his Army could fight, massed artillery could 
support assaults effectively and observation was easier.46 Artillery tactics were changing 
to emphasise firing until the last minute, with the ranges lengthened when troops 
assaulted.47 Howitzers shelled positions on reverse slopes, defiladed from British 
guns.48 Buller's CRA, Col Parsons, issued special orders and sited batteries personally. 
Parsons' pennanent grouping of batteries improved coordination. Artillery, supported 
by heavy small anns fire, caused many Boer casualties. Despite this Buller failed to 
pursue.49 
Roberts stressed mobility, deception and surprise; his force was more mobile than 
Buller's, partly because it had more horses and mules, partly because its transport had 
been reorganised, equipment shed and its mounted troops massed in a division. Roberts 
took logistic risks, cutting rations in contrast to Buller. French's cavalry operation to 
relieve Kimberley was based on speed, surprise and a mixture of deception and security, 
but horsemastership was poor. This damaged mobility later. French's charge at Klip 
Drift was significant for future tactics. 50 Contrastingly Buller's operations were 
sluggish. Roberts admittedly was moving in flatter country but was equally hampered 
by heat and water shortages and was operating at the end of longer lines of 
communication.51 Despite poor British staffwork, Cronje was surrounded at Paardeberg, 
45 GEOHSA II pp 266-7; G Powell Buller: A Scapegoat? (1994), pp 173-4 defends Buller's shift. Having 
seen the ground I am unpersuaded; General Altham The Principles of War (1914),p 131. 
46 CPs 2/4/14. 
47 RCWSA Evidence II p 233. Also seen at Spion Kop, EPs 8704-35-17. 
41 Maj Molony 'Pieter's Hill: A Tactical Study' PPCREs XXX (Chatham 1904),p 264. Boer positions 
were sited to counter Direct Fire. Glossary. Chapter 4. 
49 D Reitz Commando (1968),pp 86-9; RCWSA Evidence II p 661 for Barton's complaint; Churchill 
London to Ladysmith (l900).p 455; Chapter 5. 
SG Maurice BROHSA II, P 16; EPs 8704-35-818-55; Chapter 5; THWSA III P 395. Horses and mules were 
faster than oxen and did not halt for hours to graze. but. unlike oxen, they needed forage supplies. 
" Chapter 5; Roberts/Lansdowne 1612100. 
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but Kitchener coordinated the initial attacks poorly. Inadequate signals and Kitchener' s 
ambiguous status contributed to this, while it was necessary to attack Cronje 
immediately to prevent a breakout. But isolated, weak attacks, poorly supported by 
artillery, failed with heavy casualties. Paardeberg then became a siege in which sapping, 
night attacks and heavy shelling finally compelled Cronje's surrender. Though this 
combination was tactically effective, the lesson which contemporaries emphasised most 
was the manoeuvre which encircled Cronje.52 
Thereafter the heavy casualties that his force had suffered in the first assault at 
Paardeberg largely deterred Roberts from attacking frontally. The major exception was 
Driefontein, where Kelly-Kenny made a frontal attack, well supported by artillery, and 
inflicted heavy casualties. 53 Roberts' artillery provided poor support at Paardeberg and 
later at Doornkop. Contrastingly Buller's artillery was very effective from Pieter' s. 54 
Roberts' force occupied Bloemfontein and then Pretoria. Due to his numerical 
superiority and improved mobility, the Boers were unable to resist his advance, but in 
tum Roberts proved unable to encircle them. In his advance the problems were logistic. 
Failure to provide sufficient forage killed many animals and disease, exacerbated by 
scanty rations and limited medical support, many men. As Roberts marched on Pretoria, 
the Boers adopted guerrilla warfare. 
Roberts' and Buller's forces differed tactically; Buller's was obliged to break 
through. His force was too immobile to outflank as both Colenso and the move to Spion 
Kop had demonstrated. Consequently it emphasised combat power, particularly massed 
artillery used close to assaUlting infantry. It has been suggested that this was effectively 
a creeping barrage. Though there were similarities in the synchronisation of fire and 
movement, there were also substantial differences. Creeping barrages were fired 
S2 Amery THWSA III pp 447-51,452-3. 
5lRoberts did not support frontal attacks, RPs71 0 1-23-11 0-1 Irish Manoeuvres Memorandum 6n /99. He 
was criticised for overemphasising outflanking, GEOHSA II pp 337-8; THWSA III pp 581,585. 
S48 Williams THWSA IV (19060,p 144. 
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Indirect, thus needing careful calculation and planning. Buller's pieces, except the 
howitzers, frred Direct. Buller's formations concentrated machine guns, sometimes 
brigading them as at Vaalkrantz, and massed riflemen to cover attacks. 55 Good 
Infantry/Artillery cooperation was crucial at Pieter' s. 56 
Common failings affected both Buller and Roberts. Both found it hard to 
synchronise attacks so that formations attacked simultaneously. Poor communications, 
undertrained staffs lacking common procedures, improvised formations and 
unnecessary changes of command caused this. 57 Generals, however capable in smaller 
expeditions, found it hard to adapt to using staffs. Under both operation orders were 
poorly written. Both CinCs failed to attack relentlessly. 58 One can speculate, though not 
prove, that this partly explains why 1914-18 attacks were continued over-long. The 
Germans criticised repeated British failures to reconnoitre and to win fire superiority. 
They felt that the British over-relied on the bayonet and their interarm cooperation was 
poor. Here Langlois argued that the British did not follow their own manuals. 59 The 
Germans condemned British failure to grip the enemy frontally, which would have 
enabled them to outflank and encircle the Boers, but it was hard to pin mobile, wary 
foes in open terrain. 
In the war's anti-guerrilla phase tactics became less relevant to conventional war 
except that: 
mobility, physical and mental, strategical, tactical and individual seemed to be 
supremely requisite ... [It] will be equally valuable in any campaign of any sort 
SS CPs 2/4/14 for Warren and Buller's orders. Buller's did not mention artillery, Warren emphasised close 
artillery support and lengthening ranges as infantry advanced; Powell Scapegoat p 173. 
56 Amery THWSA III P 318; Churchill Ladysmith pp 435-6 noted similar fire support on the Frontier; Lt 
Col Keene 'Medium Guns and Howitzers' lUSII XXXII (1903); Maj Scales Artillery in Small Wars: 
~Ann Arbor 1976), p 206. Chapter 4; Malony Pieter's, p 268; Table 36. 
7 Kitchener's position at Paardeberg and Roberts' subordination of Col vile to Hamilton; Williams 
THWSA IV p 89. 
SlGEOHSA II pp 270-1. White was similarly criticised, Amery THWSA II P 219. Williams THWSA IV pp 
410,412, comments that Roberts' stafTsystem was subject to 'an almost complete breakdown.' His 
private secretary issued many orders. Roberts' Intelligence stafTwas unnecessarily disrupted; Williams 
THWSA III pp 453-5, GEOHSA II P 287. 
59 Qen Langlois Lessons from Two Recent Wars (1909),p 145. The Akers-Douglas criticised the manuals 
heavily. 
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that the future may have in store for US.60 
This was to be significant as the British developed their tactics after 1902. Both sides 
introduced mounted charging tactics in this period. Imperial forces had to maintain 
tempo in pursuing guerrillas. The Boers' firepower was now insufficient to stop 
mounted assaults and they had to withdraw if they were to survive. Consequently 
British mounted troops often charged positions.61 Similarly poor British marksmanship 
allowed Boers to attack on horseback firing rifles.62 This gave ammunition to those who 
argued that shock was still viable. Raids on Boer laagers re-emphasised night 
operations' value after the failed night attacks during Black Week. 63 
That the guerrilla phase was both longer and followed conventional operations, 
may have led to some of the latter's lessons being underemphasized. But widely 
dispersed anti-guerrilla operations gave great scope to younger commanders, amongst 
whom were Haig, Allenby and Gough. South Africa saw a generational change with 
younger officers coming forward. In contrast Kitchener's attempts to control numerous 
mobile columns from Pretoria overstrained the communications net and often proved 
ineffective.64 
The Guerrilla phase's high mobility was balanced by the construction of some 
3700 miles of blockhouses. Initially these were designed to protect railways, but from 
June 1901 cross-country lines were built to counter Boer mobility. Modem rifles' 
firepower and the absence of Boer artillery meant that these could be held by 30 men 
per mile. The men thus saved were available for offensive operations. But dispersal 
demanded much of junior leaders.65 
60 GEOHSA II pp 329-31; GEOHSA I P 28; GEOHSA II P 328-9,337; E Childers THWSA V (1906),p xii. 
61 HWPs 6503-39-12 pi; Lt Col Pilcher Some Lessons From the Boer War (1903), P 14. 
62 RCWSA Evidence I p 288; HamPs 2/3/1 HarniltonIRoberts13/11/01; L Oppenheim 'The Fight at 
Rooival (50)' 19C U (1902), P 910. 
63 Childers THWSA V pp 329-30; GEOHSA I P 28; Belmont. Spion Kop, the Ladysmith sorties. 
~able 25. Capt Grant BROHWSA IV (1910), P 338 lists 45 columns operating in the ORC in 4 months. 
65 Ibid p 570; Ibid P 572; Ibid p 575. 
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Transport was again reorganised in November 1900 to increase mobility further. 
This was a reversion towards the regimental system. Roberts issued memoranda on 
reducing horse-loads and on animalmastership.66 Both were critical for mobility and 
were developed from 1902. 
The Immediate Analysis 
The Anny produced an elaborate series of reports on South Africa. This effort 
exceeded that carried out immediately after 1918 and was the first major British attempt 
to gather data systematically after a war. There were four broad categories of report; 
Army HQ South Africa initiated the first, the WO the second, these were mainly 
concerned with weapons and equipment, third were works written later such as the 
Medical and Veterinary Histories. Finally there were individual reports.67 
Roberts, possibly prompted by Brackenbury, the Director Ordnance, established 
committees to consider organisation and equipment issues at Pretoria. Reports from the 
Cavalry, 7 and 11 Divisions, the Provost Marshal, the Lines of Communication, the 
REs, the Chaplains, the AOD, and Army signals resulted.68 No field artillery report 
survives but Headlam refers to the Pretoria Committee, which examined all categories 
of artillery. HQ SAFF initiated a report on heavy artillery, probably based on the 
Pretoria Committee's work. This was later incorporated into the WO Report.69 
French established 3 boards under Generals Dickson, Broadwood and Gordon to 
examine respectively: personnel and organisation: equipment: horses and mobility. 
Dickson's recommendations were most controversial. He criticised both officer and 
soldier standards, this suggests the Cavalry's manning problems. Better quality 
personnel would enhance initiative, allowing more extended formations to be used. 70 
66 Ibid pp 598-9; RPs 7101-23-111-1 F68 'COSCM 8;' RPs 7101-23-111-2 F663 'COSCM 11.' 
67 Table 6; eg Grierson's, WO 108/184. 
61 Dated 9/6/00. Respectively WO 108/250, 1081254, 108/253, 108/251. RE no reference, 108/255, AOD 
reproduced on WO 1 081245, WO 1 08/256. 
69 Headlam RA III, Appendix G; Circular letter 10/11100; WO 108/266 p 125 et seq. 
70 WO 1081250 p 3. 
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French disagreed with their criticisms of officer standards and felt that they were over-
harsh on soldiers. Dickson's Board recommended one machine gun per squadron, an 
RHA battery and 2 porn poms per brigade and another divisional RHA battery. This 
recommendation would have substantially increased cavalry firepower above prewar 
norms. Manoeuvre was to be enhanced by an extra squadron per regiment. They did not 
denigrate shock, recommending that each brigade should have a lancer regiment. They 
considered that shock was: 'of primary importance.' However they later stressed that a: 
'more prominent position must be given to .... training .. .in the use of the fire weapon.' 
This generic designation suggests that cavalry might be rifle-armed in future.71 Dickson 
recommended brigading regiments: 'as much as possible with RHA.' This would have 
facilitated inter-arm coordination, making artillery support more effective. He 
considered that the IGC should limit his activities below brigades. This would give 
brigadiers more responsibility, thereby encouraging initiative. Musketry should be 
carried out throughout the year to improve marksmanship. One notes a balance between 
shock and fire and concern with initiative and interarm cooperation. 
Broadwood's board recommended lighter equipment to improve mobility. 72 
Carbines were too short-ranged, so they advocated rifles, while pointing swords should 
replace the current weapons. They proposed one Maxim per squadron and 2 porn poms 
per brigade. Gordon's team examined horses, transport and remounts. Their detailed 
report, commended by French, emphasised mobility. Entrenching tools were to be 
carried with squadrons, recognising dismounted action's importance. They 
recommended lightening horse-loads. Carbines were inferior so they stated: 'if a cavalry 
man is called upon, as he is now, to act repeatedly on foot, he should be armed with a 
weapon as good as his infantry comrade.' 73 All 3 boards urged extra firepower. This 
71 WO 1081250, pp 3-4. 
nlbid p 5. 
13 WO 108/250 pp 13,12. French proposed to report seperarately on remounts. 
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was not strictly within their tenns of reference, but their joint approach suggests that 
cavalry attitudes were changing towards dismounted action and increased fire support. 
Modern theory argues that enhancing firepower increases mobility. Their reports were 
later carefully analysed in Britain. 74 
The infantry committees stuck more to their terms of reference and consequently 
are less valuable. Pole-Carew established a committee of all his battalion COs presided 
over by a brigadier to produce 11 Division's report. This recommended more initiative 
for company commanders. Three officers were needed per company, demands for MI 
and staff officers had impaired companies' efficiency, while demands for good soldiers 
for signalling, MI and other duties were: 'most serious.' Implicitly this recognised the 
new importance of individuals and initiative, as well as the greater tactical importance 
of companies. They recommended many improvements to rifles, most significantly 
cliploading which would increase the rate of fire and lighter, more practical equipment. 
They stressed the need for more entrenching tools, recognition of protection. All section 
commanders should carry binoculars, again recognising low-level initiative. They were 
unimpressed with machine guns, though allowing their defensive value. This is 
probably due to the fact that Roberts' force was manoeuvring rather than breaking 
through. The machine gun report contradicted them.75 
A committee, chaired by a Tirah veteran, drafted the 7 Division report. They felt 
that entrenching tools should be improved, and cliploading introduced, reservists were 
undisciplined and punishments on operations were insufficient, but they concluded, 
rather against the trend of their previous remarks, by recommending more scope for 
low-level initiative. Their GOC stressed efficient signallers, lighter, more practical 
equipment and criticised reservists' indiscipline.76 
7. WO 3216781: Chapter 5. 
75 WOI08/253 pp 5,5-6. 6-10; UMIU7/2462 para 29 noted binoculars aided musketry; Chapter 4. 
76 WOI08/253 pp 10-12; 1-2. 
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The signals and the signals equipment reports are short but significant. Poor 
communications had caused several defeats.77 General Macdonald commented that: 
the want of cohesion between co-operating columns, owing to the failure of the 
system of communications, has been .... a very great...cause of the prolongation of 
h . 78 t e ... campaign. 
The Director of Signals noted that: '[ t ]he present system of organisation is entirely 
regimental, ... [while] the numbers of trained men .... .is inadequate for war purposes.' He 
complained that WEs 1898 did not establish signallers at force HQ, the Director of 
Signals' staff officer, or the cavalry divisional signals officer. Formation HQs needed 
mounted signallers as marching men delayed mounted staffs. Brigades should have a 
signals officer and dedicated signallers. Infantry and cavalry units needed more 
signallers, RHA and RF A units had none, while RGA signallers required extra training. 
The SAFF had only managed to communicate by robbing units to equip HQs. 
Macdonald outlined in the report a proposal by his BM, a Tirah veteran, who had seen 
similar communications problems there, to establish formation telephone-detachments 
that would provide line down to battalions.79 
Logistics and transport were examined carefully. The ASC conducted much of this 
internally and established a new corps magazine to stimulate thought. 80 Boards of 
enquiry held after significant defeats also provide tactical data. 81 Whether Buller's force 
conducted a comprehensive reporting exercise is unclear, there are references to artillery 
and medical reports, but the only survivor is logistical. 82 There were many unofficial 
works analysing the war including works by Callwell, May and Pilcher. But perhaps the 
most significant was The Times History. Written to stimulate reform, it had privileged 
n WO 108/256, WO 108/278 'Spion Kop' p 16; Coke's Memorandum, RCWSA Evidence II. 
71 WO 108/256 p 3. 
79 WO 108/256 p 3; WO 108/278 P 9 No 1 06; Ibid pp 24, 4-6, RCWSA Evidence II Haig Qs 19498-19501. 
10 ASCQ 1 (1905), p 1. 
I. Eg WO 3217904 Uitval's Nek; WO 3217949 'Nooitgedacht;' RMMISAs I: 'Whether commanders who 
meet with a reverse ... should face a court-martial?' 
12 WOI08/265 p 21 fn·; WOI08/268. 
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access to official material and serving officers wrote the technical chapters in its 
Volume VI.83 
Conclusions 
Smokeless ammunition and extra firepower, generated principally by magazine 
rifles had altered battlefield conditions greatly. Infantry went into the early South 
African battles deployed as tightly as 1-2 paces between men. By 1902 they extended 
up to 30. Fieldcraft became essential against enemy fire and this individual skill 
combined with dispersion meant that subordinate initiative was vital. Extra firepower 
became essential to counter enhanced enemy fire. Artillery support had to be 
coordinated with the Infantry movement, with pieces firing to the last safe moment. 
Preliminary shelling were shown as pointless, at least on the scale possible in South 
Africa. Destruction depends on the absolute weight of attack and there were not enough 
pieces to generate the firepower needed. It should be noted that, though Boer defences 
were impressive, they were not on the scale of those constructed in Manchuria or 
Flanders, so there was little need to destroy them. Neutralisation sufficed. It is probably 
for this reason that the RA remained satisfied with shrapnel as its prime field gun 
ammunition nature. 
Outflanking was stressed from the war's start, but due to Boer mobility and long-
range weapons, this failed in many early battles as the British were insufficiently 
mobile. South Africa's guerrilla phase reinforced the importance of mobility. Night 
operations were used extensively. 
There was a searching analysis of the war, which, as later chapters argue, deeply 
influenced ideas on tactics and on weapons. Generally mobility was seen as the 
dominant tactical factor, but it would be wrong to argue that firepower and protection 
were consequently neglected. As Chapters 4 and 6 show, the Army enhanced its 
Il LS Amery THWSA VI (1909). P vi. 
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firepower and protection extensively. A veteran summarised the war's effects: 'Paul 
Kruger was the best friend the British Anny ever had.,84 
14 Maj Gen Ellison • Anny Administration' AQ III (1921 ).p 18. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 4. Firepower 
Extreme, depressed pOint-blank or short, end-first or an 'ow, 
From Colesberg Kop to Quagga's Poort, from Ninety-Nine till Now, 
But what I've 'eard the others the others tell an ' I in spots 'av seen, 
There's nothin' this side 'Eaven or 'Ell Ubique doesn't mean! 
South Africa was the first major war in which almost all combatants carried 
small-bore flat-trajectory magazine rifles firing smokeless ammunition. It also saw 
the first extensive deployment of effective machine guns, some QF artillery, HE 
shells and the first modem British use of howitzers firing Indirect. These far-reaching 
technical changes increased firepower significantly. This caused profound alterations 
in the other tactical factors of manoeuvre and protection. Consequently firepower 
was analysed exhaustively. This chapter examines the lessons and their 
implementation. 
Chapter 3 has examined the state of weapons technology in 1899. Neither side 
had fully appreciated how much firepower had increased; both were forced to alter 
their tactics from the start of fighting. Artillery was undergoing the most radical 
technical change and is therefore analysed in the greatest depth here. Furthermore it 
was the arm with greatest potential firepower, though Boer rifles caused most British 
casualties. 
The RA in 1899 
The RA in 1899 had both strengths and weaknesses. Its officers were recruited 
from the more able, its organization developed initiative and its unit training was 
thorough, though sometimes unrealistic. 1 That it was not regimentally-based 
developed professionalism. It had its own institute and journal, both encouraged 
study. Infantry and cavalry did not enjoy these advantages.2 The RA had developed 
a field artillery 'doctrine' based on rapid advances and short-range Direct Fire. 
I Maj Gens Callwell and Headlam The History o/the [RA] I (Woolwich nd), pp 238-242. 
1 Brig Bidwell Gunners at War (1970), Chapter 3; Glossary. 
94 
Though generally suited to Colonial warfare, it was primarily derived from Gennan 
experience from 1866-1870 and later trials. Scales argues that the RA's tactics were 
primarily derived from colonial warfare, but it is more correct to say that that both 
had influenced pre-1899 artillery tactics. 3 
Britain lagged behind France and Gennany in its proportion of artillery to 
infantry. The Army had not fought a well-anned enemy since 1856 and the other 
anns were ignorant of artillery's power.4 Some gunners regarded their ann as 
technical and therefore a purely artillery matter. The exact reasons for this are 
unclear but gunners underwent a more intense education than Infantry or Cavalry and 
historically had been organisationally separated from them. Gennan gunners were 
equally guilty of this failing.s The RA gave great independence to BCs, while field 
artillery units were improvised. This unconsciously strengthened batteries. A unit 
deploying in 1899 was: 'collected - the [CO] from Lucknow, the adjutant from 
Rawalpindi, and the batteries from Secunderabad, Ahmednagar, and Deesa.' 
Consequently batteries were unused to cooperating together or with other anns. 
Tactical performance suffered. In colonial warfare primitive enemies and stretched 
logistics meant that little artillery was usually needed or could deploy, so this fault 
was under-appreciated. 6 Tirah had demonstrated both the dangers of improvised 
gunner units and the need for effective artillery support, but there was insufficient 
time for remedial action before 1899.7 Furthermore a single artillery unit for a 2-
brigade infantry division was clumsy, despite brigade-divisions being the accepted 
l Call well & Headlam RA I pp 255-6, pp i-ii; Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfmgen trans Maj Walford Letters 
on Artillery (Woolwich 1887) was very influential. It was based on 1870's lessons; Maj Scales 
Artillery in Small Wars (Ann Arbor I 976),p 2. 
4 Table 15; Maj Gen Headlam History of the [RAJ II (Woolwich 1937),pp vii,l; Chapter 2. 
S They had been under the Ordnance, not the CinC, while gunners were educated at the long-
established RMA. Maj Williams-Wynn 'The Brigade System in the Royal Field Artillery' PRAI 
XXXII (1905-6),pp 17-8; Callwell & Headlam RA pp 2,5 ; LS Amery THWSA VI (1909),p 477. Maj 
Head 'Knowledge of the Use of Artillery' JRUSI XLVIII (1904),p 1172; ED Brose The Kaiser's 
Army (Oxford 2001). pp 98-9. Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen Letters pp 71-74. 
6 Headlam RA III (Woolwich 1940).p 484; Col Callwell Small Wars (1906),Chapter 24. 
7 Callwell&Headlam RA I, P 254; Wolseley felt that artillery units' effectiveness was weakened as 
many were split between barracks, WO 279/4 pp viii,7; ARSG /899 (1900),p 8. 
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tactical unit. 8 The abolition of RF A and RHA signallers in 1899 had further 
damaged interarm cooperation. A major field artillery concentration only occurred in 
August 1899 when 17 batteries assembled on Salisbury Plain. But this involved drill 
rather than tactics and was not an all-arms exercise. Senior gunners were unused to 
handling artillery in an all-arms setting. This being so, non-RA commanders were 
likely to be worse.9 Consequently integrating artillery into all-arms tactics would be 
difficult. 10 
The RA's weapons were roughly comparable to other European states for as yet 
only France had developed a true QF gun. British field artillery had been entirely 
gun-armed until 1896, when, common shell having been withdrawn from field guns, 
5" Howitzers were introduced to fire HE. Howitzers were, however, poorly 
understood even by gunners, insufficient numerically and fired too small a shell to 
destroy substantial defences. II 
In the 1 st Boer War little British artillery deployed, its weapons were feeble, 
while its training and tactics were primitive. By 1899 the RA had made great strides, 
it had a tactical doctrine and had improved its gunnery. Extravagant expectations 
were placed on artillery and HE. Many felt that they would offset Boer 
marksmanship, while some argued that the Boer acquisition of artillery would impair 
their mobility. 12 This did not happen. 
Tactical Characteristics: 1899-1902 
Chapter 3 has analysed how new technology enhanced artillery's importance. 
South Africa's open terrain and the consequent long engagement ranges further 
• FAD 1896,p 7; Glossary. 
9 Maj Head 'Knowledge of the Use ofField Artillery' JRUSIXLVIII (1904), pp 1174-5. 
I~S 7101.23·188 Col Chamberlain/Lansdowne 28/8/00, voicing Roberts' views; Artillery Training 
III War (1928) defines artillery's aim as cooperation, thus effectiveness would be problematic. 
II Callwell &Headlam RA I pp 252·3. Ibid P 192. FAD 1896 had no tactical guidance on howitzers. 
12 Capt Thuillier The Principles of Land Defence (1902),p 187; LS Amery THWSA VI (1909).p 477. 
Boer heavy artillery was remarkably mobile. 
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increased this. But the country's size, the resulting logistic problems, combined with 
poor routes, partly counterbalanced its greater effectiveness. 
The Boers were generally better marksmen than the British, and paid great 
attention to entrenchment and concealment, aided by smokeless powder. Boer 
artillery tactics emphasised dispersal, use of cover, extreme-range fire and 
preservation of their pieces ahead of tactical effectiveness. British officers assessed 
these tactics as realistic in view of their numerical inferiority, but they were eccentric 
by European standards. Boer artillery ammunition was unreliable, while poor 
training meant that their frre often failed. An RA committee cautioned: 
[t]hey look upon the Boer War as having afforded much experience and many 
valuable lessons but some of the conditions were exceptional. The war afforded 
no experience of how large numbers of well-served guns firing accurate time 
shrapnel are to be dealt with. This ... will inevitably occur in a European war. 13 
Professor Travers has criticised British reluctance to learn from the war. Here their 
reasons are articulated. 
The Boers deployed siege guns in field operations, contrary to conventional 
orthodoxy. Poor ammunition, inadequate training and their gunpowder propellant 
made them largely ineffective, but they were demoralising and had to be countered. 
This demanded long-range fire so RN, later heavy RGA, guns deployed for this task. 
This was unusual for an Army which traditionally had used lighter weapons in the 
field. Heavier weapons were also better suited to destroy defences. The British had 
mailed attacking Boer-style defences with artillery and small arms. British artillery 
grew in calibre during the war to tackle both tasks and by mid-l 900 the Army was 
convinced that: 
South Africa shows conclusively that in future wars a proportion of heavier 
Il Headlam RA 1I(1937).p 112. At Ladysmith British casualties from artillery were small. despite flre 
converging. RCWSA Evidence I p80. Boer fuzes were unreliable. Spion Kop was the only battle in 
which Boer artillery had a substantial effect. But this was due to terrain and the British plan rather 
than Boer tactics. Amery THWSA VI pp 467-8.479; WO 33/192.p 3. 
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guns than our present field gun, as well as howitzers, will be required. 14 
The war revealed that British field guns were inferior to Boer pieces in range and 
rapidity of fire. IS 
The RA was constrained as, except in Natal, combat was at the end of long, 
low-capacity logistic chains, reliant forward of railhead on animals. This prevented 
prolonged shelling, even though heavy ammunition consumption by contemporary 
standards sometimes occurred. 16 The Boers' long, narrow firing lines and concealed 
trenches were poor targets for shrapnel. Nor could the weight of HE needed to 
destroy defences be generated as there were few HE-capable pieces. Generally, 
however, the neutralising effects of shrapnel proved adequate against Boer defences. 
Lanchester blamed the limited effectiveness of British artillery on Boer dispersion 
and very open terrain; his first point is valid, but the latter is wrong. Open terrain 
favours artillery. 17 
The main small arms lessons stressed snapshooting and independent fire. 
Dispersed enemies using fieldcraft made both essential. At long ranges artillery was 
more effective than rifle fire. The British criticised the fact that the Lee-Metford was 
not cliploading. They felt that cavalry needed rifles, while machine guns should be 
tripod not carriage-mounted. The latter were very visible and hence very vulnerable. 
Implementing the Artillery Lessons 
Introduction 
The following sections examine how artillery was enhanced. The changes were 
14 Maj Gen Hughes Open Fire (1983),pp 56-7. As late as 1917 the British had a lesser proportion of 
heavy artillery than the Continentals; Brig Bidwell and D Graham Fire-Power (1982).p 96. The 
Indian Anny, however, used heavy artillery in the field, Amery THWSA VI P 475; Table 38; 
UMIU7/1558-66IndialLondon 1715/00; REJXXX (1900), ppl94-5 .. 
15 PRO/30/4013 Maj ForsterlEverett 27n/00; WR 3; PRO 30140/16 'Untitled Memorandum Weapons.' 
16 Amery THWSA VI pp 492-3, the war's total artillery ammunition expenditure, some 2800 tons, was 
nearly equalled by one corps in 2 days in 1917, Lt Oen McNaughton The Development of Artillery in 
the Great War (nd) p 18. 
17FW Lanchester Aircraft in War(1916),pp 86-7. The question is covered in the Glossary. Chapter 6 
examines Lanchester's deductions on fieldcraft. 
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made in several ways, by altering organisations to match them with other arms, by 
increasing numbers, by altering the mix of guns and howitzers and by tactical 
changes. Training also improved. A later section covers the development of new 
equipments. 
Increasing Artillery 
British artillery was substantially increased from 1900. This reflects not just the 
lessons from South Africa but the fact that European warfare was now seen as more 
likely. Wolseley had long argued that Britain had too little artillery and the Army 
Board, prompted by Brackenbury, stated in December 1899 that the number of 
available pieces was: 'dangerously low.' 18 Grierson calculated that, in Roberts' 
advance to Pretoria, British norms demanded 26 batteries but there were only 17. 19 
But as the Boers had little artillery, this was less significant in relative terms. 
However, as the absolute weight of gunfire is a key dimension when destroying or 
neutralising defences, the deficiency was potentially important. 20 Repington felt that 
greater enemy firepower demanded more artillery support. Maj Bethell breezily 
summarised a key lesson: '[t]o storm an ordinary position, bring up plenty of 
artillery; to storm a strong position, bring up all the guns you can.' Col Vincent saw 
insufficient British artillery as a critical weakness. He also condemned its inadequate 
range and firepower. 21 
The Anny decided to increase artillery to European norms of 5-6 guns per 1000 
men in mid-1900. The Infantry Division's artillery doubled to two artillery units in 
1902. Now there was one artillery unit per brigade. This would be likely to improve 
"RCWSA Report Appendices D-n p 214 and D-VI 'Col Lloyd;' WO 108/307 pp 115-6. 
19 WO 108/184 P 94. 
20 Bidwell &Graham Firepower p 289. This may explain Lanchester's comment above on open 
terrain, he possibly meant areas. Amery THWSA VI P 485 notes the ineffectiveness of British HE at 
destroying Boer trenches. Though there were technical problems with Lyddite, there were also too few 
~ieces to achieve this. 
1 'Suggestions from the Front. Lessons of the War' 19CXLVIII (1900), P 710; 'Duncan Medal 
Essay' PRAIXXIX (1902-3), p 141; 'Lessons from the War' US~/XXIV (1901),pp 28,34; Table 15; 
Glossary. 
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inter-ann cooperation as the organisations matched. Secondly corps artillery was 
strengthened with twelve 4.7" or 5" heavy guns, increasing both the range and weight 
of fire. Between 1900-1904/5 field artillery increased substantially. Haldane cut 
batteries later, but the British ratio of pieces to men was as great as any other major 
power in 1914.22 
Infantry/Artillery Cooperation 
Improving infantry/artillery cooperation reflected the need to counter increased 
defensive firepower qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Buller stressed that the 
maximum weight of covering fire synchronised with infantry movement was vital in 
attacks. Major Caunter criticised: 
promiscuous shelling of the enemy ... , whilst the infantry remained out of the 
fire until the defenders were considered to have been sufficiently shaken, 
proved worse than useless ... We learnt ... that ... artillery preparation and the 
infantry attack should be very nearly simultaneous.23 
But there was an important caveat; there were no elaborate defences that had to be 
destroyed before assaults were delivered, while there was sufficient artillery to 
neutralise the Boer positions at Pieter's and Bergendal. Both these battlefields were 
of limited extent which meant that the British deficiency in absolute numbers of 
pieces was not critical. Lt Col Murray commented bluntly: 'infantry cannot carry a 
position in the face of the modem rifle unless assisted up to the last moment by 
artillery fire.' The lesson, demonstrated in Tirah, had been insufficiently stressed 
. before 1899.24 Some gunners criticised their own ann: '[i]n this campaign we ... have 
been at our worst in supporting infantry in attack.' Gunner Powell noted: '[ w ] ant of 
combination between infantry and artillery conspicuous. Field Artillery offering 
assaulting columns no support.' That a private saw the problem suggests its scale. 
12 UMIU7/10139 'WO letter 5n1OO;' Table 20. 
DaULPs 2065 MlSS4/18 'Draft Nov 1900' p 2; Caunter Free State. p 33. 
J4 RCWSA Evidence II p 328; IDB 1896'5 S 113 includes artillery. S 114 machine guns. But it does 
not mention intense fire till the last safe moment synchronised with movement. S 124 para 10 and S 
53 are vague on infantry covering fire. while p 125's reference to 'masking' implies that fire till the 
last moment was seen as impossible for technical reasons. In 1900 risks were taken. Glossary. 
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Furthermore it occurred during a critical attack. Callwell stressed synchronising 
shell fire and infantry movement. There were many reasons for poor inter-arm 
cooperation in South Africa. These included fonnation commanders' ignorance of 
artillery, insufficient inter-arm training, the lack ofRFA signallers and the SAFF's 
organisational disarray. 2S Nor had the prewar manuals emphasised inter-arm 
cooperation and close support for as long as safely possible. 
Despite the above problems, Buller's Force, which fought a series of battles 
generally involving frontal assaults on strong positions, forged a system which gave 
close, effective infantry support. Field guns, heavy artillery, mountain guns, 
howitzers and small arms supported the attack at Pieter's. This was the first time that 
the RA had used such a range of weapons to tackle an entrenched position. The 
parabolic trajectories of howitzers were particularly effective for searching into 
trenches and cover.26 Fire was kept up for as long as possible, Buller saw RN guns 
firing their last rounds: 'three feet in front of the leading men,' while 2 West Yorks 
asked for fire till the last moment and suffered several casualties in consequence. The 
weight and concentration of fire were far greater than at Colenso.27 
Improving artillery/infantry cooperation took time and the exact originator of 
this change is hard to establish, if indeed there was one man. Warren, GOC 5 
Division, had advocated heavy gunfire to cover frontal assaults, while Buller's final 
CRA on the Tugela, Col Parsons, was very important. Parsons re-established artillery 
communications and sited his artillery where its fire would be fully effective. 
Ranging and target identification occurred before the attack, and Parsons 
15 Maj Callwell The Tactics of To-day (Edinburgh 1900},p Ill; Ed D Martin Duelling With Long 
Toms (Ilford 1 988}.pp 26-27 dated 2412100. It is a reprinted diary; Maj Callwe 11 'Artillery Notes From 
The Veld (sic)' PRAI XXVIII (I901-2).p 283. 
26 Headlam RA III P 404; Maj Call we II 'The Training. Organisation and Equipment ... of the 
IRGA) ... ;' PRAI XXVIII (1901-2). pp 129-30; FAD 1896 pp 6-7. 
7 RCWSA Evidence II Q1S47S; RH Davis 'The Relief of Ladysmith· SM XXVIII (I900).p 48; Capt 
Dawnay 'Artillery and Infantry in the Final Stages of the Attack' JRA XXXV (1908-9),p 51; Mitten 
at Camberley, it contains DS comment. THWSA VI Part II P 481 stresses effective infantry/artillery 
cooperation in the later Natal battles; Table 36. 
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devised a system of reference points to control and thus concentrate fire. 28 He 
insisted that batteries observed the advancing infantry continuously, thus enabling 
the following tactic to be used: 
[a]s soon as it becomes dangerous to continue firing at the line about to be 
rushed, the guns should slightly increase their range ... so as to bring their 
projectiles to bear on the ground immediately to the rear .... Nothing can be 
worse than for the artillery to cease firing ... when the infantry have .... to 
charge. 29 
Consequently the infantry assaulted while the enemy were still suffering from the 
shelling. Lengthening the range interdicted either reinforcement or retreat. A Boer 
described the results: 
[w]e saw the ridge ... going up in smoke and flame. Of our Pretoria men ... not 
one came back ... The British had blasted a gap through which the victorious 
soldiery came pouring. 30 
Scales argues that Bergendal was the key battle for infantry/artillery cooperation, but 
he does not demonstrate any significant tactical development from Pieter's.31 
After 1902 officers stressed that: 'infantry advancing is dependent for ... 
support on [ artillery] fire.,32 FAT 1902 highlighted infantry support, explaining 
the combination of shrapnel-firing guns neutralising and howitzers searching into 
trenches. It contained new instructions: 
[i]n order to cooperate with the infantry ... the artillery commander must be 
thoroughly acquainted with the general's plan of attack. He must accompany 
the latter in his reconnaissance ... and must receive precise instructions as to 
the role which the artillery is to carry out. 
These would enhance infantry/artillery cooperation greatly. IDB 1896 had been 
28 WW Williams The Life of Sir Charles Warren (Oxford 1941 ),p 251. Williams quoted from 
Warren's contemporary papers; Maj Callwell . A Heavy Battery at the Relief of Ladysmith' PRAI 
XXVII (1900-1),p 142; SAD II (1901),pp 44-5. The batteries enfiladed the Boers. 
29 SAD II (1901 ),p 43; Maj Hamilton-Gordon 'Fourteen days Howitzer work on Service' PRAI XXVII 
(1900-I),p 358; Maj Callwell The Tactics of To-day (1900),p 114. 
30 D Reitz C.ommando (1929),pp 87-8. This is secondary but A Conan Doyle The Great Boer War 
(1900),pp 291-2 supports it; Doyle's book was sent to Boer prisoners who felt that he had 
underestimated Boer casualties from artillery at Pieter's, 'Boer Critics on "The Great Boer War'" 
CHM XI (1901), P 297. 
31 Scales Artillery, pp 232-3. The main target at Bergendal was the tip of a salient angle. This accident 
of ground meant that artillery was more effective than at Pieter's; Lyttelton makes the point. WO 
279/9 p 129; SAD II pp 102-3. 
J2Eg Maj Crowe 'Duncan Medal Essay' PRAI XXVII (1900-1 ),p 286. 
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vague on measures to ensure cooperation, contrastingly FAT J 902 stated: 
'employment of artillery ... depends entirely on the [overall commander's] general 
plan. ,33 Tactical integration of infantry and artillery had increased. FAT also 
emphasised concentrated frre during the assault more than FAD did. FAT saw some 
friendly casualties as tactically preferable to ceasing fire prematurely, which would 
allow enemy infantry to rrre freely on the attackers. This was a major innovation. 
Training directives and manuals accentuated artillery and other arms cooperation 
down to 1914.34 Fire support was not just a lesson for artillery; an Infantry officer 
commented: 
We have at last begun to recognise that fire and movement are '" closely 
connected with each other ... In order to move forward, co-operating, or 
covering fire from artillery and infantry is absolutely necessary.35 
But infantry/artillery cooperation remained difficult until the introduction ofRT. 
Concentration of Fire 
Artillery concentration is another qualitative means of increasing firepower. 
Though the number of pieces may not increase, fire is massed on tactically-key 
targets and is thus more valuable than an equal weight scattered over less important 
targets. Prewar tactics had collocated artillery in great lines of batteries to generate 
the necessary concentration. South Africa's first conventional phase confirmed this 
need, as Col Davidson commented: 
The greatest tactical requirement of the Artillery is that the CRA may have the 
means of concentrating the fire of as many guns as possible, on the key to the 
enemy position at the psychological moment. 36 
But physically massing batteries firing Direct was tactically undesirable. It made 
concealment harder; there was less chance of enfilading the target, while CB from 
hidden enemy pieces was likely to be very effective on the exposed weapons. 
)) FAT 1901 P 13; Ibid p5 start of 'S3 General Principles.' FAD 1896 P 3. 
~ IDB 1896 P 116; FAT 1901 p 12; Ibid P 13. 
)5 Col Doran 'The Co-operatioD of Artillery and Infantry.' JLR II (1911 ).P 168. 
16 Oen Hamley The Operations of War (Edinburgh 1900).p 435; RCWSA Evidence II p 367. 
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Callwell criticised: 
the fetish of massing guns because the Gennans adopted this method .... But in 
the present.. . everything points to the dispersion of artillery to the utmost extent 
possible, and to no bigger unit than the battery being .... at one particular spot. 
Here Callwell reveals 1870's persisting tactical influence, while Roberts foresaw 
that: 
50 or 60 guns concealed ... over 2 or 3 miles of front would be able to destroy 
100 equally good guns massed together. ' 
This suggests how tactical changes can negate numerical superiority; it also confirms 
Lanchester's comments on fieldcraft's powerful effects. 37 The solution was to 
disperse batteries, thus making them easier to hide and complicating enemy CB, 
while concentrating their fire on targets.38 Furthermore such fire would, as 
contemporaries observed, be more effective as it was converging. This in tum meant 
that long-range weapons were more useful. Dispersed gunlines obliquely encouraged 
Indirect Fire.39 
FAD 1896 had emphasised physically massing artillery to attain concentration 
of fire: 
batteries must be sufficiently concentrated to be worked by one commander. If 
the guns be dispersed, their effect will be successive and not simultaneous. 
FAT 1902 was less prescriptive, seeing that there were many cases where dispersal 
was practical, though it still saw physical concentration as probably still necessary. 40 
The Committee drafting FAT 1902 had wished to emphasise co-locating pieces more 
strongly, but Roberts insisted that, if cavalry and infantry were extended, artillery 
must also be dispersed. Roberts insisted that officers with initiative: 'should be able 
to concentrate the fire of their guns as well ifbatteries and sections are separated as if 
31 Tactics. p 109; Glossary; RPs 7101-23-124-3 F646 21111102; Chapter 6. 
)I Maj Crowe 'Duncan Medal Essay' PRAI XXVII (1900-1),p 284, he stressed C3; Glossary. 
]9 Glossary. The longer the weapon range the more fire could be concentrated. Intervisibilty issues 
encouraged Indirect Fire as Direct Fire is rarely possible over 3000 metres in NW Europe. 
40 FAD /896 P 4; FAT 1902 pp 5,6 while pp 3-4 suggests less physical concentration; the senior 
Gunner of an army's duties contain less stress on personal conunand of massed artillery than FAD 
/896 P 3 does. 
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they are all huddled close together.,41 FAT 1902 (Amended 1902) outlined the 
technicalities of concentrating the fire of dispersed batteries. This and instructions 
on using directors were the main changes from FAT 1902.42 That FAT was replaced 
in its year of pUblication suggests that these changes were both urgent and important. 
By 1903 General Marshall, Roberts' ex-CRA, recommended that: 
[p ] rovided, however, control of fire can be kept, every latitude should be 
allowed a commander to disperse ... in accordance with the tactical situation 
and the ground. 43 
Roberts appreciated that concentrating fire from dispersed batteries meant that: 
'[s]ignalling is essential. It was a mistake giving it up in the Artillery and should be 
reintroduced as soon as possible.,44 The RF A reinstated signallers in 1903, Maj 
Geddes described their training, the communications network, the resulting ability to 
concentrate fire and to communicate with infantry and superior HQs. Wood at the 
1903 Manoeuvres concentrated the fire of 76 pieces on key targets using RA 
signals.4S 
Dr Marble concludes that the RA became disillusioned with concentration 
after 1902. It is argued that his assessment is incorrect. Firstly he overemphasises 
the guerrilla phase, which saw artillery widely, but correctly dispersed. Secondly 
Kitchener's abolition of the GOCRA South Africa's post was justified. Marshall was 
required in Britain, while there was no likelihood of massed artillery being used in 
action. Thirdly the organisational changes, described later, saw formation and RA 
unit powers increase after 1902.46 
41 RPs 7101-23-122-3 Robertsllan Hamilton 4/4/02. 
42 FAT 1902 Amendedpp 93-4,99-102. This is the only instance of an important manual being 
replaced in the same year that I am aware of. Roberts' intervention may have caused this; Glossary. 
4J Capt Wilson 'Dispersed Artillery' USM XXVI (1902),pp 296-8; RCWSA Evidence II p 365. 
44 RPs 7101-23-124-3 'Minute on Tactical Training RHA&RFA' 21111102. 
4' 'Communication between Artillery units in action' PRAJ XXX (1903-4); WO 279/516 'Preliminary 
Trg II Corps ... 1903' p 14. But it is easier to move notional than real shells! 
46 Dr Marble The Infantry cannot do with a gun less (KCL 1998).pp 15-16; WO 27/504 . Artillery 
Report Salisbury Plain' p 1. 
105 
Adopting concentration took time to bed-in because traditions of battery 
independence and other anns' beliefs that artillery was so technical that gunners 
alone could comprehend it had to change first. It is not argued that field artillery 
immediately adopted a monolithic structure, but the C3 necessary for more 
centralised fire control began to emerge. Also Buller's introduction of single gun 
tactics at Aldershot was quickly countermanded.47 If Dr Marble's contention is 
correct this would probably not have happened. He is undoubtedly correct to identify 
weaknesses in concentration, C3 and tactics. Even compared to 1916 these were 
primitive. But the trend was towards centralised C3, unit and later formation-directed 
training and concentrated fire, which Parsons had stressed in 1901 on Salisbury 
Plain. Here it is the trend which is more important than the temporary weaknesses. 
But manoeuvre, which the British stressed increasingly after 1902, demands some 
artillery decentralisation. 48 
Artillery Organisation 
Concentrating fire, discussed above, demanded that artillery was reorganised. 
Tirah had taught that haphazardly assembled batteries were less effective than 
cohesive units. This problem recurred in 1899-1900 and Headlam, a senior RA staff 
officer, was convinced that: 
The Lieutenant-Colonel commanding a Brigade-Division must be given the 
administrative powers ofa [CO] of Cavalry or Infantry ... [T]he very looseness 
of the tie which binds the batteries to him only encourages the 
rupture of that tie and the dispersion of the batteries. ,49 
Headlam shows here how organisations affect tactics. Permanent artillery units 
encouraged concentration. Brigade-divisions were formalised in 1900. This was not 
47 BULPs 2065/M/SS4/18-Item 2 pp 3-4. 
41 Maj Oen Bailey Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis 2004),p 34. In manoeuvre, artillery 
decentralisation allows quicker reactions at the expense of overall effect. In 1918 's mobile combat 
decentralisation occurred, with medium pieces deployed forward with units, Brig Oen Edmonds 
MOFB 1918 IV (1947),pp 445,516. T Travers How the War Was Won (1992), pp 150-1 cites 1918 
advocacy of Direct Fire for its greater responsiveness; ARSG 1901 (1902),pp 13,14. 
49 HedPs 'Folder Centralization ... RHA and RFA,' p 5. 
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immediately successful as some COs tended to allow their BCs considerable licence 
while remaining aloof from their training. But units whose COs became involved did 
better tactically at practice camp.50 A similar change was seen in coast artillery 
which saw the responsibility for training switch from the School of Gunnery to the 
tactical commanders. 51 
Marshall commented after South Africa that: 'it has been quite common for a 
general to be ignorant of the elementary principles of artillery.' This suggests how 
defective the training of senior infantry and cavalrymen had been. Col Davidson, 
French's senior horse-gunner, lamented that there was no established cavalry CRA.52 
It was necessary therefore to tackle the problems of other-arm ignorance of artillery 
and to establish artillery commanders in formations. The latter would educate their 
GOCs on artillery. On I January 1903 artillery units were incorporated in infantry 
divisions under the GOC's command. This would improve inter-arm cooperation 
and would also force divisional commanders to understand their artillery. Permanent 
divisional CRAs were not instituted till 1907. But senior officers pressed for their 
establishment beforehand and temporary appointments were made for manoeuvres. 53 
Probably finance caused the delay as, until the formation of the large infantry 
division with its stronger artillery, it was uneconomic to establish them. But, as 
Pieter's demonstrated, CRAs substantially improved artillery's effectiveness and 
inter-arm coordination. 
Cover and Concealment 
Smokeless ammunition's tactical effects for Infantry have been outlined 
already; its implications for artillery were as important, for as Lanchester argued, 
concealment and cover are force-multipliers. Gen Marshall commented: '[t]he value 
50 ARSG 1901 (1902), P 9. 
51 Headlam RA II P 310. 
51 RCWSA Evidence II p 366; Ibid Qs 18672& 18700. 
5) WO 2791516 'II Corps Report 1903' P 14; WO 27/504 'Aldershot StafTTour 1905' p 3. 
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of cover and the power of concealed guns, rendered practicable by smokeless 
powder, has come out strongly [in South Africa].' Maj Ducrot remarked: 
the vital necessity of concealment is one of the lessons of the war; and the 
"deliberate method" of coming into action ... should be practiced more than 
ever. 54 
FAD 1896 had viewed cover as the last priority in selecting gunlines; FAT 1902 
urged: 
[t]oo much importance cannot be assigned to the concealment of guns, not only 
... in action, but when advancing into action. By skilful use of ... ground and 
natural features ... , the presence of ... artillery may often be concealed ... until 
fire is opened; and even after that if the positions ... have been well chosen, 
especially ifit be practical to employ indirect laying ... In this way it is possible 
to compensate for inferiority of ... number.55 
Before the introduction of Cordite, the 'Deliberate Method' occupying gun positions 
had not been worth the extra time required as the first round fired betrayed the 
pieces' positions. Despite smokeless ammunition having been introduced as the 
principal propellant well before South Africa, the RA had not adjusted their tactics to 
emphasise concealed movement. Now this changed. 56 The quotation also suggests 
the greater importance of Indirect Fire from 1900. It contradicts General Bailey's 
judgement that the RA had: 'less intention of firing indirectly than it had before the 
Boer War. ,57 It also suggests why artillery duels were less likely, though FAT 1902 
did not delete them entirely. 58 The defending artillery could evade guns shooting 
Direct either by reserving fire till enemy infantry assaulted or by firing Indirect. 
Parsons when IGRA India insisted on cover and concealment in training. 59 This 
suggests a shift towards appreciating greater enemy firepower and the need for more 
advanced tactics. 
54 RCWSA Evidence II Q 18596; 'Guns in South Africa' PRAIXXVIII (1901-2),p 203; Glossary. 
"PRAI XXVII (1901-2),pp 279-80; FAD 1896 p 12; FAT 1902, p 6. 
S6 PRAI XXVII (1901-2), pp 276-7, p 280. FAD 1896 pp 14-5 downplays the Deliberate Method. FAT 
1901 p 12 stresses covered advances; Headlam RA II P 48; Glossary. 
57 Bailey Artill~ry. p 223. 
sa FAT 1901 P 12; it was not so described but may be inferred. But FA T noted that the inferior 
defending artillery could avoid duels; Ibid pp 17-8. Callwell disparaged duels, Taches p 107. 
"UMIU7/10839 'IAR 1903-04' p 3. 
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Howitzers 
Howitzers are important due to their links with Indirect Fire, which dominated 
artillery tactics from 1914. That the RA emphasised howitzers more from 1900 
suggests that gunners now understood that they would have to shell trenches, 
structures and engage defiladed targets more often. This suggests greater 
appreciation of changing battlefield conditions.6o Two distinguished authorities, 
Generals Bailey and Scales, both ex-artillerymen, have misappreciated the influence 
of South Africa on howitzers and Indirect Fire. General Scales criticises the RA' s 
handling of howitzers in 1899-1902, implying gunner conservatism as the cause. To 
understand his case and to provide context for this section, it is necessary to examine 
howitzer tactics in the Sudan, the first operational use of the 5" Howitzer. 
Scales criticises flat-trajectory howitzer fire at Omdurman, but breaching walls 
was technically best done SO.61 Emslie, the BC there, cautioned that his howitzers 
were used for: 'quite exceptional' tasks, which would not: 'normally fall to ... 
[them].' Amongst these he included wall-breaching.62 Emslie did not use Indirect 
Fire, but there was no CB threat at Omdurman, while signalling from observers to 
the gunline would have slowed firing. Finding a gun position in flat country that 
provided the necessary defilade for Indirect Fire and which was close to the Nile 
would have been hard.63 Emslie was aware of howitzers' ability to search into cover, 
continuing: 
[i]f carried out, as it very likely may be from hidden positions, it will be most 
difficult to deal with, and must inevitably cause modification in the tactics both 
of infantry and artillery ... It will therefore probably form part of [howitzer] 
tactics to fire as far as possible from behind ... cover. 
Scales considers that Emslie demonstrates RA conservatism. In fact Emslie clearly 
60 'RF A' The History and Present Position of the Field Howitzer. Present Position II' USM XXV 
11902),p 273. However howitzers had a substantial shrapnel ammunition scale. 
·Scales Artillery p 198; Glossary; the last occasion in 1944 that the RA breached fortress walls, gun-
howitzers fued Direct at point blank. The {IU] Commemoration Book (1950),p 113. 
6l 'The Possible Effect on Tactics of Recent Improvements in Modem Weapons' AMS (1899),p 6. 
61 Ibid, his howitzers were landed from barges and frred from near the Nile. 
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recognised Indirect Fire's implications, not just for Artillery, and that his Omdunnan 
tactics were unsuited to modern warfare. 64 
Scales claims that Emslie caused Maj Hickman's pamphlet to advocate Direct 
rather than Indirect Fire for howitzer batteries in South Africa.65 The pamphlet only 
mentions Emslie briefly and makes no claims for his Omdurman tactics except 
simplicity. Contrastingly it praises Hamilton-Gordon, who had developed Indirect 
Fire techniques. Scales does not produce evidence for his claim, further stating that 
Hickman's pamphlet was for: 'all howitzer batteries on service. ,66 His claim is 
surprising. The PRAI version states: '[t]hese papers were written for the use of Lt 
Col Waldron's Howitzer Brigade-Division.,67 Waldron's was not the only howitzer 
unit in South Africa. Hickman recommended that Waldron's batteries used Direct 
Fire because of: 
the very small amount of training [of Waldron's unit] and ... the possibility of 
the batteries [undertaking] tasks ... not. .. hitherto considered as coming within 
the role of howitzers. 68 
Indirect Fire, as Scales acknowledges, required lengthy training, so, given that the 
decision to arm Waldron's unit with howitzers was taken in mid-December 1899, it 
is hard to see how else it could have been operational in early 1900.69 Scales also 
criticises Hickman for not recommending an FOO with the attacking infantry. The 
pamphlet states: 'someone belonging to the Battery should advance with the infantry 
... and be responsible for giving the signal [to cease fire].' This suggests an officer 
64 The RA trialled wall-breaching in Egypt beforehand; it is unclear whether Emslie attended; 
Headlam RA III P 244; Glossary; Emslie 'Effects' pp 5, 7, 6-9. 
65 Scales Artillery pp 202-3; this thesis uses the version, The rBL Howitzer Technical Considerations 
and Fire Tactics reproduced in PRA/s XXVII (1900-01). There was clearly a stand-alone pamphlet 
~ssibly used by Scales which may explain the discrepancy. 
Scales Artillery p 202. Hickman's work was copied to Hamilton-Gordon, '14 Days Howitzer Work' 
PRA/ XXVII (1900-1), p 362. This would seem to be a sensible staffwork, enabling howitzer BCs 
already deployed to understand the new batteries' tactics. 
67'The S-BL Howitzer. Technical Considerations and Fire Tactics in the Field' PRA/ XXVII (1900-1). 
61 Ibid pp 23-4. Hickman's views on Direct v Indirect Fire were balanced but, due to insufficient 
training and weak Boer CB, he recommended Direct Fire for the newly armed batteries. 
~O 3217887, 16112199 P 3. Brackenbury suggested howitzers. WO 108/307 P 104. 
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with an FOO's responsibilities and communications.7o Also Scales' argument is 
partly based on incorrectly assuming that Hamilton-Gordon's battery was in 
Waldron's unit and would therefore be constrained by Hickman's pamphlet. 71 
Scales attributes the fact that Roberts abandoned all his howitzer batteries on 
the advance to Pretoria to howitzers' failures at Magersfontein and Paardeberg.72 But 
Roberts retained 6" and 9.45" heavy howitzers. Technically they were not in 
batteries, being RGA, but they represented substantial howitzer firepower. Major 
MacMunn, the source of Scales' comment, was serving with a unit and was therefore 
poorly placed to know Roberts' reasons. A more plausible explanation was not 
prejudice, but mobility, Roberts' force had to cover large distances but the 5" was 
relatively immobile, its ammunition was heavy, though its shells were relatively 
ineffective, and there was limited transport. Battering Pretoria's forts, a likely task, 
would need heavier howitzers than the 5". Scales also cites Hamilton-Gordon on 
Roberts' anti-howitzer prejudice, but more or less simultaneously Roberts requested 
more 6" Howitzers.73 Also Hamilton-Gordon was serving as a Be in Natal and was 
therefore poorly placed to understand Roberts' motives. Grierson, a gunner on 
Roberts' staff, criticised the immobility and short-range of 5" Howitzers and their 
inferiority to 6" Howitzers. These were substantial, specific reasons rather than 
generic criticisms of all howitzers. Later Grierson recommended arming divisions 
with howitzers.74 
Scales attributes the post-war disdain for howitzers to their failures at 
70 Scales Artillery p 203; Hickman Technical Considerations p 29. 
71 Scales Artillery p 204; Capt Kenyon 'The Boer War 1899-1900 Part I' PRAI XXVII (1900-1),pp 77, 
79, Hamilton-Gordon's 61 Bty was in Lt Col Barker's Brigade-Division, deployed in 1899. 
n Scales Artillery pp 246-7 citing Maj MacMunn 'Concerning the Field Howitzer' PRAI XXIX 
( 1902-3 ),pp 314-5. MacMunn did not produce evidence for his statement and somewhat contradicts 
himself by reporting other arms' confidence in howitzers. 'Lessons of the War-IV Artillery' The 
Times 4/1/01 blamed Methuen's ignorance of artillery for failure at Magersfontein. 
7l RPs 7101-23-124-3 F37 4/8/02 Roberts later had 5" howitzers withdrawn from South Africa due to 
their weight and short-range, but there was no tactical requirement to destroy major defences then; 
HGPs MS 117; RCWSA Evidence I p 82. 
74 WOI08/184 P 92; Ibid P 102. 
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Magersfontein and Paardeberg, but does not provide contemporary evidence of such 
views. Both battles were unsuited to howitzers; one being a silent night attack, albeit 
with a prior bombardment, the other involved uncoordinated, hasty attacks. Here 
Kitchener's initial attack must be separated from the subsequent siege. Only one 
howitzer battery was initially present at both actions and the weight of fire needed to 
destroy defences could not be generated.75 Stretched logistics prevented heavy 
bombardments at Paardeberg. Gunners, however, attributed Cronje's surrender to the 
6" Howitzers' fire.76 
There were very real reasons why howitzers were not fully effective in South 
Africa. They were frequently misemployed as field guns to engage unsuitable targets, 
but the SAFF was short of artillery. Hickman had anticipated this by recommending 
Direct Fire for Waldron's pieces. Howitzer units and batteries were often divided; 
this made Indirect Fire harder as there were insufficient signallers and specialists to 
direct it.77 Despite the problems which Scales mentions, the RA began the war with 3 
field howitzer batteries and ended with 12. Though there was a shortage of guns, this 
increase does not suggest general hostility to howitzers. 78 A paper available to 
General Ardagh recommended that the ratio of field guns to howitzers should be 2: I. 
The 1899 ratio was 5.5: I. Furthermore India wished to raise its proportion of 
howitzers in 1901 demonstrating that Scales has overstated hostility to howitzers.79 
Scales claims that there was much criticism of howitzers at the RCWSA but he 
only cites Hannay-Rainsford and does not provide any details. A commissioner 
75 Having seen both battlefields, it is clear that the areas were too large for one howitzer battery to be 
effective. This can be checked against The Official History's maps. 
76 Scales Artillery p 245, LS Amery THWSA III (1905), pp 431,475-6; he suggests that the 6w howitzer 
bombardment on 26/02100 was decisive p 482. Infantry attributed surrender to their night attack. 
77Maj Gen Stubbs 'Some Operations about Slinger's Fontein' USM XXIII (1901),p 502. From the RA 
distribution in Appendices to Headlam RA III, it seems that no howitzer unit had all its batteries 
together. This meant that there would be no CO to explain their special abilities authoritatively, while 
~littlng batteries damaged their Indirect Fire ability. 
Maj MacMunn 'Concerning the Field Howitzer' PRAIXXIX (1902-3), p 314. 
79 PRO 30/40/16 'untitled memorandum on weapons;' It is unclear for whom it was written; Table 20; 
WO 3216771 • India Military Despatch 44 2113/01.' 36 of the 126 new pieces were to be howitzers 
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contradicted him: '[w]e have had a good deal of evidence in favour of howitzers as 
against guns of lower trajectory. ,80 Nor is Rainsford-Hannay listed as a witness and 
Scales' page citation does not apparently exist.81 That a civilian commissioner 
recognised curved trajectories' tactical value suggests that opinion was shifting 
towards howitzers. Checking the RCWSA' s index shows that no individual criticised 
howitzers directly. Several witnesses praised them, notably Hunter, Stopford who 
stressed their value against shrapnel-proof trenches, and Hilyard.82 Warren criticised 
5" Howitzers' short-range but noted their effect on trenches. All had served in Natal, 
suggesting that Buller's force, which included Hamilton-Gordon' swell-trained 
battery, valued howitzers more than Roberts' force. But Roberts commended 
Hamilton-Gordon, even though the latter had served in Natal. 83 
Roberts recommended developing a new field howitzer. Clearly he had no 
prejudice against howitzers in general. Col Davidson praised 5" and 6" Howitzers, 
but diagnosed that further training was needed for greater efficiency. That a senior 
horse-gunner commended them, suggests a cultural shift. The RHA' tactical ethos 
was based on simple, dashing Direct Fire, sharply at variance with Indirect Fire's 
complexity. Marshall acknowledged 5" Howitzers' good work in Natal, when well 
handled, praised Hamilton-Gordon and recommended developing a new field 
howitzer. As late as 1906 Lyttelton, then CGS, praised Hamilton-Gordon's battery.84 
Gunners criticised the 5" Howitzer's short-range, light shell and heavy weight. They 
saw the 6" Howitzer's range was inadequate; it was cumbrous, requiring a platform, 
and fired heavy shells. But these were specific, not generic criticisms of all 
10 Scales Artillery p 246; having checked against QAL Apr 1904 pp 3110 & 1966, Scales has 
transposed his name; RCWSA Evidence II Q 18551. 
I. RCWSA Evidence I pp vii-xii, Ibid II pp iii-x, RCWSA Report p 284. Scales Artillery p 246 cites 
RCWSA. p 455 no volume specified. 
'1nis it is emphasised depends on the index's accuracy; RCWSA Evidence II Q 14655; Admiral 
Lambton Q 19134; Qs 16693-4; Ibid P 235. 
Il SAD 1.( 1901 ).p 23. 
14 RCWSA E"idence II, Q 15850:QI8628; Q 18508;p 364; WO 279/9 p 129, Lyttelton had 
commanded formations in Natal. 
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howitzers.8s Many Boers considered the 5" Howitzer as the best British artillery 
weapon, while British veterans viewed the Krupp howitzer as theirs'. Significantly 
one of those agreeing was Lt Col May, an ardent horse-gunner.86 May also advocated 
howitzers and Indirect Fire, though he criticised the 5" Howitzer's short-range. 
Several RF A officers praised them.87 This suggests that not all RF A and RHA 
officers were prejudiced against howitzers, while the RGA had long advocated siege-
howitzers rather than siege-guns. 
Scales does not cite criticisms of howitzers in the military press after 1902. Had 
anti-howitzer views been rampant even in the RA only, one would expect such views 
to have been common. Indeed the reverse appears the case. Capt Wilson remarked: 
'the tenor of all recent changes seems to be a plea for the more general use of 
howitzers. ,88 He deduced that the greater use of cover would favour them and 
recommended more howitzers than heavy guns with field forces. 89 As early as 190 I 
Lt Col Rodwell deduced that howitzers would become more important. 90 Repington 
praised howitzers and noted their effectiveness against trenches. That an infantryman 
and senior staff officer appreciated this suggests that thinking non-gunners were 
starting to recognise howitzers' increased importance. 91 Hamilton-Gordon's postwar 
career again suggests lack of prejUdice. He was appointed to the committee on the 
new artillery equipments, developed Indirect Fire techniques and briefed the 1908 
GS Conference on howitzers. That the Army developed a new howitzer, based on 
South African experience, shows that, despite sharp criticisms of 5" Howitzers, there 
., Maj Nicholls 'The Training, Organisation and Equipment ... [RGA)' PRAI XXVllI (1901-2),p 
104. 
16 JRUSI XLVI (1902),p 1358; WO 108/266 pp 136,154,156 . 
• 7 A Retrospect o/the South African War (1901),pp 131-3. He analysed Boer howitzers lengthily, Ibid 
pp 135-7; Maj Ducrot 'Guns in South Africa' PRAI XXVIII (1901-2),p 205; Maj Crowe 'Duncan 
Medal Essay' Ibid. P 283. 
II 'Is Field Artillery Obsolete?' USM XXVII (1903),p 495. 
19 'Essays on Artillery III. Cover and Concealment' USM XXV (1902),p 379. 
90 Lt Col Rodwell Reflections on the Boer War (Meerut 1901),pI26. 
91 'Suggestions from the Front' 19C XLVIII (1900). p 708; WO 33/192; WO 279/18. 
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was now recognition of howitzers' value. 92 
The non-artillerist may feel that howitzers have been over-examined. But in 
view of their close connection with Indirect Fire, the latter's importance between 
1914-18 and errors in the historiography, they demand careful analysis. 
Indirect Fire 
General Bailey argues that Indirect Fire was one of the most significant 
tactical developments of the 20th Century. This judgement is valid, but he also 
states that South Africa had little influence on the RA's adoption of it. Therefore any 
evidence of field artillery's greater use of Indirect Fire after 1900 is significant. 93 It 
was closely connected to howitzers; their parabolic trajectories were well suited for 
it, unlike guns' flatter trajectories. Hitherto most field gunners had been averse to 
Indirect Fire. Now attitudes started to change. MacMunn outlined Indirect Fire's 
tactical benefits in his winning Duncan Medal essay. An RF A officer, stressing the 
importance of reverse slopes, commented: 'I strongly endorse your correspondent 
who says we should pay more attention to indirect fire (sic).' Callwell underlined: 
'[t]he value of indirect laying for all classes of artillery is now very generally 
recognised. ,94 May stressed its tactical advantages, though noting that it was slow; 
this caused difficulties when engaging moving targets. He also analysed locating 
enemy artillery firing Indirect. 95 May was a leading RHA theoretician; his 
commendation of a slow, scientific process, at variance with the dashing tactics 
typical of horse artillery, suggests changing attitudes. Furthermore he was a 
Camberley DS and well-placed to influence the future elite. Du Cane felt that 
Indirect Fire was slow and indecisive, but argued that circumstances might demand 
92 Maj EG Nicholls 'Duncan Medal Essay' PRAJ XXVIII (l901-2),pp 104-5; WO 33/192,pp 8-9. 
9) The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare (Camberley 1996): fn 60 above. 
MARSO 1899 (1900),p 8; 'Duncan Medal' PRAI XXVII (1901-2),p 275; Lt Col Harrison 'RA In 
South Africa' Ibid. pp 604-5; 'The Training, Organisation ... of the [RGA]. .. · Ibid P 125. 
95 R~trospect pp 122-4,133. That enemy artillery was likely to fire Indirect suggests that it was 
valuable. In tum this would have compelled British use of Indirect Fire. 
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its use. His criticisms were largely based on the fact that the instruments then used 
for Indirect Fire were primitive.96 Lt Col James also noted Indirect Fire's ability, 
combined with longer ranges, to allow dispersed, hidden pieces to concentrate fire. 97 
Not all were convinced; Maj Bethell felt that Indirect Fire was unpopular in South 
Africa due to its slowness. This was probably due to poor training, divided howitzer 
units and inexpert signallers. 98 
Indirect Fire had other advantages. No longer was it necessary for each 
gunlayer to identify his target. This was a great advantage as ranges increased, while 
CB was hard against pieces fIring Indirect.99 The implications for the artillery duel 
have been considered above. FAT 1902 had signifIcantly more on Indirect Fire than 
FAD 1896 and trials proceeded from 1901 to develop it. 100 
Heavy Artillery 
Traditionally the RA had emphasised light weapons in the field. Why this was 
so is beyond the scope of this thesis but it was probably due to the difficulties of 
shipping heavy weapons and their teams overseas. South Africa demonstrated that 
heavy guns were needed to attack positions, conduct CB and provide long-range fire. 
The calibre of artillery in South Africa increased substantially during the war. The 
mobility of both Boer and their own heavy weapons impressed the British. For the 
first time MT moved heavy artillery into action. Several officers speculated on the 
future of MT towing pieces, while a committee examined heavy artillery. The 
Pretoria Committee's heavy artillery sub-committee had recommended heavy 
weapons for use in the field. Roberts, with long service in India where it had been 
regularly employed, was sure that: '[n]eglect to supply ... heavy artillery, sufficiently 
96 Glossary, 'Cover and Cooperations' PRAls XXX (1903-4),pp 361-2. 
97 Modern Strategy (1904),p 169. James' emphasis on Indirect Fire was not in his 1903 edition. 
91 'Duncan Medal Essay' PRAI XXIX (l902-3),p 145. 
99 As ranges lengthened target indication became harder, ARSG 1900 P 17, A RSG 1901 P 15. 
100 FAT 1901 pp 77-80,97-101; FAD 1896 pp 93-5. FATpp 97-101 appears to incorporate some of 
Hamilton-Gordon's work, Headlam RA II pp 45-6; Lt Col Hamilton-Gordon 'Observation of ftre from 
a flank' PRAI XXIX (1902-3) describes trials. That one of FAT 1902 Amended 1902's main changes 
inserted Directors, used for Indirect Fire. suggests that there was more than before 1899. 
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mobile to accompany the troops in the field' was a major fault. 101 
Long-range Fire 
Improved propellants, open terrain and Boer marksmanship encouraged long-
range fire in South Africa. This strengthened artillery relative to the other arms and 
of Indirect compared to Direct Fire. Artillery ranges in South Africa were excessive 
and long-range fire there rarely inflicted many casualties. However FAT 1902 
foresaw that engagement ranges would grow. Fire at practice camps steadily 
lengthened. Roberts saw the new German QFs firing at 4800 yards. Tactically 
longer-ranges meant that artillery was becoming more powerful, forcing enemies to 
deploy earlier, widening the choice of gun positions and hitting deeper into enemy 
lines. I02 It also increased the ability to concentrate fire. Longer-ranges forced the RA 
to improve its optics and also demanded more efficient coordination with the other 
arms and better C3. 
The Mix of Weapons 
Wartime demands for close support, Indirect Fire, engagement of structures and 
defiladed targets, and long-range fire meant that no single weapon could fulfil all 
these tasks. Gunners therefore deduced that a range of weapons was needed. This 
suggests greater understanding that combat was becoming more complex. It partly 
contradicts scholars who have criticised field gunners for their obsession with Direct 
Fire and shrapnel. 103 May advocated an RHA and an RF A QF field gun, a field 
howitzer, a heavy gun and a porn porn. Marshall agreed, but excluded porn poms. I04 
The British introduced 2 QF field guns, one for cavalry, the other for infantry 
101 'Duncan Medal Essay' PRA/ XXVII (19OO-1),p 283; Maj Callwell 'A Heavy Battery at the Relief 
of Ladysmith;' Ibid p 138; Tables 37&8; May Retrospect p 143; Maj Bethell 'A Motor Field Battery' 
PRA/ XXVII (1900-1); WO 108/249; WO 108/266; RCWSA Evidence I p 430. Ibid Q 10564 
102 Head 'Desirability' p 1175 on wasteful long range fire; such fire became more efficient during the 
First World War and perhaps more critically between 1939-45 when RT and C3 had developed, 
Bidwell Gunners p 97. Longer ranges strengthened Indirect Fire as in Western Europe intervisibilty is 
rare over 4000 metres, DOAE Engagement Ranges Study; Amery THWSA VI P 478; Tables 22&23: 
RPs 7101-23-122-2 F 126 RobertslLansdowne 16/8/01; Table 22. 
103 Lanchester Aircraftp 19; S Marble 'RA Doctrine 1902-1914' WSJ II (1996),p 97. 
11M RCWSA Report p 93. 
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support, a field howitzer and a heavy gun. Field guns would support other anns; 
howitzers would attack material and engage defiladed enemies, while heavy guns 
would shell distant targets. 
The New Weapons 
QF ArtiUery 
The Boer War occurred at a significant stage in artillery development. QF 
artillery was emerging and its status in South Africa is more complex than has been 
suggested. Boer field guns were technically superior to British ones, outranging 
them, a significant disadvantage in open terrain. They used fixed ammunition, 
consequently firing faster than British pieces. lOS British experts during the war 
assessed that some of these guns were QFs. Postwar analysis appeared to confirm 
thiS. 106 In fact they were wrong; the French 75mm was the first true QF field gun. 
Controversy exists as to whether the RA used QF field guns. Some of the 
weapons, which Professor Spiers claims as QF, were in practice not when used in the 
field. RN guns on improvised carriages could not be fired at QF rates due to 
excessive recoil forces, while ammunition availability constrained platform-mounted 
pieces. But the RA manned QFs on annoured trains and porn poms. 107 The Elswick 
Battery was described as QF; its weapons were ex-naval guns firing fixed 
ammunition. Whatever the exact position, Roberts concluded that: 
South Africa has shown ... that [our] Artillery material [was] considerably 
behind other European states. Our field gun ... was wanting in range and 
rapidity of fire. 108 
lOS Capt Wilson 'Essays on Artillery II. Long-Range Fire' USMXXV (1902),pp 267-8. 
106 Capt Wilson 'The War. The Future Of Our Artillery' USMXXl (1900),p 572; WO 33/235, p 389 
describes the Boer 75mm Creusot and the 120mm Krupp Howitzer as QF; this was a postwar 
technical report on captured weapons; Lt Col Bethell Modern Artillery in the Field (1911). 
107 EM Spiers 'Reanning the Edwardian Artillery' JSAHR 57 (1979),p 171; WO 108/266 pp 12-3. 
Platform-mounted RN 4.7s theoretically could fire at QF rates, but logistics probably prevented this: 
WO 132110 'RN Report of Operations 213/00.' 
101 RPs 7101-23-122-7 F663 12nl04; Lt Jones RNR 'The Elswick Battery in South Africa' JRUSI 
XLV (1901), pp 993-4; RCWSA Report p 90. 
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The RCWSA did not agree, but the British were well aware of European progress. 109 
Professor Beckett argues that European developments, rather than South 
African experience, caused Britain to introduce QF weapons. 1 \0 His argument is 
based on assuming that the British did not face QFs in South Africa. Technically he 
is probably correct, although porn poms were QF, but it is argued here that what 
contemporaries believed at the time is more significant than a retrospective 
assessment of enemy weapons. ttt Furthennore any professional observing British 
inferiority in South Africa and being aware of European developments would have 
concluded that Britain needed QF weapons urgently. Rearmament was urgent in 
view of a threatening international situation. Consequently Britain ordered several 
batteries of Gennan QF field guns in 1901. Roberts established a committee to 
examine QFs in 1901. It benefited from the Pretoria Committee's and Brackenbury's 
efforts. 1 12 
The QF Field Artillery Programme 
Brackenbury began examining the introduction of QF field guns in early 
1900,113 Though his precise motive remains unclear, Brackenbury was keen to 
incorporate operational experience in the new weapons and devised the questionnaire 
sent to South African units on weapon perfonnance there, The Committee on Horse 
and Field Artillery produced specifications, largely based on South Africa, against 
which manufacturers were asked to develop solutions, 1 14 These indirectly 
emphasised Direct Fire by limiting the pieces' elevation and by requiring fixed 
109 CW Dilke 'The Report of the War Commission' JRUSJ XLVIII (1904),p 225 criticised the 
RCWSA for not emphasising QFs; Capt LR Kenyon 'QF Field Equiprnents on the Continent' PRAI 
XXVI (1899); WR 3 examines Boer technology. 
110 The Victorians at War (2003),p 237. 
III Whether the porn porn was a gun is debateable, but it was QF and suggested the trend of future 
artillery technology; Glossary. 
112 WO 33/192; AFPs 50314, 'MGO's Minute 24/12/04.' Roberts was warned of the intention to 
develop QF field artillery and invited to collect information on 5/3/00. This may have triggered the 
Pretoria Committee's establishment. WO 33/235 for technical intelligence on Boer QFs. 
III AFPs 50314 'MOO's Minute' 24/12/04. 
114 WO 33/192; Headlam RA II. p 73; Chapter 9. 
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ammunition. For the RHA the prime characteristic was mobility, for the RF A 
firepower was. The latter's shell weighed 18.5 lbs and was substantially heavier than 
its Continental equivalents. Both guns had shields and considerably longer ranges 
were specified. 11 S Dr Marble has criticised the RF A's choice, but the 18 Pounder's 
characteristics were similar to its continental equivalents. I 16 Though the RA has been 
criticised for not switching to Indirect Fire earlier, French and German weapons were 
not inherently more suitable. Both fired fixed ammunition and the 75mm, with its 
lesser elevation and higher muzzle velocity, was technically less capable of Indirect 
Fire than the 18 Pounder. 
The RA specified that shrapnel was to be the only ammunition nature for the 
new field guns. This presupposed warfare en rase campagne in which opponents 
would have little time to dig deeply. Consequently field guns would not need to shell 
material often, while the RF A also had HE-firing howitzers. But Dr Marble's 
assertion that shrapnel was unable to neutralise trenches is wrong. It was, indeed may 
even remain more efficient at suppression than groundburst HE. 117 Furthermore 
shrapnel was the prime French and German field gun ammunition nature. Dr 
Marble's criticisms of the RA are misplaced. RA policy conformed to European 
norms and, unlike the French, British infantry divisions included howitzers which 
were technically more effective at firing HE than the French 75mms. 118 
There was, however, controversy over the RFA's weapon. Many gunners had 
been impressed by the mobility and firepower of heavy artillery in South Africa. I 19 
They argued that, though mobility was important, the 18 Pounder had sacrificed 
liS WO 33/192; 6000 yards shrapnel; Glossary. 
lI~arble 'RA' pp 91-2. Table 25. 
117RCWSA Appendices pp 195-8; Marble Gun p 19. Bidwell Gunners pp 23-4; Glossary. 
III Marble Gun p 12; Glossary, however the RA failed to tackle HE fuzing's problems. 
119 Capt Powell 'How a Field Gun of Greater Power might be used equal to the 5-BL Howitzer' PRAI 
XXVII (1901-2).p 63. 
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firepower for excessive speed. Roberts nearly altered its specifications in favour of a 
slower weapon firing heavier shells.120 
The resulting QF programme involved manufacturing 966 guns, 2898 wagons 
and some 1,000,000 rounds. The Treasury wanted to prolong the process to smooth 
expenditure, Arnold Foster was unhappy that the 18 Pounder differed significantly 
from its European equivalents but the Army was adamant that the programme went 
ahead. 121 The AG argued that the weapons were based on more recent combat 
experience and consequently should not imitate the French or Germans. Unusually 
the Treasury was defeated, this, at a time of retrenchment, shows that soldiers and 
statesmen realised firepower's importance. The total cost, £3,436,000, was a major 
item in the equipment budget. 122 
New Heavy Artillery 
The Army specified that its new heavy gun would fire as large a shell as 
possible about 10,000 yards and weigh some 4 tons. By virtue of being a gun it was 
consequently optimised for Direct Fire, and, though it fired HE, it also had a sizable 
scale of shrapnel. Its tactics were largely based on South Africa. The RA' s emphasis 
on heavy guns after 1902 and the development of what was to become the 60 
Pounder were unfortunate in retrospect. The RGA had long seen heavy howitzers as 
more suitable for attacking structures and howitzers were better able to deliver HE. 
1914-18 demonstrated howitzers' greater tactical importance. But the RA did not 
ignore heavy howitzers completely. 123 Brackenbury began developing an 8.5" 
I~rig Gen Wolfe-Murray 'Do We Require Field Artillery?' PRAI XXIX (1902-3),p 219; RPs 7101-
23-122-6 Roberts! Brackenbury 20/12/03. Roberts cited Wolfe-Murray, arguing against the 18 
Pounder. Brackenbury persuaded Roberts to support it: Ibid F90 Roberts! Kitchener 8/1104. 
121 AFPs 50314 'Proposed Letter on Delay New Gun 5/1/05,' P 2; Ibid 'The New Field Gun.' 
III WO 33/392B P 91. 
IlJWO 331379 states that this basic specification was provided by Roberts' telegram of 20/8100. The 
Pretoria Committee probably advised him. Roberts reiterated the specification but preferred the 5" to 
the 4.7" gun, UMIU7/IS6S 'Enclosures to Despatch 3 1111101;' Heavy Artillery Training 
(ProVisional) 1903. This emphasised dispersion and operating in sections; Siege Artillery Drill J 89 J. 
P 48. The technical arguments are in the Glossary. Col Simpson 'Heavy Artillery 1903' PRAI XXXI 
(1904-S),pp 234-S. 
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howitzer but this failed due to mobility problems. 124 Development of a new field 
howitzer started, while the 6" Howitzer had its range extended to 7000 yards. There 
were financial limits on what could be done when the Army's field guns needed 
replacement. However criticisms of complete failure to develop heavy howitzers 
after 1900 are off-target. 125 
Summary 
The development of a range of weapons, which for the first time was driven by 
user specifications, suggests a greater desire to match technology and tactics, as well 
as a more doctrinal approach. That a substantial part of the Army's budget was spent 
on QF field artillery shows the importance the Army attached to firepower. Weapons 
embody tactical assumptions and the prime deduction is that the new guns, using 
Direct Fire and firing shrapnel were best suited to supporting manoeuvre. But 
howitzers were not neglected and their enhanced position suggests a new realisation 
that tactical conditions were now more complex. 
FAT 1902 and Training 
The new manual, FAT 1902, incorporated some of the tactical lessons which 
South Africa had taught. These included more emphasis on Indirect Fire, 
concealment, use of ground and dispersed positions. The work was transitional, not 
all lessons were included, eg its guidance on howitzers was sketchy. This was 
understandable. The RA was developing its own QF weapons and time was needed 
to assimilate both South Africa's lessons and experience from the recently bought 
Gennan QFs. But there was one absolutely new element, the inculcation of 
flexibility. FAT 1902's Preface emphasised: 
While the details of drill ... must be strictly adhered to, officers must 
understand that a book of this description ... cannot be expected to legislate for 
the varying contingencies of active service. To meet these officers must depend 
124 WO 33/235 'Report Ordnance Co 1901; WO 33/299 'Report Ordnance Co 1903.' 
115 Headlam RA II, P 246; Gen Farndale A History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery (Woolwich 
1986), p 2 is unaware of the 6" Howitzer's post-I902 modification. 
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upon ... initiative, self confidence and resource ... The attainment and 
development of such powers is the object of military training. 126 
Greater emphasis on training complemented FAT 1902. Artillery training areas were 
much extended with the addition of Salisbury Plain in 1901. This allowed far more 
freedom to manoeuvre and thus greater tactical realism. Parsons, Buller's ex-eRA, 
the first commandant of the Salisbury Plain range emphasised: 
The importance of reconnaissance and scouting; the amount of latitude allowed 
to [BCs] in their choice of position ... ; the desirability of taking a broad view of 
the drill book and using their own common sense in situations not legislated for 
in the drill book; the value of concealment both in approaching and occupying 
a position; the value of an eye for ground; the imE0rtance of training and 
quickening the general intelligence of all ranks. I 7 
This contrasted with the prewar stress on regularity and drill. Parsons continued 
teaching these points in India. 128 Greater realism prevailed in training: 
The great importance of cover is not yet properly appreciated. It was constantly 
pointed out to battery and section commanders ... and towards the end of the 
practice great improvements in the way cover was made use of were 
manifested. It is hard for officers to disabuse their minds of the idea that perfect 
line and dressing are of the first consideration, seeing how much for years past 
this has been impressed on them. 
This also suggests that, even in the RA, whose organisation fostered initiative, drill 
had deadened initiative. Reducing competitive firing allowed more tactical shooting. 
For the first time COs trained the batteries which they would command in war. 
Another advance was the concentration of batteries for training, which occurred first 
in Ireland in 1903. This meant that more facilities were available, officers got more 
practice in observing fire and unit training was enhanced. Parsons introduced similar 
changes in India. 129 
Training facilities were improved. An artillery range was acquired in Wales and 
Glen Imaal, bought in 1899, proved, after its extension in 1904, to provide very 
126 FAT 1902 P iii. 
127 UMIU7/10839 'IAR 1901-2' para 9. 
121 ARSG 1901 (1902),p 13; UMIU7/10839 'lARs 1902-3 and 1903-4.' 
129 UMIU7/10839 'Annual Report RA India 1901-2' para 9. Lt Col Du Cane's article 'Cover' was 
written following Roberts' criticisms of the RA'5 poor use of cover on the 1903 Manoeuvres: 
Headlam /U II, pp 48-9. 
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realistic terrain. The RA introduced more realistic targetry including indistinct Boer-
style trenches. Engagement ranges in training lengthened. This and the new, more 
realistic targetry made indicating targets to individual gunlayers harder, obliquely 
encouraging Indirect Fire. 130 
Training is the practical extension of doctrine, and the changes in training 
outlined above were probably as significant in improving artillery's effectiveness as 
FAT 1902 or the new weapons. Realism, initiative, interarm cooperation and the 
strengthening of COs' and later CRAs' responsibilities for training had powerful 
effects across the RF A. 
Indirect Fire Training 
RHA and RF A gun batteries were using more Indirect Fire in 1901 than they 
had in 1899. The distinction that these batteries were gun-armed is important; 
howitzer batteries, as was suggested earlier, were more likely to have used Indirect 
Fire. In 1901 the Okehampton Commandant was critical: 
The drill in indirect laying showed a slight improvement on last year, but in 
many cases it evidently does not form part of the regular routine of the training 
of the battery ... More attention should be given to the details of indirect laying 
and firing from behind cover. 
This may have been directed at howitzer batteries only, though the document did not 
specify that this was the case, while only 3 howitzer batteries fired at Okehampton in 
190 I. But: 'many cases' implies more than just three batteries firing. 131 However the 
1900 Report is clear that field guns had fired Indirect and that RHA batteries would 
have done so if they had had the correct instruments. Also in 1900 the Glen Imaal 
report emphasised: 
Much more attention should be paid to [Indirect Fire], and a higher standard 
should in future be attained in it. 132 
130 UMIU7/10839 'IAR 1901-2' P 3 noted longer ranges and harder targets at practice camps. Table 
21; Glossary. 
III ARSG 1899 (1900),p 8; ARSG 1901(1902).p 6. 
III ARSG 1900 (1901 ),pp 8-9; Ibid P 17. 
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The 1899 Report had not mentioned Indirect Fire. Furthermore all the pieces firing at 
Glen Imaal in 1900 were guns. Had there been a switch to howitzers in 1900, this 
alone might have accounted for the introduction of Indirect Fire. In 1901 Parsons, 
assisted by Hamilton-Gordon, directed the Salisbury Plain camp. Parsons stressed the 
need to improve the: '[p ]rocedure for firing from behind cover.' In 1901 
Okehampton also saw considerable use of Indirect Fire; the Commandant 
recommended that Indirect Fire stores were issued to gun batteries. Glen Imaal also 
reported in 1901 that Indirect Fire practices were more successful than in 1900. 133 
In India field batteries fired Indirect in 1902-3 and 1903-4. Parsons, the Indian 
IGRA, encouraged this: 
Considerable strides were made at Home last year [1902] owing to the use of 
experimental instruments for the direction of fire at unseen targets ... I am glad 
to see that the same spirit has spread to India ... The increased use of Indirect 
Fire may have a tendency to make batteries slow. I see from the Reports ... that 
this is the case ... Every step should be done quickly and then the end will be 
quickly attained. 
Indirect Fire further increased in Indian practices in 1904-5, though Parsons was still 
dissatisfied with the results. 134 
General Bailey is wrong to assert that there was less Indirect Fire after South 
Africa than beforehand. It is not possible to prove that South Africa was the cause as 
1899 practice camp reports mention it. But despite this, Parsons' stress on it in 1901 
suggests that it was used more in training because of South Africa. That Parsons had 
Hamilton-Gordon as one of his staff supports this conclusion. The issue of directors, 
essential to Indirect Fire and the reissue of FAT 1902, both in 1902, support this 
conclusion. 
Infantry Firepower 
Unlike artillery, major technological change had already occurred with the 
deployment of magazine rifles Consequently the Infantry firepower lessons were less 
III ARSG 1901 (1902),p 17; lbidp8; lbidp 19. 
134 UMIU7/10839 lIAR' 1903-04' pp 6-7; 'IAR' 1902-03 pp 1-2.4-5; Ibid 'IAR' 1904-5' pp 3-5. 
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significant than the artillery's. Small anns technology was not as dynamic and, 
though technical changes occurred after 1902, the most significant developments 
involved tactics and training. The largest quantitative increases were the Cavalry's 
adoption of rifles and the doubling of unit machine guns. 
Machine Guns 
Brig Gen Baker-Carr stated that the Army deprecated machine guns before 
1914, while Lt Col Hutchinson claimed that after 1902 they: 'regained [their] former 
unpopularity. ' 135 Contemporary evidence is far more positive, despite the fact that 
some machine guns used in South Africa were unreliable or carriage-mounted. The 
latter made the weapons very vulnerable. Also the Boers were poor targets due to 
their fieldcraft and reluctance to assault. 136 
Despite these adverse factors, veterans were very positive about them. Hilyard 
emphasised that the: '303 Maxim has done good service, and will do better now we 
have the tripod.' Lt Col Thomeycroft brought his own machine guns to South Africa 
and submitted a detailed report, commended by Buller, while a cavalry CO cleared a 
stoppage personally. This suggests that not all cavalrymen were technophobes. 137 
Senior officers were generally positive. Brig Gen Bum-Murdoch saw machine guns 
as: 'useful at long ranges,' significant in view of South African terrain, while Brig 
Gen Gordon noted: 'the effect is ... great,' recommending one per squadron. 138 Both 
were cavalrymen. Buller remarked that all COs: 'like these guns ... On the whole 
[machine guns] were very useful,' General Cooper concluded: '[i]t is hard to 
exaggerate the value of machine guns.' Coke noted their suppressive effects, while 
FW Kitchener emphasised: 
13' From Chauffeur to Brigadier (1930),p 71; Machine Guns (1938),p 73. 
116 WO 1081267; Ibid sers 7 p 20 and 2 p 19 respectively; General Cooper noted that hilly Natal 
reduced machine gun lethality. Also RCWSA Evidence II Q 14343. Methuen noted that South Africa, 
like Tirah. was unsuitable for machine guns. Not all guns were carriage-mounted, see WO 108/307 P 
16, the Army Board had recommended tripods on 31/8/99. 
137 WO 1081267. 
III Ibid sers 1.17; Table 12. 
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if understood tactically, the machine gun dominates the whole question of 
attack in the future ... , [T]he lost opportunities, owing to neglect of ~their] 
proper tactical use ... was the most important lesson of [1899-1902].1 9 
Many criticised unwieldy carriage-mounted weapons. l40 Many Guards officers 
serving under Methuen in more open terrain than Natal consequently distrusted 
them. 141 Most officers saw their role as defensive with the significant exception of 
those serving under Buller who felt that machine guns could cover attacks. Machine 
guns appear to have been used most effectively at Pieter's.142 A CO stated: 'a battery 
of Maxims (4) completely silenced a Boer trench and Maxim,' while Lt Col 
Campbell noted: 
At the start of the war, I with others, thought that a Maxim was useless in the 
attack, but...in this country, Maxims, ifproperly handled can be brought into 
the firing line and assist an advance by overhead frre. 143 
Campbell had not studied IDB 1896, which outlined their use in attack. Tirah had 
demonstrated this practically. 144 
Future senior officers were positive; Allenby reported machine guns as: 'very 
effective .. .1 should like to have one per squadron.' Byng commented: 'the effects .... 
have been excellent,' De Lisle concurred. 145 All were to be cavalry generals, again 
suggesting that the arm was not technology-averse. The general mounted arm 
consensus was that machine guns should be tripod-mounted and pack-borne. Though 
pack-carriage was more laborious than vehicle-transport, cross-country mobility was 
better, and the guns could be manhandled into action, making them smaller targets. 
Some cavalrymen preferred galloping-carriages for speed, but noted that rough 
terrain impeded them. 
1)9 WO 108/267 Nos 1 P 19, 23 p23, 8 P 20, 23 p22,32 P 23 
140 Kenny-Kelly noted that his division was attacking and machine guns were hard to deploy in 
consequence; WO 108/267 P 27. 
141 Ibid Nos 43,46 p 25, Nos 47,48,49,50 p 26,pp 53-4; WO 108/253,p 11. 
142 WO 108/267's questions are general, significantly 5 replies mention Pieter's; sers 14,15,22,30,31. 
This is more than for any other battle. 
I4lWO 1081267 No 37 p 62. 
144 Machine Guns p 73.IDB1896 P 118. Chapter 2. 
14' WO 108/267 pp 4,10,11. 
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The Report also sought views on the future of machine guns. Most replies 
advocated 2 per unit but FW Kitchener urged: 
machine guns should accompany every company .... [T]o fight any body of 
infantry .. unsupported by machine guns . .is a crime ...... .! consider eight the 
minimum and 10 the best number for 600 infantry. 146 
Mounted arms were more positive about machine guns than infantry. Carbine-armed 
cavalry naturally found them more valuable for long-range fire than rifle-armed 
infantry. Also MI and cavalry tended to more widely deployed in action, making 
their support more valuable. 
Brackenbury instituted the Special Committee on Machine Guns to clarify their 
tactical roles and to resolve conflicting views from South Africa. The Committee had 
access to the South African report. The President had experience with machine guns 
in South Africa. All members had served there and the secretary had also fought in 
Tirah. The Committee was asked to answer what their tactical roles were? What arms 
should have them attached and how many? The Committee foresaw 10 offensive 
tasks, the most significant being to cover attacks. Their concentrated fire meant they 
were easier to control than riflemen, while their fire should be flanking, minimising 
hostile fire and maximising enfilade. Veterans were 'unanimously' favourable on 
their defensive value. The Committee noted their ability to sweep avenues of 
advance, to free men for counter attacks and to enfilade obstacles. 147 They were 
useful for advanced and rearguards, for outposts, reconnaissance and convoy 
protection. The Committee recommended that cavalry regiments should be scaled 
with one and MI and infantry battalions with two guns. Mobility was the prime 
characteristic for cavalry and MI weapons, which should be carriage-borne, with a 
tripod also carried. 148 The last feature suggests the increased importance of 
146 Ibid pp 5,61, Ibid P 62. 
147 WO 33/137 pp 7-8. Glossary; all apply today. 
141 They also recommended MI companies in cavalry brigades should have porn poms. Thus cavalry 
units needed less firepower. Later cavalry units were armed with 2 machine guns. 
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dismounted action. Later cavalry machine guns were pack -borne, suggesting cross-
country mobility was the priority. The Committee recommended that unit machine 
gun officers: 'should be allowed great liberty of action,' clearly endorsing initiative. 
The Committee recommended tha~ these officers should consequently be mounted. 149 
They concluded that bad tactical training had resulted in failure to use the weapons to 
best effect in 1899-1902. Often they had been over-exposed to Boer fire. 
The Army doubled its numbers of machine guns to two per Infantry and Cavalry 
unit. This scale was greater than any other European army until after Manchuria. 150 
Weapons were tripod, not carriage-mounted, and were thus able to move more 
tactically. More emphasis was given to training and there were several machine gun 
publications.15t That the Army established the Committee suggests both the interest 
in machine guns and a detennination to increase firepower. 
Porn poms were used extensively in South Africa. A separate committee 
examined them but they were quickly withdrawn from field fonnations. They were a 
transitional weapon, useful before the deployment of QF artillery, but then markedly 
inferior. 152 
Rifles 
A report recording over 600 replies from most SAFF units analysed rifles. 
The questions are technical, though some replies give general insights; eg De Lisle's 
comment: 
The greatest lesson [of] this war is the power of the modem rifle ..... , I think it 
[the Lee-Metford] much inferior to the Mauser ... As a quick loader, it cannot 
be compared ... as a long-range weapon, it is much inferior. 
Most favoured cliploading to increase rapidity of fire. Major Fry commented: 
Where small parties are covering ground, ... rapid fire at long ranges makes it 
almost impossible ... to gauge the strength of the force opposed, and ... valuable 
149 WO 33/137 pp 10-11; this would speed up reconnaissance. 
ISO WO 10813072312100. 
lSI Mwketry Report Hythe 1901 (1902),p 32, Chapter 8. 
IS2WO 108/265; WO 331137; Glossary. 
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time is gained. How often have our estimates of the Boer forces been very 
much exaggerated by thiS. IS3 
Many appreciated that volume of fire was as important as accuracy. An Infantry 
CO observed: 
I am now strongly persuaded that no ammunition fired with any sort of aim ... up 
to ... possibly 1500 yards is ''wasted''. Even ifit has no more result than to 
make the enemy keep his head down, the expenditure is justified. lS4 
Volume of fire rather than extreme accuracy was a feature of the BEF's musketry in 
1914. This was based on South African lessons and extensive trials. 
Cavalry viewed carbines as too short-ranged; more perceptive cavalrymen 
foresaw that: 
In future ... cavalry benefiting by recent experience will use their firearm more 
effectively then hitherto, for instance having seen how a few well posted ... 
Boers, acting as a rearguard have delayed the advance of mounted troops 
pursuing, it will be ... necessary to provide a more efficient weapon than a 
carbine. 
This suggests a switch away from shock action. Four Cavalry brigadiers felt that a 
longer-range weapon was needed. Gordon commented: 
It is essential for cavalry to carry a really good firearm, and one which, when 
dismounted action proves necessary, can compete fairly with the enemy's 
infantry. 155 
Haig felt that: 
[t]he possession of a rapid and accurate shooting weapon has rendered cavalry 
more independent. .. The ideal cavalry is one which can fight on foot and attack 
on horseback. 156 
No similar stress on improving cavalry firepower has been detected before South 
Africa. This suggests that cavalry tactics had changed substantially. Chapter 5 
examines the far-reaching deductions that were made about rifle-armed Cavalry's 
future importance. 
153 WO 108/272 Q l{b) P 24; Ibid No 329 P 72. 
IS. WO 108/272, No 401 P 119. Also Col Carr RCWSA Evidence II p 394. 
ISS WO 108/272 No 80 P 147; Ibid No 24 P 173. 
156 RCWSA Evidence II p 402. 
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The SMLE was the product of South Africa. Its barrel was shorter so that 
mounted troops could carry it easily and it was lighter by llb. ls7 A journal 
summarised its characteristics which were: 
adapted to the greater individual activity demanded in the face of modern fire 
action, and to the snapshooting from behind cover at short ranges to which the 
[CinC] is constantly ... .laying stress.' 158 
It was cliploading and thus capable of a higher rate of fire than the Lee-Metford. 
Trials showed that it was slightly more accurate than the long Lee-Enfield. 
Theoretically a short barrel reduces muzzle velocity reSUlting in less accuracy and 
less ability in bayonet-fighting. Practically it was as accurate as the Long Lee-
Enfield, while its handiness was an advantage in close combat. 159 It was optimised 
for rapid fire, being largely wood-covered. This protected the firer against barrel-
heat, while its bolt was designed for rapid fire. A 1914 veteran recalled the results: 
I fired 130 rounds ... If I haven't killed and wounded 80 of them, I ought to be 
reduced to a third-class shot. .. rabbit shooting ain't in it. 160 
Training and Tactics 
Generating greater firepower from small arms had to be achieved primarily by 
training and tactics as the technology was relatively mature. However the Army 
examined SLRs after 1901. 161 Roberts criticised bad short-range shooting and poor 
combat marksmanship. He blamed low-quality recruits, lack of initiative and poor 
training for these faults: 
[n]or is it to be expected that that he will become a master of his weapons, ifhe 
is not accustomed to use his own common-sense and to take an interest in his 
own training as a skilled fighting man. 
Kitchener commented: '[o]ur men were not as quick and accurate .. .in shooting 
rapidly, but they had not been trained for this.' Here Kitchener was stressing 
1S7 WO 32/9075 'Memorandum Superintendent Enfield 22/2105.' 
lSi SA LXVIII (1902),p 54. 
159 AFPs 50315 'Maj Marker Memorandum. ' 
I~O 279/9 p 118; OF Allsop & MA Toomey Small Arms (1999),p 139; Maj Pridham Superiority of 
Fire (1945). pp 17,65, citing a 1914 veteran, possibly: 'remembered with advantages!' 
161 WO 3219082 • Automatic Rifles 1902-4'. 
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snapshooting, whose importance had been emphasised by the need to engage foes 
using fieldcraft. Gwynne summarised senior officers' views: 
[n]o expenditure of time or money is too great when made in the direction of 
obtaining efficient shots. The ideal of musketry training is not high enough 
(sic). 
Gwynne's correspondents felt that more field firing would be necessary, while a 
more individual fire-discipline would replace volleys. 162 
MRs 1898 had emphasised that: 'volley firing is the description of collective 
fire generally employed, while independent is the exception,' noting that volley-
firing: 'keeps the men well in hand and is an aid to discipline (sic).' 163 As in Tirah, 
veterans criticised the use of volleys. Capt Cairnes argued that they were only 
possible at long ranges and recommended controlled, individual fire. 164 Capt 
Campbell rebutted the idea that collective fire meant volleys. This, he noted, was 
first questioned after Tirah. 165 Grierson reported that volleys were no longer 
practical: 'the sooner this is recognised and the men taught to fire individually with 
care and intelligence the better.' Lt Col Pilcher urged more field-practices. 166 As 
Chapter 7 argues, rejecting volleys delegated initiative to soldiers. 
In 1901 Hythe reduced weapons drill, the most mechanical part of its syllabus. 
In contrast a: 
corresponding increase has been made in ... skirmishing ... , tactical 
employment of fire and object lessons in fire ... From the commencement of 
[1901] a good deal of weight has been given to skirmishing. 167 
Hythe now emphasised the: 'quick aim and the use of cover.' Field practices were 
treated as small tactical schemes. 168 The Indian authorities recommended that: 
'military training must be combined with practices at objects and at ranges likely to 
162 WO 32/9082; RCWSA Report p 46; Ibid pp 46-7; The Army on ltself( 1904 ),p 159; Chapter 7. 
163 MRs /898 P 83. 
164 'The Military Critic The Westminster Gazette' 'Some Lessons of the Boer War' NR 35 (1900), P 
1035. 
165 'The Limitations of Infantry Fire Control and Discipline' JUSII XXX (190 1). ,p 120. 
166 Lt Col Pilcher Some Lessons From the Boer War (1903), p34; 35-6. 
167 Musketry Report J 90 J (1902), p5. 
I"lbid pp 21-2. 
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be met in the field.' They emphasised snapshooting, initiative, enfilade fire by picked 
shots and imaginative training involving musketry and tactics rather than memorising 
pages of regulations. 169 
MRs 1903 contained little on volleys and omitted MRs 1898' s mechanical fire-
discipline section. Instead it stressed snapshooting and firing from cover. It continued 
Hythe's integration of low-level tactics and shooting, described above. It emphasised 
field firing, initiative, delegation of command, concealment and significantly that: 
'Mutual Action and Support (sic) are of the first importance.' 170 This stress on 
covering fire and greater tactical integration suggests that increased defensive 
firepower had to be countered by more firepower and more sophisticated 
tactics. 
The 1898 and 1903 trained soldiers' musketry courses contrast starkly. In 1898 
there were 6 volley-practices, in 1903 none. In 1903 more practices were fired lying 
which gave greater protection than when standing or kneeling. Chapter 6 examines 
the consequences for fieldcraft. In 1903 both rifle and machine gun practices stressed 
firing from cover, unlike in 1898. This suggests far greater realism and fieldcraft. 
Practice ranges were shorter in 1903. This is partly explained by the deletion of 
volleys, involving long-range fire, and the inclusion of snapshooting, a short-range 
skill, in MRs 1903. The Indian authorities introduced similar changes in musketry, 
though there Tirah may have been influential. 171 Also MRs 1903 recommended more 
realistic, smaller targetry than the 4 'x8' screens used previously. 
Conclusions 
The examination of frrepower after South Africa suggests that artillery's 
importance had increased, close artillery/infantry cooperation was vital and that 
169 UMI1J7/2462 Musketry 1901-2. India also introduced extended formations; Ibid pp5,9. 
170 MRs 1903 p47. 
I7ITables 17& 18; MRs /903(Provisional),p 91. Increased use of the prone position suggests an 
important change in fieldcraft; IDB /896 bad prohibited this close to the enemy, Chapter 6; MRs 1903 
pp 112 -1 to 10; MRs 1898 P 94; UMI1J7/2462 'Musketry Circular,' pp 3-4; Table 19. 
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movement had to be synchronised with fire. Consequently artillery could no longer 
be a matter for gunners only. This had implications for professional development, for 
artillery organisation and C3. British forces had suffered from technically superior 
Boer pieces; Britain was aware of French QF developments and felt menaced. Thus 
rearmament with QFs was pressing. Chapter 9 analyses how QFs were developed 
through purposeful user-specification. The Army began to appreciate howitzers 
more. South Africa had taught that Indirect Fire was valuable for engaging defiladed 
targets. Concealment of pieces had become more important and there was greater 
stress on initiative by gunners 
South Africa showed that Infantry needed more firepower and more 
machine guns. Infantry focused on shorter-range fire and snapshooting as volleys 
were found to be impossible. Chapter 7 examines the implications for initiative and 
Chapter 5 analyses the implications of the Cavalry's rearmament with rifles. Some 
firepower lessons, particularly on C3, cooperation between infantry and artillery, 
extra firepower and marksmanship had already been seen in Tirah. It is thus possible 
to trace a rough connection between the lessons of the two campaigns. 
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Chapter 5 Mobility and Manoeuvre 
Wot makes the soldier's 'eart to penk, wot makes 'im to perspire? 
It isn't standin' up to charge nor lyin' down to fire, 
But it's everlastin' waitin' on an everlastin' road, 
For the commissariat camel an' 'is commissariat load. 
Introduction 
As Kipling suggests, mobility is far more than dashing cavalry charges. 
Logistics, organisation and staffwork are equally important in achieving it. This 
chapter examines the theoretical basis of mobility, analyses British mobility in 1897 
and in South Africa, the ensuing lessons and their implementation. It argues that more 
stress was put on mobility and thus on manoeuvre and the operational level of warfare 
from 1900. This had implications, examined in Chapters 7 and 9, for the development 
of initiative, doctrine and C3• 
Mobility, Manoeuvre and the Arms 
Mobility and Manoeuvre 
This section probes deeper into the theory of mobility and manoeuvre, 
continuing Chapter 1 's examination of manoeuvre and attrition. It blends theory with 
factors specifically relevant during the thesis' period. 
The first point is that mobility, unlike fire, has no military utility of its own. 
Troops cannot fire when moving or their firepower is impaired. In motion they are 
more vulnerable to enemy observation and fire. Movement causes stores to be 
consumed at a faster rate, while their replenishment is complicated. Movement tires 
troops and animals, and, particularly if combined with food shortages, it increases the 
casualty rate. In consequence movement must be undertaken to gain an advantage or 
to diminish that of the enemy. 
Mobility during this period was a more complex factor than firepower which was 
an instrument applied directly on battlefields of limited depth. Mobility does not 
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necessarily involve combat as forces move faster when not fighting. 1 Consequently 
mobility has a greater association with strategy and operations than it does with 
tactics, but it affects all three levels.2 Strategic mobility was essential for an empire 
extending from Esquimalt to Stanley. This partly accounts for the Anny's high 
proportion of Infantry, the most readily transportable arm, compared to Cavalry or 
Artillery, and its lighter artillery pieces.3 Colonial warfare demanded mobility but this 
was largely logistical. Churchill attributed the Mahdi' s defeat to the railway. Logistics 
were critical to victory in most other Colonial campaigns.4 Consequently the speed 
and tempo demanded by operational level mobility in conventional wars was less 
important. This naturally caused cavalry, a logistically demanding arm, to be at a 
discount. 
The effects of mobility are non-linear, both geographically and mathematically. 
Attrition tends to be conducted between relatively static forces and is generally 
positional in nature. Contrastingly mobile warfare is dynamic and, instead of set-piece, 
positional actions, meeting engagements are more common on more complex, deeper 
battlefields. Firepower generally is only capable of achieving effects proportionate to 
its inputs; indeed there is an upper limit at which it inflicts excessive collateral damage 
and overstrains the firing side's logistics. Dynamic mobility contrastingly is capable of 
disproportionate results. Unlike firepower where the absolute weight of attack is 
critical, mobility's key dimension is its relationship with the enemy's ability to react.s 
I Maj Gen Altham The Principles of War (1914),pp 114-5. 
2 Maj Oen Mawice British Strategy (1929),pp 51-4. 
3 BA LV (21/9/95), P 341; Chapter 4, Table 15. Horses suffered from long voyages, both arms were 
equally reliant on horses, while few extra-European wars demanded massed cavalry or artillery. 
4 Maj Callwell Small Wars (1899).pp 38-9. WS Churchill The River War I (1899), Chapter 9 and II p 
326; Maj Oen Hughes Open Fire (1983).pp 56-7. 
5 Maj Oen Mawice Maps 18-26 BRo.HSA (nd). ~aps 22&22a suggest mobility's complexity. These 
show Boers and British interspersed m depth; Bng Oen Edmonds MOFB 1918 I (1935).p 533 for 1916-
ITs damage to German mobility in March 1~18; Table 10; R Beaumont War, Chaos and History 
(Westport 1994),pp xiv, 3-6,8-10. Beaumont Illustrates complexity by using dynamic situations such as 
fluids and meteorology. This suggests the.greater complexity of mobility. DESERT STORM and 
COMPASS suggest mobility's disproportionate effects. 
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Consequently organisations and C3 affect it considerably. This is another reason why 
mobility is complex. An ill-structured force with poor C3 may physically be as fast as 
its enemy but will find collective, timely movement hard.6 Speed, a dimension of 
mobility, is connected closely to tempo and surprise. Chapter 7 argues that delegating 
initiative is necessary to achieve both effects. Mobility may not necessarily favour 
larger forces, which, Bloch argued, would collapse under their own logistic weight. 7 
Here mobility differs from firepower where numbers are more important. 8 
Mobility is primarily the factor associated with offence. To attack involves 
movement and, when moving, fire is less effective. Moreover movement involves 
more exposure, even when utmost use is made of fieldcraft. Covering fire protecting 
movement became more vital as defensive firepower increased. Tirah and South 
Africa both demonstrated this. Mobility allows ground to be exploited dynamically 
and increases the efficiency of weapons by concentrating strength against weakness.9 
Fire may also be necessary to kick-start movement. Reitz commented: '[t]he British ... 
blasted a gap through which the victorious soldiery came pouring.' Current doctrine 
links the two factors inextricably. 10 Mobile forces must have sufficient firepower not 
only to provide covering fire during movement but also to threaten or to inflict mortal 
damage on the enemy once they have reached their objective. 11 This has logistic 
6 R Leonhard The Art of Manoeuvre Warfare (Novato 1991), p23 describes the mathematical difficulties 
of modelling manoeuvre. Firepower is far easier; Maurice Strategy pp 174-5; Chapter 9; Glossary. 
7 I Bloch Is War Now Impossible? (1899),pp 37,151,342-5; current analysis shows that too many 
vehicles relative to available routes causes jams. JJ Mearsheimer Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca 
1983),p 39. 
• FW Lanchester Aircraft in War (1916), Chapter 5. Numerical superiority is tempered by concealment, 
skill and weaponry but when these factors are roughly equal, it is decisive. 
9 ADP J Operations (1994),p 5-3; Glossary. 
100 Reitz Commando (1929),pp 87-8, though secondary evidence, he was a Pieter's veteran and 
material in Chapters 3&4 confums his point: DMO (1996),pp 4-21-22. 
II This makes the point that mobility is not decisive by itself. But as it disrupts the enemy's cJ and 
demoralises, the amount of casualties inflicted may be less than those required by attrition, eg the 
contrast between Verdun and SICHELSCHNITI. JS Corum The Roots of Blitzkrieg (Lawrence 1992). p 
3 suggests over 700,000 casualties at Verdun more or less equally divided. German casualties in 
SICHELSCHNm were 156,556, Maj Ellis The War in France and Flanders (1953),p 353. 
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implications. 
MobiUty in 1897 
Superficially mobility is determined by speed but there are other dimensions: the 
ability to cross rough terrain, the capability to move in the teeth of enemy fire and 
finally endurance. 
In 1897 tactical and often operational-level mobility was based on marching and 
animals, primarily horses. Horses have good cross-country ability and move faster 
than infantry in good going, but are prone to disease. They are harder to conceal than 
men, making tactical use of ground harder. In dismounted action, 25% of troopers 
must remain as horseholders and the led horses are vulnerable. 12 There were thus 
sound reasons for commanders to keep cavalry mounted, maximising mobility, 
surprise and tempo. 
Mobility changes with ground. In very rugged terrain Infantry have the greatest 
mobility. Mounted troops were less impeded than wheeled artillery, but pack-borne 
pieces could: 'climb up the side of a sign-board an' trust to the stick of the paint.' 13 
Mobility is also relative to threat. Artillery was more vulnerable when moving under 
Direct Fire by virtue of its slower pace than mounted troops, its inability to fire when 
moving and its large target-size. But artillery, particularly when shooting Indirect, can 
switch its fire almost unconstrained by enemy action. The shells are the weapons. 
Furthermore, as its pieces are usually not under close-range Direct Fire when shooting 
so, artillery retains more freedom to move than the other combat arms. Mounted troops 
were large targets, though smaller than artillery, and were barely capable of firing 
12LS Amery THWSA VI (1909),pp 428-30; Maj Callwell Small Wars (1899),pp 51.54,357-8; Lt Col 
Blenkinsop Contagious Diseases Among Animals (Dublin 1904); 'The Military Critic' The Westminster 
Gazette' 'Some Lessons of the Boer War' NR 35 (1900),p 1032; FW Lanchester Aircraft in War 
P916),pp 14-5. Col Henderson The Science of War (1905), p 59. 
J Amery THWSA III P 395; Glossary; R Kipling Verse. Dejinili\'e Edition (1977),p 403. A more 
conventional assessment is that mules can climb anywhere that men can without using their arms, Brig 
Bidwell Gunners at War (1979).p 84. 
138 
while moving. But shock demanded speed which also produced surprise and tempo. 
Sometimes a cavalry charge was cheaper in casualties and more decisive than a slower 
infantry advance. Infantry can move under heavy fire by using ground and their fire is 
less constrained by movement. Under heavy fire Infantry may be more mobile; out of 
contact mounted troops were, while shells are constrained only by range, the 
availability of ammunition and trajectory. Thus mobility depended on many factors 
other than crude speed. 
A key component of mobility is endurance. This, based on logistics, the available 
transport-lift and, in the period, animalmastership, is critical for the sustained mobility 
that manoeuvre over distance demands. In 1899 logistics relied on animals tactically 
and sometimes at the operational level, and rail and water both operationally and 
strategically. 
Here it is worth emphasising that attrition and manoeuvre impose somewhat 
different demands on logistics. The logistic scale of the former war is undoubtedly 
challenging, but manoeuvre, illustrated by the Allied breakout from Normandy, poses 
harder replenishment problems. Sustaining momentum demands that supplies are 
pushed forward against dynamic resistance over rapidly increasing distances while the 
defence's supply lines are shortening. Also the attacker is advancing over partly 
unknown terrain in which the enemy has probably demolished many installations. 
Furthermore there is less scope to alter the obj ectives of manoeuvre for logistic 
reasons. 14 On the Somme it would have been possible to reduce the attack frontage to 
conserve ammunition. In the German attack on Russia in 1941, reaching Tula, a 
prodigious advance, meant failure. IS In an animal-reliant army, forage was vital but 
14 The Boer demolition of key bridges partly caused the British halt at Bloemfontein, Maj Gen Maurice 
BROHWSA II (1907),pp 242-3,258. I' J Erickson The Road to Sta!ingrad (1975), Chapter 7. Manoeuvre which fails and which has passed 
its culminating point is very vulnerable both tactically and logistically as 1941-2 showed. 
139 
also bulky and inefficient, constituting a far greater logistic burden than ammunition. 
Also during rapid movement animals need more food but supplying it is harder, as is 
their veterinary care. In short manoeuvre poses greater logistic problems than 
positional, attritional war does. However it would be wrong to conclude that logistics 
are easy during attrition. 16 
Manoeuvre 
To achieve victory mobility is not enough; movement has to be purposeful, ie it 
implements the commander's plan. In short mobility has become manoeuvre. 
Successful manoeuvre depends on a commander's concept, designed to outwit the 
enemy, and, for its implementation staffwork to coordinate details. Both have to be 
effectively transmitted, reinforcing the above arguments on mobility's relationship to 
c3• 17 Manoeuvre maximises surprise. The same is true of firepower, but there is an 
important technical difference. Generally firepower inflicts most casualties within 60-
90 seconds of rounds hitting. 18 Afterwards targets have taken cover and attritional 
engagement begins. In the period of this thesis, manoeuvre extended much deeper than 
fire and was capable of inflicting surprise in depth. The commander's aim targeting 
enemy vulnerability and dynamic surprise combined into manoeuvre may overwhelm 
weak C3 systems which are unable to react in time. In this respect manoeuvre is 
superior to firepower in winning and maintaining the initiative. 19 Seizing a tempo-
advantage is inherent in manoeuvre. Though the immediate casualties may be greater 
than in more deliberate combat, overall victory is far cheaper than in prolonged 
161M Brown British Logistics on the Western Front (Westport 1998) contrasted to M van Creveld 
Supplying War (1977), Chapter 5; Glossary. Col Nicholson Behind the Lines (1939),pp 213-7 for 
logistics' affect on mobility in October 1918. 
17 Chapter 9; Brig Bidwell Modem Warfare (1973), pp 91-2; defective C3 decided several manoeuvre 
battles. 
II JG Crowther & R Whiddington Science at War (1947), P 118. 
19 ADPJ p5-J. The contrast between Anzio, where manoeuvre was just the landing and Operation 
COMPASS where it was sustained in depth is suggestive. The later overwhelmed Italian C3. 
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attrition. Contemporaries argued similarly for shock. 20 
Mobility Before 1899 
Cavalry 
The Stanhope Memorandum, which saw continental campaigning as the Army's 
last priority, combined with a low threat to Britain, ultimately damaged the Cavalry. 
The mobility that colonial warfare demanded was logistical and cross-country rather 
than the speed and tempo of major warfare. Massed cavalry were unsuited to many 
colonial wars. They were hard to move strategically, while terrain often precluded 
shock action as in Tirah. Between 1815 and 1899 the British Army only deployed a 
cavalry division twice. Its performance in the Crimea was varied and Raglan proved 
reluctant to use it boldly. Wolseley obtained better results in 1882, but the enemy were 
feeble and the cavalry pursuit was over a short distance. 21 Hence, with adequate 
mobility, greater firepower and lower logistical demands, MI was often preferred to 
cavalry in colonial warfare. Many British-based and for that matter British cavalry 
units in India vegetated before 1899. 
Cavalry was the key manoeuvre arm in major warfare but British Cavalry was 
weak compared to that of the major continental powers and distrusted by many 
generals.22 Its officers were recruited from generally low-calibre candidates, described 
by a contemporary as: 'dunces. ,23 Dr Badsey identifies a cavalry revival in the 1890s, 
though his 1886 start-date is apparently based on a typographical error.24 More open-
order shock-tactics were instituted, while the Squadron System was introduced in 
20 DMO (1989),p 43. Lt Col Maude Cavalry: its past andfuture (1903), pp x-xi argued that 
Paardeberg's siege probably cost more disease-casualties than an attack would have done .. 
21 Anglesey A History of British Cavalry II and III (1975& 1982), respectively pp 49-50,75,82-4 and pp 
272, 303-5, cavalry divisions were used in India; WS Churchill My Early Life (1930), pp 71-3 157-8. 
II Table 40; Lt Col Gough 'The Strategical Employment of Cavalry' JRUSI XLIX (1905), P 1131. It is 
tempting to trace this back to Wellington's irascible comments, I Fletcher Galloping at Everything 
~taplehurst 1999),pp xv-xvii. 
Lord Tbring 'Place the War Office in Commission' 19C XLVIII (1900),p700. 
24 SO 8adsey Fire and the Sword (Cambridge 1981 ),p 107 fn 4. 
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1892. Wood emphasised cavalry training and shooting when commanding at 
Aldershot. There were cavalry manoeuvres in 1890, 1894 and 1895, with cavalry 
concentrations in 1897 and before the 1898 Manoeuvres. But this training was flawed. 
The 1897 concentration of38 days included 32 parades, one divisional, 14 brigade and 
3 regimental drills, 1 brigade march-past, 3 days of inspections, one horse and 5 
church-parades. It incorporated only one outpost practice and 2 reconnaissance days. 25 
This was insufficient for effective training in detached duties. Over-accentuating 
shock and drill discouraged initiative. In 1898 during both the preliminary cavalry 
concentration and in the later all arms manoeuvres little dismounted training occurred, 
suggesting the tactical predominance of shock.26 Protection and reconnaissance were 
poorly performed on the 1898 Manoeuvres.27 Afterwards Wolseley criticised the state 
of training of the cavalry brigades: their brigadiers lacked enterprise, while superior 
commanders gave them too little scope. The former suggests that cavalrymen lacked 
confidence in their own arm. Wolseley and Roberts criticised cavalry reconnaissance 
in 1898 and 1899. These faults and the logistic weaknesses, analysed later, suggest 
that the Army would find sustained manoeuvre hard.28 
Over-control by senior commanders suggests institutional distrust of the cavalry 
and failure to understand its operational level capabilities.29 The usual British 
proportion of cavalry was one brigade per army-corps, while the Cavalry Division HQ 
was not seen as usually deploying. This meant that cavalry brigades would be under 
corps command or further decentralised rather than being concentrated for significant 
15BHG III (1897),p 5;Maj Morrison 'Cavalry in the Manoeuvres of 1898' JRUSI XLIII (1899),pp 632-3. 
26 WO 297/4 pp 18, 21, 47,50,29-30 implies that there was no formation reconnaissance and limited 
protective training between Inl-27/8/98, while RHA were only present between 16-27/8/98. MI were 
used as artillery escorts, suggesting their firepower was used ineffectively. Morrison 'Manoeuvres,' pp 
637-9: WO 297/4 p vii. 
27 FM Wood From Midshipman to Field Marsha/II (1906),pp 214-5. Though secondary evidence, this 
simply records facts; WO 27913; WO 279/9 p 32. 
21 Buller also was critical, WO 297/4, Appendix II pp 25-6; Times 28/8/99. 
29 'Military Notes' JRUSI XLII (1898) pp 1208-1213. 
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missions under the CinC.30 CDB 1898's section on the Cavalry Division saw its tasks 
as tactical, largely involving action on the battlefield rather than detached on key 
missions.31 Both suggest that bold manoeuvre was not anticipated. 
Hythe judged that cavalry undervalued musketry in 1899. They still carried 
carbines and there is no evidence of sustained cavalry pressure for rearmament with 
rifles before 1899. Even in 1902 after South Africa's firepower lessons, Army HQ 
India criticised British cavalry's shooting. CDB 1898 did not examine marksmanship 
and had only limited coverage of horse artillery and machine gunS.32 Experts assessed 
that insufficient cavalry/RHA training had hurt interarm cooperation. This suggests 
that the Cavalry had misappreciated the growth of firepower and underestimated the 
need for covering fire. This impaired the arm's manoeuvrability. 33 
CDB 1898 overemphasized massed shock action, thereby devaluing detached 
duties. It ordained that: 
[d]iscipline and perfect order are the most important characteristics, leaders must 
consequently seek in training of their troops to develop these qualities to the 
utmoSt.34 
It also stressed that: 
[t]he charge is the culminating point of cavalry instruction. Rapidity and 
vehemence at the point of attack must be united with perfect order and 
cohesion.3s 
Though it did not formally devalue reconnaissance and protection, these followed its 
30 WEs /898 P 128; Table 29; Glossary; CDB /898 does not mention Independent Cavalry. It would be 
hard for GHQ to command 2 brigades directly without an intermediate divisional HQ. 
31 CDB /898 pp 351-363. Though the Cavalry Division was seen as having: 'a more or less independent 
role' Ibid p 351 but with the possible exception of its instructions on pursuit and retreat, CDB did not 
emphasise this, contrastingly CT 1904 stressed Independent Cavalry. Glossary. 
32Musketry Report /899 (1900),p 9; UMIU1/2462 'AHQ Circular Musketry 1901-2' p 2. That 
frrepower was devalued is suggested by the fact that troopers only carried 30 rounds each, WEs /898 P 
6. An MI private had 100. A sustained campaign for rifles would have left traces in the military 
~oumals; CDB /898 pp 318-81. It merely drew officers' attention to FAD. 
3 Col Paget 'The Tactical Employment of Horse Artillery with Cavalry' JRA XXXV (1908-9),p 69; 
CDB 1898 P 318. 
M CDB /898 p 199, the drill standards on p 200 stressed control. 
3' Ibid p 231. The section which the quotation starts is entitled: 'Drill of the Attack.' 
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lengthy Part ill on drill, the basis of shock, implying their lesser importance. CDB 
1898 saw reconnaissance as important in the context of triggering cavalry against 
cavalry action, but did not stress its importance for extended all-arms manoeuvre. 
Baden-Powell considered that reconnaissance was underemphasised, while drill and 
shock were overvalued before 1899.36 These defects impaired the Army's ability to 
manoeuvre. 
Many units had poorly implemented the Squadron System, particularly its 
emphasis on delegated training. Centralisation favoured close-order shock, damaging 
initiative and the performance of detached duties. Decentralised cavalry combat 
required speedy decision-making, initiative and judgement but conditions before 1899 
did not foster these qualities.37 The older cavalryman: 
who for years had never had a voice in the feeding or management of his horses, 
whose men had been paid by a regimental Paymaster, drilled by an Adjutant or 
[RSM], and who had not the power to take a horse of his own troop out of the 
stables without permission from his [CO] was not likely to embrace with zeal a 
newly found freedom which he was not trained to use.38 
The quotation links horsemastership and initiative. That horsemastership was weak 
suggests the Cavalry's vegetation. Officers had little involvement with it and CDB 
1898 had no instructions on it. This suggests that cavalry was focussed on tactical 
shock as operational manoeuvre demands meticulous animal-care over long 
distances.39 
Cavalry saw less operational service than Infantry; officer entry-standards were 
lower than those of other arms and cavalry officers were seen as less professional. In 
turn cavalrymen felt discriminated against.40 Rimington summarised the state of the 
l6lbid P 283; Aids to Scouting/or Neos and Men (Aldershot nd),pp ix, 11; Glossary. 
37 RCWSA Evidence I Q 10441. The 4th Hussars were overcentralised in 1913, HOWPs 8/4/1 letter 
16112113; CDB 1898 pp 301-2 gives instructions which demand initiative but does not emphasise 
inculcating it. 
)IMaj Gen Smith A History o/the [RA VC] /796-/9/9 (1927),p 172. Though secondary evidence, 
failures in South Africa and Rimington's comments, cited later, bear this out. 
)9 RCWSA E"'idence II p 662; Col de Lisle The Training o/the Remount (Bombay 1909), pp 4-5. 
40 EDR CLXXV (1897),p 530. 
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pre-1899 Cavalry in Britain: 
A regiment was judged by the number of officers who hunted and raced and 
went into society, as good or bad, or rather smart or the reverse. The fact was 
that in those days, as long as your horses were fat and you could march past and 
were fairly clean, any question of fighting efficiency never occurred. 
Detached duties had been neglected since Waterloo, while shock had been 
overstressed as it was suited to: 'weaker intelligences.' This provides evidence that 
contemporaries linked detached duties and initiative.41 
MI, Marching and Logistics 
MI, which contemporaries saw as a uniquely British arm, were improvised from 
picked infantrymen, who had, in theory, prior training. They used horses for 
movement but did not fight mounted. Their instruction was short, continuation-
training was limited and thus expertise was lost, while their riding, let alone 
horsemastership, were initially poor in 1899. Raising MI on mobilization meant that 
the reSUlting units lacked cohesion while their parent battalions lost their best men at 
the start of campaigning. Tactically MI was suited to colonial warfare; their extra 
firepower and dismounted skills outweighed inferior riding. That many colonial wars 
were small-scale, meant that weak unit-cohesion was less damaging. But MI were also 
intended to fight in conventional warfare to bolster carbine-armed cavalry's firepower. 
British commentators felt that this role and the fact that they were regulars constituted 
their distinctive feature. But their very existence suggests that there were defects 
within the Cavalry. 42 
Infantry, seen as very much the master arm in 1899, depended on marching for 
their tactical and sometimes their operational mobility. They had marched poorly on 
41 Thring 'Place the War Office in Commission' J 9C XLVIII (19OO),p 700; WO 3216781; Akers-
Douglas Co Report pi; WO 279/9 pp 33,43, WO 32/6781 'Dickson Co Report' p 2. RCWSA Evidence 
II Qs 12729-30. 
41 Col Grierson Scarlet into Khaki (reprinted 1988),p 42: Glossary; RCWSA Evidence II Q 13941; LS 
Amery THWSA III (l90S),p 391; The Times 11/1/01 'Lessons of the War V-MI.' 
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major manoeuvres in Britain before 1899 and there was concern that this would recur 
in South Africa, given the influx of reservists. The ASC provided a coherent logistic 
structure but it, the A VD and the remount organisation were understrength and 
unready for major warfare.43 The A VD was not attracting good-quality entrants. 
Furthermore veterinary hospitals had been deleted from WEs 1898. These structural 
defects suggest that the Cavalry had either little influence or was incompetent. These 
logistic weaknesses further imply that the Army did not anticipate sustained, large-
scale manoeuvre. 44 
Manoeuvre Doctrine before 1899 and the American Civil War 
The Army's manuals before 1899 had no stress on mobility and manoeuvre set at 
the operational level. There had of course been campaigns in which British forces had 
manoeuvred over distances; one can see the Blenheim or Vittoria campaigns being 
mounted at the operational level and being based on a commander's concept involving 
creativity, risk taking and surprise. Roberts had marched from Kabul to Kandahar and 
Wolseley had initiated a bold pursuit after Tel el Kebir but neither had left any trace in 
either contemporary manuals or manoeuvres. Nor significantly were there any 
instructions on the use of Independent Cavalry. This concept, though well established 
in continental doctrine, was not apparently one Britain intended to adopt. This 
omission would have inhibited any British attempt to resort to manoeuvre. 
Dr Badsey has examined the American Civil War's influence on the fire versus 
shock debate. However, it had a strong second influence. Henderson's Stonewall 
Jackson was the most significant book by a British officer around 1900. It was written 
to instruct on command, morale and surprise, ignored by Hamley, and, one may add, 
factors central to manoeuvre warfare. Henderson in his preface emphasised the need to 
43 Col Furse The Art of Marching (1901),p 115; QRs J899pp 186-7; RCWSA Evidence I pp 138,142-.3. 
RPrs (1903),pp 1-2. RCWSA Evidence I Col Duck, head AVe p 133; 'Duck Report 11151/99.' RCWSA 
Appendices (1903),p 100; Smith RA VC pp 203,16,38. 
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study strategy and its 'principles.' This focus suggests doctrine as Chapter 9 argues, 
while Jackson's highly mobile operations also implied the need for doctrine which 
would steer subordinates amidst complexity.45 The book's most significant part 
examined the Valley Campaign of 1863. In this Jackson combined speed, surprise and 
risk-taking to attack enemy weaknesses. Jackson's operational level manoeuvre 
defeated superior numbers and dislocated Federal strategy. For a small army 
realisation that superior mobility could defeat greater numbers was important.46 The 
book impressed Wolseley, who introduced its second edition: 
[the 2 volumes] have taught me much; they have made me think still more; and I 
hope that they may do the same for many others in the British Army.47 
Roberts had presented copies of Stonewall Jackson to Rawlinson and Hamilton 
for their voyage to South Africa. Later Roberts claimed: 
I had given a considerable amount of thought to the probability of [war] in South 
Africa ... While still thinking over this problem, I read Stonewall Jackson, and 
was much struck with the extraordinary effect which strategy ... had upon the 
campaign in Virginia, and also with the result of Jackson's swift and unexpected 
movements.48 
Henderson served as Roberts' senior intelligence officer during the Paardeberg 
operation which similarly combined deception, surprise and rapid manoeuvre to defeat 
Cronje. Stonewall Jackson impressed H Gough, Ismay, Montgomery-Massingberd and 
Monash amongst others. The Valley Campaign was a frequent examination subject. It 
features in a near-contemporary manual and there are many references to both it and 
Jackson's phrase: 'mystify and mislead' in contemporary works. Rimington modelled 
his brigade's training on Jackson's methods. Henderson's influence remained 
44 If LADs were deleted from tank units' establishment, it would suggest defects in the RAe. 
• .5 Badsey Fire pp 1.18,20-26; Lt Col Henderson Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War 
~ 898).pp ix-xi; J Luvaas The Education of an Army (1965), pp 225-6; DMO P 49. 
J Selby Stonewall Jackson as Military Commander (1968), P 95; ADP 2 Command (1995).p 2-23; B 
Holden Reid War Studies at the Staff College (Camberley 1992)1 pp 8-9. 
47 Col Henderson Stonewall Jackson (1899).p vii. Introducing the second edition suggests spontaneity. 
41 RPs 7101-23-110-1 RobertslHenderson 27/9/99; Roberts 'Memoir' in Henderson Science. p xxiv. 
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substantial down to 1914 through his works and his effect on Camberley 
graduates. 49 
Mobility and Manoeuvre in South Africa 
South Africa confonned to Rommel's comment on North Africa: 'the tactician's 
paradise, the logistician's purgatory.' The Boers, exceptionally by European standards, 
were nearly all mounted, consequently they: 
had, anywhere ... away from the lines of rail, far greater mobility in every 
respect than their opponents ... In their independence of all stores, in the mobility 
of their least mobile troops, ... they surpass any force known to history. 
The Boers began the war with the advantages of surprise, numbers and mobility. They 
also had a time-window before British reinforcements arrived to exploit these 
advantages to the full. Contemporary commentators criticised their failure to use this 
period decisively. 50 
British Cavalry had one initial success and created the opportunity for another. 
At Elandslaagte they outflanked and then charged the withdrawing Boers. At Talana 
Colonel Moller's force got behind the Boers where it was ideally placed to kill their 
horses, to attack their rear in combination with the infantry or charge their withdrawal. 
But Moller dithered and was captured. 51 
Poor British mobility in South Africa caused most early attempts at outflanking 
49IFW Beckett Johnnie Gough VC (1989),p 131; Gen Ismay Memoirs (1960),p 16; FM Montgomery-
Massingberd The Autobiography of a Gunner (Woolwich 1946),p 5. Stonewall Jackson inspired him to 
try for Camberley; G Serle John Monash (Carlton 1983),p 191; JH Anderson Notes on the Life of 
Stonewall Jackson (1904),p 5; Maj Gen Haig Cavalry Studies (1907),p 319; BORs (1908) II P 86; Lt 
Col Edwards Notes on the Training. Equipment. and Organisation of Cavalry for War ( 191 O),p 79; 
AFM I (1985),pp 301-11. FM Robertson From Private to Field Marshal (1921),pp 82-3. Though 
written later, perspective would have been needed for such a judgement, while the views of an ex-
student of Henderson and a later Commandant ofCamberley are valuable; WO 279/516 '3 Cav Bde 
Mans 3-15/8/03' p I; ROBPs 112110 'Notes on Strategy by Col Henderson. Compiled for ... students at 
the Staff College' (6th edition 1912). It almost certainly would have been distributed to Quetta; that it 
had reached 6 editions suggests wide distribution; WO 27/405 'Strategy.' 
so Maj Norris The South African War (1900),pp 46-7; Capt Mahan USN The Story of the War in South 
At!ca (1900), pp 8-9,58. 
, MURPs 'Talana folder;' LS Amery THWSA II (1902),pp 170-3,230; Lt Col Gore The Green Horse in 
Ladysmith (1901),pp 6-9,10-11. Moller's regiment was nicknamed Kruger's Own afterwards! 
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to end in frontal attacks eg Buller's outflanking move at Colenso and Methuen's initial 
actions at Belmont and Graspan. Both commanders were short of mounted troops, 
while Buller's were hastily organised. Buller largely blamed his artillery losses at 
Colenso on his inability to resupply his troops with water. This logistic failure was 
essentially a mobility defect. 52 Buller understood that immobility meant infantry 
assaUlting entrenchments frontally: 'the very thing that ought not to be done,' but he 
did not make the required enhancements to mobility. 53 Even when his mounted troops 
increased, Buller did not organize them into a division. This meant that they were thus 
less able to execute operational level tasks. This suggests that Buller distrusted 
mounted forces. Buller had criticised cavalry reconnaissance in 1898. Cavalrymen 
later criticised his timid handling of their arm in Natal. That Buller's mounted troops 
were organized into separate brigades increased the span of command and complicated 
staffwork for his HQ, which, as Table 29 suggests, was already under considerable 
pressure because of its improvised nature. 54 Furthermore it was coordinating 
operations on two other axes, dealing with strategic issues and tactically commanding 
in Natal. 
Buller's approach contrasted with Roberts' assessment that: 'the only means of 
bringing this war to a speedy conclusion ... is for our force to be more mobile than the 
Boers. ,55 Roberts raised more mounted troops and organised them and his cavalry into 
a division capable of independent action. But this over-large, uncohesive formation 
complicated C3• S6 Roberts probably erred by over-expanding his MI and colonial 
'2 RCWSA Evidence II Qs 15281-4; Dundonald went to South Africa privately; he was hastily sent to 
Natal as a brigadier, Army Life pp 93,98-100, also Haig RCWSA Evidence II p 402. 
'3 RPs 7101-23-221-1 extract telegrams BullerlWO 11111199& 16/12/99. 
,.ws Churchill London to Ladysmith (1900),p 251. Buller initially had 2 regular cavalry, 3 irregular 
units and 4 sub-units, only one regular, SAD II (1901),p 100; Glossary. 
" A Wessels Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa (Stroud 2000),p 53. 
56 SAD I (1901),p 2; Maj Gen Maurice BROHWSA 1(1906), P 48S.1t consisted of3 cavalry brigades, 8 
regular MI units, many of whom were novice riders, 7 colonial MI units and 7 RHA batteries. Whether 
all the MI were under French's direct command is unclear, but at Poplar Grove he commanded 3 
cavalry and 2 MI brigades, SAD I P 19; Chapter 9. 
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forces rather than horsing his Cavalry adequately. 57 This possibly suggests that 
Roberts distrusted the Cavalry. Roberts also enhanced mobility by reorganising his 
transport. It has been claimed that this was due to his ignorance of the British 
transport system, but this is superficial. Roberts had served as CinC Ireland between 
1893 and 1899 and was therefore aware of the British logistic system. Also he had 
specialist ASC advice. He felt the Regimental System required more resources than 
were available in early 1900. Indeed Roberts was forced to reduce his ambulances 
drastically due to vehicle shortages in February 1900.58 But Roberts' new centralised 
system was unsustainable. Transport was reorganised several times afterwards, each 
time reverting towards the original system. 59 Roberts, however, was able to abandon 
the railway and thereby surprise Cronje. Here logistic changes had devastating 
operational level results. 
In Natal transport remained on the old system, and, though distances were far 
less than in the Cape and Orange Free State, Buller's force was sluggish: 
[t]he vast amount of baggage this anny takes with it ... hampers its movements 
and utterly precludes all possibility of surprising the enemy ... [R]oads are 
crowded, drifts are blocked, marching troops are delayed, and all rapidity of 
movement is out of the question. Meanwhile the enemy completes the 
fortification of his positions and the cost of capturing them rises.60 
Churchill makes an important point that mobility is only valuable in that it translates 
into some military advantage. Buller and Warren were reluctant to use their cavalry 
boldly during the Spion Kop operation. Cavalrymen were certain that Buller: 'will not 
use his cavalry,' castigating his failure to pursue after Pieter's.61 
57 This deprived the Cavalry of remounts, Haig RCWSA Evidence II Q 19375; Dr Badsey emphasises 
the point, Fire p 139. 
51 SAD 1 (1901), P 5; RRCCTWSA (1901), P 21. 
'~aurice BROHWSA I pp 348-9; RPs 7101-23-110-1 RobertslLansdowne 7/1/00, SAD I P 5, there 
were shortages of both vehicles and animals. Roberts had senior ASC officers on his staff. LS Amery 
THWSA VI (1909), pp 364-410 contains a long monograph on transport. 
60 Churchill Ladysmith p 253. 
61lbid pp 282-3,292; Dundonald Army pp 136,127-8; Maj Gen White-Spunner Horse Guards (2006).p 
421 citing HCM Box 7 AB 2351; Churchill Ladysmith pp 469-70. SAD II (190t),p 40 Roberts hinted 
that pursuit was possible after Pieter's. 
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Contrastingly Roberts employed his cavalry on what can be seen as an 
operational level mission to relieve Kimberley. This was based on logistic changes, 
described above, concentration of mounted troops under a proven leader, French, and 
intelligence, deception and security measures orchestrated by Henderson.62 The 
chargers were unfit, their rations scanty and water scarce, a lethal combination, but 
despite these drawbacks, French relieved Kimberley.63 The key action was at Klip 
Drift, where, after reconnaissance, his division charged, covered by heavy shelling. 
The charge was not directed at a Boer force, instead French steered it at a gap in their 
position. Speed, extension, there was some 5 yards between files, and dust, kicked up 
by both the shells and the horses carried them through a position which would have 
probably stopped slower-moving infantry.64 Commentators, including Amery and 
Childers, neither supporters of traditional shock, were impressed: 
The part played by the cavalry [at Klip Drift] ... is one which will grow in 
importance in the wars of the future, and in tracing the development of this new 
function of the mounted arm the military historian will take his starting point in 
the great charge that relieved Kimberley. 65 
Their praise suggests that advocacy of mobility was not just the preserve of 
reactionary cavalrymen. After the relief of Kimberley and a day wasted pursuing the 
Boer artillery, French was switched against Cronje. Roberts' selection of a geographic 
location as French's objective was probably incorrect; Cronje's force was the proper 
one. This suggests command and staff failures. Despite high horse mortality, French 
intercepted Cronje, who, instead of evading, entrenched and was eventually 
captured.66 The effort, however, largely destroyed the cavalry's chargers and later 
62 Amery THWSA III, pp 339-40,347-55,59. 
63 Capt Boyle 'The Cavalry Rush to Kimberley and in Pursuit of Cronje' 19C XLVII (1900),p 906. 
64 Amery THWSA III, pp 393-5. One officer was killed, 20 all ranks wounded, SAD I P 10; Leonhard 
Maneuver p 64 suggests defeating the enemy without fighting is the acme of manoeuvre. 
65 Amery THWSA III P 395; E Childers War and the Arnie Blanche (1910), pp 96-106. 
66 Rhodes pressured for an early relief; THWSA III, P 368. But Cronje's failure was much greater and 
Roberts' choice of objective could hardly have been based on Cronje's adopted course. Later there were 
other criticisms of Roberts for adopting geographic rather than military objectives. Henderson went sick 
during Paardeberg; his absence has been blamed for Roberts' preference. 
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manoeuvres consequently failed. Weak horses, Roberts' staff's failure to synchronise 
formations, and a sluggish performance by French let the Boers escape at Poplar 
Grove.67 
Despite command and staff failures by senior commanders and their HQs, many 
cavalry commanders and units performed poorly in South Africa. Roberts 
stellenbosched 6 cavalry brigadiers and 11 of 17 cavalry COs. This was a far higher 
proportion than in the Infantry, suggesting serious cavalry defects.68 
As combat continued, both sides' mobility increased. The Boers ditched their 
wagons, partly the cause ofCronje's encirclement, while the British raised more 
mounted troops, lightened horses' loads, discarded cold steel and, as the Boers no 
longer had artillery, withdrew pieces from many columns. This removed the risk of the 
Boers capturing British artillery, which would have been fatal to their blockhouses, 
and increased British mobility. Surplus gunners converted to high-class MI. Many 
future senior commanders led columns in these highly mobile operations. Gough 
admitted to learning more about reconnaissance from some Natal farmers than from 
his previous 10 years cavalry service. This shows how poor prewar training had 
been.69 
Despite these improvements, British mobility remained below that of the Boers'. 
The British relied on resupply and were constrained by wagons. Many were either 
poor horse-masters or untrained recruits. Another problem was that Kitchener's 
centralised control system proved, with the existing communications, unable to 
coordinate dispersed, mobile operations. 70 
67 Robertson Private pp 114-5.Robertson was at Roberts' HQ, though he wrote years later. 
61 WO 3217904; RPs 7101-23-122-2 Roberts/Curzon 19/9/01. He sacked 3lnfantry cas. 
69Soldiering On (1954},pp 66-7, though written years later, Gough's candour suggests veracity; Byng, 
Haig, and Allenby all commanded columns in South Africa and later armies in 1914-18. SAD II (1901 ). 
~ 57 praised Gough's scouting so he learnt fast. 
E Childers THWSA V (1907),pp 89-90; Oen Hamilton The Commander (1957), pp 99-104. 
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A perennial problem was how representative of modem warfare were South 
African conditions? The Boers had no cavalry but later adopted charging tactics 
successfully. These were not based on physical shock but on mounted fire or galloping 
to fire positions, then dismounting and shooting from cover. The British also adopted 
galloping tactics, which were far from exclusive to cavalry. They had to pin and 
defeat the Boers, who could not afford to become committed to decisive action if they 
were to survive. 71 Galloping horses are a hard target and, with declining numbers, the 
Boers could not generate enough fire to stop them. A veteran recalled how 8 troopers 
had rushed a small group: 'at this stage in the war the Boers would very seldom hold 
onto a position if they saw us galloping straight for them. ,72 Probably the latter part of 
the war saw more shock tactics, albeit of a novel nature, than the first phase. This 
further complicated the fire versus shock debate. 
Changes in Mounted Tactical Roles 
The tactical demarcation between Cavalry and MI changed in South Africa. 
Hitherto reconnaissance and shock were strictly Cavalry tasks, while dismounted 
action was practically reserved for MI. Cavalry saw the tactical need for rearming with 
rifles and fighting dismounted, while some MI officers argued that their men could do 
more than simply move mounted. MI columns, many of which had no cavalry, had to 
scout and sometimes charge. But these innovations did not affect MI tactics or roles 
after 1902. Contrastingly South Africa permanently altered cavalry tactics and 
weaponry, with more emphasis on dismounted action, reconnaissance and fire.?3 
Increased firepower and dispersion in South Africa suggested that 
reconnaissance, offensive manoeuvre and dismounted action were now more 
necessary than traditional shock-action. Offensive manoeuvre involved rapid 
71Altham Principles pp 78-9; Capt Saunderson Noles on [MJ] (Aldershot 1904),pp 28-32. 
n Lt Holland 'South African Reminiscences- contd' BHG VI (1908),p 187. 
13 MIT 1904 P 66 stressed that MI only fought dismounted. 
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movement to pre-empt the enemy and seize tactically important points which cavalry, 
now rifle-armed, could hold until relieved. This combined offensive manoeuvre and 
firepower to defeat static defensive firepower. The defenders faced either encirclement 
or being forced to break-out. For a small army, backed by a strong economy, superior 
mobility rather than increasing numbers had attractions. But some opponents of 
traditional shock, including Roberts, saw a residual role for it. Here it may be noted 
that the First World Warsaw considerable shock action including Mounted Rifles, 
troops without either the cavalry's shock-ethos or steel weapons, successfully charging 
semi-permanent defences on horseback. The Australians later demanded and were 
issued swords in 1918.74 
Shock tactics altered in South Africa. In theory their greatest effectiveness is 
produced by the collision of a heavy, cohesive unit moving as fast as possible. 
Consequently cavalry needed to be literally boot-to-boot. In South Africa charges 
tended to be at wider intervals. One notes the 5 yard interval at Klip Drift and the 
extended order at Elandslaagte. Partly the reason for this was that the British were not 
charging enemies in close-order, indeed at Klip Drift they were charging space not 
troops. Greater firepower also encouraged open-order charges. Consequently 
cavalrymen started to recommend smaller men and smaller horses for their arm. 
Heavy men on heavy horses were ideal for traditional close-order shock, but such 
horses were poor in protracted manoeuvre as they were less robust and needed more 
rations.7s 
Whether poor reconnaissance in South Africa was due to smokeless ammunition 
and long-range weapons, combined with the open terrain or whether it was due to 
cavalry failures combined with inadequate training is not a question which can be 
74 CT 1904 P vi; Capt Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestine II (1930), pp 638,644-5. 
7' Gore Green Horse p 31; W Gilbey Small Horses in Warfare (1900),p 1. 
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settled definitively here. GroWld-based reconnaissance needs to be more extensive in 
manoeuvre and is particularly important in view of the need to target weakness. The 
general view was that British reconnaissance had been poor; many blamed the 
Cavalry. Gwynne had questioned 10 commanders on cavalry scouting, which he saw 
as their most important task: 9 felt it had been bad. Lt Col Morrison, a South African 
veteran and cavalryman, criticised cavalry reconnaissance. In contrast Grierson, 
serving at Roberts' HQ felt that cavalry had provided sufficient infonnation.76 Despite 
this one notes reconnaissance failures, perhaps most critically during the first De Wet 
Hunt which had failed largely due to: 'extraordinarily bad scouting and field 
intelligence. ,77 
The Lessons 
Mobility and Manoeuvre's Importance 
Cavalry tactics were changing with more emphasis on reconnaissance and 
manoeuvre rather than on tactical shock. But the latter change went deeper than just 
tactics or the Cavalry. Manoeuvre, surprise and tempo had Anny-wide implications. 
Manoeuvre demanded initiative, 'internal' discipline, doctrine and staffwork. It also 
demanded that infantry marched well, that logistics were strengthened and that all 
parts of the Anny were ready for sustained movement. 
The South African War, Britain's ensuing diplomatic isolation and the revelation 
that the Anny had perfonned poorly increased the perceived threat of major warfare. 
Given the wide array of contingencies analysed briefly in Chapter I and the 
advantages of manoeuvre over attrition when fighting superior numbers, 
unsurprisingly the British were to emphasise the fonner. In January 1900 the RUSI 
reprinted Gen Chesney's lecture 'English Genius and Anny Organisation ... by special 
76 The Army on Itself(l904) p 60; WO 108/184 P 87; 'Second Prize Essay' JRUSI XLV (1901),pp 
816,801. 
n B Williams THWSA IV (1906), P 432. 
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request.' Why this was done is not recorded but it was almost certainly due to 
Chesney's emphasis on mobility. Chesney argued that the antidote to Continental 
numbers was a small, high-quality mobile anny, capable of outmanoeuvring masses.18 
Better-quality recruits would be more likely to display the initiative necessary in such 
combat. Many later commentators acknowledged Chesney directly. Others, like 
Conan-Doyle or Cairnes, were probably influenced indirectly. The former 
recommended that 30,000 MI form the backbone of the Army, precisely the same 
figure as Chesney suggested for his mobile force. 79 
The RCWSA gave mobility exceptional attention. Its Report highlighted 5 
topics. Three involved mobility: horsemastership, horsemanship and marching. The 
others were shooting and entrenchment. It had a separate section on mounted forces. 
There was no artillery section, even though QF artillery was emerging. This suggests 
the priority attached to mobility. The Report noted that the SAFF initially deployed 
with more mounted troops than establishments allowed, but even they had proved 
insufficient. It argued that more mobile troops were needed to outmanoeuvre greater 
defensive firepower and larger enemy forces. 8o The RCWSA saw increased mobility 
as necessary for European warfare. Roberts emphasised: '[i]n all future wars we shall 
require a much larger number of mounted men than we have ever had hitherto.' He 
had heavily criticised cavalry performance in South Africa, yet recommended 
strengthening the ann. Haig unsurprisingly agreed: 
Cavalry will have a larger sphere of action in future wars; in fact, as now anned, 
[with magazine rifles] it is a new element in tactics .... Besides being used before, 
during, and after a battle ... we must expect to see it employed strategically on a 
much larger scale than formerly, when it was without an effective firearm. 
Haig's 'strategic' would now equate to the current operational level, while his point 
71 JRUSI XLIV (1900), pp 61-3, given in 1874. Research at the RUSI has failed to establish why it was 
reprinted. 
79 The Greal Boer War (1900),p 530; Chesney 'Genius' p 62 suggested 30,000 mounted men. 
10 RCWSA Report pp 49-52,32-3,49; WEs 1898 P 128. 
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on rifles enhancing mobility is examined later. Baden-Powell, the new IGC, 
considered that: 
[c]avalry are more essential in modem war than '" ever before, both for 
extended strategical moves, for wide reconnaissance, for distant raids, and for 
tactical flanking operations. 
Gatacre, an infantryman, concluded: 
[c ]avalry will more than ever be necessary for the fight of the future ... [f]or 
turning movements, prolonging attacks and positions rapidly, for rear guards and 
pursuits.' 
Gen Wood emphasised: 
Four legs will always beat two ... Large conscripted armies cannot afford many 
[MI], but with our small voluntary Army it is the natural solution of fighting 
greater numbers by enabling one man to fight three, as has been shown ... in 
South Africa. s1 
Outside the RCWSA others similarly extolled the importance of mobility and 
hence the cavalry'S greater value. In 1904-5 the Military Secretary judged that 
Cavalry are, I think, in these days the most important branch of the Service, and I 
cannot conceive any more retrograde step than a reversion to ... admitting 
... Officers of inferior mental calibre. 
He saw the arm priority as cavalry, artillery, engineers and finally infantry.82 Judging 
by previous criteria, the previous order had been engineers, gunners, infantry and then 
cavalry. Col Graves felt that if the war's first lesson was invisibility, mobility was 
second, citing Chesney. He blamed British immobility for many early frontal attacks. 83 
French saw future cavalry roles as: outflanking, reconnaissance and protection, 
threatening enemy lines of retreat, then pursuit, finally screening and deception. Shock 
was only important in that it enabled the defeat the enemy cavalry, thus depriving 
them of their reconnaissance force. This would increase the chances of gaining 
I. RCWSA Evidence II Q 13247; Ibid P 402; Ibid pp 402,273; BalPs RMMISA 1895-1928 I 'Wood 
Memorandum' 4/10/00 pp 1-2. Wood argued similarly to Chesney. 
11 AFPs 50320 'Memo by MS on Shortage of Cavalry Officers.' 
Il 'Lessons from the South African War Chiefly from a Cavalry Point of View' USM XXIV (1901 ),pp 
249-50; WO 108/184 P 87; Maj Rodwell ReflectiOns on the Boer War (Lahore 1901), pp 134-5. 
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surprise. Major Rodwell argued that tactical mobility was, due to the large size of 
European armies, acquiring strategic qualities. Grierson saw the Cavalry's future role 
as: 'wide adventurous turning movements against the enemy's flanks and rear,' noting 
that in South Africa they were reduced to acting as MI, despite being carbine-anned. 
His use of MI suggests that the cavalry were limited to tactical missions.84 Grierson 
implied that cavalry would be used at the operational level. HW Wilson suggested that 
the whole army corps would be mounted as Chesney had proposed.85 'The Future of 
Our Cavalry' extolled Chesney's recommendation that the Army should consist of 
picked men and be largely mounted, the author then argued that smaller, better-trained 
forces' superiority would be based partly on their logistic advantages. Bloch had 
argued that huge forces were logistically unsustainable. Captain Cairnes argued 
similarly: 
British troops have in the past fought and conquered .... vastly superior numbers 
on Continental soil: I cannot see why it should be so absurd ... that, capably led, 
intelligently trained .... they should not be able to do the same again ... [W]e must 
bear in mind the very size of these great hosts will render them unwieldy ... and all 
conditions of modem warfare, as we have learned in South Africa, favour a 
comparatively small but mobile anny, well trained for war.86 
Col Henderson concluded that: 
extraordinary results, strategical as well as tactical, that may be produced by 
mobility have been conclusively demonstrated [in South Africa] ... [I]t is clear .... 
that a mounted force as mobile as the Boers, and equal-as were Sheridan's 
troopers to any emergency of attack or defence, will be .. most effective ... on a 
European theatre of war. 87 
This mention of strategical again suggests a shift in mounted forces' role from the 
tactical. Gwynne commented: 
The functions of cavalry have been proved by the recent war to be considerably 
enlarged. The possession of the rifle ..... opens up for cavalry great fields of 
14 WO 32/6782 'Role Cavalry' 7/3/04 p 1. 
IS 'Supplement. The Story of the Boer War' NR XXXV (1900),p 34. 
16 'The Future of Our Cavalry' BWM 169 (1901), P 715; J Bloch Has War Become Impossible 
P899),pp3, 4-5; A Common-sense Army (1901),p 17. 
7 Count Sternberg My Experiences of the Boer War ( 1901), pp xxxi-ii. Henderson introduced the book. 
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enterprise. Cavalry can now be used for great strategical movements round an 
enemy's rear or against his flanks ..... Cavalry in future, besides in great 
strategical enterprises, must find their true (sic) use in gaining information, in 
screening the movements of the main body ... , and in protecting all ... troops from 
surprise. That cavalry on the battlefield can not (sic) be used ''to ride over masses 
of infantry" is no new deduction of .... South Africa. That cavalry can most 
effectively charge I am the last to gainsay ... But it is only on occasion.88 
A range of individuals argued for greater mobility, which they saw as having strategic 
or, as current doctrine would define, operational level implications. 
Firepower and Manoeuvre 
Professor Holden-Reid emphasises that firepower and manoeuvre are 
inextricably linked: 
[Manoeuvre warfare] is a means by which overwhelming fire can be brought to 
bear ... and ... defeat the enemy by paralysing the enemy by speed and fire. 89 
Contemporaries felt that the Cavalry's acquisition of rifles had enhanced its power of 
manoeuvre. The Cavalry's ability to provide covering fire and to defend increased 
substantially with regiments' rearmament with rifles and the addition of more machine 
guns, while cavalry formations received porn poms and had more rifle-armed MI 
incorporated in them. There was greater stress on artillery and machine gun support.90 
But French deprecated complete subordination of mobility to fire, for: 'as a natural 
consequence, all great tactical combinations ... will be paralysed.' Here French 
suggests manoeuvre's operational-level effects and time's importance in combat.91 
The heated debate over fire versus shock tactics continued until 1910. Dr Badsey 
has exanlined it masterfully; re-examination would be sterile, but the strength of 
feeling displayed during it is significant. Supporters of traditional shock, those 
advocating a middle course, which was to be the British cavalry's eventual preference, 
II Gwynne Army pp 65-6. 
19 Ed B Holden Reid The Science of War (1993),p 5. 
90 WO 33/1838. 
91 WO 32/6782 'Role Cavalry'7/3/04 p 1. Brig Simpkin Race to the Swift (t985),pp 111-2 for fire's 
slowing manoeuvre-tempo. 
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and outright advocates offire-only tactics, all saw cavalry as vital. All were effectively 
arguing for superior mobility ie the feature that would compensate for numerical 
inferiority. Roberts as CinC spent more time analysing South Africa's mobility 
lessons and cavalry weapons than he did on artillery. 92 
~imnalmnastership 
Manoeuvring over long distances demanded careful animalmastership. It was 
equally important logistically, as transport forward of railhead usually relied on beasts. 
Animal mortality in South Africa was vast: some 326,000 horses, 51,000 mules and 
195,000 oxen. This was partly explained by the fact that: 'the standard of 
horsemastership in the regular forces was indifferent or bad, excepting the Artillery. ,93 
The consequences included the failure at Poplar Grove to capture Kruger and many 
abortive chases in the guerrilla phase. Roberts commented: 
Cavalry or [MIl ... must know how to get the utmost out of their horses by good 
treatment and never-failing consideration of their wants. The discouragement of 
individuality and the practice of training men under all circumstances ... to follow 
precise rules is to blame. 
His comment suggests initiative's pervasive importance in fields other than the strictly 
tactical.94 Grierson noted that inadequate forage and poor-quality remounts had 
impaired mobility, but added a rider: 
I do not think our cavalry save their horses enough. I never saw them leading 
their mounts on a march, and frequently they remained long periods in the saddle 
at a halt when they should have instantly dismounted. 
He also criticised MI horsemastership and training. Rimington commented: 
We have seen the officers and men who were ignorant of Horsemastership (sic), 
absolutely useless and worse than useless in war.95 
Even French acknowledged that practical cavalry horsemastership was poor, while 
91 Eg RPs 7101-23-111-10-F 3342. RobertslBroadwood 13/11100; there is relatively little in his papers 
on the artillery lessons of South Africa. 
93 Smith RA ve. pp v-vi. 
94 Amery THWSA III P 564; RCWSA Report pp 45-6; Ibid P 47. Chapter 7. 
9S Brig Gen Rimington Hints on Stable Management (Aldershot 1905).p vi. 
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Brabazon was emphatic: 'something must be done to take the weight off the horse,' 
commenting later: 'I never saw such shameful abuse of horseflesh. ,96 Weaknesses in 
the A VD and an undermanned field remount organisation also hurt mobility.97 But 
South African distances, the vast tonnage of forage required and insufficient transport 
prevented adequate animal rations being provided. The vets assessed that this had 
caused failure at Poplar Grove.98 Experts began to advocate small, hardy horses able 
to withstand short rations and therefore to sustain manoeuvre but less suitable for 
shock action. Interestingly the Royals insisted on taking their Basuto ponies to France 
in 1914 and were impressed with their stamina and hardiness.99 
Training 
Rimington blamed poor prewar training, an inspection system designed for 
display rather than war-efficiency and inadequate training areas for the Cavalry's 
problems in South Africa. Regiments dispersed in cities for policing, where training 
was hard, exacerbated the problem. Lt Col Wogan-Browne concurred, while French 
was convinced that: 
[c ]hiefly owing to the want of opportunity in peace time (viz., few men or horses 
to train, with but little ground on which to drill and manoeuvre in England) 
[cavalry officers] took the field less proficient ... in the tactical methods required 
by modem war. 
He recommended: 
Give troop, squadron, regimental and brigade commanders more opportunities 
for training their commands in open country where mounted and dismounted 
(sic) tactical exercises can be carried out in a manner resembling ... actual war. tOO 
That French emphasised dismounted training suggests that cavalry tactical priorities 
were shi fting away from close-order shock. He also advocated delegation to NCOs. 
96 RCWSA Evidence I p 86; Ibid Qs6863 &6908; WO 108/184 pp 100-1; RCWSA Evidence II p 301. 
97 Sessions Remount pp 14-15; Smith RA VC; RPrs ppI8-19. 
9IMaj Gen Smith A Veterinary History o/the War in South Africa /899-/902 (1919), pp 39-40. 
99 W Gilbey Small Horses in Warfare ( 1900). pI; White-Spunner Guards p 449. There were formally 
no heavy cavalry in the Army, but that the Royals, traditionally Heavies, preferred small horses 
suggests that a deep cultural change had happened. 
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Dr Badsey argues that the Cavalry's problems in South Africa were largely due 
to errors by other-ann commanders. 101 But criticisms by cavalrymen of their own ann, 
acquiescence in low officer education standards and poor cavalry horsemastership 
suggest his judgement must be qualified. But, as the 1898 Manoeuvres demonstrated, 
many generals did not get the best from the arm. 
Marching 
Grierson commented: '[0 ]ne thing which has been most effectively disposed of 
[in South Africa], and that is the British Infantry cannot march.' Kitchener and 
Roberts agreed. Such was the interest generated in the topic that South Africa inspired 
a hook on marching. It quoted frequently from Stonewall Jackson, arguing that 
superior mobility was essential to a weaker force and marching was stressed down to 
1914.\02 
Transport 
A contemporary pamphlet contains a profound statement on logistics' 
importance in manoeuvre: 
"The great strategic movements of armies have depended always upon their 
means of obtaining food and warlike supplies. " This modern perfecting of the 
efficiency of the interior transport of an army is a new strategical weapon in the 
hands of a general. 103 
Roberts' reorganisation of the transport before Kimberley's reliefhad similar effects 
to those quoted above. Later the Anny planned to produce similar effects by 
motorizing logistics. The quotation also suggests the contemporary interest in strategy 
and mobility. 
1899-1902 was the first war which saw relatively extensive use of MT. The 
100 Rimington Cavalry p 82; 'What is Required to improve the Training of Our Cavalry in Peace Time?' 
USM XXIV ( 1901); RCWSA Evidence II p 301; 8adsey Fire pp 171-2. 
101 8adsey Fire p 171. 
102 W0108/184 p 79; RCWSA Report p 46; RCWSA Evidence I Qs 10544-6; Col Furse The Art of 
Marching ( 190 I), pp 16-7. 
103 Capts Pryce &Webb Transport Training Notes (Allahabad 1904), Introduction; original emphasised. 
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Germans had used traction engines in 1870 and the British had employed them in 
India but without lasting consequences. The Anny planned from the start to use MT 
logistically in South Africa and MT also towed a gun into action there. 104 Steam 
engines were unsuited to South Africa. Going and weak bridges were a problem, while 
fuel and water were scarce. The Chief Engineer SAFF outlined MT's technical 
handicaps: some engines were old and there were several makes. There were 
insufficient trained personnel; specialist advice was often not available while engines 
were hampered by moving with slower animal transport. lOS But when conditions 
permitted MT proved useful. It minimized a Glanders epidemic; engines moved 
supplies inside the infected area. Compared to animals it was cheaper to run, could lift 
heavier loads and only required fuel when moving. It was faster and occupied less 
roadspace. Its fuel was more efficient than forage and more easily moved. By mid-
1900 the WO was convinced that: 
machine transport will ... be substituted for animal in .... war to an extent not 
hitherto dreamt of, and .. .it will be used on the field of battle. 
This suggests considerable vision; steam was technically unsuited to conditions in 
South Africa and had moved little tonnage there. A historical curiosity was that 
armoured traction engines deployed, while cars moved and powered searchlights. 
After the war there was considerable speculation on mechanising artillery. 106 
Another lesson was the need to control transport. Grierson felt that poor handling 
of transport had impaired mobility. Mounted units' wagons followed directly after 
their units' main bodies, rather than moving behind the other fighting troops. Wagons 
were more likely to cause delays, so this order of march risked impeding combatant 
units. He noted that transport officers paid little attention to their orders. Poor 
104 WO 108/307 P 41; WO 108/249. 
10' WO 33/2894 'Report Steam Transport South Africa' p 3. 
I~rig Gen Aston Staff Duties and Other Subjects ( 1913 ),pp 60-1; IJMIU3/2135 No 70 of 31105/00; 
Maj Gen Anderson 'Traction for Heavy Field Artillery' PRAI XIX (1902-3). 
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staffwork exacerbated both problems. 107 Grierson also criticised failure to requisition 
and billet extensively. Requisitioning reduced the need to transport supplies and 
consequently vehicle numbers, thus speeding movement. Billeting cut sickness in men 
and horses and reduced the need to carry tentage. 108 Requisitions were particularly 
valuable for mounted troops, who were unable to carry supplies on their horses and 
whose wagons could not keep up with the fighting troops. Others criticised excessive 
baggage and over-lavish transport. An American correspondent commented: 'we 
travelled like major generals.' 109 
Implementing Mobility and Manoeuvre 
The post-South African manuals reflected the new importance of manoeuvre. 
Here it must be noted that injunction does not automatically ensure implementation. 
But it does suggest the direction of thought. 
The earliest official publication to reflect the above argument was the Australian 
Mounted Service Manual. The work, superintended by Hutton, a South African 
veteran and MI pioneer, is significant because it is a non-cavalryman's view and gives 
a back-bearing on British reasoning. Hutton claimed that his work had influenced 
Roberts. Hutton emphasised: 
When the great area over which modem battles will extend, the vast range of 
artillery fire, the accuraccy and deadly effect of modem firepower are taken into 
consideration, it will be understood that extreme mobility and the power of 
covering distances at a rapid pace ... become imperative. 
He continued later: 
Not only, however, has the tactical value of mounted troops increased ... but the 
very favourable conditions for the defence ... make the strategical value of 
mounted troops in the future as great, if not greater, than the tactical. A 
strategical attack upon the enemy's flank and rear by a rapid and far reaching 
march will compel the evacuation of a position which it may be impossible to 
attack [frontally]. 
107 Churchill Ladysmith p 253; WO 108/184 p103; Ibid pl04; Chapter 9; Glossary. 
100Maj Gen Alderson Pink and Scarlet (1913), p220; WO 108/184 pp 108-9. Tents are heavy and bulky. 
109 RH Davis 'Kits and Outfits' SM XXXVII (1905),p 386. 
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Hutton stressed the strategic, or in modem parlance the operational level, noting: '[ t ]he 
value of mounted troops for strategical purposes is in direct ratio to their rapidity of 
movement.,110 
CTrg 1902 began by emphasising firepower and the defence's growing 
strength. I I I However, it stressed mobility, manoeuvre against enemy weakness and 
surprise, which mounted troops, it saw, were particularly capable of inflicting. Modem 
manoeuvre doctrine similarly stresses targeting weakness and surprise. CTrg 1902 
contains an entire part on information and reconnaissance and another on marches. 
Both suggest that it attached greater importance to mobility than IDB 1896 did. II2 
CTrg 1902 outlined a new concept for the British: Independent Cavalry. Neither 
CDB 1898 nor IDE 1896's Part V had mentioned them. I 13 The CinC would use this 
formation for key tasks, suggesting that their mission would be effectively at the 
operational level. Given poor contemporary signals capability, Independent Cavalry 
commanders would need to exercise wide initiative and bear heavy responsibilities 
due to the likely critical nature of their mission. This in tum suggests that doctrine 
would be needed to guide them. 
Haig's Cavalry Studies Strategical and Tactical also suggests this shift of level. 
Two of its three dominant ideas were: 'the strategical employment of Cavalry [and] 
the role of the Independent Cavalry Division (sic).' Another example was that the 
1909 staff ride on the Cavalry Division's strategic use. 114 This would equate to the 
modem operational level. 
Roberts introduced CT 1904 by stressing the shift towards a more operational 
110 Mounted Service Manual (Sydney 1902), pp xi-xii, xiii-iv; HuPs 50086 Hutton! French 25/9/02. 
III CT 1902, fire and defence pp 14-17; offence and surprise pp 17-18. 
112 Ibid respectively Part III pp 69-77; Part IV pp 78-93 
III CTrg 1902 pp 21-2. Independent Cavalry was not a new concept in Continental doctrine. 
114CQvairy Studies Strategical and Tactical (l907),pp 1,5. Haig emphasised Henderson's influence; WO 
279130 pI; Table 33. 
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level role for cavalry: 
I desire most earnestly to call to the attention of all ranks of the cavalry to the 
augmented importance of this branch of the Service consequent upon the 
introduction of far-reaching guns and rifles. Cavalry must now be considered not 
only the eyes of an army, and the arm by which a demoralised enemy can best be 
destroyed, but equipped ... with the new short rifle, it will take a part in war 
which it has never been able ... to take in the past. I IS 
Roberts not only emphasised reconnaissance but saw cavalry mobility as the antidote 
to enhanced firepower. CT 1904 was emphatic: 'mobility is one of the greatest factors 
of success in war.' This suggests that the cavalry's importance within the Army had 
Increased and that this latest doctrinal work placed more emphasis on mobility as a 
decisive factor that CTrg 1902 had done. It continued: 
Nothing in war has a greater moral effect than surprise, not only in itself, but by 
reason of the dread (sic) of it which engenders uncertainty and anxiety, and 
weighs down the minds of [ enemy] leaders, making their operations hesitating 
and slow. By its mobility, cavalry frequently has the advantage of being able to 
effect a surprise. 
This was a vivid description of the Boers' effect on Buller or for that matter Roberts' 
on Cronje, echoing Jackson's phrase: 'mystify and mislead.' It also suggests modem 
manoeuvre doctrine's emphasis on surprise creating psychological disruption. CT 
1904 also stressed: 
if [cavalry] make proper use of their mobility and act with skill and daring .. .in 
their hands to a great measure lies the success or failure of future campaigns. I 16 
This again suggests cavalry's shift to the operational level and that the arm's 
importance had increased. Neither CDB 1898 nor IDB 1896's Part V contained a 
similar statement. 
Others argued that the cavalry's role was shifting from the tactical. Lt Col H 
Gough criticised CDB 1898's failure to highlight the arm's strategical importance. He 
argued that 'manoeuvre' and 'mobility' largely relied on timely orders. In tum these 
lIS CT 1904 P iii. 
116 Ibid P 196; Chapter 9. 
166 
depended on cavalry reconnaissance. This again suggests the importance of time 
in manoeuvre combat. Allenby also stressed cavalry's greater strategical value. I 17 
CT 1904 highlighted the need for professionalism and: 'a higher understanding 
of war,' by cavalrymen. This again implies that cavalry roles were shifting from the 
tactical to higher levels. Neither FAT 1902 nor IT 1902 had similar injunctions to 
infantrymen or gunners, while AO 79, ending the separate entry-list for cavalry 
officers, stated: 
In modern warfare the duties of Cavalry officers of every rank are of so 
responsible a nature that it is essential that they should be possessed of the 
highest professional attainments and be amongst the most capable 
intellectually. ' 118 
This also links greater professionalism to the arm's new importance. 
Tactical Change 
The preceding section has examined the Cavalry's shift towards the operational 
level and the arm's increased importance. This section looks at the change of emphasis 
in its tactical tasks. The first signs of this came in 1900 when the Indian IGC stressed 
dismounted duties and reconnaissance. This may reflect lessons from the 1897-8 
Frontier campaigns as well as South Africa, as his conclusions were based on 
inspections dating back to 1898.119 
CTrg 1902 emphasised reconnaissance and protection and saw manoeuvre as 
more usual than shock. It also stressed fire and dismounted action by mobile forces. 120 
CTrg 1902 used the generic term, mounted troops, which embraces MI and therefore 
implies less use of shock. Contrastingly IDB 1896's Part V referred to cavalry and MI. 
117 'The Strategical Employment of Cavalry' JR USI XLIX (1905); Gough sought to analyse principles, 
suggesting a more doctrinal approach, Chapter 9;Gen Bemhardi 'Cavalry in Future Wars' CJ II 
(1907),p 227. 
Iller 1904 p 200; Chapter 9 examines French's attempts to inculcate strategy and argues that it was 
connected with developing doctrine which adopting manoeuvre demanded; WO 123/45 p3 dated 1903. 
119UMII.n II S 140 ' Notes for the Guidance of Cavalry Officers in India 1900 10/04/00, ' Sections X 
&XI. 
120 CTrg 1902 P 14. 
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CTrg 1902 accentuated interarm cooperation and contained a section on 
operational staffwork. Both would have enhanced the Army's manoeuvrability. 121 
There was much in CTrg 1902 on protective duties; these now fonned a significant 
cavalry task which IDB 1896's Part V had not stressed.122 Emphasising security 
denied the enemy information, in tum this increased the chance of decisive 
manoeuvre. 
CDB 1898 had stressed shock. CT 1904 assessed cavalry's tactical roles 
differently: 
The three first and chief duties of cavalry are: 1. Reconnaissance ... 2. The 
service of local security. 3. To prevent the enemy's cavalry obtaining 
information. 123 
The latter tasks reflect surprise's importance in warfare. That 2 topics involved 
information reflects the new importance attached to manoeuvre which emphasises 
reconnaissance and surprise. 
CT 1904 stressed shooting, omitted from CDB 1898. It also emphasised the 
combination of rifles, machine guns and RHA covering mounted attacks more than 
CDB 1898 had. The GS later criticised Childers for dismissing covering fire's value in 
supporting mounted action. Their emphasis suggests that it was now fully appreciated. 
CavalrylRHA cooperation increased after 1902. Here it may be noted that increased 
fire support was seen as essential in enabling shock action in 1918. CT 1904 
emphasised shock in open-order, more flexible than the old boot-to-boot fonnations 
and less exigent of training time. 124 Also it highlighted the use of ground more than 
CDB 1898 had done. 125 
121 Ibid Part II pp 59-68. Initiative was also stressed. 
122 Ibid pp 113,123; Chapter 6. 
III CT 1904 p 197. 
124 cr 1904 pp 47-8,322,331-362; CDB J 898 P 378, its preceding pages do not emphasise covering fife. 
'OS' 'War and the Arme Blanche' JRUSI LIV (1910),p 1062. They felt Childers downplayed covering 
fire as it was an argument for shock; Capt Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestine II (1930).pp 
644-5. 
III CT 1904 pp 208,217. 
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Reconnaissance 
CTrg 1902 stated that: '[ s ]uccess in war depends on timely information. ' 
Consequently it saw reconnaissance as the Cavalry's most important role, though it 
noted the difficulties which the task now faced. This emphasis on reconnaissance, 
generally by cavalry, supports the idea that Army was shifting towards manoeuvre as 
this demands searching ground-based reconnaissance over extended distances. Such 
reconnaissance in positional, attritional fighting it is impossible. 126 Contemporaries 
felt that the difficulties which reconnaissance now faced were not entirely a defensive 
advantage. An attacker could manoeuvre behind a screen, made impenetrable by 
modem firepower, thus defeating the defenders' scouts and increasing his chances of 
surprise. 127 
CT 1904 emphasised reconnaissance more than CDB 1898 did 128 Another new 
feature was that the former urged developing self-reliance. All young cavalry officers 
were to be trained as scouts, as were many troopers. 129 In the following years there 
were several major Cavalry reconnaissance exercises and much low-level scout 
training. 130 In 1906 the IGC held a competition to improve horsemastership, scouting 
and despatch-riding. Hamilton, GOC Southern Command, also noted in 1906 that 
South Africa had improved cavalry reconnaissance and skirmishing substantially. Haig 
when IGC India set many reconnaissance exercises; Rimington ran similar schemes. 131 
126 Notes on Soviet Ground Forces (1972), pp 3-14 to 5, Soviet norms demanded ground reconnaissance 
some 50 kilometres ahead of the leading fighting echelon. It should be noted this was in an age of 
airborne and electronic reconnaissance. Though the greater speed of defenders meant more depth of 
reconnaissance was needed, this suggests that deep reconnaissance is important in deep manoeuvre. 
127 CTrg 1902 pp 13,18,21-4; Ibid P 69. 
128 CDB 1898 pp 283-4 saw reconnaissance as important, but was less emphatic. 
129 CT 1904 p 197; CDB 1898 P 285; CT 1904 pp 220-234. 
130 'Special Correspondent' 'The Second Cavalry Brigade in Sussex' CJ 1 (1906) pp 448-9 for Byng's 
emphasis on reconnaissance. Chapter 7 examines scouting and service pay. 
III 'Reconnaissance Competition 1906' CJ II (1907), P 113; 'Training of the Troops during 1906' JRLSI 
L (1906). p 1517; WO 2791516 '3 Cavalry Bde Manoeuvres 3-15/8/03' p 1. 
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Training 
Cavalry training, like training generally, was transformed after South Africa. Dr 
Badsey argues that the appointment of Baden-Powell as IGC was Roberts' attempt to 
enforce tactical change, but it is plausible that he was selected for his training abilities 
and his encouragement of individualism. That Baden-Powell had served before 1899 
in India, where training was more realistic than in Britain, reinforces this argument. 
Two cavalry schools and a professional journal were established, thus giving the 
Cavalry a stronger institutional focus. These schools adopted new methods of training 
and several able officers instructed at them. 132 CT 1904, unlike CDB 1898, 
emphasised officers' training responsibilities: 
squadron commanders are personally responsible for the efficiency of their 
squadrons ... The main object of cavalry training is to bring men ... to the 
highest possible standard of war efficiency in their war duties. 133 
More cavalry exercises occurred in both India and Britain than before 1899. Here it is 
worth emphasising that attitudes to training were changing. Both Vaughan and Gough 
were highly critical of Scobell' s lackadaisical attitudes to training and staffwork when 
he was their brigadier. French eventually dismissed Scobell as IGC despite the latter's 
impeccable social connections and fine South African record, for neglecting training. 
Haig ran several major cavalry staff rides. In unit training Haig stressed skirmishing 
and dismounted reconnaissance, recommending that pickets entrench automatically. 
All suggest a swing from shock towards detached duties. Exact comparisons are hard 
as the equivalent records for pre-l 899 IGCs do not exist. But, judging from 
descriptions of Luck's close-order field days in the 1890s, Luck stressed mounted drill 
and shock. But Luck probably had to emphasis these, given the poor standards of 
1l28adsey 'Fire' pp195-6 notes Baden-Powell's attention to reconnaissance encouraging low-level 
groups, reconnaissance and protective training, WO 32/8865 'letter to Cines;' RSM Plumb cited 
Chapter 7. 
III CT J 904 p 19. Sections 1-10 pp 19-30 cover the training system; CDB 1898 pp 407-410 lacks 
general emphasis on training and the section quoted concentrates on the mechanics. 
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many COs and regiments before 1899.134 
Professor Spiers states that 70% of cavalry training after 1902 involved shoc~ 
but this statistic, for which he does not provide a direct reference, is questionable. 135 
By 1904 cavalry in India were outshooting the Infantry. Had 70% of their training 
been shock-orientated, this is unlikely to have been possible. It should also be noted 
that, due to stable duties, cavalry had less training time than the Infantry. It is very 
possible that 70% of major manoeuvres involved shock as numbers were needed for it. 
But manoeuvres also incorporated much reconnaissance and protective training. 136 But 
low-level training can teach reconnaissance, unlike shock, which demands massed 
troops. Low-level reconnaissance training was less likely to be recorded than major 
exercises involving shock. I37 
MT, Transport and Logistics 
The development of logistics from 1902 suggests that the Anny was enhancing 
its capacity to sustain manoeuvre. Motorisation after 1902 was a long process, which 
was incomplete in 1914. Between 1899-1902 steam had been the prime form ofMT, 
but by 1905 the ASC were arguing for internal combustion. It was not dependent on 
water, was better suited to campaigning and cheaper, while petrol was easier to handle 
than coal. As early as late 1901 motorcars and motor lorries were tested. Afterwards 
the trials staff recommended developing internal combustion propulsion. In 1902 
traction engines moved the Corps Ammunition Park. 138 In 1903 the MVC was formed; 
134HPs 3155-40 'Inspection notebooks;' Anglesey A History 0/ the British Cavalry III (1982),pp 150-1; 
HPs 3155-40 'Season 1903-1904 Inspection Notes.' Morrison 'Manoeuvres' p 638 for Luck's exacting 
precision. Maj Gen Vaughan Cavalry and Sporting Memories (Bala 1954),pp 110-1, Gen Gough 
Soldiering On (1954),pp 91-2. 
IlS 'British Cavalry 1902-14' JSAHR LVII (l979),p 79. 
136 Eg WO 2791 39 'Report Anny Manoeuvres 1910, pp 61-2 for the importance of reconnaissance 
during manoeuvres and the attention paid to it during post-exercise analysis. 
137 WO 279/30 pp 7-9; Haig listed many points on reconnaissance, Ibid pp 10-11: Eg Sgt Vass 'A 
Narrow Escape' 12 RU I (1909), 'Patrol Duty in India' TE II (1908). Neither of these 2 exercises even 
~e in a regimental history. 
1 ANG XLII (1901),p 1233; Maj McNalty 'The Supercession of Steam ... for Military ... Vehicles' 
ASCQ I (1905), p 76; Trials o/Self-Propelled Lorries/or Military Purposes ... 1901 (1902),p 7. 
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by October 1904 it had driven over 100,000 miles, largely supporting training.139 It 
was the first corps of its kind in Europe. In 1906 MT was recommended for its speed, 
shorter column-lengths and economy. Also in 1906 motor cars were sufficiently 
common in India for an officer to write a book on their use there. Haig, criticised as 
technologically-averse, recommended motorcyclists and WT to improve cavalry 
communications. 140 
CTrg 1902 emphasised that transport had to be deployed correctly on marches 
and that tactical considerations must prevail over administrative convenience. 
Manoeuvre reports stressed controlling transport. 141 The ASC reviewed vehicle 
designs to improve mobility and efficiency, using South African experience and data 
from the Boxer Rebellion. ASC officers were keen to rationalise supplies and improve 
procedures to enhance mobility. 142 The ASC increased by over 1200 men after 1902, 
but the most significant development was the motorization of the BEF's second and 
third-line transport. Maj Gen Altham saw this as: 'not merely an administrative gain ... 
but. .. a new departure with important strategical and even tactical consequences.' The 
change was carefully trialled, practicised on manoeuvres and professionally debated. 
The BEF mobilised with the greatest proportion of MT to strength of all the armies in 
1914. Furthermore the British had motorised one arm, the RFC, holding that horses 
were unsuited to support aircraft. 143 
The third logistic innovation was that the Army systemised requisitioning and 
billeting. Van Creveld suggests that Germans requisitioned spontaneously in 1914, but 
the British deliberately planned to do so. Requisitioning had great potential: '[t]wenty-
139 Capt Paynter 'The Use of the Motor Car in Warfare' JRUSI L (1906),pp 767-8. 
140 WO 279/9 'GS Conference' pp 76-7; Table 16; Maj Warren The Motor Car in India (Bombay 1906); 
WO 279/30 pp 18-19,21. 
141 CTrg 1902 pp 81-3, this tackled Grierson's criticisms. Glossary; WO 279/527 P 10. 
142 WO 331216 'Co Transport Vehicles' 18/11101; WO 3216150; Richardson ASCpp 143,151-2. 
143 Altham Principles p 50; Table 16; eg [ASe] Training IV [M71 (1912), Memorandum Reorganised 
System of Supply ... Introduction oflMT J 1912. Supp(l' Manual (War) 1909 (1912 edition); Table 44. 
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five percent less transport to provide ... twenty-five percent less to f~ maintain and 
keep efficient. l44 Fewer vehicles meant shorter columns and consequently faster 
movement. Fewer animals meant that less forage was needed. Wilson as Commandant 
of Camberley advocated requisitioning and billeting to DSD. FSRs 1909 included 
instructions on requisitioning, and there was a major cavalry billeting exercise in 
1910.145 Both requisitioning and billeting were particularly relevant to European 
conditions and were largely new skills for the British. Their systematic adoption 
suggests the switch towards European warfare. In summary the Army's logistics 
changed extensively after 1902 to enhance mobility. 146 
Animalmastership 
Animalmastership, principally the Cavalry's care of horses, was radically 
overhauled, particularly as it was anticipated that long-range fire would force wider 
movements. Loads on horses were cut and AO 3 of 1902 'The Care of Horses,' based 
directly on South Africa, was widely issued. Later a manual stressed: 
Every mounted man should regard his horse as part of himself, and should 
remember that his efficiency and his safety on service depend on the fitness of 
his horse. 147 
Manuals and training emphasised animalmastership, while several long-distance riding 
competitions were held to promote horsemastership. The Army's veterinary and 
remount organisations were overhauled with significant results in 1914. 148 Sordet's 
Cavalry Corps was crippled by sorebacked horses and found completing a key mission 
hard. By the Marne Moltke complained that there was not a horse capable of trotting, 
I44Lt Col Greenly Notes on Billeting/or Cavalry (1913),pp 3-4; Creveld Supplying p 123;WO 279/9 P 
69. 
14'HEWPs 3/3/9 HWIDSD 30/10/07; SIULRs 191 I; WO 279/529. 
146 Col Beadon The [RASC] II (Cambridge 1930), Chapters 1-3. 
147 Amery THWSA VI p445; WO 123/44; The Manual 0/ Horse and Stable Management (1904 ).p 5. 
148 CT 1904 pp ix, 19; Maj Geddes 'Officers' Despatch Riding Competition .... PRAI XXIX (1902-3). 
Some were held in India, but such competitions have not been traced in Britain pre-l 899; Amery 
THWSA VI pp 422-3; S Corvi 'The ManIHorse Relationship 1914-18' lecture to the War Studies 
Society King's College. 
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this in an anny reliant on mobility for victory. Bridges compared the annies: 
Our horse-mastership was good, that of the Gennan was inferior and the French 
(who ... never got oft) was bad. The British cavalryman walked nearly as often 
as he rode, [thus] his horse ... kept condition remarkably well. 149 
Bridges wrote long afterwards but his conclusion is well supported. 
Marching 
British Infantry had marched well in South Africa, surprising some 
commentators. The emphasis was kept up in training afterwards. From 1902 most 
manoeuvres involved formidable marches. This was a conscious choice for an army, 
which had to offset numerical inferiority by superior mobility. The strongest 
endorsement was in Kitchener's Infantry Tests which were centred on marching and 
shooting. Pte Richards described his CO's priorities: 
He did not believe in too much ceremonial drill: the ability to march and shoot 
straight were the two chief things he required. 
Practical measures improved marching. Maj Ruck-Keene noted that there was far less 
falling-out on marches due to better food and the establishment of soldier-
chiropodists. I so 
Conclusions 
South Africa demonstrated that both tactical mobility and operational level 
manoeuvre were essential in modem warfare. Colonial warfare had put a premium on 
combat and firepower, but as the Sudan demonstrated, its mobility was logistical, 
rather than the speed and sweeping manoeuvre needed for major warfare. After 1902 
the British emphasised manoeuvre, tempo and pre-emption as they faced fighting 
greater numbers. Manoeuvre had implications for initiative, doctrine and training, 
149 Brig Oen Edmonds MOFB 1914 I (1922),p 266; K Helfferich Der Weltkrieg II (Berlin 1919),pp 17 -8. 
Lt Oen Bridges Alarms and Excursions (1938),p 81. 
ISO Maj Ruck-Keene 'Summer Training, 1908' OXUC 1908 p119; Altham Principles p 402; Pte 
Richards Old Soldier Sahib (1935).p 163. This secondary source is well supported. It is included as it 
emphasises that these priorities were clear to privates. 
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which Chapters 7 and 9 analyse. 151 
Before 1900 general tactics, particularly in colonial warfare, had largely 
emphasised frontal attack. Cavalry were at a discount due to the absence of a major 
threat and the ann's tactics were focussed on tactical shock. Afterwards the British put 
greater emphasis on an ann which had for much of the 19th Century been seen as less 
useful than the others. There was a shift in cavalry's roles towards operational level 
manoeuvre over extended distances. The new tactical emphasis naturally enhanced the 
Army's capability for surprise and tempo. Cavalry tactics changed with more attention 
to manoeuvre, reconnaissance, pre-emption, protection and firepower. In 1914 the 
BEF deployed with the highest ratio of cavalry to infantry divisions. The ratio, 1 :2, is 
in striking contrast both to the continental average in 1914 and to the SAFF in 1899.152 
The tactical changes to mobility were complemented by logistical enhancements, 
improved animalmastership, the introduction ofMT and the alterations to C3 analysed 
in Chapter 9. The Army in 1914 was far more capable of manoeuvre than in 1899. 
lSI Roberts' march from Kabul to Kandahar lasted some 24 days with the average march of some 13 
miles, Dr Peaty 'Wars in Afghanistan' IHR 9/1107. This was not the speed or tempo that conventional 
warfare demanded. 
IS2 Brig Gen Wilson In;t;at;\'e and the Power of Manoeuvre (AMS 1910),p 7; Table 9. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 6 Protection 
Only a Kensington draper, 
Only pretending to scout, 
Only bad news for the papers, 
Only another knockout. 
This Chapter analyses protection as a tactical factor, its state in the British Anny 
in 1897, its execution in 1899-1902, the resulting lessons and their implementation. It 
also examines the REs. Sappers are split between the two tactical factors of protection 
and mobility, but are considered here for convenience. It also examines technology, due 
to its links with the engineers. 
Protection 
Protection is more elusive than either firepower or mobility and, unlike them, is 
generally defensive in nature as it does not threaten the enemy directly. It can be 
attained physically; armour saw a renaissance with the introduction of shielded QF 
artillery. It can be achieved by using ground, cover, camouflage and extension. These 
factors broadly constitute fieldcraft. Fieldcraft, ultimately a personal skill, requires 
individual initiative to be effective, as Kipling suggests above. It has powerful effects. 
Lanchester argued that fieldcraft counterbalances numerical superiority, favouring more 
advanced weapons. He concluded that South Africa had demonstrated both points. 1 
Furthermore it can be deduced that fieldcraft and more advanced weapons demand 
better trained soldiers capable of showing initiative if they are to be effective. The 
improvements, examined in Chapter 7, support this argument. 
Protection also encompasses entrenchment and fortification. Both are strong 
though time-consuming antidotes to firepower, but, when overemphasised, both impair 
mobility and the ability to react. Protection also includes outposts and the defensive 
I Chapters 7&8~ Aircraft in War (1916).p 29. Lanchester argued that fieldcraft prevented the enemy 
concentrating fire on advanced systems. thus aiding their survival. Fire directed at areas rather than at 
point targets is less lethal. 
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itself. 2 But it is not solely defensive. Troops have to entrench in attack, fieldcraft is 
equally important then, while unwary sentries are always lethal. Protection also 
generates surprise by denying the enemy infonnation.3 Essentially though, it is 
defensive in nature. The shattering effects of fire and manoeuvre may, fully exploited, 
enable attacking forces to gain the initiative so strongly that effective counter-action at 
gaping protective weakness is impossible.4 
In 1899, as now, defence was not emphasised as much as attack. This is a 
recurrent doctrinal trend. 5 Even when a nation's strategy is defensive, the military 
advantages of initiation, tempo, surprise and concentration against weakness are 
attractive and benefit morale. Battles may have been lost through protective failures, but 
it is hard to demonstrate that protection alone has won any. 
Protection, when implemented, is generally tactically low-level. A general may 
initiate sweeping manoeuvre to further his plan and his CRA will co-ordinate massed 
fire in support. A fonnation may have a protective scheme but its detailed 
implementation depends on subalterns, sergeants and soldiers. A clubbed manoeuvre or 
botched fire plan probably stem from command failures. Contrastingly defective 
protection is generally due to low-level failure, as Kipling suggests. The passive nature 
of protection explains this phenomenon. Firepower and manoeuvre due to their strongly 
offensive nature are less dependent on all components functioning correctly. Other 
elements can compensate for mistakes. In a 500-barrel fire plan that one or two batteries 
miss is probably unimportant. But protection, which is passive, cannot rely on other 
parts compensating as the enemy is able to concentrate on the point of vulnerability. A 
few unalert sentries nearly led to Ladysmith falling. Methuen's defeat at Tweebosch 
1 Gazala and DESERT STORM make the point. Wellington deprecated trenches in field combat for the 
same reason. 
) Capt Swinton The Defence of Duffer's Drift (1904 ),pp 25,30. 
4R Holmes Army Battlefield Guide Belgium and Northern France (1995),pp 183-4. Dynamic manoeuvre. 
devastating fuepower and defective Allied C3 prevented coordinated counter-action at gaping German 
protective weaknesses. 
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was due to a variety of individual failures, with a major the senior responsible officer; at 
Sannah's Post, an NCO. Such faults suggest defective discipline and training.6 
Protection before 1899 
Primitive, poorly-armed, ill-disciplined tribal foes were rarely able to exploit 
British protective weaknesses systematically before 1899, though raids and ambushes 
were a constant tribal tactic.7 Primitive enemy tactics and weapons meant that 
entrenchment, extension and fieldcraft were therefore not essential. Enemy night attacks 
were rare, thus British outposts were rarely rigorously tested. Here Tirah fonns an 
exception.8 Consequently training in fieldcraft and protection was generally poor. 
Outposts were practised, but this was undemanding. IDB 1896 suggested that training: 
'should start at dusk and need not exceed from 2 to 3 hours' work.' This did not 
replicate the problems of vigilance on operations. Nor did IDB 1896 stress concealing 
outposts. British manoeuvres with their non-tactical overnight phases were also poor at 
teaching outposts. Wolseley criticised the 1899 Manoeuvres for lacking pace, but feared 
that all-night training would hit recruiting.9 IDB 1896's orders on outposts were 
mechanically sound, but poor initiative and training meant that their execution was 
often poor. 
Many infantrymen were untrained in using cover; doing so would, it was feared, 
make them overcautious. The RCWSA heard conflicting evidence on how widespread 
training in using cover was before 1899. IDB 1896 recommended using cover but 
concluded that: 'the utilization of cover in attack is subordinate to order and cohesion. ' 
5 AFM I The Fundamentals (1985),p 43; EC Kiesling Arming Against Hitler (Lawrence 1996),p 137. 
6 Brig Gen Edmonds & Capt Wynne MOFB J 9 J 5 I (1927),p 92. At Neuve Chapelle 2 batteries failed to 
support a brigade, despite this the operation was initially successful; fn below; IT J 902 supports Kipling; 
RPs 7101-23-209 'On a proposal that a military officer ... should be tried by a Court-martial' pp 11-2. 
7 Maj Callwell Small Wars (1899),p 389. 
• Ibid p 391 emphasises that night attacks were rare in Colonial warfare; Chapter 2. 
91DB /896 pp 221,189-193; 'British StafTOfficer' An Absent Minded War (nd).pp 98-9; Chapter 7: The 
Times 28/2/0 I. 
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It overestimated officers' ability to control in the face of modem firepower. 10 Nor did 
IDB 1896's S47 'Open Order Drill' insist that recruits were individually trained in 
fieldcraft. It merely suggested that they should be shown how to use cover. Weak recruit 
instruction hit army-wide standards. IDB 1896 did not explain how to use cover. It 
ordered that movement between cover was to be made upright, unless ordered 
otherwise, as: 'in which [position] the movements and the signals of their leader can 
most readily be observed.' IDB 1896 saw control as more important than cover. II 
Furthermore that S47 was entitled 'Drill' suggests that its instructions were to be rigidly 
applied: 
cover is only a means to an end, and that when the soldier has been launched in 
the attack, he must push forward at all hazards 
This did not encourage fieldcraft, nor did it reflect the realities of firepower. Col 
Macdonald observed a battalion deploying on a hillside as if on a barrack square. There 
it would have been easier for it to have used cover rather than deploying in drill-order as 
it did. 12 Even in LI units, which emphasised skirmishing, fieldcraft was poor before 
1899. Crum, instructing riflemen, commented: 
when left to themselves [they] seem quite hopeless ... Some didn't even know 
which side of a hill to take cover. 13 
Crum suggests a connection between initiative and fieldcraft. Roberts later attributed 
poor performance of tasks demanding initiative like fieldcraft to over-control by 
commanders. 14 
Before 1899 extension was downplayed, formations were dense, and consequently 
10 Historically individuals ducking were criticised, J Keegan The Face of Battle (1976),p 178, this 
recurred in 1899, J Stuart Pictures of War (1901 ),p 67; Maj Gen 8engough Notes and ReflectiOns on the 
Boer War (1900), pp 26-7 claimed that infantrymen were untrained in using cover. Coke contradicted 
him. RCWSA Evidence II p 444; 1 DB 1896 pp 280-1. 
"/DB J 896 P 62 ; Hutchinson and Pollock, cited in Chapter 2. support this argument. 
IZ Col Macdonald 'Infantry in a New Century' JRUS/ XLV (190 1 ),p 243. 
Il Chapter 2; Maj Cnun Memoirs of a Rifleman Scout South Africa 1899-/902 (Helensburgh nd).p 9, they 
were in theory trained soldiers serving in a foreign-based unit; SLI recruits got fieldcraft training. Maj 
Pollock 'Training Recruits at Regimental Depots' J R US/ XL VI (1902), pp 677-9. 
14 RCWSA Report ( 1903 ).p 46. 
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ground could not be used effectively. IDB J 896 suggested an 800 yard frontage for an 
infantry division attacking 2 brigades up. A popular guide recommended 30 inches 
between men in extended-order. There was much unofficial use of normal formations. 
Troops so deployed spent more attention conforming to templates than to terrain. Crum 
criticised lethally dense formations during prewar training. Similar dense formations 
were used initially in Tirah. 15 These defects stemmed from a system which 
overemphasised control, downplayed delegation and underestimated firepower. 
IDB J 896 covered defence in some 5 pages, recommending a rather formalised 
three-line deployment borrowed from the attack. This layout incorporated some depth 
by virtue of its 3 lines, but IDB J 896 gave no useful instruction on using ground, 
reverse slopes or concealment in defence. This suggests a failure to understand either 
the effects of smokeless ammunition or modem weapons. It recommended a norm of 
five men per pace of defensive front. This would have meant a divisional frontage of 
about a mile; far denser than contemporary weapons required. But IDB J 896 warned 
against exposing machine guns to artillery and outlined the use of' false fronts. ,16 
Land restrictions meant that troops rarely entrenched on British manoeuvres. 
General Leach concluded: 
Where ground cannot be broken, and where in peace manoeuvres, shelter 
trenches are represented by screens, it is clear that the instruction to the troops 
cannot be great. 
IDB J 896 treated digging as a drill, giving no useful tactical advice. Its recommended 
design, the shelter-trench, was wide, shallow and had a prominent spoil-heap in front, 
betraying its position. It provided poor protection. Too often digging was seen as an RE, 
not an all-anns skill. Units dug poorly in training, while service tools were bad-
15 Glossary; IDB /896 P 143; Ibid P 147. It should not be imagined that IDB 1896 advocated an advance 
shoulder to shoulder, as British formations had considerable depth. However, with 2 brigades on such a 
frontage. ground could not be used effectively. Hamilton deployed a battalion (-) on virtually the same 
distance at Elandslaagte. Chapter 3; Crum Scout pp 10-11; Chapter 2. 
161DB 1896 pp 120-126; Capt Slessor The 2nd Battalion Derbyshire Regiment in Tirah (1900).p 93; 
Chapter 2; IDB /896 P 149; Table 39; Glossary. 
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quality.17 Though the manuals did not stress concealing either defences or men, the 
Army ordered that all guns sent to South Africa were to be painted khaki. This was the 
Army's field-clothing colour and in this respect the British were ahead of continental 
annies. 18 
IDB 1896's Part V did not cover engineers or their tasks in all-arms tactics. 
Manoeuvres were short and as sappers were required for logistic tasks, eg constructing 
camps, there was little chance of other arms learning much about their tactical use. The 
1898 Manoeuvres caused Wood, the AG, to form a committee under Hilyard to remedy 
the problem. The Committee criticised IDB 1896's omission ofsappers, proposing more 
interarm training, guidance on RE duties and better engineer training. IDB 1896 was 
amended accordingly in 1900. 19 
Clearly entrenchment, fieldcraft and concealment were undervalued before 1899. 
Over-control and failure to appreciate the growth of firepower had caused these 
protective weaknesses. Tirah, as Chapter 2 argues, had improved protective training. 
But there was insufficient time to remedy the above defects before the start of the South 
African War. 
Protection in South Africa 
This section analyses protection in the war. Extension is important as it shows the 
effect of increased firepower and how the spatial nature of combat was changing. 
Increased emphasis on using ground suggests a similar appreciation of firepower. When 
combined with extension and fieldcraft, it suggests why initiative was more necessary. 
Entrenchment is closely connected with increased firepower which also affected outpost 
and defensive tactics. 
I7WO 32/6082 P 21; IDB /896 pp 266-8; Plate XVI; Maj Callwell The Tactics ofTo-da), (1900),pp 140-1; 
A Conan-Doyle The Great Boer War (1900),p 517; Glossary . 
• 1 RCWSA Evidence II p 662; WO 108/307 P 54. Gennany introduced feld grau just before 1914 while the 
French introduced bleu horizon during the war. 
"wo 3216082 p 4; Ibid p 11-12. 
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Extension 
Generally British troops extended reasonably fast during comba~ suggesting that 
nonns seen as late as 1898 had changed substantially.20 Henderson's 'Technical 
Training,' Buller's 1899 Memorandum and Roberts' emphasis on skinnishing had 
probably caused this. But there were exceptions.21 One was Hart's advance in quarter 
column at Colenso. Hart drilled his brigade before action and tried to ensure that they 
deployed in quick rather than double time when coming under fire. It would be tempting 
to dismiss Hart as a reactionary, but his stress on control and order was fully in 
accordance with modem Continental ideas and IDB 1896.22 But Burleigh reported 
Hart's brigade as rather bunched before Spion Kop. This contrasted with another 
advance which Burleigh observed in late November 1899 with 10 paces between men 
and 50-150 between lines. By December 1899 a nonn of 5 paces' extension seems to 
have been usual for infantry in South Africa. Later troops extended up to 30 paces.23 
The Use of Ground 
Initially ground was often used poorly in South Africa. Prewar close-order 
formations meant that subordinates did not need to select ground themselves and were 
unused to exercising initiative in the field. Capt Cairnes commented: 
The most striking lesson ... is that our men have not, as a rule, the most 
elementary knowledge of how to avail themselves of accidents of ground to gain 
cover from the fire of their enemy ... [T]hey did not know how to do so. Over and 
over again men have been seen contentedly taking cover behind some ridiculous 
little stone, with a fold in the ground beside them unnoticed which would have 
sheltered a section.24 
Maj Caunter criticised poor infantry use of cover, while Major Baden-Powell felt that 
using ground had: 'not been sufficiently studied' before 1899. Colonel Vincent 
20 PRO 30/40/16 'Untitled Memorandum on weapons.' 
21 'HRK' 'South Africa 1899-1900' HL/eIV (1904), pp 50,52; Chapter 2. 
II LS Amery THWSA n (1902),pp 400-1,402-3; Ibid p 445; JPs 'Diary 15/12/99;' Chapter 2. 
13 The Natal Campaign (l900),pp 314. 109; Henderson Science p 373; Ed RG Stockman The Boer War 
Diaries of Major HG Shute and Private GJ Gullick (1999),p 13. These are reprinted contemporary 
diaries; Lt Col May If Retrospect of the War in South Africa (1901).p 189. 
24 'The Military Critic' The Westminster Gazelle' 'Some Lessons of the Boer War' NR 35 (1900).p 1034. 
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contrasted the Boers' 'scientific' use of cover with British failures. 25 Maj Pollock 
noted: 
The experiences of ... the Boer War should have impressed on all officers the 
immense importance of thoroughly educating themselves in the ''use of ground." 
The very essence of sound tactical leading is a quick appreciation of every detai I, 
artificial as well as natural ... 
Later he remarked: 
The successes of the Boers have been due to their common-sense use of ground 
(sic) ... [T]he average British officer has no military eye for country.26 
Pollock blamed artificial training and over-control for this fault. His argument was 
similar to Henderson's criticisms of normal formations. Pollock emphasised using 
ground throughout his work. Both he and Henderson saw that initiative was essential for 
effective fieldcraft. 27 Lt Col Alderson emphasised that studying ground was a basic 
military requirement. Gen French stressed using ground and cover in training, linking 
improved performance in both to greater soldier intelligence. 28 
Poor use of ground led to badly-sited trenches as Swinton emphasised in Duffer's 
Drift. Ostensibly a work of fiction: 
[ilt embodies some recollection of things actually done and undone in South 
Africa ... Should this tale, by arousing the imagination, assist to prevent in the 
future even one such case of disregard of principles, it will not have been written 
. . 
111 VaIn. 
It emphasised concealment, selection of positions and developing an eye for ground. 
One of its hero's, the hapless Backsight-Forethought, most egregious errors was siting 
trenches when standing up. Kitchener noted that: 
instructions on the construction of intrenchments (sic) ... did not sufficiently 
accentuate the importance of adapting the actual work to the ... the ground. 
Roberts blamed many wartime failures on: 'officers not understanding how to take 
1$ Glossary; The Campaign in the Free State and its Lessons (1901),p 34. War in Practice (1903),p 108; 
Chapter 5; Vincent 'Lessons of the War in South Africa' JRUSI XLIV (1900). pp 631-2. 
16 Simple Lectures for Company Field Training (1900), pp 1,10. 
Z7 Ibid, pp 34-40, Pollock cited 17 lessons, ground figures in 9 and is the main topic of 3. 
D Alderson IOOpp 39-41; AFPs 50321 'Training ... Aldershot 1905' p 153. 
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advantage of ground.' Later a French officer saw a key 1899-1902 lesson as: '[ m laking 
full use of the topographical features of the country. ,29 This suggests that other armies 
were also poor at using ground. 
Here it is worth emphasising that the tactical use of ground relates to the weapons in use 
at the time. Though the above evidence suggests that ground was barely used before 1899, the 
real problem was perhaps a mental hangover from the era of shorter-ranged, less effective 
weapons. But, whatever the reason, British use of ground was poor, suggesting defective 
training, poor initiative and failure to deduce the effects of greater firepower. 
Fieldcraft in South Africa 
The defects analysed above, particularly defective initiative, meant that British 
fieldcraft was initially weak. Callwell made a sound point: '[t]he Boers have used their 
wits and we have not; hence the numerous petty disasters which have marred the 
progress of the campaign.' Roberts noted that: 
In the attack the men were even more oblivious of cover than on the defence; and 
on scouting and outpost duty it was long before they learned the importance of 
invisibility. 
He blamed poor training and over-control for these problems. A CO cited an example: 
A young officer ... demanded permission to move his company slightly as his men 
were commencing to suffer ... He knew what to do, but feared to take such a small 
piece of responsibility ... meanwhile his men were dropping.30 
This again suggests that the link between fieldcraft and initiative. A magazine reported 
that: 
reluctance to take cover is the ineradical (sic) vice and nothing short of the 
cultivation of the general intelligence of the rank and file will banish this fault.3J 
Individual fieldcraft was poor. 32 Henderson cited a South African veteran: 
the average British infantryman usually exposes half his body ... and frequently 
19 Swinton Duffer's p 29; Ibid Preface; Ibid, made in the contrast between Dreams 5&6; Ibid p 47; RPs 
7101-23-122-8 RobertslHamilton 7/12104; RCWSA Report (1903). p 47; Col Beea A Study o/the 
Development of Infantry Tactics (1911 ).PP 62-3. 
JO RCWSA Report P 46; Aleers-Douglas Report (1902),p 51. 
II 'The Arms of the Service II Cavalry' SR 92 (1901).p 104. 
II Callwell Tactics p 133. 
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puts himself into such a position that he can neither aim accurately nor shoot 
quickly. This is one of the criticisms most frequently heard among the Boers. 
But MRs 1898 ignored shooting from cover. An American attache observed: 
[British] Infantry never make rushes in their attacks but march erect and calmly 
forward. I have seen mounted men under a hot rifle-fire at short range halted, 
waiting for orders to advance, sitting erect on their horses, a perfect target. 33 
The former contravened IDB 1896's S54 which recommended rushes, the latter was 
poor horsemastership. Both showed dire fieldcraft. Significantly the MA then criticised 
British soldiers for lacking initiative, reinforcing the link, suggested above, between the 
two. Colvile, concerned with the standard of fieldcraft in his brigade, ordered that his 
guardsmen were trained like deerstalkers. Vincent criticised British officers' personal 
reluctance to use cover, particularly in attack. This partly accounts for their heavy initial 
casualties.34 Alderson emphasised using ground tactically, citing many examples of 
poor fieldcraft: '[t]he British soldier, if not constantly (sic) reminded will walk about on 
the skyline.' He continued: 
Another necessary "battle habit" is that of taking cover. Unless men are trained to 
do this at manoeuvres, when in action they do so from the instinct of self-
preservation. 
This quotation is apparently obscure, but Alderson implies by 'self-preservation' that 
such use of cover would be just to protect the individual, rather than for tactical effect. 35 
Buller castigated ineffective reconnaissance, a product of poor fieldcraft and bad prewar 
training. Gough admitted to learning more about reconnaissance, fieldcraft and tactical 
movement from patrolling with Natal farmers than from his 10 previous years service as 
a cavalry officer.36 Lt Col May diagnosed: 
Where our men did more conspicuously fail and continued to fail was in 
)lCol Henderson The Science of War (1905),pp 350-1. Henderson used the quote to link Tirah and South 
Africa, Chapter 2; 'Precis US MA Report' JRUS/XLV (1901), p 895. 
l4RCWSA Evidence II pp289,663; Vincent 'Lessons' p 632. 
35 Lessonsfrom 100 Notes made in Peace and War (Aldershot 1908), pp 7-8, 12,67. Chapter 1 shows that 
fieldcraft balances risk and effectiveness. 
36 Vincent 'Lessons' p 632; Oen Gough Soldiering On (1954),pp 66-7. Though made decades later. this 
suggests the strength of impression. It does not reflect well on Gough, his unit, or his arm, suggesting its 
accuracy. 
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disregarding the features of the ground ... It is in developing in their men the 
power of recognizing the opportunities for utilizing cover that the task of those 
who train our battalions and brigades will chiefly lie. 
But improvement occurred during the war. Repington noted that facing enemy 
firepower: 'we extended our firing line and returned to the old and too much neglected 
practice ofskirmishing.,37 By mid-l 900 an Australian commented that: '[t]he Derbys, 
Gordons and CIVs ... crept up from ridge to ridge, making good use of every fold in the 
ground.' The first two units contained many Tirah veterans. The third was a Volunteer 
unit whose intelligent privates were more likely to show initiative and thus employ 
fieldcraft correctly than drill-indoctrinated regulars. Roberts concluded that 
campaigning had improved soldiers' initiative and fieldcraft. 38 
Outposts 
British outposts were often poorly sited and their sentries unalert. Alderson 
commented that South Africa: 'teems with ... instances of [such] neglect.' Pilcher noted 
the defeat at Mazillikat's Nek was caused by a unit bivouacking in a hollow rather than 
picketing the surrounding hills.39 Maj Baden-Powell recalled that: '[m]ost of the 
reverses we sustained ... were due to neglect of some sort in providing a proper 
protective screen.' He insisted that troops on protective tasks must be alert and hide 
themselves and criticised stentorian challenges by sentries and visible movement by 
outposts. Gilmour was very critical of unwary sentries who caused defeat at 
Nooitgedacht. A veteran reported sentries marching on their beats as if at Pall Mall.4o 
Comer blamed the Yeomanry surprise at Senekal on unalert outposts. Even at 
Ladysmith the Boer attack on Caesar's Camp was detected late and Hamilton was 
37 'Suggestions from the Front' 19C XLVIII (1900).p 715. 
H F Wilkinson Australia at the Front (1901).p 194; RCWSA Report p 45; Ibid P 66 for praise of the elV. 
39 Alderson /00 P 7; Ibid pp 48-59; Pilcher Lessons pp 20-1; WR 3. 
40 War i" Practice (1903),p 200; Ibid pp 219-20; ed P Mileham Clearly My Duty (East Linton 1996 ),p 
114. This is a contemporary diary; 'War -Soldier' 'Outpost Sentries' USM XXIV(1901 ).P 180. 
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surprised at Wagon Hill. Clearly Colonial warfare had not taught vigilance.41 
Alderson noted how modern weapons had made French modify the drillbook 
system of outposts in South Africa by pushing them further out than the 1800 yard 
norm. Baden-Powell felt that outposts might have to be pushed out to 2000 yards to 
protect against modern rifles, or 6 miles to counter artillery.42 This reflects the greater 
effectiveness of firepower, paralleling similar changes during Tirah. But modem 
weapons' greater firepower meant that outposts could be thinned-out. Baden-Powell 
suggested a yardstick of 100 men per mile.43 Veterans later insisted on vigilance, no 
matter how tired troops were, and were adamant on executing sleeping sentries. This 
penalty was not rigorously enforced in South Africa. One can speculate that the greater 
severity displayed between 1914-18 was a reaction.44 
Boer vigilance was worse than British. Reitz's uncle paid a younger member of 
his picket to stand his watch while he slept in a feather-bed. The Boers unsurprisingly 
were raided twice outside Ladysmith losing several guns and night operations generally 
favoured the British.4s They had been a distinctive feature of British tactics since Tel-el 
Kebir. They negated enemy firepower and surprised the enemy. Though night attacks 
failed at Magersfontein and Stormberg, they succeeded at Belmont, Paardeberg and in 
numerous night raids on Boer laagers during the guerrilla phase. Contemporaries 
deduced that night operations were an important means of defeating firepower but that 
training for them needed to be good. Manuals developed this point after 1902.46 
41 Story of the 34
'
" Company (Middlesex) Imperial Yeomanry (1902),pp 74,90-104; Maj Gen Maurice 
BROHWSA II (1907),pp 558-9, 565-6. 
42 Chapter 2; Alderson J 00 pp 13-4; Baden-Powell War p 206. 
4J Baden-Powell War p 209. His section on outposts totals 30 pages. 
44SAD II (1901),p 24; Lt Col Pilcher Some Lessons From the Boer War (1903),pp 19-21,47-8; Lt Bethell 
Outpost Duties as Learnt in South Africa (1903 ),pp 25-7. 
4S D Reitz Commando (1968),p 62. this secondary evidence is well-supported by events at Ladysmith and 
during the latter part of the war; Maurice BROHWSA II pp 546-9. 
46 Maj ('rum With the [MI] in South Africa (Cambridge 1903),p 209; 'CB' 'Some Tactical Considerations 
Arising from Recent Events in South Africa' JUSJ/ XXX (190 1 ).P 8. IT J 902 pp 141-4. 
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Entrenchment 
Boer trenches made a great impression with the most salient example at 
Paardeberg. There a young ASC officer commented: 
Boer trenches are marvellous and a real lesson to us; our rotten little scooped-out 
affairs, a foot or so deep, in one long line, always open to enfilade, look child's 
play to theirs; ... at least 4 feet deep, hollowed out in front with good headcover ... 
and ... are never (sic) in one straight line ... [T]hese trenches are the talk of the 
whole army.47 
That a logistician was so impressed suggests the strength of the lesson. That British 
field-trenches were untraversed suggests that the effectiveness of enfilade fire had been 
underestimated. Long-range weapons made this more letha1.48 Roberts and the Chief 
Engineer, who personally reported on the Boer trench designs at Paardeberg, were 
impressed. They were deep, narrow, thus well-protected against shrapnel, and were 
carefully concealed. Thuillier attributed the RA's failure to deal with Boer trenches to 
these factors. Also smokeless ammunition enabled defenders of trenches to remain 
hidden while firing. This strengthened the defensive. Thuillier's assessment reinforces 
Lanchester's deductions on the powerful effects offieldcraft.49 That commentators 
ranging from Roberts to subalterns praised Boer entrenchment suggests the strength of 
the lesson. 
In contrast British positions with their raised parapets and angular, regular 
construction: 'advertised themselves as far as the eye can see,' violating: 'most of the 
rules to which the Boers owed so much of their success.' Swinton emphasised the 
47 SKDs (1902) p 33; REJXXX (1900),p 92. Original italicised, republishedJRUSI XLIV(1900), pp 582-
4; Glossary. 
41 REJ XXX (1900),pp 194-5; Maj Norris 'Retrospect of the War' REJXXX (l900),p 119; Swinton Drift 
p 19. For enfilade's dangers and traversing, Ibid pp 23,25. Traversing had been long used by the sappers, 
that it was not employed by infantry suggests poor training. 
49 Ed A Wessels Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa (Stroud 2000),p 59; RobertslLansdowne 
28102100, The work is a collection of contemporary documents; The Work of the Ninth Di,';sion ( 1901 ),p 
43; Glossary; Capt Thuillier The Principles of Land Defence (1902),pp 191-4. 
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importance of hiding defences, particularly from artillery and concealing spoil.50 
Rundle castigated his subordinates: 
I have failed to see any intelligent use made of entrenchments by Brigadiers ... 
[T]hey appear to think that a few stones ... or 6 in of earth hastily scraped up at 
haphazard is adequate protection against modern ... fire. 
His division later adopted the Boer-designed Paardeberg Trench. As late as July 1900 
the REs were dissatisfied with the technical standard of other arms' defences. This 
suggests that their initial efforts had been dire. 51 
Change happened during the war. 2 West Y orkshires, serving under Buller, 
practised entrenchment.52 In Natal more digging tools were issued to infantry, implying 
that combat in Natal was more positional than in Roberts' command. But the protective 
differences between Buller's and Roberts' troops were less significant than those 
involving firepower and manoeuvre. 
Based on wartime experience, sappers recommended concealing trenches, 
avoiding skylines and digging dummy trenches. 53 Callwell also emphasised the need to 
entrench in attack, commenting that with veterans: 
[n]o admonitions are needed, and in the case of tried troops, very little 
superintendence by the officers is called for. The men are impelled by the instinct 
of self-preservation, and use not only their muscles, but also their wits. 
This shows how combat stimulated initiative. The RA entrenched or put pieces in 
emplacements in South Africa. Previously this was rare in field operations, though not 
in siege warfare. Now gunners saw that such defences saved casualties and hid 
movement on gunlines. Callwell recommended camouflaging guns with foliage, an 
innovation for the RA. S4 
5(1 'Impressions of the Boers' HLICIII (1901),pp 682-3; Pilcher Lessons p 18; Swinton Drift pp 19,24-5; 
Ibid pp 33-5 describes how the ideal position was hidden; Ibid p 19 point 9; p 25 point 18. 
S! Callwell Tactics Ibid pp 139-142; RCWSA Evidence II Qs 17888, 17902; WO 108/295 P 1. 
51 Ed N Riall Boer War (2000),p 32. This is a contemporary diary. 
S) Col Wood 'The Work of the Engineers in Natal' in Capt Edwards PPCREs XXVII (1901 ),pp 62-3. 
54 Callwell Tactics pp139, 147-8. 
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Defence 
1899-1902 was the first recent war in which British forces had had to defend for 
long periods against modem weapons. British performance in defence was variable, 
though rarely tested by Boer assaults. At Kimberley and Mafeking they constructed 
defences effectively. Maj Gen Knox, a veteran of the Russo-Turkish War, fortified his 
sector of Ladysmith heavily and visibly. Contrastingly Ian Hamilton adopted a system 
of small, detached posts on the forward slope with his main force on the reverse slope of 
Caesar's Camp. The forward posts were not mutually supporting and were not sited for 
all-round defence. They proved vulnerable during the Boer assault on 6 January 1900 to 
attacks from behind. Hamilton's system of siting his main defences on the reverse slope 
may have been tactically correct to counter heavy firepower. But Boer artillery was 
ineffective at Ladysmith. Nor did White, the GOC Ladysmith, appear to have been 
understood Hamilton's plan. White ordered costly immediate counter-attacks, rather 
than attacking at night, when casualties would have probably been less. 55 There is a 
tension between the generally good state of the defences in the besieged garrisons and 
poor field entrenchments outlined above. The answer is that the sappers generally 
planned and oversaw the former, whilst the latter were largely dug by infantry. 
Some argued that Ladysmith should have been fortified prewar. 56 This failure 
suggests British over-confidence in 1899. White also miscalculated Ladysmith's 
garrison, which was far stronger in relation to the perimeter than either at Kimberley or 
Mafeking.57 A correct estimate would have allowed White to hold an extended area. 
This would have complicated the siege by forcing the Boers to hold a longer perimeter. 
Due to Ladysmith's closeness to the Tugela, the eventual front line between Buller's 
force and the besieging Boers, this would have deprived the Boers of defensive depth, 
55 RCWSA Evidence II (1903), P 560; Ibid pp 424,431 HedPs 'Box 1 Letter HeadlamlStapleton;' Amery 
THWSA III p 179; Maurice BROHWSA II pp 558-60. 
56 Glossary; 'War Despatches' BWM 169(1901), P 408. 
57 Stuan Pictures pp 216,219; RCWSA E,'iclence II Q 19963, P 424; Table 41. 
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thus aiding Buller. It would have also have meant that more land was available for 
grazing thus improving the garrison's supplies. Alternatively White could have released 
his cavalry from Ladysmith, giving Buller more options. Failure to appreciate the 
increased effectiveness of fIrepower recurred at Spion Kop where 4500 troops were 
crowded into an area barely suffIcient for 500.58 
Another protective error was that the British failed to demolish the railway lines 
from the Boer Republics to Ladysmith. This omission may well have made the siege of 
Ladysmith logistically feasible. Thus a simple tactical failure dislocated British strategy. 
It also shows British overconfIdence and poor staffwork. White later argued that the 
Boers' mobility was horse-based and therefore demolitions would have been 
ineffective, but the railways were logistically vital to the Boers. 59 
South Africa was the fIrst war in which the British used barbed wire extensively. 
At Kimberley they wired nearly the entire perimeter and wire was widely used at 
Mafeking. Later a sapper defending a minor Transvaal town laid over 60 miles of it. His 
defences also included abbatis, minefields, fougasses, barricades, fortified houses and 
redoubts. 60 
South Africa showed the value of non-linear defences. Baden-Powell's defences at 
Mafeking were based on a series of mutually supporting but separate posts sited for all-
round defence with overhead cover against shrapnel. Such positions required smaller 
garrisons than continuous trenches. The REs developed the concept of non-linear 
defences later in the war. Then it was vital to hold many positions yet manpower had to 
be economised to free troops for mobile operations. Firepower, obstacles and defences 
were substituted for men, while lower troop-densities meant that the reduced garrisons 
51 Amery THWSA III pp 297-8; RCWSA Evidence II Qs 15136-8, Buller felt that White could have 
released them; Ibid Q 21889; Maj Gen Maurice BROHWSA II (1907),pp 383,385,389,393. Both Warren 
and Coke contributed to the overcrowding. Lyttelton appreciated this and attempted to outflank. 
59 'The War Despatches' BWM 169 (1901),p 407; RCWSA Evidence II p 151contains White's defence. 
60 Capt Edwards PPCREs XXVI (Chatham 1901),p 73;Maj Turton 'The Defence of Christiana' REJ 
XXXI (1901 ).p 126. 
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were less vulnerable to artillery and there was less need for resupply.61 Reducing the 
logistic bill and hence the need for convoy guards freed yet more troops for offensive 
action, while there was less risk of stores being captured. In the guerrilla phase the 
Boers largely survived on captured supplies. 
The Engineers 1899-1902 
South Africa demonstrated that the sappers were vital in modem war. The war 
initially demanded the construction of defences and later the erection of thousands of 
miles of blockhouse lines and barbed wire.62 During the British offensive manoeuvre 
demanded a range of engineer tasks ranging from the improvement of drifts to building 
bridges. Growing technological complexity also increased their importance. Sappers 
had to operate WT, traction engines, cars, balloons and searchlights, as well as 
surveying, photographing and minelaying. The logistic construction tasks necessary in 
an undeveloped country were vast. Engineers constructed miles of railway, hospitals 
capable of accommodating 26,000 men, 210,000 square feet of covered storage and 
barracks for 16,000 troopS.63 Most sapper tasks were logistical in nature, rather than 
combat engineering. By mid-1900 the RE strength in South Africa exceeded 5000, 
excluding local forces. 
The REs analysed the war's lessons carefully.64 CREs commented that field 
companies must carry more digging tools, suggesting that entrenchment would be more 
important in future. They stressed engineer mobility.65 Improving routes was essential 
for mobility, but marching sappers moved too slowly to start work sufficiently far ahead 
of the main body of troops. Furthermore that sappers marched meant that they were 
61RCWSA Evidence II p 424; WO 108/295 P 1; Map 1. The defences gave all-round defence and were 
later adapted to defending towns and areas, Amery THWSA VI P 336. 
62 Capt Grant BROHWSA IV (1910). Appendix 2, they provided a fixed line of stops to assist the drives. 
6l WO 108/299 pp 48-50; WO 108/295; Col Watson History o/the Corps o/[REs] III (Chatham 1915), p 
111; Amery THWSA VI pp 334-5. 
64 WO 1081282-97. these files form a sapper history of South Africa; Lt Col Girouard History 0/ the 
Railways during the War in South Africa. 1899-1902 (1903). WO 108/376, the telegraph history, WO 
1081246, WO 1081248. 
6S WO 1081246 eRE 7 Div pp 14-5; eRE 9 Div p 19; OC Fd Park p 24; Ibid p 17. 
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tired before beginning hard work. Maj Hunter-Weston stressed that at least one RE 
troop per cavalry brigade was needed. Hitherto there had been one troop for the whole 
Division. Digging tools and explosives must be packbome, consequently with greater 
cross-country mobility, while the Cavalry Division required a CRE for coordination. 
Hunter-Weston noted that even cavalry had entrenched. This suggests that greater 
firepower had increased the importance of dismounted tactics. 66 General Wood, the 
Chief Engineer, stressed that the infantry divisional CRE's position was unsatisfactory; 
he should be on the divisional staff to ensure: 'the fullest and quickest direction of the 
Engineer Arm.' This also would have also increased inter-arm cooperation. He made the 
same point to the RCWSA, recommending more mounted sappers, pontoons, 
telegraphists and signals material. 
The general consensus was that South Africa had increased the REs' importance 
and that sappers must therefore be more integrated into tactics. This recognises the 
importance of both protection and mobility, and that warfare was becoming more 
technica1.67 It was not an entirely new lesson as Hilyard's Committee had made similar 
points. 
Technology 1899-1902 
New equipments were generally assigned to the REs so technology is covered 
here. The Army Board showed no reluctance to use technology in South Africa; indeed 
flying machines were the only significant device declined. As they had not yet been 
invented, the Board's refusal may be attributed to prudence and not innate 
technophobia. Langley's aircraft, commissioned for the Spanish-American War, did not 
fly until 1903 with less than satisfactory results.68 The Board saw merit in armoured 
cars but referred them to the RE Committee. Dipping needles to detect buried Boer 
66 Ibid pp 7-8, 24-5: Ibid p 72; French saw a CRE as essential in a cavalry division; Watson REs III p 43. 
67 WO 108/246 pp 8-9 CE Appendix lA.; Glossary; RCWSA Evidence I Qs 2221-4; WO 3216805 P 5. 
61 WO 108/307 P 117; The Times Two 16112103, p 7. 
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guns, WT, cars, annoured traction engines, extensive use of telephones, all featured in 
South Africa.69 Baden-Powell flew photo-reconnaissance kites, while balloons were 
used to control artillery and locate hidden weapons. A searchlight section deployed in 
early 1900, and numbers increased from a few commandeered lights in 1899 to some 
250 in 1902. This reflects the importance of night operations. 
In South Africa distances and dispersion demanded efficient signals as in Tirah. 
For the first time in 1899 the RE Telegraph Division laid telephone lines to outposts.70 
The prime issue in South Africa, however, was not technological but organisational. 
More signallers were needed, especially by field artillery which had abolished them in 
1899. More signalling equipment was vital and more signallers had to be mounted as 
they could not otherwise keep up with mounted HQs. In the besieged garrisons 
comprehensive communication systems were established which allowed their 
commanders to control from central positions. White attributed the repulse of the Boer 
attack in January 1900 to the telephone system which enabled him to coordinate the 
defence. French, outside Colesberg, commanded across a 33 mile front by field-
telegraph and heliograph. Telephones were used on the battlefield; French telephoned 
for reinforcements before Elandslaagte. 71 
The Anny laid 9361 miles of telegraph-wire along blockhouse lines and installed 
nearly 2000 telephones, over 50 exchanges and 18,236 miles of line. The Army hired a 
WT contingent from Marconi's, supplementing this with sets seized from the Boers. 
Several wireless trials were conducted and the Ladysmith garrison improvised a WT 
set. 72 Professor Travers has argued that the Anny had an anti-technology bias before 
1914; this does not appear to be the case between 1899-1902. 
69 WO 108/307 pp 122,134. 
70 HBM III (1900),pp 180-1; WO 108/290 P 5; WO 108/298 pp 29-30; WO 108/376 P 4. 
7. WO 108/376 pp 23-4 & Diagramme 7; THWSA In (1905),p 152; Maj Cburcher With the Irish Fusiliers 
from Alexandria to Natal (nd), pp 39,45; WO 108/376 pp 23,6. 
n WO 1081376 pp 49-50,54; WO 108/307 pp 68,71: Official Records o/the Guards' Brigade in South 




Defensive tactics changed after 1902, when, due to greater firepower, defensive 
norms were cut from 10,000 to 5000 men per mile. This contained a margin for counter-
attacks. When these were not envisaged, norms could be further reduced to 3000. 
Thinning-out defenders made enemy shelling less lethal as the defenders were less 
concentrated, while ground could be better used. Thuillier, citing Callwell, estimated 
that these norms could be reduced even lower.73 This meant that the same number of 
troops could hold longer frontages. Consequently outflanking movements, made more 
necessary by increased firepower, had to be pushed even wider, further complicating 
manoeuvre. These post-1902 defensive norms were greater than those used in South 
Africa; however contemporaries felt that European armies were more likely to assault 
than the Boers. Hence positions had to be held more strongly. Thinning-out also meant 
that initiative was delegated. Many argued that thinning-out also aided offensive action; 
more troops could be freed for attacks, rather than being tied down holding the 
attacker's own defences. 
Contemporaries felt that: 'new weapons have greatly increased the tactical 
strength of the defensive side.' CTrg 1902 acknowledged: 
entrenchments ... are the special prerogative of the defence, and by their aid a 
position could be rendered practically impregnable. 
However, heavily entrenched positions could be outmanoeuvred, a reason advanced for 
developing mobility, or attacked by night.74 
Smokeless ammunition meant that defensive tactics now emphasised concealing 
positions. CTrg 1902 saw that well-hidden defenders were able to surprise rash 
13 Maj Edwards The Defence and Defensil'e Positions ( 1902),pp 369-70: The Principles of Land Defence 
~1902), PI'> 308-9. These nonns allowed for considerable depth. 
4 Thuillicr Principles p195; Lt Col James Modern Strategl' (Edinburgh 1903),pp 140-1; CTrg 1902 P 16. 
Chapter 5. 
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attackers. IDB 1896 had not mentioned this point CTrg 1902 suggested that gaps 
between positions were acceptable if they were covered by fire. This was a South 
African lesson. Defensive artillery tactics put far greater stress on avoiding artillery 
duels from 1902. Also FAT 1902 emphasised: 
In all military operations, concealment of plans and dispositions is all important. .. 
Firing from behind cover and from concealed positions should be resorted to 
whenever practicable and no guns or emplacements may be placed on the skyline 
where they are easily located. Gunpits ... must be provided. 
FAD 1896 had not contained these points, while MME 1899 had remarked that: 
'[a]rtificial cover for artillery will be very rarely, if ever, used [in field operations]. ,75 
The new manuals gave more space to defence than did [DB 1896's Part V. But like 
[DB, CTrg 1902 stressed counter-attacks. 
Entrenchment 
Montgomery-Massingberd argued in a staff college paper that South Africa had 
taught the Army the value of entrenchments. 76 His DS did not criticise this and, judging 
by the weaknesses outlined above, his argument has force. The postwar manuals 
emphasised digging. Improved spades were introduced in 1900 and the number of 
digging-tools in battalions doubled. Trench-designs altered to become deeper, narrower 
and traversed against enfilade fire. 77 The manuals advised digging during attacks. This 
did not mean sapping attacks, although Buller had envisaged these on the Tugela, but 
the immediate consolidation of captured positions to provide firm bases for further 
advances. 
AIME 1901 emphasised concealing trenches and recommended that 
communication trenches were dug in the field. Hitherto they had been only used in 
7S F.4 T 1 I}O] piS; MME 1899 P 50; Chapter 4. Entrenchment was always important in sieges. 
76 MMPs 214 'Paper on Field Entrenchments' p I. He probably meant by arms other than the sappers who 
were well aware of its value. 
77 MME (Provisional)(1903). P 9 totals 684: MME (Provisional) 1901 is 404. (Provisional)MME 1899 p 3 
328; IME Part I Field Defences (1902).p IS; (Provisional) MME 1899. pp 47-9; ME I (1902). Plates XlIa 
& XIII; Glossary. 
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sieges.78 Surprisingly, after a war which saw massive use of barbed wire, MME 1903 
did not cover it in more depth.79 But Field Defences saw wire as the: 'best of obstacles,' 
noting its speed of construction, the difficulty of destroying it and that it did not block 
observation or rrre. These points had not appeared in the prewar edition. They suggest 
South Africa's influence. 80 
Fieldcraft 
As postwar norms for manning defences reduced, those for extension while 
moving increased. In 1899 infantrymen moving were as close as a yard apart; in 1902 
they extended up to 30. Both changes demanded more low-level initiative, both 
facilitated fieldcraft, allowed the better use of ground and enhanced protection. IDB 
1896' s section on extended-order drill was rigid and put little emphasis on fieldcraft. 
Contrastingly IT 1902 explained why fieldcraft was important: 
Troops are formed as skirmishers for the following reasons:- That they may not 
present a favourable target. .. That they may escape observation when 
reconnoitring; and enable them to take advantage of cover. 
It stressed that the: 'paramount importance of concealment must be impressed on all 
ranks,' warning that poor individual fieldcraft could betray collective movement. This 
partly confirms the point made at the start of the Chapter that protection is more 
affected by individuals than firepower or mobility. IT 1902 saw extension between 
soldiers as ranging from 5-15 paces and possibly more. It stressed careful individual 
instruction in the use of ground both as cover for movement and as fire positions. It 
ordered, unlike IDB 1896, that soldiers were to be practically trained in crossing ground 
with individuals selecting their own cover. Unlike IDB 1896 soldiers were allowed to 
deviate from the line of advance to use ground. IT 1902 emphasised that commanders 
should not expose themselves unnecessarily and that they were to use cover.81 IDB 
71 MME (Provisional Edition) 1901, pp 50-50A. Communication trenches were common in siegewarfare. 
79 MME 1903 has an additional illustration of barbed wire, Plate XXII. 
10 IME I Field Defences (1902),p 80 contrasts with MAlE /899 pp 56-7 and IME Part I (1894),pp 68-9. 
II IT 190: p 142; Ibid pp 135, 144. 147,149. 
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1896 had forbidden using the prone position within 500 yards of the enemy, presumably 
to maintain control. IT 1902 ordered: 'skirmishers will invariably ... lie down. ,82 
IT 1902's S154 forms the basis of the Anny's fieldcraft instruction. It 
recommended avoiding bunching and exposure on skylines, stressed selection of 
ground, firing round rather than over cover and careful individual fieldcraft training. 
Even before IT 1902 was published, training at Hythe had started to change. 
During the past year [1901] certain practices have been introduced framed with a 
view to teaching individuals to utilise ... ground for cover ... These practices take 
the form of individual instruction in skirmishing ... The result has been very 
satisfactory. Such practices have been introduced in the revised ... Musketry 
Regulations. 83 
That Hythe held trials before changing MRs suggests a more logical method of tactical 
innovation. Hythe's methods were also introduced in India. The 1901-2 Indian 
Musketry Circular recommended that the individual soldier received training in: 
how to get over [ground] without exposing himself, how to utilize cover, to get 
into a position to fire ... Widely extended formations have increased the necessity 
for independent action on the part of the soldier and he cannot always depend on 
having someone at hand to tell him where to go and what to do.84 
It noted that using cover was now being taught but British troops' progress was poor. 
MRs (Provisional) 1903 included using fieldcraft in rangework. They stressed 
cover, entrenchment, adapting formations to circumstances and that: '[i]nvisibility (sic) 
has acquired an importance second only to fire effect.' They forbade close formations 
when troops were in sight of their targets. MRs 1898 did not mention fieldcraft and gave 
no instructions on tactics or initiative. They had no mandatory practices involving the 
use of cover. Nine of MRs 1903's practices included fieldcraft. 8s The musketry schools 
and the musketry staff, who existed in all major commands, had real potential to 
improve fieldcraft army-wide by enforcing these regulations. 
Illbid P 141. 
I) Mwketry Report 1902 (1903),p S. 
14 L[MILI712462 '1901-2 Indian Musketry Circular' pI. 
a'MRs 1898 had an attack practice, but there was no certainty that cover was used; Tables 17, 18. 
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The other anns gave more attention to fieldcraft in training. Parsons stressed 
more attention to the: '[p ]rocedure of occupying [gun] positions unseen' and to the: 
[u]se of ground to conceal movement.' CT 1904 emphasised dismounted skinnishing, 
fieldcraft and using cover. This suggests that both the Cavalry's tactics and culture were 
altering. 86 
Outposts 
CTrg 1902 stressed the concealment of outposts and was far more emphatic on the 
need for fieldcraft by individual sentries than IDE 1896: 
To see without being seen is the first maxim of outpost duty ... The more an 
enemy is kept in ignorance of the strength and position of the outpost troops, the 
greater will be his uncertainty ... All troops on outpost must be carefully 
concealed. 87 
CTrg 1902 saw that the best position for sentries at night was in lower ground so that 
enemies crossing a crestline were skylined.88 It was a South African lesson. IT 1902's 
treatment of outposts differed from IDE 1896: 
If an enemy is so continuously watched that he can make no movement without 
being observed, surprise is manifestly impossible. The first duty ... of the outposts 
is RECONNAISSANCE (sic).89 
This demanded more active conduct of outposts with emphasis on patrolling and 
scouting rather than IDE 1896 's static posts. This also links in with the greater stress on 
mobile reconnaissance. The change also required more low-level initiative. 
South Africa like Tirah emphasised many practical points on concealment, 
camouflage, including adding foliage to helmets, avoidance of skylines and vigilance.9O 
General Protection 
CTrg 1902 devoted a chapter to protection. It covered this topic in more depth 
86 ARSG 1901 (1902),pp 15,17; CT 1904 pp 54-6. 
17 MRs (Provisional) 1903 p 47; Table 18; Ibid pp 24-26; CT 1904 pp 53-56, CTrg 1902 P 108. 
II CTrg 1902 pp 109,126-127. IDB 1896 P 193 placed them on the forward slope. 
19 CTrg 1902 P 107. 
90 IT 1902 and IDB 1896. pp 43-4 &80 respectively; Lt Tulloch 'Some Notes on Outpost Duty in South 
Africa' JRUSI XLVIII (1903).p 1161. 
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than IDB 1896's Part VI. The latter, outlining protection, was curiously not included in 
IDB's section on 'Combined Tactics,' though this part was apparently intended for all 
anns.
91 30% of CTrg 1902 was on protection; attack accounted for 12% and defence 
10%.92 The work emphasised protection's importance in advances, withdrawals and in 
positional fighting. It laid down general protective principles. It is not possible to 
compare CTrg 1902 and IDB 1896's treatment of protection quantitatively as the two 
works are pitched at different levels, but the former's stress on protection suggests 
South Africa's influence. 
The Engineers and Technology 
South Africa was the first major war in which the CinC, Kitchener, was an ex-
sapper. Other engineers rose to prominence there. Like the RA, South Africa caused a 
substantial increase in the REs; afterwards some 65 officers and 1970 sappers were 
added. They were organised in a variety of units ranging from railway companies to 
balloon sections. The REs were becoming seen as the fourth combat arm. More sappers 
attended Camberley after 1902, and more, as Wood's Committee had recommended, 
were selected to command formations. 93 As Table 30 suggests British infantry divisions 
had more sappers than French and German formations. 
There was no reluctance to advance technology after 1902. Searchlight sub units 
were established. Field telephones were introduced and later field WT, after 
experiments beginning in 1903. The Anny introduced a comprehensive signals 
organisation after extensive trials. Here the British were ahead of other European 
annies, with significant results in 1914. Chapters 4 and 5 cover technical developments 
in firepower and transport respectively. The Service press became interested in aircraft 
91 CTrg 1902 Part V pp 94-140. This can be deduced as IDB /896's instructions are not limited to 
Infantry, eg p 163. 
91 CT 1902 attack pp 19-36. defence pp 36-50. 
9) Brig Oen Baker-Brown History o/the Corps o/[REs] IV (Chatham 1952),pp 18.51,54; this was not a 
smooth process from 1902, the 1904 Esher reforms impaired the REs' position for a time. 
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relatively early. By 19145% of the Army's budget was spent on the RFC and the 
British had a higher ratio of aircraft to fonnations than either France or Germany. 
Similarly Britain had more MT. Britain deployed considerable scientific effort to 
improve aircraft. The Army used aircraft more effectively in 1914 than the Germans 
who relied more on cavalry reconnaissance and failed to detect the BEF in 
consequence.94 This was despite the fact that the BEF, the westernmost army on the 
Allied front was located where reconnaissance was imperative for the Gennans. This 
system was based on extensive trials, principally on the 1912 Army Manoeuvres, to 
develop air-reconnaissance and its associated C3.95 A thesis devoted to tactics cannot 
pursue the question of technology far but in summary British weapons and military 
technology was not inferior to that of other annies in 1914. There were differences but 
these can largely be accounted for by the differing roles of the armies.96 
Conclusions 
The growth of firepower and the introduction of smokeless ammunition 
emphasised protection more, enforced greater use of ground and cover, made 
camouflage worthwhile and enforced extension. In turn dispersion demanded greater 
low-level initiative. Similarly nonns for attack and defence altered. These changes 
involving wider extension improved protection. Many of these features were first seen 
in Tirah. 
The Army paid greater attention to defence after 1899. Defence was still seen as 
subordinate to attack but CTrg 1902 summed up their relative advantages and 
disadvantages well. The general view was that greater firepower, entrenchment and 
94 Table 46 ; D Edgerton England and the Aeroplane (Basing stoke 1991), P 10. He emphasises that the 
scale of theoretical physics and engineering was substantial. Report of the Advisory Committee/or 
Aeronauticsfor the Year 1909-10 (1910) shows 7 FRSs involved in the research; Brig Gen Edmonds 
MOFB 1914 I (1937). pp 59-60. 
9S ED Brose The Kaiser's Army (Oxford 2001).p 203; WO 33/620; Statement on the Army Estimates 
1914-15 (1914) 
96 Notably in the German emphasis on medium howitzers, but the Germans faced breaking through 
defences. This conclusion parallels recent scholarship on the RN. see J Brooks Dreadnought Gunnery and 
the Battle of Jutland (Abingdon 2005).p xii. 
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smokeless ammunition favoured defence. The manuals stressed that defence should be 
active. This was not new but South Africa had shown the dangers of passive defence. 
Commentators generally felt that the gain in defensive power was not totally inimical to 
attack. Now an attacking force could economise on the troops required to hold its own 
defences, thus freeing more for manoeuvre. Mobile troops who had manoeuvred to seize 
a position could retain it more easily due to their increased firepower. The Army's 
defensive tactics altered as a result of South Africa; afterwards firepower rather than 
thousands of infantry per mile was seen as the requirement. The postwar manuals saw 
that continuous lines were unnecessary; gaps covered by fire were acceptable. 
Far more attention was paid to fieldcraft, the use of cover and concealment, 
avoiding skylines and entrenching both infantry and artillery after 1899. Trench designs 
improved, and the scale and effectiveness of digging equipment increased. As Roberts 
pointed out to the RCWSA, delegating initiative improved individual performance in 
entrenchment, outposts and fieldcraft. South Africa saw the most extensive engineer 
commitment since the formation of the Corps. The engineers were becoming accepted 
as the fourth combat ann. 
The Army exploited technology in South Africa; the most significant innovations 
were MT, the emergence ofQF technology and the extensive use of telephony, 
telegraphy and the pioneering use of WT. The new emphasis on signals reflected 
weapons' lengthening ranges. This had also featured in Tirah. 
Protection, when implemented, occurs at lower tactical levels than firepower or 
mobility and demands low-level initiative. Thus the emphasis on protection and its 
component, fieldcraft, from 1899, suggests that the culture of top-down control was 
changing due to the effectiveness of modem weapons. 
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Chapter 7 Initiative, Discipline, Education and Training 
Definition 
For e' might have gone and sprayed 'em with a porn pom, 
Or e' might 'av slung a squadron out to see, 
But 'e wasn't taking chances in them 'igh and 'ostile krantzes-
He was markin' time to earn a KCB, 
(Panicky, perishin' old men), 
That 'amper an 'inder and scold men, 
For fear 0' Stellenbosh! 
Introduction 
Verse rarely tackles military problems, so that Kipling wrote on defective 
initiative in South Africa suggests how serious the fault was. He also diagnoses that 
severity inhibits risk-taking with adverse tactical results. Clearly the British were 
tactically centralised in 1899 despite the lessons learned during Tirah. This Chapter 
demonstrates firstly that from 1899 the Anny attached great importance to inculcating 
initiative. Firepower had caused battlefields to become extended and complex. On these 
coherent combat with commanders exercising close control proved impossible. Instead 
fighting had developed into interrelated skirmishes which demanded individual 
initiative. 1 Secondly it shows that inculcating initiative required substantial changes to 
training, education, discipline and administration. All altered either to enhance initiative 
directly or, if not expressly so intended, the changes would have been beneficial. That 
so many measures were used to inculcate initiative suggests the change's importance. 
Here a definition of initiative is appropriate. There are two military meanings: the 
first is the ability to dictate combat's pattern and pace. This is generally connected with 
the attack, and the related factors of surprise and tempo which have always proved 
fonnidable military advantages.2 This Chapter considers initiative's second meaning, 
the ability of subordinates to act, either without orders or when these have become 
I There were confused battles previously, eg Inkerman. But commanders could control tactically in the 
musket era, eg Wellington at Waterloo. By 1900 this had become impossible. Though Symons, Buller and 
Methuen were not personally equal to Wellington, their failures at Modder and Colenso were primarily 
systemic caused by enhanced firepower. All three went too far forward and became casualties. 
1 BDD (1996), p 4-9. 
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inappropriate, to further the overall aim.3 This qualification emphasises that reckless 
action, however independent, is often disadvantageous. Thomeycroft's abandonment of 
Spion Kop showed independence but did not further Buller's plan.4 Those exercising 
initiative must therefore show jUdgement. This has further implications, demanding the 
development of doctrine, principles which guide decision-making without being unduly 
prescriptive. 
The two meanings of initiative are connected; surprise and tempo, needed if the 
initiative is to be won, are impossible if requests for decisions have to be laboriously 
passed up the chain of command and orders then transmitted downward. Manoeuvre 
depends on gaining the initiative and consequently demands timely decision-making. 
This Chapter concentrates upon the second definition, but juniors displaying initiative 
are more likely to increase tempo than the inert, thus aiding manoeuvre and gaining the 
initiative in the first sense. 
Initiative and Firepower 
One of the Army's most significant changes, which occurred during the magazine 
rifle era, was largely invisible, both to contemporaries then and to historians now, but 
nonetheless was critical. Essentially it switched from centralised to delegated tactics 
allowing subordinates initiative. The new weapons forced dispersion and compelled the 
use of ground as cover against fire. Commanders now were more vulnerable to longer-
ranging, more accurate fire, while smokeless ammunition meant that no longer could a 
company, let alone a CinC, gauge the enemy at a glance. His own troops, dispersed, 
hugging the earth, were hard enough to find, let alone command. Tactical 
communications were weak so juniors had to be allowed initiative. Wellington had 
allowed little freedom to his senior commanders; in the magazine rifle era sergeants, 
) Lt Col Maurice 'The Use and Abuse of the Initiative' AR VII (1914),pp 1-2. 
4 LS Amery THWSA III (1905),pp 289-90. 
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soldiers even, had to exercise more initiative than the Duke's officers.5 It was a 
profound alteration and far from being limited to tactics. The Army's culture of top-
down control had to alter with deep implications for discipline, education and training. 
Initiative, Society and Culture 
Military initiative has a cultural component influenced by society-wide forces as 
well as more narrowly military factors. In Russia, autocratic control combined with a 
military culture, extending back to Suvorov, of mass and shock, exacerbated by poor 
education, curbed initiative. British officers from the Crimea to Manchuria criticised the 
reSUlting Russian inertia.6 How far wider trends in Britain, the growth of education 
being but one, influenced initiative from 1897 is hard to say. There clearly was an effect 
but contemporaries hardly acknowledged it. 
In an Anny, with Infantry and Cavalry regimentally based, unit cultures were 
significant, variable and resilient, ranging from the Gordons' sturdy independence, 
disdain for staff and Staff College and strict drill tradition, to LI's delegation and 
initiative.7 A veteran LI CO commented of them: 
Such were the principles instilled into me when I joined the 43rd as a boy of 
eighteen. Such are the principles that I have tried to carry out all my life. Such 
are the principles that made Napier ... describe the 52nd as "A Regiment never 
surpassed. ,,8 
LI's role in dispersed combat had developed initiative, internal discipline and leadership 
in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries. Now modem weapons were making these 
qualities necessary for all infantry. The LI revival did not cease in 1899 and many 
recognised the importance of LI principles in instilling initiative. Some non-LI officers 
, 'Regimental Officer' 'Musketry and Discipline' USM XXIII (1901),pp 367-8; Col Marshall Men 
against Fire (NY 1947),p 129. Marshall's methodology has been highly criticised, but few combatants 
would dispute his conclusion; J Keegan The Mask 0/ Command (1987),p 132 passim 
6 Col Mercer Give Them a Volley and Charge (1998), p 7; Chapter 8. 
7 Gen Hamilton Listening/or the Drums (1944),pp 69-71. But their culture was changing by 1899; Lt Col 
Maurice 'The Use and Abuse of the Initiative' AR VII (1914),p 5. 
I Lt Col Clark 'The Maintenance of Discipline' aXLI III (1894),p 212. 
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consciously used LI methods in training after 1902.9 
Initiative was not unifonn across the combat arms due to their differing tactical 
requirements. Infantry, less LI, had traditionally fought in close order under tight 
control, with, as Callwell recalled, adverse results: 
a field gunner brought into close relation with any infantry battalion at the time 
[the late 1880s]could hardly fail to disapprove of the general principle governing 
its internal economy .... [C]entralisation was the key-note of the system, with 
adjutant for focus, and senior captains ... seemed to have less authority ... than I 
had enjoyed ever since ... first joining a battery. 
This is secondary evidence, yet a general's reflection after a lifetime's service has 
value. 10 Cavalry nominally had the Squadron System which should have fostered 
initiative, but its implementation was patchy. II But cavalry, massed for shock action, 
were necessarily under close control, and it was precisely in tactically decentralised 
duties that they were to fail in 1899-1902.12 Field artillery was decentralised but this 
was reducing; longer-ranged weapons, the resulting ability to concentrate and the need 
to coordinate fire meant that batteries were becoming pennanently organised into units. 
Qualification is necessary, however. Batteries were allowed considerable freedom, and 
in manoeuvre centralised control of artillery was hard. Thus it would be hard to argue 
that field gunners needed more or displayed less initiative after 1899. Some, however, 
feared that centralisation would inhibit it. 13 Infantry and Cavalry were to be most 
affected by the need for increased initiative after 1902, though the RA also inculcated it. 
Initiative, Discipline, Education and Training 
This section examines the complex interrelationship between the above factors. 
Fuller noted that tactical changes altered discipline and FM Wavell explored the 
9 Chapter 2; Gen Haldane A Soldier's Saga (Edinburgh 1948),p 270. Haldane was non-LI, and, though 
his comment was made decades later, it is corroborated by his Notes on Training written pre-1914. 
10 Stray Recollections I (1923),p 294. Brig Bidwell Gunners at War (1970),p 58 corroborates Callwell. 
II Glossary; HA Gwynne The Army on Itself(I904),p 69. HowPs 8/4/1 Letter 16112113. 
Il 'Cavalry Organisation' BA LXXXI (1908),p 490 blamed poor initiative for these tactics failings. 
Il WO 163/11 'IGF Report 1905' pp 178-9; Bidwell Gunners pp 42-3; Maj Williams-Wynn 'The Brigade 
System in the RFA' PRAI XXXII (1905).p 18. 
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relationship, viewing discipline as: 'simply ... "the soldierly spirit.'" He continued: 
the discipline ... now required ... is not so much unquestioning obedience as that. 
when two or three are gathered together, there shall be courage and enterprise. 
And to my mind this ... derives more from the ... education hut ... than ... the 
barrack square ... Forty years ago our battles could still be won on the barrack 
square as was shown at Omdunnan. But it is certain that barrack-square methods 
can no longer win battles as the Boer War ... taught us ... [T]raining ... should be 
directed to develop ... individual responsibility and initiative of the soldier ... 
[E]ducation ... rather than drilling ... is the foundation of discipline. 14 
Wavell states that a relationship exists between dispersed tactics, initiative, education 
and 'internal' discipline. Wavell, a South African veteran, had served throughout the 
change, thus giving him perspective, and he has a reputation as a thinking soldier; his 
views have therefore validity. 
This thesis maintains Wavell' s argument that the above relationship exists. 
Profound change in one factor will affect the others to varying extents. Tirah and South 
Africa saw major tactical change ie greater firepower which forced dispersion, thus 
initiative had to increase. To accommodate this discipline needed to become more 
'internal' as soldiers were not under close control. They had to be better educated, far 
more had to use maps. As is shown later, training altered to cater for greater tactical 
complexity. 
Initiative and Discipline 
Dispersed combat demands intelligence and 'internal' ie self-discipline, based 
upon patriotism, comradeship, and regimental pride, fostered by leadership rather than 
top-down control enforced by 'imposed' discipline:s In the Frederickian era discipline 
was external and ruthless: '[i]f a soldier ... looks about to fly, or so much as sets foot 
outside the line, the [NCO] standing behind him will run him through.' 16 In close-order 
14 Col Fuller Sir John Moore's System of Training (1924),p ix; FM Wavell The Good Soldier (1948),pp 
99-100. 
15 Brig McPherson Discipline (1950),pp 1-3. ADP 2 Command (1995),p 2-23 for discipline's effects on 
initiative. 
16 Oen Hackett The Profession of Arms (l983),p 123, citing Frederick the Great. 
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combat geometry made such enforcement possible; furthermore soldiers had to 
take few decisions, even officers in line infantry or massed cavalry required little 
initiative. In Tirah's nullahs, on the veldt, in dispersed combat generally, spatial changes 
made external discipline unenforceable. I7 Nor were superiors at hand to give close 
tactical direction. Admittedly the British Anny was not mercenary as Frederick's 
largely was, while Georgian benevolence had matured into Victorian paternalism. But 
despite these society-wide influences, taut 'external' discipline had survived in many 
units: 
the paramount importance of the very strictest attention ... to ... drill and the 
minutiae of interior economy ... [I]t is in the closest adherence to routine, to rules 
and to orders definitely laid down that we must base the foundation of true 
discipline. IS 
In consequence: '[t]he corporal will not do anything for fear of the sergeant ... the 
sergeant will not move for fear of the Captain.' Switching to 'internal' discipline, 
essential for dispersed combat, demanded profound Anny-wide changes. Neglecting to 
implement these had dire results in 1899: 
[a]ll initiative in the soldier was sternly repressed. Independent firing was not 
encouraged, because it was argued, the private, being "stupid" and improvident, 
would hurriedly fire off all his ammunition. The clip loader ... was rejected for the 
same reason. "Crisp" volleys (which in war hit nothing) were preferred; ... at 
Nicholson's Nek-this meant losing. 19 
Professor French notes improvements in discipline after 1893. It is true that there 
were fewer reported offences, although the decline accelerated far more later during the 
period this thesis cover. But despite this improvement, the method of imposing 
discipline remained 'external' before 1899. This is suggested by the poor performance 
of detached duties in both Tirah and South Africa, tight administrative centralisation, 
17 J Keegan The Face of Battle (1976),pp 182-3; RCWSA Report pp 57-8. 
II Lt Col Hutton Five Lectures on [MI] (1891 ).p 6. That Hutton was an LI officer who respected his 
regiment's ethos suggests how dominant control was. 
19 RCWSA Evidence II p 260; 'Efficiency in the Services' QR 196 (1902),p 279. 
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stress on control in the manuals and the still high rate of disciplinary offences.2o 
Initiative and Tactics pre-1897 
Chapter 2 has analysed British tactics in 1897, this section examines their relation 
to initiative. Broadly close-order and control had remained effective against inferior 
enemies.21 Consequently: 
[a] slavish obedience was enjoined upon the officer, ... he was taught to regard it 
as almost a crime to think ... Whatever he did, his superior stood over him; 
divisional generals meddling with the internal management of brigades, colonels 
with companies and so on .... A vast manual of many hundred rules and 
regulations contained provisions for everything ... Initiative was a word without 
meaning.22 
Many officers had not seen combat, and in Britain, with little threat of major warfare, 
administration was over-emphasised at the expense of training. One unit faced 
completing 61 administrative reports at intervals ranging from daily to annually.23 Red 
tape: 
the prodigious accumulation of "checks and counter-checks" ... [is] the 
distinguishing feature of the British system, with the effective result that 
responsibility is abolished and initiative ... destroyed. 24 
This emphasis on obedience was accentuated, as, pre-l 899 , much training was 
drill conducted by a troika of CO, adjutant and RSM.25 Drill had little value in modem 
combat, though necessary in the Sudan, and it absorbed time that could have been used 
for sub-unit tactical training. This damaged company and squadron commanders' 
initiative. Once indoctrinated in obedience, officers passed this on, creating a culture of 
control. An anonymous article described the effects: 
[t]he individual training which sharpens the wits of the soldier and teaches him to 
exercise his judgement in the use of ground and on outpost and patrol duties, was 
20 D French Military Identities (Oxford 2005). pp 183-4. 
21 BA LXIV (1900),p 71; Col Maurice Sir Frederick Maurice (1913).pp 94-6 citing contemporary 
material 
22 Efficiency' QR pp 279-80. 
2J [SOs] lit Battalion OXLI (portsmouth 1890). pp 7-13. 
24 'Efficiency' QR. p 274. 
25 Lt Col Pollock 'The Training of the Army' JRUSI XLVII (1903), P 177. 
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quite inadequate. Mechanical volleys had usurped the place of intelligent 
skinnishing.26 
Firstly this recognised training's importance in promoting initiative and that before 
1899 it had been defective. Secondly it links initiative and ground explicitly, contrasting 
skinnishing and volleys. 
The AG's department, responsible for training, was seen as hostile to tactical 
initiative and Buller, AG between 1890-1897, was regarded as a centraliser.27 Whatever 
the prime cause, the results harmed both initiative and realistic training. There were of 
course exceptions. Maurice and Wolseley had emphasised initiative, while LI, the RA 
and IA generally allowed young officers more responsibility than line units in Britain.28 
Conn aught tried to foster initiative at Aldershot while IDB 1896 endorsed it: 
Local circumstances ... may render the precise execution of ... orders ... 
impractical. Delegation of command is a necessity, and commanders must ... 
take every opportunity of training their subordinates in accepting 
responsibility ... [M]odem warfare renders it imperative that all ranks should be 
taught to think ... and ... act for themselves.29 
This, however, was heavily qualified as it also emphasised volleys and omitted 
fieldcraft and skinnishing, both demanding individual initiative.3o Judging by Tirah and 
1899, IDB's endorsement of initiative was largely unimplemented. Here one encounters 
the gap between injunction and implementation. To introduce low-level initiative 
required more than a few sentences in a drillbook. Col Maxse summarised the 
problem's cause: 
the home training of the British officer before [1899] was calculated to stifle the 
most precious qualities an officer can posses- ... resourcefulness and initiative. 31 
When officers' initiative was curbed, the situation was worse for soldiers. 
26 'Official Despatches' EDR CXCII (1900).p 304. 
27 BA LXVII (1901 ),p 534. 
21 Lt Maurice The System of Field Manoeuvres ... (Edinburgh 1872),pp 10-11,23-5. But Parsons felt that 
some gunners were hidebound, UMIU7/10839 'IAR 1902-3' pp 4-5. 
29 ANG XXXVII (1896), P 14; IDB 1896 pp 129-130 . 
.lO Tables 17 and 18. 
) I Col Maxse Seymour Vandaleur ( 1905 ),pp 136-7. 
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Initiative in South Africa 
Immediate Analysis 
Criticisms of poor initiative in Tirah were often oblique as Chapter 2 argues, but in 
South Africa inertia was sharply attacked from the war's start. The National Review 
urged the need for: 'self reliance and individual initiative in ... officers ... and even in 
each ... private.' Initiative was vital in modem fighting and increasing it was the most 
urgently needed reform.32 The magazine, edited by Col Maxse's brother, had naturally 
good links with Service opinion. An officer described an extended-order assault: 
the men could not possibly be under the immediate control of even section 
commanders ... [they] must be trained to act independently ... Volley firing 
would be practically impossible.33 
He also identified the relationship between training and initiative. Roberts' Pretoria 
committees emphasised initiative. A Cavalry Board criticised poor-quality personnel, 
suggesting that improving standards would enable more initiative to be delegated and 
looser formations introduced, while 7 Division recommended that: 
greater efforts be made in our peace training to develop the individual 
intelligence of the soldier, and make him think more for himself, so that when 
necessary he would be more able to act on his own initiative.34 
This confirms that prewar training had impaired initiative. Gen Pole-Carew urged 
adoption of double companies, the infantry equivalent of the Squadron System and 
NCOs' importance in action.35 Strengthening sub-units organisationally enhanced low-
level initiative by weakening COs' powers, while Pole-Carew's recommendations were 
key features of the German methods of inculcating initiative. That Roberts' committees, 
which sat during the war, stressed initiative suggests the importance of improving it. 
Buller complained: 'our Officers lack initiative and independence of spirit.' He 
II 'Greater Britain-Lessons of the War' NR XXXIV (January 1900).p 960. 
l) Chapter 2; . Akela' 'Ladysmith· The Bugle (OLI) XII (1900),p 3363. 
)4 WO 1081250 p 3; WO 108/254 P 12; Chapter 3. 
lS WO 108/253 pp 5,1. 
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somewhat unfairly blamed WO overregulation for the defect, as AG he had been 
responsible for training policy and discipline. Capt Vaughan remarked: 
[a]ll ranks must be taught to think. The greatest fault in our training is that in 
peace subordinates never think for themselves. 36 
Vaughan, a South African veteran, writing at Camberley in the aftermath of the war, 
suggests the direction of the future elite's thinking. Lt Col Morrison condemned lack of 
initiative, recommending less rigid training, while Lt Walker stressed: 'Infantry must 
learn individually to act and think for themselves. ,37 Gen Wood criticised the state of 
low-level training, which he saw was becoming more important as weapons forced 
dispersal: 
Every report from South Africa leads to the conclusion that our rank and file are as 
untrained as they are brave, and the failures in scouting, in outpost work, in taking 
cover, in improving shelter, and in nearly all those duties which it is the province 
of the Company Officer to teach, are ... notorious.38 
Many of Wood's criticisms involved poor initiative, while his candour, as AG he was 
responsible for training, suggests the problem's scale. The Akers-Douglas Committee 
later attributed defective officer initiative to poor training. 39 Roberts emphasised to 
Lansdowne that the: 
treatment of our soldiers in the future must be very different from what it has 
been in the past, both as regards life in barracks and training for war. Men must 
be left much more to their own resources, and taught to think for themselves. 
The Colonials are far ahead of our men in all [MI] work. They can take care of 
themselves and do not work as if they were parts of a great machine. 
His reference to 'MI work' suggests the new importance of detached duties. The 
Army's stress on mobile operations increased the significance of increasing initiative. 
Roberts also suggests the importance of administrative measures in improving initiative 
36 BULPS 2065 M ISS4 118 'Further Papers ... Natal Army' M3 27/11/00 pI; Vaughan 'Cavalry Notes-
South Africa' JRUSI XLV (1901),p 454. 
)7'Lessons to be Derived from ... South Africa 'JRUS/XLV (1901),p 822; 'The Infantry Attack 
Supported by Artillery' JRUSJ XLV (1901),p 1324. Both authors were South African veterans. 
)I BalPs 13133 'Wood Memorandum 4/10/00' p 2. Wood had already started remedial action. 
)9 Report of the Alcers-Doug/as Comminee ... (1902), P 30. 
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by encouraging higher-quality recruits to enlist.40 
After the war a wide range of individuals analysed defective initiative. Maj 
Ellison blamed many South African failures on over-control which had consequently 
caused officer inertia, commenting that: 
the importance of the company commander's role in modem war had not ... been 
recognised ... Speaking broadly, the main tactical teaching of the late war has been 
that the individual ..... training of every officer and man .... increases in 
importance in direct ratio with the improvement in weapons ... even in the lowest 
ranks, intelligence, self-reliance, and technical knowledge have been found ... 
indispensab Ie. 41 
Ellison aided Henderson in preparing CT 1902 and had close links with Balck. His 
stress on companies followed Germany's example. Gen Warren warned: 
the ... mechanical duties ... inculcated by ... Frederick were in his day 
necessary ... , yet nowadays they go against success; still we require mechanical 
drill, but it is that which develops individuality ... The soldier can no longer be 
treated as merely part of a machine. 
Warren's analysis of drill may appear confused, but that an officer, who was seen as 
authoritarian, urged more initiative suggests the depth of change.42 Others were equally 
forceful: 
The rigid discipline which discourages individual initiative, requires to be 
replaced by an intelligent system of tactical education, the aim of which is to teach 
men to cultivate ... self-action and self-contro1.43 
The National Review criticised poor scouting and outposts as one of the war's main 
lessons, blaming these defects on the Army's destruction ofinitiative.44 'Regimental 
Officer' recommended that: 
skirmishing and attack practices ... to take the place of the endless barrack-square 
drills. Individual action to be encouraged at all times, and the recruit taught to 
think and act/or himself(sic). Interference ... to be discouraged once a man is 
trained.4s 
40 RPs 7101-23-110-3 F131 2/8/00; Chapter 2. 
41 EPs 8704-35-33 'Some administrative lessons of the war lI'pp7-9. 
42 'On Discipline' NR XXXVIII (1901 ).p 629. He allegedly arrested Churchill at Spion Kop ! 
4JWA Baillie Grohman 'One Cause of Our Defeats: The Service Rifle' FR LXVII (1900),p 688 . 
.. 'The Story of the Boer War' NR XXXV (1900),pp 33-4. 
45'Regimental Officer' 'Lessons of the South African War' USltf XXIII (190 1 ),p 74. 
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Lt Col Wals~ an LI officer, recommended more interesting training and less drill, 
suggesting that delegation to companies would improve training and develop initiative. 
Walsh stressed scouts, sections and 4-man groups, which he felt were a good means of 
training the soldier: 'to think and act for himself, and leaders to take the initiative,' 
while double companies were: 'the most important tactical fighting unit.' The British 
made companies the infantry tactical unit post-South Africa. Walsh urged that: 
[y]oung officers, [NCOs] and scouts should be trained ... to think and act for 
themselves and take the initiative as much and as often as possible.46 
Lt Col Plowden, a Tirah veteran and LI officer, stressed skirmishing as it 
increased initiative. He defined it thus: 
The men follow the lead of their officers, thinking and acting/or (sic) themselves. 
By this is meant that they judge where to find cover, how to make the best use of 
it, when to leave their cover, when to fire ... what to fire at ... Hitherto these ... 
have been performed only by word of command. 47 
This is another link between initiative, fieldcraft and independent fire, reflecting the fact 
that combat was changing towards interconnected skirmishes. Plowden had seen the 
need for tactical change during Tirah and he developed his analysis using South African 
material. If Plowden's comments referred to his own unit, it would suggest that even 
some LI units were backward. He concluded: 
our system stifles all initiative in officers and men, and we train both to 
dependence on immediate superiors, who in their turn depend on others 
... [N]either officers nor men have the pluck to act independently.48 
IDB 1896's injunction on initiative had clearly not been implemented. 
The Cavalry did not escape criticism despite the fact that the Squadron System, 
which should have promoted initiative, had existed since the early 1890s. Col 
Younghusband criticised the arm's destruction of individuality; on extended 
battlefields: 'we cannot promote too highly the individual intelligence of the trooper. ' 
46 'Battalion Training and 8attJe-Training' USM XXIII (1901), pp 628,630-3. 
47 Notes on Skirmishing (Lahore 1900). p 284 . 
.. Ibid pp 286,296. 
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Another cav~ Col Porter, remarked that South Africa: 'was a private soldier's 
war, as under the altered conditions he was compelled to act on his own initiative.' Col 
Graves recommended: 'individual (sic) initiative' and criticised centralising COs for 
suppressing it, while Lt Col Wogan-Browne remarked: 
Our squadron leaders are so accustomed to act by words of command and to wait 
for orders, that it is difficult to make them act ... on their own initiative. It is the 
result of years of strict enforcement of the old regimental system, under which all 
orders emanated from the orderly room, and nothing could be done by the 
squadrons ... [O]perations which gave scope for individual and independent 
action ... were seldom if ever practised. Everything was strict methodical dril1.49 
This shows how generations had been indoctrinated by drill, as well as revealing how 
poor training had been before 1899. These criticisms of defective initiative suggest 
recognition of changing cavalry tactical priorities towards detached duties away from 
shock. 
Four influential officers, Lt Cols Callwell, a future DMO, May, a Camberley OS 
and general, Pilcher, an MI expert and general, and Clarke, a member of the Esher 
Committee, urged inculcating initiative. Callwell considered that extension was 
tactically essential, deducing: 
The more dispersed formation infantry assumes the greater ... the responsibility 
of subordinate leaders ... [I]t is the judicious leadership, to the soldierlike example 
and to the ready resources of captains of companies and their subalterns and 
sergeants that the regiment must look to. 
This suggests commanding by leadership rather than by coercion, but he did not 
mention changing discipline directly. Emphasising companies recognised their new 
tactical importance. Callwell also saw arm-requirements differed: 'the infantryman and 
gunner may look to their officers; the trooper must look to himself.' Others later 
emphasised the need for high-quality cavalrymen, capable of initiative, suggesting the 
ann's growing tactical importance and the lesser tactical role of shock compared to 
49 'The Horsemen of the Future' MR IX (1902),pp 83-4; BA LXVI (1901).p 20; 'Lessons from the South 
African War chiefly from a Cavalry point of view' USM XXN (1901-02),pp 257-8 'What is Required to 
improve the Training of Our Cavalry in Peace Time?' USM XXIV (1901-02),p 265. 
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reconnaissance. 50 
May, writing at Camberley, emphasised that we must: 'do all in our power to 
make men reason and act intelligently on their own responsibility.' Consequently 
training must be made more interesting and more books provided as they: 'cultivate 
intelligence and I believe intelligence second only to courage as a military quality. ,51 
This is another contemporary recognition of education's new importance and its links to 
initiative. May confirms Wavell' s analysis. Pilcher saw: 
the necessity of developing the intelligence of the individual .... under a hot fire 
neither battalion commanders, captains, nor section leaders will in future be able 
to exercise any great amount of control, and the man's own resources in 
intelligence and courage will generally have to guide his actions. 52 
Pilcher apparently saw intelligence as synonymous for initiative. Col Clarke 
urged: 
"Laputan methods" which waste the time and dull the intelligence of the soldier 
must be abandoned. If we have "stupid officers" and "infinitely stupider private 
soldiers" ... they are the results of a system which tends to destroy the initiative 
and individuality that all sound methods of education must seek to promote. In 
place of prescribing formulae, which according to the egregious orders not long 
ago published at the Curragh, "are to be known by heart by all ranks who have 
passed their drills," it is essential to cultivate the individual intelligence by every 
possible means. The days when mechanical obedience to accustomed words of 
command sufficed for the needs of an army have ended for ever. 
Clarke stressed the importance of training at all levels as well as the need for systematic 
changes to increase initiative. Hitherto colonial campaigning had been a quicker means 
of promotion than professional study. Clarke felt that these campaigns were 
unrepresentative of major warfare and had damaged performance in South Africa. 53 
Influential civilians analysed initiative. Amery emphasised delegation, initiative, 
education and training, and, as NCOs were more important tactically than ever, he urged 
so The Tactics of To-day (1900),pp 57-8; 59; 103; Chapter 5. Callwell suggests the change in cavalry 
tactics, as before 1899 shock action meant that troopers were under tight control. 
51 A Retrospect on the South African War (1901),pp 41,55. 
5.1 Some Lessons From the Boer War (1903),p 44. 
Sl'Training of the Army' The Times 2812101 p 8. 
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training them better.54 He argued that: 'the ordinary officer loses rather than gains in 
intelligence and initiative' while serving. Responsibility, particularly for training, was 
the remedy. Amery highlighted the need for intelligence, moral qualities and education 
as modern warfare demanded more of individuals. 55 Gwynne, the chief Reuters 
correspondent in South Africa, writing rather later also stressed initiative and more 
extended formations. Consequently NCOs would have greater tactical importance. He 
summarised his influential respondents' views as: 
[mluch has been gained in present Infantry training from the war, chiefly in the 
encouragement of individual action ... By making the soldier feel that he is a real 
and necessary part .... and by explaining the aim and object of his functions, his 
intelligence is being improved as well as, to a certain extent, his self-reliance. 56 
Several commentators stressed the need to improve the quality of recruits to 
enhance initiative. Amongst them was Capt Cairnes, later Secretary of the Akers-
Douglas Committee, while an anonymous article in Blackwood's was explicit: 
Every advance in military tactics has been dictated by the improvement in the 
weapon available ... [I]t has remained for the Boer in the late war to effect a ... 
further tactical change by putting an independent, intelligent man behind the 
rifle ... So we must conform ... and put intelligence behind our rifles ... [T]he 
intelligence which we seek must not be blind or unreasoning: it must be that of the 
individual whom training has pointed out as fit to be intrusted (sic) with 
independent action when he finds himself away from a guiding voice. 57 
The article urged that better-quality soldiers should be recruited; it then sketched one 
unit's attempts to improve soldiers' conditions. Another article stressed improving pay 
and conditions to attract better men, with special incentives for good SNCOs. It 
recommended the: 
abolition of irritating small stoppages ... privacy in barracks, freedom of civil 
domicile to re-engaged soldiers ... and a more enlightened system of training, 
entailing the cessation of much needless drudgery. 
54 The Problem of the Army (1903),pp 192-195. 
ss Ibid p199; Appendices E&F, pp 188-9; ppI86,188. 
S6 The Army on Itself(I904),p131. Original underlined. 
S7 Chapter 2; Capt Cairnes 'Canteens' NR XXXVIII (1901), P 437; Col Vincent 'Lessons from the War' 
USM XXIV (1901-2), pp 37-9; 'The Elevation of Thomas Atkins' B WM CLXXII (1902), P 491. 
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Roberts had already made these points after Tirah.58 The quotation also suggests how an 
enlightened unit could improve discipline without leaving much trace. 
The RCWSA and Initiative 
As the above section shows there had been much emphasis on inculcating 
initiative during and after the war. The RCWSA attached similar importance to 
initiative. Paralleling similar conclusions made after Tirah, it noted that: 
long-range arms and smokeless powder involve an immense extension of the lines 
of battle, diminish the power of control by [COs] and increase the degree of 
individual intelligence required in each individual private. 
This implies the need for delegation and by 'intelligence' they clearly meant initiative. 
Many witnesses, Roberts, Kitchener, French, Haig, Colvile, Crabbe, Ian and Bruce 
Hamilton, Hilyard, Hunter, Gatacre, Methuen, Paget, Plumer, Baden-Powell, Kelly-
Kenny, and Wolseley stressed instilling initiative in subordinates. Buller wrote on 
initiative for the RCWSA. He saw financial responsibility as important for developing 
it. That these witnesses ranged from the older to the coming generation suggests the 
importance of improving initiative. 59 Colvile, a Guardsman, criticised prewar priorities: 
While a strong advocate of smartness and unbending discipline, I am inclined to 
think that the former quality has been given undue weight in the selection of 
[NCOs]. In battle a great weight of responsibility often falls on these men ... it is 
of the utmost importance that they should be quick, intelligent, resourceful, and 
have an eye for country. 60 
Later the Leinsters reinforced Colvile's conclusions on NCOs; they considered that: 'the 
South African War showed that the peace training of our [NCOs] was hopelessly 
inadequate;' hitherto they had been selected for drill, not tactical leadership. Colvile's 
link between intelligence and an eye for terrain is significant as is the indication that 
NCOs' tactical responsibilities were increasing. Ian Hamilton also linked terrain, 
51 'Army Refonn' QR 193 (1901).pp 196-7; Chapter 2. 
59 Col Melville The Life 0/ General Sir Redvers Buller I (1923 ).PP 264-5 citing a contemporary document 
which has not survived. It is possible that it was the document mentioned at fn 77 below. 
60 RCWSA Evidence II p 286. 
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training, initiative and the new importance ofNCOs: 
peace training at Aldershot proved ... quite unsuited to '" South African warfare. 
This ... was calculated to stunt rather than develop the initiative of company 
officers, section leaders and men. In the attack ... company commanders had little 
leisure to study the ground ... They were ... absorbed in waiting for orders from 
some senior officer in the rear ... [NCOs] were ... ciphers.61 
Several witnesses criticised privates' poor education and intelligence, implying that 
these had damaged initiative. Roberts remarked that the private's: 
individuality had been so little cultivated that his natural acuteness was checked, 
and his want of resourcefulness, especially at the beginning of the campaign was 
marked. 62 
He diagnosed the remedy: 
Resource and cunning in the field should be encouraged, especially at 
manoeuvres. Barrack-square drill and deadening routine should be reduced .. , and 
competition introduced ... .into ... riding, shooting, skill at arms, detached duties as 
increased intelligence is essential to work in the field. 
Kitchener commented that privates were: 
too dependent on ... officers and lacked individuality ... Before the war in all 
combatant branches of the Service, mechanical perfection had been cultivated at 
the expense of individual resourcefulness. 63 
Here Kitchener confirms how predominant drill had been before 1899.64 Haig felt that 
the: 'main lesson ... is that modem conditions ... entail [the] higher training of the 
individual.' Many older officers failed in South Africa because they lacked initiative; 
Kipling's verse, cited above, had a general as its subject. Kitchener urged that officers: 
'should be induced to exercise their brains and strike out ideas for themselves, even at 
the risk of making mistakes,' while deprecating: 'dull routine which ... moulds 
[officers] into machines of very limited capacity.' Readiness to accept mistakes 
represents a switch towards more realistic training. Chapter 9 develops this point. 
French also felt that senior officers lacked initiative, while Roberts stellenbosched many 
61RCWSA Evidence II p 112; 'rr' 'NCOs of the Regular Army' JLR I (191O).p 317. 
61 Hilyard, Hunter. B Hamilton, Methuen, CE Knox and Kelly-Kenny; RCWSA Report pp 42-47. 
6J RCWSA Evidence II , P 424; RCWSA Report pp 46-7. 
64 Chapter 4 shows that even the RA had been over-drilled. 
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senior officers for this fault, blaming COs for inert subaltems.65 Colvile, stellenbosched 
himself, diagnosed: 
The greatest fault of our officers ... lies in their want of initiative, ... I believe this 
to be entirely the fault of their superiors ... [A] young man fresh from a public 
school .. .is full of ideas; yet, if ... he venture to take any line of his own, .. .it is a 
certainty that ... every senior officer within range will be thundering at him, and 
after a few such attempts he gives it up and in time he becomes one of the 
thunderers .. .It is far better that a young officer should make a few mistakes ... 
than .... he should become a ... puppet. 66 
Colvile suggests how the Anny's culture curbed initiative and the importance of 
changing initial training to tackle this. Colvile's frankness suggests how concerned 
senior officers were. Colonel Crabbe, another veteran, remarked that: 
The responsibility of young officers and section leaders will ... be increased by ... 
greater extension .... due to ... modem small arms and smokeless powder; the 
more responsibility which can be devolved from the captain, first to the 
subalterns .... then on to the [NCOs]. .. the greater will be the intelligence and 
freedom ... [of] the company. 
Crabbe recognised that companies required more initiative; this was a key feature of the 
German system. French insisted on allowing officers initiative and the chance to learn 
from their mistakes, while Baden-Powell, the new IGC, urged: 
Junior officers should be given responsibility from their first entry ... With officers 
accustomed to work on their own responsibility, and with men using their own 
intelligence working under them, senior officers will be able ... to give their 
subordinates a free hand ... unhampered by the usual (and so often fatal) tugs on 
the check strings. 
Dr Badsey has criticised Roberts' selection of Baden-Powell as IGC, but the latter's 
attitude towards initiative and training suggests another motive, the need for an IGC, 
sympathetic towards initiative, to inculcate it in an arm whose newly important 
detached duties demanded initiative. The Cavalry had not distinguished itself on them in 
South Africa.67 
65 RCWSA Evidence II, Q 19299; RCWSA Report pp 52,54. 
66 Chapter 2; RCWSA Evidence II Q 17305; RPs 7101-23-188 Col ChamberlainfLansdowne 28/8/00; 
BalPs 13/33 Roberts' 'Memorandum on a proposal ... ' p 4; RPs 7101-23-124-2 F478 'Minute Akers-
Douglas Co;' Correspondence relative to the recall of Major-General Sir HE Col\'ile (1901).p 3; RCWSA 
Evidence II pp 287,308. Qs 17297-30; Ibid Q 20805. 
67 RCWSA Evidence 11 p 419; Glossary; Ibid Qs 17297-30; Ibid p 424; Chapter 5; Badsey Fire p195. 
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Hamilton '8 RCWSA Paper 
Hamilton analysed tactics and discipline on extended battlefields in an annexe to 
the RCWSA's evidence. This is one of the longest contemporary analyses of initiative 
and is significant in view of Hamilton's later career. Hamilton described, in words 
unsurpassed by Maxse, how: 
[a] brook, ... or imperceptible fold ... shelter a further advance. Half a dozen 
private soldiers may find themselves at this spot. If they possess sufficient 
training ... together with new discipline, initiative and enthusiasm to take advantage 
of it, they will creep on ... [I]f, as a result, the enemy's line is penetrated, even by 
a few men, the power of ... modem armament will make their flanking fire so '" 
effective that the position will either be abandoned ... or ... an assault may become 
practicable.68 
Plowden had described similar tactics in Tirah, there are parallels with Boer tactics 
and an anticipation of 1918-style infiltration. Again ini tiati ve and fieldcraft are linked. 
Hamilton highlighted modem weapons' effectiveness. He recognised that discipline 
would have to change to complement new tactics and new weapons: 
Let each little group understand the common objective. Then leave them to the 
promptings of their own consciences of what was right rather than to the dread of 
doing wrong. 
This suggests switching from external to internal discipline. His point on objective 
reinforces the importance of all understanding aims in modem combat. By linking 
objective to small groups, who would not necessarily be officer-led, Hamilton indicates 
that combat would be less coherent. His comments on discipline and initiative, 
foreshadowed in Chapter 2, suggest that attitudes to these were changing. He later 
remarked: 
Of all the rich windfalls garnered by Greater Britain from ... South Africa ... one 
of the best was her new Discipline (sic). Lessons learnt ... during ... Tirah ... had 
prepared our minds for the change and the fresh experiences ofkopje and veldt 
soon convinced our officers that, in open country and during daylight, the ancient 
mechanical discipline ... could not be applied to the new tactics. Armament, 
necessitating ... wide extensions, isolated the individual. Neither by voice nor 
61 Lt Oen Muse The Soft Spot (1919), but this had been written during the First World War. It is one of 
the more important British works on infantry tactics; RCWSA Evidence n, p 108. 
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revolver could the captain [in 1900] dominate a firing line extended at [5-10] 
paces interval through the uproar ... of a battle. 69 
This of course is not primary evidence, but, supported by primary material, written by 
an individual intimately involved in the process, it suggests how important the change 
was. 
Conclusion 
Many more stressed the need for low-level initiative than after Tirah. That 
commentators ranged from generals to civilians suggests the strength of South Africa's 
lessons. Their views were a decisive rejection of close-order tactics. The emphasis on 
initiative from 1900 suggests that the reforms in the 1890s had been inadequate. 
Increased firepower was the impelling force; it had clearly been underestimated before 
1899. Contemporaries saw that links existed between initiative, tactics, education, 
training and discipline and that these factors needed to alter to improve initiative. The 
next sections examine the changes. 
Inculcating Initiative from 1900 
Inculcating initiative started during the war, while training was transformed with 
more extended-order work and greater emphasis on sub-units.7o The Army overhauled 
its tactical manuals, stressing skirmishing and reconnaissance. Administrative 
simplification reduced centralisation, promoted initiative and freed time for training. 
Remedial action began in Britain in early 1900, Wood, the AG, instructed the 
Royal Reserve and Militia that company commanders were to be given more initiative 
and that COs were to inculcate their officers with responsibility.71 Wood's stress on 
company commanders suggests German influence. It may be argued that orders to the 
Reserve are unimportant, but with most regular units deployed, they are significant. 
69 The Battalion on the Frontier (Lahore 1899),pp 16-17; The Soul and Body of an Army (1921), p 101. 
70 Chapter 3. 
71 USG (2114/00),pp 312-3. see fn 38 above. 
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Wood's timing, well before Roberts' Pretoria committees, suggests how urgent 
introducing initiative was. Wood, inspecting Sandhurst in 1900, insisted that the cadets 
execute an outpost scheme instead of parading. The Deputy Commandant threatened to 
resign at this dangerous innovation. That the exercise involved detached duties requiring 
initiative was probably deliberate. Furthennore Wood had noted the poor perfonnance 
of outposts in South Africa. That Wood acted so early suggests that Tirah may possibly 
have influenced him.72 Wood also stressed LI work, criticising its absence from the 
RMC syllabus. Sandburst company commanders became more involved in training their 
cadets about this time.73 The new Hythe Commandant began revising musketry training 
with: 'more emphasis on the individual which high authorities see as imperative:' 
From the commencement of[1901] a good deal of weight has been given to 
skinnishing and to the use of the rifle in action generally .... The standard reached 
in this training is, however, always disappointing ... [T]here is an absence of a 
~e?~e ?f individua~ re~onsibility; combination, mutual support and intelligent 
InItIatIve are wantIng. 
The timing suggests that Wood had initiated this change as Roberts left South Africa in 
mid-December 1900. In early 1901 Roberts recommended to Wood that more initiative 
be introduced into individual training. Wood claimed to have already started this from 
October 1900 before Roberts returned.7s By March 1901 Wood had ordered that 
company and squadron commanders were to be responsible for training their men. He 
saw this as the means of regenerating the Army.76 It was a key feature of the Gennan 
Army. 
Also in late 1900 or early 1901, Buller issued Observations on points on which 
n See fn 38 above; Chapter 2. One notes Henderson's comments on Tirah's effect. 
73 Akers-Douglas Report p 2; Lt Gen Markham, Ibid Q 7461. Markham was regarded as ineffective so an 
external influence, an irate AG possibly, probably caused the latter change; Chapter 9. 
74 usa (16/2/0t),p 124; Chapter 4; Commandant Hythe Musketry Report 1901( 1902),p 5. The 
Commandant's timing is imprecise, but as Roberts did not leave South Africa until December 1900, it is 
~ssible that Wood inspired Hythe's instructions. 
S Midshipman p 259. This was written reasonably soon after the event described and. though the whole 
book is secondary evidence, this part may be argued to be primary. It is just possible that Roberts' 
recommendation was made at the end of December 1900. 
76 Col Maude • Army Reform' M R II (190 1 ), P 41. 
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South African Experience seemed to show how our system of training might be 
improved. Its precise form is unclear, but it was circulated with a reprint of Buller's 
1899 Training Memorandum. The latter, as Chapter 2 shows, had been influenced by 
Tirah. Observations may be linked with Wood's efforts in 1900 to enhance initiative. It 
emphasised: 
our Army lacks initiative and independence of action by subordinate 
commanders and independent and intelligent action [by soldiers]. .. In field 
practices drill ceases, and [Cas] must ... allow more independence ... and educate 
all ranks to act more on their own initiative. It is better for a man during field 
training to do wrong than to do nothing. 77 
Later Buller criticised over-drilling, adding: '[i]t behoved officers to do their utmost to 
train the individual intelligence of all ranks.' Separately he commented that close-order 
tactics cramped initiative. Buller stressed NCO initiative and scouting, criticising strict 
adherence to regulations. Though Buller did not command at Aldershot for long 
afterwards and therefore had limited ability to cause change, his views suggest how 
South Africa had changed attitudes to inculcating initiative.78 Before 1899 Buller had 
been seen as a centraliser. Gatacre at Colchester also enhanced opportunities for young 
officers and NCOs to exercise responsibility after returning from Africa. The acting 
CinC India instructed that all ranks were to show initiative, while the 1901-2 Indian 
Musketry Report criticised stereotyped tactics, noting that soldiers were now taught to 
use cover and did so intelligently. The Indian comments may represent Frontier as well 
as South African lessons.79 
Roberts • Memorandum on Musketry Efficiency, issued in 1902, stressed sub-unit 
training, itself fostering initiative, and that: 
[i]nstruction in barracks and .. .in firing exercises [is] designed to train individuals 
n It has not survived but is summarised in BA LXVI (1901),p 155. It is possible that Observations was 
based on Buller's RCW8A paper, see fn 59 above. 
71USG (30/3/01),p 247; BA LXVI (1901),pp 178,192; BULP8 2065M1add 288-64-6669-84 'Remarks at 
the Officer' s Clubhouse 1719/01' 
79 RCWSA Evidence II QsI68448-53; ANG XLII (1901).p 941; UMIU7/2462 'Circular Memorandum 
Musketry 1901-2' pp 5-6; Chapter 2. 
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to use their own intelligence and judgement.. . and ... to practice all ranks in 
selecting and making the best possible use of natural cover. 80 
Roberts also emphasised to Kelly-Kenny, the new AG, that: 
[t]he greatest care should be taken to teach [troopers] to scout in an intelligent 
manner ... The whole system of instruction should be the encouragement of 
individuality.81 
This instruction shows how much cavalry training had altered when it is compared with 
the CDB 1898's emphasis on drill. More or less simultaneously Roberts issued 
instructions on initiative, training and extended frontages. 82 These do not survive, but 
are another example of contemporaries linking the three factors. That the CinC issued 
them suggests their importance. Also in 1902 the new manuals: CTrg 1902, IT 1902 and 
FAT 1902 stressed initiative far more than their predecessors. The whole suggests a 
coherent attempt to foster initiative. 
Based on Wood's and Roberts' instructions, MRs 1903 had far less on volleys. It 
ordered: 'exercises in movement and fire must be set especially with the view of making 
[recruits] think and act for themselves. The new practices were based on independent 
fire and fieldcraft. Both required initiative.83 Hythe was one of the Army's few central 
training schools; many infantry and cavalry officers and NCOs attended and it thus had 
Army-wide influence. 
Some of the evidence cited above is incomplete, but collectively it suggests a 
powerful, coherent attempt to modify training and tactics to increase initiative. There 
does not appear to have been a pre-1899 equivalent, though Tirah had triggered some 
change. 
'Infantry Officer' suggests that some results were already apparent by March 
1901 : 
10 BA LXVIII (1902),p 427. 
II RPs 7101-23-124-2, F 4797/5/02; Chapter 5. 
12 BA LXVIII (1902).p 406. 
I) MRs 1903 p 30. Tables 17&18; Chapters 4 and 6. 
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[t]he new method of training ... is tending towards inculcating habits of self-
reliance and independence ... [T]he private ... is to become ... capable of thinking 
and acting for himself, and not. ... a mere machine. The machine was good enough 
in the days of "Brown Bess" when troops could be manoeuvred in close fonnation 
to within 300 yards of the enemy; but now it is necessary to shake out ... at 1000 
yards, it is obvious that men who may find themselves 10 or 20 yards from a 
comrade, and perhaps 100 lards from a section commander, must ... "play the 
game off their own bats."s 
The article was on shooting, suggesting that contemporaries saw that the link between 
independent fire and initiative was important. The 'new method' may suggest the early 
results ofHythe's changes, though the Commandant, as noted earlier, was less 
convinced on progress. 
Administration and Initiative 
The Army modified its administrative system to free time for training and to 
encourage initiative. The Dawkins Committee reviewed the Army's clerical and 
administrative system to promote decentralisation. It noted that the: 
future training of the troops will be far more arduous and incessant. .. If [this] is to 
be done, officers and men must be given time in which to do it. Freedom from ... 
minute regulations will enable the soldier of every degree to increase his power of 
thought and .. .individual responsibility. 
Its work was based on the principle of: 
Delegation of authority through the whole chain of command ... so that every 
[CO], company, or squadron commander or officer, every [WO] and [NCO] shall 
have his sphere of decision. ' 
It was followed by another committee on simplifying regulations. The Special AO 1902 
announcing the Army Corps organization also gave greater administrative freedom. 
This would have promoted initiative and, by reducing paperwork, would have freed 
time for training. ss 
Service Pay, introduced in 1903, was another administrative method of improving 
initiative. It aimed explicitly at: 'increasing efficiency' by more pay for better 
14 Chapter 2; . Anny Shooting. and Its Improvement' B WM CLXIX (1901 ),p 320. Finkelstein attributes 
this to Lt Col Mockler-Ferryman, an LI officer. 
uRCWSA Appendices (1904), Appendix 43; WO 33/2888 pI; Special AO 4/3/02 pp 14-5. 
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performance; qualification being based on: 'a fairly high standard of individual 
discipline ... physical and military efficiency.' The cavalry standard was: 
a good scout with ... knowledge of simple map reading, ... power of observation 
and reporting, a good horseman, groom, horse-master and man at arms. He should 
have an adequate knowledge of troop and squadron drill. 
Mapreading was an essential soldier skill in dispersed combat and education was vital 
for it. Rimington's brigade had issued all troopers with maps and Rimington linked 
mapreading, reconnaissance training and developing initiative. The Cavalry were 
encouraging mapreading throughout the ann.86 For infantrymen the standard for the 
award of Service Pay was: 'a good skinnisher and should combine skill at arms with ... 
physical development.' Arm-criteria stressed individuals' abilities in decentralised 
combat. For cavalry collective skills were subsidiary to decentralised ones. Service Pay 
could increase a private's income by over 50%, a considerable incentive. The repeated 
mention of 'efficiency' suggests the influence of the National Efficiency Movement, 
established because of South Africa. 87 
That administrative measures reinforced tactical changes shows that the reforms 
were important, while such a combination was more likely to be effective in increasing 
initiative than just changing tactics. 
Training and the Tactical Manuals 
AO 189 of September 1901, amending KRs, stated that: 'efficient instruction and 
training of all ranks is ... of paramount importance.' For officers it stressed: 'the 
development of resourcefulness, prompt decision, and ... readiness to accept 
responsibility;' for soldiers: 'the development of individual intelligence and self-
reliance.' It continued: 
The officer ought to be in all respects the instructor and leader of his men .... He 
16 WO 123/45 AO 193;WO 279/9 P 33; WO 27/491 IGF 'Report 1905' p 8. 
17 Text Book of Military Administration and Law (nd), pp 14-15; GR Searle The Quest for National 
Efficiency (1971). Several soldiers, mainly sappers, were founder-members. It partly inspired the 
Dawkins Committee. 
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must show himself superior to the soldier in knowledge, experience and strength 
of character, and he must be competent to carry out his duty in any situation 
whatsoever without shirking from resrs>nsibility, or, when thrown on his own 
resources, without waiting for orders. 8 
This new emphasis on training has a Germanic ring; no longer would status be sufficient 
for command. Now professional ability and example, components of leadership, were to 
be the dominant criteria for officers. Here there are parallels with the LI pioneers. 
Wood stressed that Sandburst cadets were to be taught how to instruct their 
soldiers. This had not been the case previously; clearly training had increased in 
priority. NCOs were to be specially trained as: 'competent instructors and leaders of the 
smaller units in both peace and war.' This was a new emphasis on NCOs, their training, 
and their duty as instructors. Sub-unit commanders were made: 
responsible to their [COs] for ... efficiency ... [in] military training of the men 
under their orders ... This devolution of authority ... depends on a reasonable 
latitude being allowed to squadron and company leaders ... Commanding and 
General Officers should not interfere ... [S]quadron and company commanders 
will be judged by the readiness for war of their ... commands. 
This suggests that the Cavalry had not fully implemented the Squadron System. 
Decentralised training developed initiative. It reflected South Africa's lesson that the 
infantry tactical unit were companies. This was a major change for Infantry. Both the 
German and the LI pioneers had emphasised sub-unit commanders' responsibility for 
training.89 
The training manuals issued from 1902 accentuated initiative. Significantly they 
were not entitled 'Drillbook,' suggesting less rigidity. IT 1902, based on Henderson's 
work with input from Ellison, differed markedly from IDB 1896. Its preface emphasised 
in words reminiscent of Clausewitz: 
Modem fighting makes heavy demands on each individual. .. the subordinate 
leader must be so accustomed to responsibility as to be capable ... of using his 
own judgement to further the general plan; the soldier of acting with intelligence 
II WO 123/43 AO 189 pp 4-5; Eds B Condell, DT Zabecki On the Gemzan Art o/War Truppenfuhrung 
~Boulder 200 1), P 5 cites a very similar German regulation. 
Akers-Douglas Report pp 2,4; D Gates The British [LJ] (1987).p 101; Chapter 9; WO 123/43, P 5. 
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~d resolution when thrown on his own resources ... The backbone of ... training 
IS the careful ... instruction of the individual, officer or soldier ... and the 
development to the utmost of his mental and physical powers. But such 
development is impossible unless free play is given to individual intelligence and 
initiative. It is therefore forbidden to limit ... the freedom granted in these 
regulations to battalion and company commanders both as regards methods of 
instruction and the leading of their men in action. Nor are the men to be allowed 
to degenerate into mere machines.9O 
The emphasis on judgement links back towards Henderson's comments cited in Chapter 
2 and anticipates the idea of doctrine. Its long, new section on skirmishing stressed: 
Skirmishing implies extended order, in which each individual acts and thinks for 
himself, and makes use of all his powers, physical and mental, to attain a common 
object. It is absolutely essential. .. that ... the intelligence of each recruit should be 
developed by every possible means, and that a spirit of independent action ... 
should be sedulously encouraged ... Skirmishing is the all important formation in 
warfare against a well-armed enemy.91 
Skirmishing is a tactic and not a formation but this section, probably drafted by 
Henderson, using LI material supplied by Verner, shows both a direct LI influence and 
dispersed tactics' new importance. It was far less mechanical than IDB 1896's section 
on open-order drill. Furthermore IT 1902 emphasised recruit training far more than IDB 
1896; this would reduce the risks of poor basic training damaging Army-wide 
standards.92 IT 1902 also warned: 
Constant practice in a stereotyped formation invariably leads to want of elasticity, 
accustoms all ranks to work by rule rather than by exercise of their wits, and 
cramps both initiative and intelligence. In peace ... the inherent and paralysing 
effects of a normal system ... easily escape notice; in war they betray themselves 
... in failure. It is therefore strictly forbidden either to formulate or to practice a 
normal form of attack or defence.93 
This strong condemnation, tougher than IDB 1896' s, suggests that normal formations 
were still common. It continued: 
[s ]ince the conditions of modem warfare render the decentralisation of command 
in action an absolute necessity, no good results are to be expected unless ... 
subordinate leaders have been trained to use their wits ... and have been called 
upon to consider the necessity of departing from their original orders. 
90 IT 1902 Preface. Both Henderson and Ellison were aware of German developments. 
91 Ibid ppI34-5; Chapter 2. 
92 'Review Infantry Training (Provisional) 1902' RBC(I902), pp 159-60, 162-3. 
9) IT 1902 pp 190-1. 
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This was more emphatic than IDB 1896's qualified endorsement of initiative. IT 1902 
saw that decentralised training was needed to instil initiative and was enlightened about 
mistakes in training. 94 
that: 
CTrg 1902, the British Anny's first modem all-arms tactical manual, stressed 
[s]uccess ... cannot be expected unless all ranks have been trained to use their 
wits ... Generals and [COs] are ... not only to encourage their subordinates in so 
doing by affording them constant opportunities of acting on their own 
responsibility, but they will also check all practices which interfere with the free 
exercise of the judgement, and will break down, by every means in their power, 
the paralysing habit of unreasoning and mechanical adherence to the letter of 
orders ... when acting on service conditions.95 
It continued: 
[d]ecentralisation of command, and a full recognition of the responsibilities of 
subordinates in action are ... absolutely necessary and leaders must train their 
subordinates not only to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief 
and very general instructions, but also to take upon themselves ... the 
responsibility of departing from, or varying, the orders they may have received.96 
CTrg 1902's mention of 'general instructions' suggests the need for doctrine which 
would enable subordinates to interpret them. It concluded emphatically: 
[i]f a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of 
his orders, when such departure is clearly justified by circumstances and failure 
ensues, he will be held responsible.97 
This was a radical departure; now failure to display initiative was punishable. 
Later CT 1904 emphasised initiative. Roberts impressed on cavalry officers the 
need to: 'stimulate the keenness and increase the individual intelligence of their men,' 
noting that: 
[w]ith our imprOVed class of men and their better general education, the old 
methods of instruction no longer altogether meet the case. A higher aim must be 
given the soldier than merely satisfying the requirements of the drill instructor. He 
CH Ibid pp 191,193. Also stressed by Brig Gen Wilson 'Initiative and the Power of Manoeuvre' (AMS 
1910) ,pp 10-11. Clausewitz also had emphasised this. 
9S CTrg /902 Preface. 
"Ibid p 59. 
97 Ibid p 60; Chapter 9. 
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should be encouraged that in perfecting himself as a fighting m~ he is preparing 
himself for ... furthering the aims of his country ... So that the development of 
individuality ... instead of loosening the bonds of discipline, will ... supply a tie 
more elevated and more binding ... in the spirit of patriotism, and self sacrifice. 
This latter represented Hamilton's new discipline. Significantly Roberts saw that 
society-wide factors had changed and therefore the Army had to alter. Tactically CT 
1904 emphasised detached duties, scouting and skirmishing, all demanded initiative. It 
differed strongly from CDB 1898's stress on drill and shock which inhibited initiative. 
Later the IGF noted that the new training of cavalry NCOs should fit them better for 
detached command.98 
Roberts stressed the importance of skirmishing, commenting that: '[t]he whole 
[LI] system was one of developing, not repressing intelligence ... of enlisting the zeal of 
the private as much of the officer in perfecting the whole.' He continued by urging: 
the necessity for thoroughly developing the system of training .... practised by 
... Moore. Discipline is as important now as it was .... but self reliance is what is 
wanted, not the rigid discipline of the barrack square. Officers, [NCOs] and men 
must be encouraged to think and act for themselves.99 
This Chapter argues that the changes instituted as a result of South Africa constituted a 
similar system, while Roberts saw that discipline and initiative were connected. 
Henderson and General Maurice, who edited Moore's diaries, are the likely sources for 
Roberts' information on LI. 100 
The new manuals strongly advocated greater initiative. There were not just the 
above injunctions but their stress on detached duties, skirmishing and reconnaissance 
for which initiative was essential 
Initiative Training after 1902 
Roberts wrote to GOCs in 1903 on developing initiative, his letter does not 
91 CT 1904 pp ix, 23-6,19,27; Chapters 5&8; WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1905' P 5. 
99 FM Roberts 'The Army-As It Was and As It Is' 19C LVI (1905),p 23; Chapter 2. 
100 ed Maj Oen Maurice The Diary of Sir John Moore (1904). Roberts cited this work in this artie Ie while 
Henderson stressed LI, Chapter 2. 
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survive, but that he wrote suggests initiative's importance. Frenc~ GOC Aldersho~ also 
emphasised company and squadron training, thereby enhancing initiative. 101 Wood 
commanding II Corps reported that: 
The individuality of the men has been developed, and advantage of ground is 
taken by the men. The section leaders have much improved, and many are fairly 
acquainted with their duties. 
Wood had also reduced guards substantially, releasing men for training and no doubt 
improving morale. 102 A chief umpire reported on the 1903 Manoeuvres: 
Taken as a whole there was more initiative in the Infantry than could be seen in 
any manoeuvres before [1899]. The extensions ... were wider, the men were 
disposed to seek cover ... and the advance was more realistic and less like the 
stereotyped line which we were so often accustomed to see. 103 
The above suggests that there was a coherent attempt to develop initiative in 1903. 
Roberts' letter may have inspired it, but French and Wood were independently aware of 
initiative's importance. 
The Army in India also stressed initiative. Gen Burnett intended that the 1903 
Poona Manoeuvres, based on South Africa, would: 
test the initiatory powers of officers and non-commissioned officers ... to force all 
ranks to think for themselves, to learn to read a map ... and above all, not to adhere 
blindly to the traditions of the barrack-square. 104 
As argued earlier, mapreading is a skill indicating decentralised combat and demanding 
education. Kitchener's 1904 memorandum on training blamed many South African 
defeats on poor training. He instructed that: 
It is impossible to lay too much stress upon the necessity for developing 
individual intelligence and initiative to the fullest extent. .. the great object must 
be to render officers and [NCOs] capable from the very first of exercising 
command. lOS 
101 BA LXXIX (1907),pp 149-50, Chapter 2. 
102 Wood Midshipman pp 270-2. Guards are unpopular as kit has to be prepared and off-duty time 
surrendered. Wood wrote fairly soon after these innovations. 
103 WO 2791516 'Report Training II Corps' p 12, 'Reports Combined Manoeuvres 1903' p 56. 
10. Capt Dawson 'Tommy Cornstalk and the Empire' JUSII XXXII (1903),p 83. Original italicised. 
losUMIU17/5/1617 p 224 citing lAO 24611/4104. 
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He stressed cavalry reconnaissance, while his Infantry Training Test included scouting 
and outposts with marks for initiative. Haig, IGC India, also stressed cavalry 
reconnaissance. Kitchener associated responsibility for training with increased 
professionalism and initiative: 
The whole secret of preparing for war is a matter of training and instruction, and 
[COs] ... who profess or show their incapacity as instructors and their inability to 
train and educate those under them for all situations of modem war must be 
deemed unfit for the positions they hold. 106 
This emphasis continued till at least 1910 when the Indian Staff Conference discussed 
'The Development (sic) of initiative by suitable training.' The debates are only 
summarised but it is clear that imaginative training had occurred during the intervening 
period. It would have developed initiative. 107 
More or less simultaneously the Army's 4 senior commanders were all stressing 
initiative in training. That India with its better facilities for training than Britain was 
highlighting initiative suggests that permanent Army-wide change was occurring. 
Col Parsons, Buller's ex-CRA, conducted initiative training in Britain. Parsons 
had issued instructions on training junior ranks' intelligence during the voyage to the 
Cape in 1899, suggesting that he had realised the need for initiative early. He later 
wrote on initiative at the RAI's request. It is significant that the RA, who were 
generally felt to have shown initiative between 1899-1902, considered that such a work 
was necessary. 108 Parsons began provocatively: 
I have long thought that the training of the individual intelligence of officers, 
NCOs and men has either ... not been attempted at all, or has not been carried out 
on common sense lines ... [South Africa] has shown that ... too many weak points 
have been left .... Some people argue that the training of a soldier must. .. stifle 
initiative, ... and resource ... because a soldier must be trained to rigid discipline. 
Nothing could be more unsound and fallacious ... A well trained soldier ... 
understands the necessity for ... discipline. He therefore conforms to it 
106 Ibid P 213; HPs 3155- 40 Box 'Season 1903-1904 Inspection Notes.' Haig's encouragement of 
reconnaissance and initiative probably had substantial results. Chapter 9. 
107 UMIUI7/5/1811 pp 5-6. 
101 Maj Geddes • Officers ' Despatch Riding Competition at Salisbury Plain' PRAI XIX (1902-3); PP Diary 
Natal. 
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intelligently. His training should teach him to act for himself. 109 
Parsons saw that 'internal' discipline was now needed to complement initiative. His 
pamphlet was widely disseminated under Wood and Roberts' patronage. Parsons also 
emphasised initiative during artillery training and later when he was IGRA India. FAT 
1902 also emphasised the need for initiative. I 10 
Unit training altered due to South Africa and possibly because of Tirah. The 
DLI's 1901 company field training in India now included scouting, skirmishing and 
several2-sided exercises. They concluded: '[t]he course has greatly benefited the men 
who have learned to act on their own individuality in taking cover and crossing open 
spaces;' suggesting even in this LI unit that soldiers had not been taught fieldcraft. III 
NCO Training 
Amery considered that NCOs pre-1899 were: 'frequently selected more for their 
capacities as clerks or as a reward for good behaviour than for their military qualities. ' 
That the JNCO promotion syllabus was biased towards drill and administration 
corroborates his accusation. I 12 The Leicesters criticised ignorant old-style NCOs and 
emphasised developing NCOs' mental and instructional abilities. I 13 As Colvile had 
pointed out, NCOs' tactical responsibilities had increased. Wood began a L/Cpls school 
in 1904. Its syllabus included mapreading, scouting and education. QRs 1899 's NCOs 
promotion-syllabus did not include the first two skills which involved decentralised 
tactics. I 14 Education potentially increased initiative and was vital for mapreading. 
Wood's school was a victim of economies, but his attempt suggests South Africa's 
109 'Hints on training the Intelligence and Powers of Observation of Officers, [NCOs] and Men' PRAI 
XXVIII (1901-2), pp 503-4. 
110 ARSG 1901 (1902), pp13,17; UMIU7/10839 'IAR 1902-03' P 1; Chapter 4. 
III The Bugle XII (Jun 1901),p 6. 
III LS Amery THWSA II (1902), p35; HWPs 3/111-2SA Ser 705/12/99 for one example; QRs 1899 pp 
415-420. 
IIl'Gael' 'The Mental Evolution ofa Soldier- A Sketch' TOTI (Oct 1905),pp 2-4. 
114 Capt Arthur 'The Soldier as Student' FR LXXXII ( 1907), p624; WO 163/9 pp 112-3; Conn aught 
praised Wood's school, WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1904' pp 22-3. 
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influence. One division held brigade NCOs classes and the Leinsters' NCO training 
included skirmishing, outposts, mapreading and signalling, all skills involving 
decentralised combat. I IS The KOYLIs emphasised NCOs' man-management skills and 
aptitude for command as: 'section and squad commanders' duties have become more 
responsible both in barracks and the field.' They highlighted NCOs' instructional duties 
while they were to hold the training manuals. They encouraged each NCO: 'by careful 
reading he must qualify himself to lead his section in the attack.' All were to achieve a 
2nd class education certificate. Emphasis on reading and education suggests that theory's 
importance was growing even for NCOS.II 6 General Douglas, a future CIGS, initiated a 
competition to test NCOs' initiative and their use of cover and ground. The latter two 
skills, as Chapter 6 argues, also involved initiative. I 17 
Scout Training 
Scout training was both tactically necessary and developed initiative. Baden-
Powell wrote the most influential work on reconnaissance, reinforced by his successful 
defence of Mafeking. Though his work was based on Matabeleland and India, it 
effectively was part of South African's lessons, being proof-read at Mafeking. It 
emphasised: 'the ability to act "on your own hook" ... without wanting an officer or 
[NCO] at your elbow to tell you exactly what to dO.,IIS In tone it was designed for 
soldiers. It was issued to companies in one unit and was followed by many books on 
scouting. I 19 Haig saw scout-training as important. He outlined scout training methods to 
the RCWSA. Several commentators advocated stalking training as: 
[w]e are constantly being told that what is needed in the soldier of to-day is 
intelligent individuality, self-reliance and initiative. 120 
lI'wO 163/12 'Annual Report IGF 1906' p73. WO 279/18 p9; [SOs] of the lSI Battalion ... Leinsler 
Regiment ... (Aldershot 1908), p45. This was not in the 1900 version. Lt later FM Dill trained them. 
116 Standing Orders of the 1"" Battalion [KOYL!] (Aldershot 1906),pp 47-8,50,65. 
117 BA LXXII (1904),p 524. 
III Aids to Scoutingfor NCOs and Men (Aldershot 1899),p 19. 
119 The Bugle (DLI) XII (l900).pp 3489-90; BA LXXV (1905), p 249; Eg Col Furse Scouting (1902), 
<;apt Carey Notes on Infantry Scouting (Allahabad 1902). 
110 'Shikari' 'Shikar' The Antelope III (1904),p 149. 
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Later Col Carter lectured officially on 'The Training and Use of Scouts.' This was later 
published as a manual Carter emphasised practical training, self-reliance and education, 
cited Moore and Craufurd, and criticised the British post-I8IS 'heavy' infantry 
emphasis. That Carter was a non-LI officer suggests that LI ideas were influencing even 
'heavy' infantry. 121 
The Cavalry emphasised initiative much more due to the greater importance of 
reconnaissance after 1902. CT 1904 stated: 
On detached duties, the success of mounted troops will depend chiefly on the 
initiative, skill and resource of the junior ranks. The importance, therefore of 
special individual training for every mounted man can hardly be exaggerated. 
Later it emphasised that: 'during ... training, the greatest pains must be taken to develop 
"initiative" (sic), not only in the officers and leaders, but also in the men.,122 CDB 1898 
had nothing remotely similar. In Ireland Rimington imaginatively trained his brigade in 
reconnaissance, commenting after one such exercise: 
As far as this brigade is concerned, it is one step more in developing in the 
cavalry soldier the qualities of Individuality (sic), self-reliance and ability to 
"carry on" without supervision. 123 
Baden-Powell and Haig both promoted reconnaissance when they were respectively 
IGC in Britain and India. The IGF recommended that all troopers were to be taught to 
scout. 124 The 12th RLs stressed unit scout-training. In infantry battalions some 80 men 
per unit were to be trained as scouts. This scale of training, roughly 8% of a battalion's 
strength, would have improved general tactical standards. 125 This post-l 900 interest in 
scout training, which even influenced RE recruit instruction, was a Boer War lesson. It 
121 RCWSA II pp405-6; The Training and Use of Scouts (1905),p 8. 
IUCT 1904 pp 47,218. 
IllWO 27/503 '3 Cavalry Brigade Report on the Ulster Scheme' p 5. 
124 BA LXXVIII (1907),p 394; WO 279/516,p 15; BalPs 13/33 'Fragmentary IGC document' pp 29-30; 
HPs 3155-40 'Notes on Training of Cavalry November 1903;' WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1907' piS. 
III Sgt Vass 'A Narrow Escape' 12 RU I (1909); Lt Davis Scouting and the Training of Scouts in Peace 
(Dublin 1907), pp 11,23. 
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shows that reconnaissance was far more tactically important after 1902. 126 
Education, Training and Discipline 
Soldier Education and Basic Training 
Earlier a relationship was proposed between education, initiative, discipline and 
dispersed tactics. Between 1903-1912 soldier education certificates doubled, suggesting 
a radical overhaul of the Army's priorities. Contemporaries felt that education enhanced 
initiative. The 1870 Education Act had caused some improvement but the Army's rate 
of increase was far higher than would have been accounted by this alone. Entry-level 
educational and recruit standards were generally low and, as far as can be judged, 
static.127 That RE recruits, who were meant to be skilled tradesmen on recruitment, 
averaged below the 3rd class education certificate level after some training suggests poor 
entry-standards. The samples are not large but their evidence indicates that the Army 
mainly caused the improvement through its in-service education of soldiers. 128 
The first IGF summarised the Army's attitude: '[e]ducation is after all, the bedrock 
of efficiency.' He tasked the Inspector of Infantry to report on the education of soldiers 
and how it affected their fighting value. The introduction of Service Pay has been 
considered above, but qualification for it was partly determined by: 
a fairly high standard of ... educationaL .. efficiency ... bearing in mind that 
individual intelligence is so essential ... in modem warfare. 
This was clearly a South African lesson, and motivated some soldiers. AO 193 did not 
directly refer to initiative, but its mention of intelligence implies it, furthermore its 
military criteria, examined earlier, emphasised initiative. 129 Later an education 
126 Col Ward Standardisation in Education (nd),pp 6-7. He was a member of the Efficiency Movement. 
127 Table 8; HC Barnard A History of English Education from 1760 (1969),pp 168-172 for education' 5 
~st-1870 problems. This suggests that civil improvement were not responsible for the Army's. 
21 WO 123/45, AO 193. Tables 26,27 and 30. But Roberts acknowledged better entry-level education, 
see above. 
129 WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1904' P 22; WO 27/509 'Instructions to Inspectors 30/05/04;' AO 193 P 5; 
WO 163/12 P 62; Pte Richards Old Soldier Sahib (1965),p 208, Schoolmaster Cameron Recollections of 
an Army Schoolmaster 1889-1920 (RAEC Box File 1.3). Both are secondary, but, given the money at 
stake, are persuasive sources. 
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certificate became mandatory for receiving Service Pay. 
A committee examined Anny schools in 1906. Two witnesses, FM Wood and 
Gen RC Hart, felt that both trained soldiers and recruits were too poorly educated for 
efficiency. Hart considered that: 
Education makes ... men more intelligent, which is what we require nowadays 
when men are often isolated from their officers and required to exercise ... 
initiative. 130 
The new tactical conditions emphasised mapreading and signalling, while the new 
weapons, mainly artillery, demanded more intelligence to handle, consequently 
education's importance was increasing. I31 Schoolmaster Wells supplied a further 
reason: 
the developing tactics of warfare placing more and more responsibility for the 
movement of his men on the [NCO] ... [M]apreading therefore became an 
essential requisite for the NCO and this soon extended to the private soldier and 
was included in the Second Class Certificate. 132 
This is secondary evidence, but is supported by other material, while Wells served 
throughout the period. 
Basic training improved; Robertson, the first to rise from private to DMT, 
commented: 
The soldier was no longer treated as ... being without intelligence ... down 
whose throat it was the business of the NCO to force as much parrot-like drill as 
possible. 133 
RSM Plumb felt that the new cavalry school's instruction was much better than the old 
central depot's: 'cut and dried methods' as it gave more scope to the: 'men's intellectual 
powers.' Similarly there is a stark contrast between MRs 1898 and 1903. The latter 
ordered that recruit-instructors were to be specially selected, that they were to display: 
130 WO 163/12 Precis 324,pp 61-2. 
\31 Chapter 4 suggests how the new QFs demanded more skill. 
III RAEC Box File 1.3 Man and Boy p 41. Fns 104& 105 above support him. 
III From Private to Field Marshal (1921 ).p 157. This secondary evidence is supported by primary 
evidence cited below. 
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'forbearance and tact,' that recruits' intelligence was to be develop~ while training 
was to be both progressive and interesting. 134 MRs 1898 did not mention these points. 
The post-1902 manuals recommended improving training far more than the old 
drillbooks. One manual, typical of many, emphasised: 
Discipline, strength of mind and body alone, are not sufficient; quickness, 
initiative and decision must be developed by individual training. 
It continued: 
Recruits and all ranks should be encouraged to take an intelligent interest in 
everything connected with their work. Questions should be simple, and of a nature 
admitting of a short, intelligent but not parrot-like answer. 135 
Instructors were to be carefully selected and specially trained. Recruits were to be 
individually instructed, while emulation and keenness were to be encouraged. An 
officer recommended that: 
In order to develop the intelligence of the recruit, practical instruction should be 
varied by lectures on theoretical subjects .... Recruits should be encouraged to 
question their instructors on any points they do not understand ...... Instructors must 
be patient and tactful, and refrain from discouraging a recruit in any way should 
he prove more backward than his comrades. 136 
The SLI stressed developing intelligence and hence initiative through questioning 
soldiers on what they had been taught. 
It is unclear how far the injunctions, cited above, on improving soldier basic 
training were implemented. But the IGF criticised ASe basic training in 1906 for failing 
to foster: 'intelligence, resourcefulness, and sense of responsibility.' This suggests that 
the hierarchy was determined to continue fostering these qualities. The 1909 ASe 
manuals emphasised developing them. But recruits suggest that basic training remained 
114'The New Cavalry School' TE U (1908), pp 97-8. MRs 1898 p16, MRs 1903 (Provisional), pp 29-30. 
The latter also stresses decentralised command, p 47. 
11S ASC Training I (1909). pp 5-7. CT 1904 stresses the need for systematic training and delegation. 
136 ASC Training IpS; Ibid p 6; Capt Bonham-Carter 'Suggestions to Instructors of Recruits' AR VII 
(1914),pp 123-4. 
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tough, though there is no doubt of the direction which the Army intended to gO.137 
Officer Basic Training 
Wood instituted the Akers-Douglas Committee on officer education and training 
in December 1900 because of defects shown in South Africa. 138 This was before 
Roberts' return. Apart from general concerns with officer education and the lack of 
incentives to study, a point also made by Clarke in his Times article, several COs 
complained bitterly: 
I consider the training of the Infantry Subaltern to be distinctly against his future 
efficiency. When the Captain is present the Subaltern as a rule does practically 
nothing ... [E]very thing is done to stifle self-reliance and responsibility, and from 
the commencement of his career he is trained to look upon himself as a cog in a 
machine and not a leader ... At Diamond Hill ... a young officer ... demanded 
permission to move his company slightly as his men were commencing to 
suffer ... He knew what to do, but feared to take such a small piece of 
responsibility ... I consider eve~ opportunity of delegating authority to young 
officers ... should be availed of. 39 
Such strong criticism suggests both the degree of concern aroused and the likelihood 
that radical change would result. The Committee criticised Sandhurst: '[l]ittle 
encouragement is given to originality of mind,' noting that it over-drilled cadets. It 
recommended more practical training, commenting that cadets did no shooting at 
Sandhurst, though Woolwich did. This was illogical; Sandhurst trained infantry officers 
whose men were rifle-armed. The Committee stressed that cadets should be 'proficient 
in ... scouting ... reconnaissance and the use of ground.' All were South African 
lessons involving initiative. 14o Sandhurst changed considerably and initiative was 
emphasised after 1900. Kitson, the new commandant, had revived the RMC Kingston 
and was probably chosen for this reason, the old commandant having been dismissed 
following an act of collective indiscipline, a symptom of poor leadership and over-rigid 
Il7 [SOs] ... SLI (Devonport 1910), p 86; WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1906' P 18; JF Lucy There's A Devil in 
the Drum (1938),pp 28-39. This was written long afterwards and veterans are not noted for diminishing 
their hardships! 
131 BalPs 13133 'Memorandum 4/10/00' P 5. 
1)9 Aleers-Doug/as pp 2, 50-51. 
140 Ibid pp 24,21. Chapter 6 for ground's significance. 
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discipline. The standard and status ofSandhurst instructors improved after 1902.141 
This change improved infantry and cavalry officer training, the two anns that had 
suffered most from defective initiative in 1899-1902. Significantly Woolwich was less 
criticised, young gunners and sappers had displayed more professionalism and initiative 
in South Africa. 142 
Wolseley more or less simultaneously deplored the low standard of Guards and 
Cavalry officers and wished to recruit more graduates. This was implemented from 
1900, while the Army expressed concern at the public schools' educational standards. 
From 1904 incentives were offered to graduates with good degrees and universities 
were allowed to nominate candidates for commissions, subject to an Army veto. 143 
Some universities established military lecturers and the IGF continued to emphasise 
officer intellectual development. 144 Detailed analysis in a work on tactics 
would be inappropriate but raising intellectual standards had implications for improving 
staffwork and developing doctrine. 
Discipline 
Courts-martials halved between 1904-1912, suggesting that the disciplinary 
system had altered radically. Better education generally improves conduct, but it is 
doubtful whether this improvement was due to education alone. The changes are in 
many respects elusive, representing altered attitudes rather than new legislation as the 
141 Akers-Douglas pp 20, 25-6 criticised instructors, and hinted at the previous commandants' 
unsuitability; RA Preston Canada 's RMC (Toronto 1969),pp 154,161-2; Akers-Douglas p 25 
recommended pscs as instructors, RMCR II (1913), recorded all Sandhurst company commanders as psc; 
in 1899 pscs were exceptional; Maj De Gruyther 'The Royal Military College, Sandhurst' USM XXXI 
(1905 ),pp 145-6. 
142 Akers-Douglas pI 5. 
14) AFPs 50304 'University Commissions,' 'Report on Promotion Exams May 1904 '; Regulations under 
which Commissions ... may be obtained by University Candidates (1904); WO 35156 'GS Folder 
Appendix B;' AFPs 50309 'Summary of Year's Work at the WO 31/1 lOS' P 14. AFPs 50321 'University 
Candidates May-October 1905.' 
144 RPs 7101-23-207 'Selection for Promotion' p 3. USG 4/6/04Jun 1904. p445for Cambridge's lecturer. 
USG 23nl04 p 585 reported that Edinburgh was to appoint a military lecturer and USG 2718/04 p 687 
London had 3; WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1907' pp 8-9. 
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1893 Army Act remained in force until 1906.145 As argued above, initiative and 
dispersed tactics demands 'internal' discipline and this in turn requires leadership and a 
more enlightened attitude to discipline by commanders. A journal commented on the 
old system: 
Whatever were the shortcomings of the British soldier in South Africa, they 
were the results of his faulty and misdirected training in peace-time; of the 
mechanical discipline handed down to us from Crimean days. 146 
This suggests the continuance of imposed discipline till 1899, the link between it, 
training and tactics and its ability to damage initiative. 
Dickson's cavalry committee in South Africa were the earliest to consider 
discipline. They recommended that government posts be reserved for veterans, post-
service employment was seen as attracting more intelligent recruits who were more 
likely to behave well and show initiative. They also advocated better barrack 
accommodation with more privacy. They suggested the modification of: 
The present irksome regulations as regards all-night and other passes .. Plain 
clothes to be worn by all NCOs when off duty out of barracks and by all men on 
furlough. All unnecessary riding school and foot drill to be abolished. Burnishing 
of steel work to be absolutely forbidden ... Barrack yard fatigues to be reduced to 
a minimum. 147 
They recommended that COs should be able to discharge indifferent characters and 
allowing recruits choose their regiment. All these measures would have indirectly 
improved discipline and made the Army a more attractive career, thus indirectly 
promoting initiative. Reducing fatigues meant that more time and men were available 
for training. Wood, when GOC II Corps, cut duties and guards ruthlessly. 148 
Lt Col May, a Camberley DS, concluded: 'old-fashioned discipline has in modem 
warfare been largely superseded by intelligence. ' He blamed over-supervision for 
14;-able 7; RH Ahrenfeldt Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War (1958),pp 77-81; 
ANG XXXVII (2218/96).p 707. 
146 USG 30/5/07. 
147 WO 3216781 'Cavalry Report' P 2. 
141 See fn 102 above. 
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damaging initiative and recommended appealing to soldiers' sense of honour rather 
than disciplining them by fear. At Camberley May was well-placed to influence the 
future elite. 149 Maj Caunter argued: 
we cannot be wrong in ... encouraging individuality and initiative in our soldiers, 
these qualities are by no means antagonistic to, but, on the contrary, are 
complementary of that true discipline ... which is based on mutual confidence 
between all ranks. 
Caunter became Deputy Commandant Sandhurst in 1902 and was able to shape 
officer training. I so Roberts suggested the direction the Anny should take: 
Discipline is as important now as it was then but self reliance is what is wanted, 
not the rigid discipline of the barrack square. Officers, [NCOs] and men must be 
encouraged to think and act for themselves. 151 
Roberts linked discipline, training and initiative, as well as the value of the LI system. 
Improvements were made in the disciplinary system. In 1899 a committee, chaired 
and apparently instigated by Buller, had recommended that imprisoned soldiers were to 
be treated differently from civilian convicts. Successive Inspectors of Military Prisons 
introduced more education, military training and abolished unsatisfactory NCO-
supervised Provost Prisons. In 1901 military prisons were brought under army control 
and specialist military staffs were established. 152 In 1902 overall discipline was 
modified to add: 
greater freedom, and to diminish the amount of time spent on fatigues ... 
Permission has been given to abolish roll-calls ... By these changes the soldier 
must, in future feel that more responsibility is thrown upon himself, and that his 
self-respect should be ... increased. I 53 
These modifications were achieved administratively rather than by changing the Army 
Act. They would have aided recruitment of better-quality soldiers, thus fostering 
149 Retrospect pp 70, viii. 
ISO The Campaign in the Free State and its Lessons (1901), P 29. 
ISIFM Roberts 'The Army-As It Was and As It Is' 19C LVI (1905),p 3. 
ISl W03218734; Lt Col Garcia ... Military Prisons 1901 (1902),pp 24-5,59; Maj Clayton ... Military 
Prisons 1902 (1903),pp 19-20; AO 241/1901. WO 32118740-43 covers implementation. 
IS) Annual Report o/the Inspector Genera/for Recruiting ... 1902,p 6. That a recruiting report makes 
these points, suggests that the Army was trying to raise entry standards. 
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initiative indirectly. The document suggests that improved disciplinary conditions could 
improve initiative. FW Kitchener modified discipline in his division, warning that: 
[r ]egimental restriction very often militates against individuality ... it is essential 
that soldiers should be encouraged to feel a sense of individual responsibility. 154 
Connaught, the IGF and a Rifleman, recommended easing tight discipline and 
advocated that the Anny study how civilian firms maintained it. He also suggested 
improving soldiers' conditions. He did not link his changes specifically to inculcating 
initiative, but the same report highlighted the topic. Connaught concluded: 
I am not advocating anything that will militate against the preservation of 
discipline ... but I consider with a better class to deal with, many of the rigid 
methods of the past might be modified, as in many cases they have been, to suit 
modem conditions. 155 
In 1904-5 remission for good conduct was introduced; in 1906 soldier prisoners were to 
wear uniform rather than convict garb, which was reserved for serious offenders 
awaiting discharge. Also in this period soldiers were detained rather than imprisoned. 
The change was made in the Anny Act 1907 in order to remove the stigma of 
imprisonment for offences which were military in character. Flogging unruly military 
prisoners was abolished. A committee considering military punishments showed a 
similar trend toward greater flexibility. It recommended that minor offences committed 
by recruits should not prejudice their later careers. 156 The Committee heard that recruits 
were now better educated and less prone to drunkenness. In the period the military 
penal ethos shifted from punishment to reformation focussed on training and education, 
recidivism reduced and assaults on staffbecame 'practically unknown.' 157 
In 1909 COs' powers were increased in order to reduce the number of courts-
1S4 Lt Col Hamnett 'Summary Awards in the Army' ASCQ I (1905). suggesting that COs' attitudes were 
changing; ANG XLIV (18/4/03),p 365. 
ISS WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1905' pp 59-60,208. 
1S6 Ibid 'IGF Report 1907' pp 85-6; WO 33/2953 'Report Co Military Punishments;" usa 7/3/07 p 186. 
IS7 AFPs 50323 FIS; WO 3216872; AFPs 50323 F19 P 107; McPherson DisCipline p 74. But statistics 
cited at Tables 7, 26&27 suggest that drunkeness was reducing at a slower rate than courts-martials. while 
entry-level education was still low. 
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martials and thereby heighten their deterrent effect. This would improve discipline, 
reduce paperwork and free time for training. ISS Better conduct meant that there was less 
need for coercion; soldiers could be trusted more, aiding extended-order tactics. But the 
Army did not adopt 'internal' discipline entirely. There were still many tough characters 
and taut 'external' discipline was necessary in some units. But Ian Hamilton considered: 
the balance point of discipline has ... insensibly shifted in the past ten years . 
. . . [O]ur officers have definitely faced the new conditions and have made up their 
minds to seek discipline for the future in the effects of good example, sympathy 
and kindness, in ... traditions, in the maintenance of a high level of camaraderie; 
in the intelligent comprehension by the rank and file of the why and the wherefore 
of an order and in their keenness to carry it out. IS9 
When Hamilton wrote this is unclear. If it was during his time as AG, it is important 
evidence of change. If later, it suggests that fundamental alteration had taken place, 
witnessed by an officer with overall disciplinary responsibility. It makes no claims for 
Hamilton's personal role and is consistent with his RCWSA paper. Brig Gen Haking 
later considered that: 
The idea oftuming a man into a machine, by means of strict discipline, and thus 
making him more afraid of disobeying orders than of ... the enemy ... has long 
proved abortive. This method of training was only possible when infantry fought 
in close fonnation. 160 
The origins of 'internal' discipline can be viewed as a continuation of the self-help 
and restraint which the Victorians saw as a sign of manliness. 161 The Army had 
similarly stressed temperance and sexual restraint, especially in India where temptation 
was ever-present and families remote. Roberts had fostered the AT A when CinC there. 
Here it may be noted that the level of offences, particularly drunkenness, and VD 
remained relatively high despite such efforts. The AT A also promoted self discipline as 
158 WO 3218701 • Minute DPS 13/11109' pp 2-4 . 
.,9 HamPs 15/1136 pp 58-9. 
160 Company Training (1913).p 1. 
161 S Smiles Self-Help (1859 reprinted 1986),p 19; S Smiles Duty with Illustrations o/Courage. Patience 
and Endurance (1880). J Bourke Dismembering the Male (1996). 
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it was largely run by soldiers, albeit with officer supervision. 162 However, this emphasis 
did not apparently affect the Army's handling of disciplinary issues or have a tactical 
dimension before 1900. Disease and alcoholism rendered men unfit to fight and 
therefore motivated the Army. But the stress on 'internal' discipline after 1902 related 
to the requirements of combat under the new tactical conditions and differed from the 
Victorian efforts. 
In summary one notes a substantial improvement in discipline; why this happened 
cannot be conclusively proved, though education played a part. But it is also argued that 
the demand for initiative, the imperatives of dispersed combat and alterations in the 
exercise of command from imposed control to leadership contributed. Another element 
of the interrelationships postulated above had changed radically. 
Conclusions 
From 1897, especially after 1899, the rate of change towards initiative, 'internal' 
discipline and decentralised tactics accelerated. This coincided with experience of 
combat involving magazine rifles. These weapons enforced dispersion. Dispersed, more 
complex combat required better educated and trained soldiers capable of initiative. That 
soldiers' education certificates roughly doubled between 1903~ 1912, while courts-
martials halved in the same period suggests that the Army had changed radically. Was 
this primarily the result of battlefield factors and the consequent need for initiative or 
the product of wider social factors? This cannot be conclusively answered; wider factors 
and altering mental attitudes were significant, but, with the exception of a few 
comments acknowledging education's effects on improving discipline, they are not 
mentioned. One also notes a generational shift of commanders and changes in the civil 
education and justice systems, but both are elusive as factors in causing change when 
compared to the tactical. On the recorded military evidence the most important cause 
162 ATA Report /89J-J895( 1895): Table 7 
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was South Africa, with Tirah its precursor. 
Earlier this Chapter outlined interrelationships between initiative tactics training , , , 
education and discipline, all changed radically in the period. It is not possible to prove 
conclusively the other elements changed just because of the need to enhance initiative. 
But on the evidence deployed in this Chapter the basic motivating factor was that 
Infantry and to a lesser extent the other arms now had to fight in open-order. The switch 
towards initiative was incomplete in 1914, but the Army's prewar direction was clear. 
Tactically dispersed skirmishing, scouting and reconnaissance, dependent on initiative, 
were emphasised. Many saw training as the way to inculcate initiative. Similarly 
greater education was needed in dispersed, complex combat. Both officer and soldier 
basic training changed substantially with less drill and more intelligent instruction. 
These would have increased initiative. It is harder to demonstrate the exact link between 
disciplinary changes and initiative, but less coercive enforcement would have improved 
the latter. Furthermore the Army changed its administrative and pay systems to enhance 
initiative. This wide spectrum of means suggests how important it was to increase 
initiative. The rough period 1897-1909 saw profound changes in attitudes to initiative, 
discipline and training. This is not to argue that the results equated to current standards, 
but essentially the modem system of initiative and 'internal' discipline was established. 
Chapter 9 examines the contrast between the Army and industry. A journal summarised 
the changes: 
fitness and efficiency off the barrack square are rightly considered of first 
importance. In former days ... efficiency was gained by constant adjutant's 
parades; the company officer was allowed little work in the training of his men; 
open order drill was as stereotyped as a march past; much more was thought of 
correct dressing ..... than in making use of cover ... [I]ndividualism had no place 
in the training of the infantry soldier .... Now ... .individualism is encouraged by 
every possible means ..... This is really the great change which has come over 
the British Army. 163 
163 BA LXXXVIII (1912).p 368. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 8. The Russo-Japanese War 
Down in the Infantry nobody cares; 
Down in the Cavalry. Colonel 'e swears; 
But off in the lead with the wheel at the flog, 
Turns the bold bombardier to a little whipped dog. 
Kipling summarises the lessons of Manchuria; soldiers felt there were few for 
British infantry, cavalry colonels undoubtedly swore at Cossack inertia, but artillery 
was to be the arm most affected. This Chapter examines the firepower, mobility and 
protective lessons of Manchuria. It scrutinises the war's effects on siege warfare and 
general tactics. It probes Dr Towle's thesis, long regarded as the definitive 
assessment of Manchuria's influence on the British, arguing that his judgment that it 
had little effect on the Anny requires modification. His deductions over-emphasise 
1914-18, thereby obscuring prewar reasoning. l Chapter 9 analyses Manchuria's 
influence on doctrine. 
This chapter argues that, though Manchuria's greatest tactical effect was on 
artillery, it confirmed to contemporaries that operational level manoeuvre was vital. 
This and other continuities from South Africa are at odds with those who have seen 
Manchuria through the prism of 1914-18.2 These continuities explain why Manchuria 
had few unique effects on Britain, but they are significant in their own right. 
However, Manchuria influenced FSRs, reinforced British interest in human factors, 
modified the South African emphasis on tactical outflanking, though it did not lessen 
British stress on manoeuvre and reawakened interest in siege warfare. 
Commentators felt that Manchuria had particular relevance for Britain as a 
predominantly maritime power was combating a mainly military one. Furthermore 
Britain might have to fight Russia, either because of the Anglo-Japanese alliance or 
I The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War ... 1904-1914 (KCL 1973), pp 382,385-6. 
1 Ibid P 16; Capt Liddell-Hart The British W~\' in Warfare (1932). pp 122-3. WS Marble The Infantry 
CQnnot do with a gun less (KCL 1998). P 18. 
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to defend India. With 2 regular annies fighting, modem artillery in action, rough 
numerical equality and more conventional tactics than in South Africa, there were 
many reasons for study. The Army made substantial efforts to learn, perhaps greater 
than for any other war which it has not fought, sending MAs to both sides.3 
Manchuria inspired three British official histories and is unique as the only war in 
which Britain was neutral, but for which these works were written.4 The Army 
circulated war-bulletins to officers and translated many Japanese and Russian 
documents. The latter did not cease in 1905.5 Military journals reprinted many 
foreign articles on the war.6 Officers were ordered to keep war diaries and make 
appreciations aided by official lectures on Manchuria. Camberley and Quetta studied 
Manchuria intensely. Brooke took extensive notes and a CO lectured to his unit on 
the war. Japanese methods were used in training, a journal recorded British 
enthusiasm for Manchurian data, while several officially-sponsored competitions 
analysed its lessons.7 Kitchener, Rawlinson, Broadwood, Barrow and other officers 
toured Manchuria's battlefields. At least one guidebook described them, suggesting 
the degree of interest in the war. The Indian Staff College visited Manchuria in 1907 
on perhaps the longest battlefield tour ever undertaken by a British staff college. 8 
Quetta continued to study Manchuria closely till at least 1913. All suggest that 
) Col Waters Reports on the Campaign in Manchuria in 1904 (1905), P 3; Table 27. 
4 Official History o/the Russo-Japanese War (1906-1908), Official History (Naval and Military) of 
the Russo-Japanese War (1910-20), JS Corbett Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War 
P914-15). 
Notes upon Company and Battalion Tactics translated GS, JRUSI LII (1908); JRUSI XLIX (1905). 
fP 680-5; FO 46/665; in 1907 the JRUSI published GS-translated documents. 
Eg 'Infantry Combat in the Russo-Japanese War' JRUSIL (1906) from the French. 
7 ANG XLV (1904), P 291; Maj Banon The Situation in the Far East and the Events that have led up 
to it. (Dublin 1904), p 1, instituted by the GOCinC to aid diarists; UMIU17/5/2276 p 30; BRPs 3/5; 
Lt Col Robson 5 Lectures on the Russo-Japanese War (1904); CRMPs Biography pp 125,128, Letters, 
11/8/07 & 15/8/07: ANG XLV (1904), P 819; Prize Essay 'Lessons in Modem Tactics ... from ... the 
Russo-Japanese War' JUSll XXXIX (1910). 
• Oen Barrow The Fire o/Life (1942), pp 136-7; HQ India ordered the tour. Vincent, a wartime MA, 
attended; Cook's Tourists Handbook to Peidng • ... Mukden. Dalny, Port Arthur (1910); Maj Austin A 
Scamper Through the Far East ( 1909), P viii; Maj Oen Rawlinson' A Trip through Siberia to the 
Battlefields of Manchuria' JLR I (1910); DALISCMBs (Simla 1908); MMPs 4/1&2, Quetta's 
timetables in 1912-13 show much Manchurian matter. It is likely that Camberley remained interested. 
249 
Manchuria keenly interested officers and thus had potential to influence them. 
There were also obstacles to learning. Russia was fighting at the end of a long 
logistic chain and therefore amassed forces slowly. This would not be the case in 
Western Europe. Contemporaries felt that this impugned some of the war's lessons. 
Russia's Army was seen as backward, possibly creating resistance to learning from 
them, while Japan did not have a major power's resources. Shrewd commentators 
felt that Japanese human factors were unique. Poor roads and mountains in 
Manchuria hampered mobility more than in Western Europe.9 Commentators 
assessed that this had reduced the pace of fighting; consequently they argued that 
some tactical features of Manchuria, particularly extensive entrenchment, were 
unlikely to recur in Europe. There combat would be at a higher tempo. 10 
Dr Towle argues that Britain should have learned more from Russia, blaming 
the tendency to concentrate on learning from the victor. But Britain and Russia were 
enemies, thus there was an incentive to learn about Russia's performance, this 
accounts for the considerable number of IA officers who served as MAs, and for 
Russia to restrict British access. MAs were carefully selected. Many had language or 
Intelligence skills, while several were veterans of the Boxer Rising. 11 More were sent 
to Japan, but the British had an entree due to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 
Firepower 
Artillery 
Manchuria was the first war in which numerous modem artillery, some QF, 
fought. However observers had reservations about both sides' weaponry. Japanese 
field guns were technically inferior to the Russians', though better training offset 
this. Others viewed Russian field guns as not true QFs, though substantially ahead of 
9 DALISCMBs p 75; Waters Reports pSI. 
1000ps 69n4/1 p 31 citing the GS in 1909. 
II Table 28. There were a higb proportion of IA officers; the IA was naturally interested in Russia. 
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their Japanese or South African equivalents. 12 Despite these caveats, commentators 
generally recognised that firepower, particularly artillery, was becoming more 
important. Home, a Gurkha MA, commented: 
The great impression ... is the overwhelming effect of modem artillery fire ... 
[U]nder modem conditions artillery is the decisive arm. 13 
General Gerrard, another MA, commented: 
the days when infantry was the Queen of Battles have now passed away .... 
Artillery has now a preponderating influence. 
That two non-gunners recognised this suggests wider appreciation of firepower's 
growing importance. This parallels South African lessons. I4 The Times emphasised: 
A feature of the campaign has been the overwhelmingly important part played 
by artillery. 
Gen French, CinC Aldershot, urged gunners to study the Manchurian artillery 
reports, commenting: '[t]here can be no doubt ... that the relative importance and 
power of Artillery ... have increased enormously.' Rawlinson, Commandant 
Camberley, concurred, citing artillery's ability to crush counterattacks. But most, 
including many gunners, still saw Infantry as the master arm. France and Germany 
also agreed with this historically-based assumption. IS 
Towle has detected variations between British MAs with the Japanese and 
those with the Russians, commenting that: 
Conservative tacticians ... tended to accept the views of Col Hume and the rest 
of the observers with the Japanese. They played down the role of artillery and 
frequently argued against the use of covered positions and heavy guns. ) 6 
But Hume was not always as negative as Towle states; he did not argue against 
12 BORs II (1908), pp 567-8,570. 
IJ BORs III (1908), p 215; Table 28. 
14 WO 106/38 Report 38 para7; Chapter 4. Coincidentally both men had started their careers as 
gunners but transferred to the lAo That they had transferred early on does not suggest inherent pro-
artillery bias. 
IS Col Cordonnier The Japanese in Manchuria II (1912), P 252; AFPs 50321 F25 P 151; Lt Col 
Kiggell 'The Counter-attack' (AMS 1905), P 16; Maj Jeudwine, Maj Sykes, Capt Robertson in 
separate 'Duncan Medal Essays' PRAls XXXV (1908-1909), pp 154,218,249. All were gunners or 
sappers. 
16 Towle Influence p 105. 
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Indirect Fire nor criticise heavy guns per se, though feeling that Russian weapons 
were ineffective as they were mostly obsolete. Significantly Hume praised Russian 
5.9" howitzers. These were modern German pieces; British opinion was to consider 
them the best German 1914-1918 weapon. Furthermore being howitzers they were 
likely to be firing Indirect. Here it is worth re-examining the characteristics of 
Indirect Fire. It depends on signals, which both sides were forced to improvise during 
fighting, and is slow when training for it is poor. 17 There were thus sound reasons for 
gunners to have reservations about using Indirect Fire to support troops manoeuvring 
as time is generally critical then. Nor are variations between observers altogether 
surprising. 18 
Towle argues that the MAs with the Japanese underestimated Russian 
casualties from artillery and consequently undervalued its importance. However, the 
British would not suffer equally from shelling as their formations were much more 
extended than Russian ones. Moreover by 1907 the GS had circulated Russian data 
and Russian casualties from artillery were better appreciated. 19 British reports of 
continental manoeuvres criticised dense formations, suggesting that firepower's 
effectiveness was understood. That Britain developed Artillery Formations after 
1905 also weakens Towle's argument that artillery was undervalued. Their institution 
shows that British infantry appreciated artillery firepower. 2o It is impossible to prove 
that Manchuria inspired them, but that war saw infantry far more exposed to shellfire 
than South Africa. Brig Gen Pilcher's lecture, 
.7 Hume saw advantages to both howitzers and Indirect Fire, see fns 24&33 below; Chapter 4 . 
• 1 BORs II pp 610-11,604; 'After Mukden' JRUSI XLIX (1905),pp 694-5; Brig Bidwell Gunners at 
War (1970), p 99 . 
• 9 GS 'Some Tactical Notes on the Russo-Japanese War' (1906), P 12; Capt Vincent' Artillery in the 
Manchurian Campaign' JRUSI LII (1908), P 28, eg the official Notes upon Russian Artillery Tactics in 
'he War of /904-5 ... (1907). 
20 Towle Influence p 107; DALISCMBs,p58; 'The Kaiser-Manover in Germany 1905' JRL'SI L 
(1906), p 187; WO 27/493 'IGF Report German Cavalry Manoeuvres 1906' p 2; Glossary. 
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the first traceable reference to them, used much Manchurian data.21 Hume 
also commented: 
[g]iven more careful training and better shrapnel, the Russian field artillery, 
even though weaker in number of guns, would have been a still more important 
factor. 
The Russians were also in the middle of introducing a new field gun and British MAs 
appreciated that this weakness was transitory. Hume later emphasised the growing 
importance of artillery in supporting attacks. Neither piece of evidence suggests that 
MAs with the Japanese significantly undervalued artillery. Dr Towle also criticises 
Hume for attacking British teaching that infantry could not attack before enemy 
artillery was subdued. However, Hume was right to warn: 
except under the most favourable conditions of ground, or with very great 
superiority in number or power of guns, it is practically impossible to silence 
an opponent's artillery ifit be well entrenched. 
Combat between 1915-18 confirmed Hume's point. British development ofCB 
tactics took years, depended on scientific progress and, though eventually achieving 
preponderance, never silenced the German artillery completely.22 
That French and Rawlinson, both very influential, stressed artillery's 
effectiveness using Russo-Japanese data, suggests that Towle's argument that the 
British downplayed artillery after Manchuria is wrong. Furthermore the later British 
increase in divisional artillery contradicts him.23 Clearly the new large divisions 
needed more pieces in view of their size, but, had the British felt that artillery was 
ineffective in Manchuria, it is unlikely that they would have agreed so large an 
. 
Increase. 
11'Formations of Infantry in Attack and Defence' (AMS 1906), pp 3-5, using Vincent's data. IT 1911 
p III describes such a formation, which was not in IT 1905. WO 279/9 pp 119-12 suggests the 
Manchurian influence and describes trials. 
II BORs II pp 582-3,585-6,608-9; Towle Influence pI 06, citing BORs II P 619 and by implication pp 
579,617-8, Towle contradicts himself Influence p 135; BORs n p 617; Col Rawlins A History o/the 
Development o/the British Artillery in France 1914-1918 (nd), p 86. 
II Towle Influence p 108; Table 20. 
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Howitzers 
British commentators were positive about howitzers, paralleling South African 
lessons and indirectly supporting Indirect Fire. Hamilton observed: 
I cannot think ofa single engagement between the Mo-tien Ling and Liao-yang 
where howitzers would not have been invaluable. 
Others concurred, including Vincent, a dashing field-gunner, later a Quetta DS and 
cavalryman, who noted howitzers' ability to search dead ground. This suggests that 
RF A attitudes were changing, thus reinforcing Chapter 4' s arguments. Hume noted 
howitzers' value at Mukden, while others reported heavy Japanese howitzers' 
destructiveness at Port Arthur.24 
Towle claims that Britain was slower in rearming with howitzers than 
Continental armies. This is surprising; the 4.5" Howitzer's introduction predated the 
deployment of its German equivalent. 25 Though South Africa inspired the 4.5", had 
howitzers failed in Manchuria, this might have prejudiced its deployment which 
occurred well after the Russo-Japanese War. Nor is there is much evidence of British 
criticisms of howitzers in Manchuria. Britain fielded 18 howitzers in each infantry 
division, the same number as Germany, while France did not deploy them below 
COrpS.26 Significantly Towle does not cite French howitzer statistics in making his 
criticism. He also states: 
As a result of [Manchuria], [gunners] came to regard the heavy howitzer both 
as more important than the heavy fieldgun and also as essential in any field 
anny.27 
Siege experts had reached similar conclusions in the 1890s on their superiority to 
siege guns. There is also a technical nuance; heavy field guns differ from heavy guns 
used in the field. The British had the latter, the 60 Pounder, but not the fonner. The 
24 BORs II pp 604,610-11: Capt Buzzard 'The Heavy Howitzer in Modem Warfare' PRAIs XXXII U 905-6 ),p 561; Chapter 4. 
Towle Influence p 124; DT Zabecki Steel Wind (Westport 1994). p 11. 
16 Table 30 RA Doughty Pyrrhic Victory (Cambridge 2005), pp 29-30. 
21 ' Towle Influence pp 129,123. 
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standard 6" British heavy howitzer did not attend manoeuvres regularly and was not 
fonnally included in the BEF's order of battle. But the weapons speedily deployed in 
1914.
28 
However, their field training increased after 1904, though it is impossible to 
attribute this just to Manchuria. South Africa had shown their value.29 The RA' s 
philosophy of heavy artillery in the field emphasised guns, the Germans stressed 
howitzers, while France downplayed both types of heavy artillery. Headlam, the RA 
historian, viewed as an enemy of Indirect Fire, was convinced that Manchuria had 
improved the howitzer's reputation and raised the question of their allocation to 
infantry divisions.3o But the logic of the organisation of large divisions demanded 
that howitzers were incorporated in them. They required resources immediately at 
hand to support manoeuvre speedily. Headlam is therefore probably wrong to 
attribute their allocation to divisions just to Manchuria. But Manchuria encouraged 
the fonnation of large divisions and reconfinned 1899-1902's lesson that field 
howitzers were valuable but subordinate to field guns. Here British conclusions 
paralleled Gennan ones.31 
Indirect Fire 
Indirect Fire was used more often in Manchuria than in South Africa. Its use 
there was controversial. Some MAs argued against it and historians have suggested 
that criticisms of Indirect Fire in Manchuria were severe. But conditions were 
adverse to it. Most weapons in Manchuria were guns and both sides' signalling was 
primitive, thus there were technical reasons why it would not be fully effective, 
28 Siege Artillery Drill 1891, P 62; Brig Gen Wolfe-Murray 'Do we require Field Artillery?' PRAI 
XXIX (1902-3); Col Stone 'The Heavy Artillery of a Field Army' JRUSI LII (1908),pp 925.927,932; 
Brig Gen Edmonds MOFB 1914 I (1922), P 424. 
29 Col Stone 'Heavy Artillery in the Field' JRA XXXV (1908-9), pp 1-2; Chapter 4; GATII J906 P 5. 
However the IGF saw 6" Howitzers firing and felt that the question of them deploying with the field 
army should be considered, WO 27/493 'Note Connaught's visit Rbayader 1906.' 
30 Maj Gen Headlam The History o/the {IU] II 1899-1914 (W~I~ch .1937), pp 178-9. Headlam was 
not biased towards howitzers. By rejecting a corps-based orgaruzanon. It would be hard to see how 
else a short-range weapon could have been organised except by allocating them to divisions. 
11 Maj Marton 'Heavy Artillery on the Modem Battlefield' REJ XVIII (1913), P 29; Table 31; A 
Clayton Paths o/Glory (2003), p 33. 
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despite the fact that the Russians had developed its techniques prewar.32 Despite 
these drawbacks, some MAs felt Indirect Fire was needed. Hamilton felt that greater 
enemy firepower made cover for artillery: 'absolutely essential,' demanding Indirect 
Fire, while Gerrard remarked: 
The present shrapnel fire with QF guns is such that no troops can face it in 
the open nor can artillery serve their guns under it. Indirect fire seemed to be 
the only practicable method. 
That two senior non-gunner MAs recommended Indirect Fire suggests greater all-
arms awareness of its potential. Hume saw some advantages of Indirect Fire, noting 
CB's ineffectiveness against hidden pieces. He also appreciated the danger of 
artillery moving under shellfire. The latter was an argument for Indirect Fire and 
weakens Towle's criticisms of Hume.33 Vincent, also with the Japanese, was open-
minded and spent more time in his RUSI lecture discussing Indirect Fire than any 
other topic.34 Capt Thacker, the Canadian gunner with the Japanese, stressed both 
Indirect Fire and that Japanese artillery had generally supported their infantry well. 
Maj Archdale, a field gunner, touring Manchuria after the war, concluded: 'the 
primary lesson appeared ... to be the necessity of using indirect fire.' Dr Marble has 
reported numerous criticisms of Japanese artillery's support of infantry; the above 
evidence suggests that he is over-harsh. 35 
Dr Towle states that opposition to introducing Indirect Fire came primarily 
from the other arms. In fact many gunners resisted it. Given that professional opinion 
generally saw artillery tactics as a purely gunner matter, it is hard to see the Army 
resisting the switch to Indirect Fire had the RA unequivocally endorsed it. 36 Nor does 
Towle appreciate that South African evidence supported its introduction and that its 
» C Bellamy Red God of War (1986), pp 30-3. 
1) BORS II p561; WO 106/38, Report 38 9/9/04, para 7; BORs II p578; BORS II, P 571. 
J4 Vincent 'Artillery' pp 36-39. 
IS Marble 'Doctrine'p 93; HamPs 3/112, pp 14, 16 report criticisms of Japanese artillery. 
"Towle Influence plIO; Col Bailey The First World War and the Birth of.\1odern Warfarc 
(Camberley nd); Marble 'Doctrine' pp 97-98. 
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use in training had increased after 1900. Maj Budwort~ a horse-gunner, argued that 
Indirect Fire was a South African lesson confinned by Manchuria; another tactical 
continuity. But Manchuria caused it to receive more attention in training. 37 
RF A Guns and Ammunition 
Britain had made important deductions from South Africa on future field guns, 
but had reservations on their correctness due to the absence ofQFs and eccentric 
Boer artillery tactics. Manchurian data was used to validate the 18 Pounder's 
characteristics. Experts, using Manchurian data, re-examined whether it should fire 
HE.38 The choice of the RFA's standard ammunition is significant as it suggests the 
Anny's, or at least the RA's tactical assumptions on future combat. Selecting 
shrapnel shows that men in the open were the prime targets, thus anticipating 
manoeuvre en rase campagne. Choosing HE indicates that structures were the 
priority, foreseeing entrenchment and more positional combat. Towle argues that 
gunners, sappers and progressive infantrymen supported introducing HE, with 
conservatives opposed. He implies that the reactionaries won.39 The choice of 
shrapnel is more defensible that he allows. In manoeuvre, logistics preclude massive 
destructive bombardments, while time limits entrenchment.40 These factors made 
shrapnel effective for killing men in the open or neutralising trenches. Nor was the 
division of support as clear-cut as Dr Towle suggests. Many gunners opposed HE. 
An influential RA committee had concluded after South Africa: 
One of the most important lessons demonstrated [in South Africa] is the utter 
inefficiency as mankillers of common shell ... and the efficacy of good time 
hr I d "1' 41 S apne un er sImI ar cIrcumstances. 
37WO 27/503 'Training ... 1" Army Corps', p 2. French reemphasized Indirect Fire in 1905 AFPs 
50321 'Training of the Aldershot Army Corps 1905' pp 150-1; 'Tactical Employment of Artillery' 
(AMS 1908), P 7; Oen Hamilton 'Training of the Troops during 1906' JRUSI L (1906), pp 1519-20, 
'Training of the Troops during 1907' JRUSI LII (1908), pp 85-6; Chapter 4. 
II AFPs 50314 'The New Field Gun Appendix B' pp 16-17. 
39 Towle Influence p 118; the MAs cited as supporting HE were infantry or cavalry, 2 opponents were 
(WlDers; Table 28. 
WVl)Ps 69n4/1 The Supply of Munitions to the Army (nd), p 31 citing GS comments made in 1909. 
The paper was written during the 1914-18 war. 
41 WO 33/339 para 3; Glossary. 
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Marshall, Roberts' C~ had decried HE at the RCWSA, despite many cavalry and 
infantrymen demanding it. Dr Marble also criticises the RF A for their obsession with 
shrapnel as their prime ammunition nature. Contrastingly Dr Towle states that 
gunners supported introducing HE. It is argued here that he has misread the evidence 
by stating that HE was the RA' s preference. Some continental experts supported their 
selection of shrapnel, while a Manchurian veteran judged that HE had no anti-
personnel effect. 42 
Dr Towle assesses future artillery tasks and this naturally bears on his belief 
that HE ammunition was needed: 
After ... Manchuria ... most British gunners thought that their task was to pin 
down the enemy's infantry and to make holes in their trenches.43 
The RGA may have seen the latter task as a priority, though there were only 6 RGA 
batteries in the BEF, but is incorrect for the RFA whose guns, though not their 
howitzers, lacked HE. Even their howitzers had a sizeable shrapnel ammunition 
scale, as did the RGA's 60 Pounders, which, being guns, were less suitable for 
destroying trenches. Consequently if Towle's statement is accepted, the RFA's field 
guns, most of the BEF's artillery, had the wrong ammunition for a major role. In fact 
the RFA's main task was infantry support with men their prime target. For this 
shrapnel was lethal. Hume partly contradicts Towle: 
Field artillery, though provided with [HE] and common shell, can produce little 
or no effect on good trenches, even when well supported by heavy guns. 
Clearly there are qualifications of scale and duration of attack. Days of shelling from 
massed field guns on a small target would have produced significant damage, but a 
42 Brig Bidwell and D Graham Firepower (1985), P 97; Glossary; LS Amery THWSA VI (1909), pp 
483-6. Appendices to Evidence RCWSA (1904), pp 195-8; WO 106/38 & BORs III P 217. Hamilton 
and Vincent had doubts on HE's value, though Vincent reported the Japanese felt that the Russians 
should have used it, BORs I P 55; Capt Barrett 'The "Q" Club Prize Essay 1906' JRUSI LI (1907), P 
80S; Oen Rohne 'Optimism in the German Field Artillery' JRUSI XLIV (1905), P 522; Marble 
In/antry,p 19 wrongly states that shrapnel has no neutralising effect; Capt Soloviev Actual 
E:xperiences of War (Washington 1906), P 18. This work was available in Britain. 
43 Towle Influence p 134, he does not cite contemporary sources for this statement. 
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small army emphasising manoeuvre was unlikely to be able to afford the time or 
ammunition. But Hume saw HE as a valuable adjunct to shrapnel, as the latter had 
little destructive effect. Dr Towle criticises the British for not introducing HE, citing 
Continental armies' adoption offield gun HE, but British divisions had, unlike the 
French, HE-firing howitzers, while Germany's strategy based on offence meant that 
they might reasonably expect to have to shell fortifications more often than the 
British. Furthermore Continental field gun HE scales were small, while wartime 
experience showed that field gun HE shells were too small to destroy defences.44 
Inter-Arm Cooperation 
As in South Africa the MAs identified infantry/artillery cooperation as vital to 
cover attacks due to increased defensive firepower. Dr Marble suggests that Japanese 
gunners were severely criticised for using Indirect Fire and consequently for 
providing poor infantry support. The evidence is not overwhelming; many MAs and 
commentators suggest that generally artillery support was good. Hume reported that 
some Japanese infantry abused their artillery, a phenomenon not unknown in other 
armies, but most: 'look more and more for the support of the guns.' Hume ended: 
The way the Japanese artillery supports its infantry is admirable, concentrating 
fire on important points, firing over the heads of the attacking lines and keeping 
it up to the last moment. 
South Africa had emphasised both the latter points. That the Japanese used overhead 
fire suggests that they were possibly firing Indirect and that Hume was more evenly 
balanced on the question than Dr Towle allows. Swinton, involved with the British 
Official History, felt that cooperation was better than in South Africa. British 
manuals continued to stress artillery/infantry cooperation down to 1914 
"wo 33/1518 p 373; FAT (Provisionaljl912 p 218; BORS II P 611; Glossary; Stone 'Heavy 
Artillery' p 931; Table 25; VDPs 69n4/1 'Smith-Dorrienlvon Donop 20/12114. 
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suggesting continuity between South Africa and Manchuria.4s 
Artillery Tactics 
British commentators used Manchurian data to debate whether artillery should 
be massed or dispersed. South Africa had first raised the issue. MAs noted that the 
Japanese switched from concentrated batteries at the Yalu to dispersed, despite their 
primitive signalling. Hamilton supported dispersion, Gen Nicholson was undecided, 
but recommended that batteries should be able to communicate rapidly, implicitly 
recognising that dispersal might be necessary. Vincent stressed artillery 
communications and many commentators highlighted the value of telephones for 
artillery. Manchuria confirmed that dispersing artillery was advantageous but 
demanded good signalling. Dispersion would inevitably mean greater use of Indirect 
Fire. 46 Vincent made another deduction by stressing the need for a divisional CRA 
to control dispersed batteries. The Army did not permanently establish CRAs until 
1908 and it would be wrong to claim that Manchuria was decisive in their 
establishment. The greater number of pieces in the large infantry divisions made 
them essential, while South Africa had demonstrated their value.47 
Dr Towle states that contemporaries first questioned artillery duels as a 
separate tactical phase after Manchuria. In fact South Africa had already shown that 
the weaker, defending artillery would reserve its fire, thus shunning duelling, until 
enemy infantry advanced. The Army rebutted Hamilton's criticisms of artillery duels 
in Manchuria by stating that FAT 1902 did not mention them. But there was still 
debate on them as late as 1906. Later the Direct Fire artillery duel mutated into the 
.svincent 'Artillery' pp 31-2; Marble 'RA' p 93; BORS II pp 617,578; Capt Dawnay 'Artillery and 
Infantry in the Final Stages of the Attack' JRA XXXV (1908-9), pp 51-2; MAs emphasised artillery 
communications eg WO 33/1518 pp 353,374; Capt Swinton 'The Defence ofa Position Upon Open 
Ground' REJIV (1906), P 132; Gen Hamilton 'Training of the Troops during 1906' JRUSI L 
U906),p 1521; Glossary. 
BORS II P 562; Ibid pp 562-3, Ibid P 560; 'Artillery' pp 34-5; 'The Transmission of Orders and 
Information in War' USM XXXI (1905),p 523; Chapter 4; Glossary . 
• 7 Vincent 'Artillery' p 35; Chapters 3-4; WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1905' pp 23-4 urged establishing 
CRAs in divisions. 
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long CB struggle that was such a prominent feature of the First World War.48 This, 
however, was based on Indirect Fire. 
Mountain Artillery 
Dr Towle states that: 'in 1903 the Mountain Artillery had finally been 
abolished in the British Anny.' He does not account for Territorial mountain 
artillery.49 Despite favourable Manchurian reports, mountain was, and for that matter 
remains inferior to field artillery in range and frrepower. It was usually packbome, 
having higher cross-country but lower road mobility than wheeled weapons. 
Continental combat generally demanded field artillery's attributes and, in a period of 
stringency, reluctance to expand mountain artillery in Britain made sense. 50 But CTrg 
1905 was amended to emphasise mountain artillery's ability to support infantry 
closely in conventional warfare through its inconspicuousness and cross-country 
mobility. CTrg 1902 had not mentioned this point which was clearly a Manchurian 
lesson.51 Also India formed more mountain batteries after 1904. But this increase 
cannot be ascribed just to Manchuria. They were essential to combat growing tribal 
firepower. The development of the 3.7" QF mountain howitzer after Manchuria again 
suggests that Towle's point is overemphasised. 52 
Infantry Firepower 
The British criticised both sides' marksmanship; Hamilton reported Russian 
reservists unable to sight their rifles and 70-man Russian volleys, contrasting them 
48 Towle Influence p 134; WO 33/1520 p 455 fn; Lt Col May A Retrospect on the South African War 
(1901), pp 126-8 suggests their obsolescence. But duels were seen in Manchuria, probably because of 
primitive tactics and poor communications, eg BORS II p618, compelled Direct Fire; Chapter 4; WO 
27/491 'IGF Report 1901' pp 79-80; WO 27/503 'Discussion following RA Operations 26/8/04;' Gen 
Famdale History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery (Woolwich 1986), pp 147-9, 186-90. 
49 Towle Influence p130, this and his footnote 98 are ambiguous; Maj MacMunn The Armies of India 
(1911), p 180; Maj Knapp 'Pack Artillery and the Close Support of the Infantry Attack' JRUSI LII 
~908), P 963. 
Maj Geddes 'The Tactical Employment of Pack Artillery: A Criticism' JRUSI L (1906),pp722-3. 
51 CTrg 1905 Amendments (1907), p 13. 
521JMIU17/5/1617 P 294; WO 33/3013 pp 46,49. But the IGF criticised the fact that there was little 
mountain artillery in Brita~ citing Manchuri~ WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1905' P 23. 
261 
with Japanese independent fire. He felt that Russia had not studied South Africa's 
firepower lessons. The MAs generally felt that neither side exploited small anns 
firepower fully, though they reported machine guns' effectiveness. This was despite 
neither side having emphasised them prewar.53 Monro, Commandant Hythe, 
highlighted their importance to the 1906 GS Conference, citing Manchurian data. 
Based on this, French centralised machine guns in 3 brigades, ordering their 
brigadiers to select a BMGO who was to train their detachments. 54 MAT 1908 
stressed: 
The value of machine guns in every fonn of warfare has been and is steadily 
increasing; the fire effect ... will be of the greatest importance on battlefields 
of the future. 55 
This does not refer to Manchuria directly, but that it made deductions on future wars 
suggests that experience from Manchuria was used. Later MAT 1908 mentioned the 
Russo-Japanese War directly, recommending training extra machine gunners to 
replace casualties. Generally, however, commentators felt that in shooting and minor 
infantry tactics there were few lessons for Britain.56 
Mobility and Manoeuvre 
South African operations were generally very mobile, contrastingly 
Manchurian combat was sluggish. Home commented: 'manoeuvring was apparently 
not practicised.' Cavalry colonels and commentators alike were disappointed with 
the cavalry's perfonnance. Britain had hoped that Manchuria would offer guidance 
on mounted tactics, but, as Lyttelton noted, these expectations were unfulfilled. 57 
There were specific reasons; Manchurian terrain was generally adverse, part was 
mountainous, and agriculture hampered mounted movement elsewhere. Despite these 
53BORs I pp 152-3; Lt Col Bird 'Rifle Calibre Machinegun Tactics' AMS (1904), p 3;'Russian 
machine guns at Liao-yang' REJI (1905), p 219. 
54 Col Ovens 'Fighting in Enclosed Country' JRUSI XLIX (1905),p 532; WO 279/9 pp 122-3: WO 
27/505 'Memorandum ... Machine guns' p 1. 
55 MAT 1908 has a section on them The IGF often mentioned them, WO 27/491 '1912' pp 69-70. 
56 Capt Sedgwick The Russo-Japanese War on Land (1906), piSS. 
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handicaps, commentators felt that Russia should have had a major advantage in its 
cavalry. This was more numerous, rifle-armed and had better horses than the 
Japanese. Japan had not stressed the ann before 1904 so its cavalry tended to avoid 
shock. Russian cavalry tactics were based on the US Civil War MI-style combat.58 
Towle cites McCullagh, who rode with Russian cavalry in Manchuria, on their poor 
marksmanship, concluding that they must have been trained for shock-only tactics. 59 
This is logical but wrong. In Manchuria most Russian cavalry were untrained 
Cossacks, who, Gen Scobell, citing MA reports, assessed as being tactically 
equivalent to undrilled Yeomanry and inferior to them in character. Even Russians 
felt that their cavalry's training was poor. Despite these criticisms, non-cavalrymen 
stressed the ann's importance; Hume felt that: 
A couple of divisions of cavalry with their complement of horse artillery 
would have made the defeat of the Russians [after Mukden] complete and 
overwhelming. 
Two Indian Staff College RF A students concurred, suggesting that the point was not 
just one made by cavalrymen.6o 
The MAs criticised the Russian cavalry for poor horsemastership, overloaded 
horses, inertia, insufficient machine guns, poor training, defective marksmanship and 
scouting. These repeated British mistakes in South Africa.61 British cavalrymen 
censured Japanese cavalry for lacking rifles, machine guns and horse artillery.62 This 
shows that British cavalry attitudes had altered since South Africa and it suggests 
continuity of lessons. 
57 The Rwso-Japanese War up to J jIlt August 1904 (1905), P 57; WO 279/9 P 9. 
SI Jardine felt terrain impaired cavalry mobility, BORs II, pp 535-6; Hamilton disagreed, pp 528-9; 
Ibid, pp 569,589; Oen de Negrier The Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War (1906),p 10; W McElwee 
The Art of War (1974), pp 172, 196-7 for the Russian cavalry's MI style tactics based on the US Civil 
War. 
59 Influence p 175; ANG XLVI (1905), P 54 claimed that Cossacks did no marksmanship training. 
~ McCullagh With the Cossacks (1906),p277; BORs I p216. Maj Burton 'Cossack and Sowar' JUSII 
XXXIII (1904), P 134; 'A Neglected Warning in Russia' CJ II (1907), pp 217-8; 'Cavalry' AMS 
(1905), p 7. Jardine disparaged Cossacks, WO 33/1518 p 347; 'RUSSIA-Cavalry in the Present War' 
JRUSI XLIX (1905),pp 981-2; BORs II, p611; DALISCMBs pp 88,96. 
61 StafTCol Zalesskij 'The Russian Cavalry in the War with the Japanese' CJ 1(1906), P 320. 
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Towle argues that South Africa and Manchuria demonstrated the superiority of 
MI over cavalry tactics. Dr Badsey has criticised this general proposition, while 
Russian MI-style tactics cannot be regarded as having been effective in Manchuria. 
The Russians failed to exploit their superiority in cavalry and consequently in 
mobility. It is suggested here that the correct argument is not fire versus shock but 
manoeuvre against inertia. Here Hamilton has force: 
My arguments are not directed against the sword as such but only against those 
who would train cavalry so that they would enter upon a field of battle thinking 
rather of where they may deliver a charge than of how they may employ their 
mobility. I have watched thousands of men trained on this system ... sitting idle 
on their horses. 63 
Historians have often focused on Hamilton's remark: 
it would be as reasonable to introduce the elephants of Porus on to a modem 
battlefield as regiments of lancers and dragoons who are too much imbued with 
the true cavalry spirit to use fire-arms. 
They have concluded consequently that all cavalry were obsolete; in fact Hamilton 
was criticising shock-only tactics. He later emphasised: 
All the obvious tactical advantages commanded by the well-mounted soldier-
such as ability to cross swiftly a fire-swept zone, moving rapidly to the flank or 
rear of the enemy, seizing a position far in advance of the army. 64 
He noted that there were still fleeting opportunities for shock. Two of Hamilton's 3 
tasks involved manoeuvre not shock. This suggests that British thinking on cavalry 
was developing towards operational level manoeuvre as Chapter 5 argues. 
Many cavalrymen agreed with him. Furthermore mounted reconnaissance, 
increasingly tactically important, could not be conducted using MI-style tactics.65 
The British criticised both sides' cavalry for inertia, defensiveness and failure 
62 Brig Oen Bethune 'The Uses of Cavalry and [MI] in Modem Warfare' JRUSI L (1906),p630. 
6J Towle Influence p167; S Badsey Fire and the Sword (Cambridge 1981), pp 348-51; BORs II pp 
528-9. 
64 HamPs 15/1/31 p 12; Maj Oen Oreenly Russo-Japanese War-Cavalry Reports (np nd), 'Report 
~5)' p 317; A Staff Officer's Scrapbook I (1905), pp 215-6; Greenly Russo-Japanese p 323. 
Eg Maj Oen Scobell 'Cavalry' (AMS 1905). pp 10-11; 'Gennan Cavalry and Lessons of the Russo-
Japanese War' CJ II (1907). pp 224,222. Doctrinally British MI did not reconnoitre mounted; there 
bad been exceptions in South Africa; Chapter 5. 
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to exploit successes, though they recognised the Japanese disadvantages. They 
argued for greater manoeuvre. CT J 907' s emphasis on daring action may have been 
partly derived from the inert performance of cavalry in Manchuria 66 British views on 
cavalry raids were influenced by a sluggish Russian mission, made without surprise, 
with poor protection and reliant on wheeled resupply. That wagons accompanied the 
raiders slowed their movement over country in which requisitions could have been 
levied. The raid unsurprisingly failed to cut vital Japanese communications. The 
Russians botched a chance for decisive manoeuvre.67 
British commentators condemned both sides' immobility. Haking remarked: 
'[n]either [side] have shown any power or capability of manoeuvre. ' Haking, a 
Camberley DS, lecturing at the 1905 GS conference, probably reflected official 
thinking by deducing from Manchuria: 
With our small army we should, therefore, be masters in the art of manoeuvring 
... To do this effectively it is of the first importance that we should possess 
great skill in the handling of cavalry, of advanced guards and of outposts. We 
should be constantly practicing such operations, our junior officers should 
thoroughly understand both the theory and practice of such detachments, so 
they can act intelligently, ably and without fear ... of doing ... wrong .... Ifwe 
could free our officers of that fear we should have the finest army in the 
world.68 
Haking's link between initiative and manoeuvre again suggests continuity of lessons 
from South Africa. His use of 'theory' implies doctrine, and his point on tolerating 
mistakes suggests that training was changing as Chapter 9 argues. Col Kiggell 
criticised Japanese slowness, though recognising their logistic and geographic 
handicaps. He stressed that mobility was vital between evenly-matched forces. Many 
66 CT 1907 P 187. There was also a reaction against CT 1904. Cavalry inertia in South Africa also 
contributed to CT 1907's emphasis. 
67 Capt Knox 'Miscbenlco's Raid on Yinkow' JUSII XXXVII (1908), pp 82,84,87-8,152-3; Gen 
Hamilton 'Manoeuvre Notes 119/07' p 2. 
"Official History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-Japanese War II (1912), pp 202,203-4,500-1.506-
7; WO 33/2747 pp 35-6. 
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commentators argued for activity and manoeuvre in combat after Manchuria.69 Such 
tactics did not necessarily involve shock action. They represented a shift towards 
operational level manoeuvre. Haking's recommendations can be seen as a forerunner 
of MAT 1908 which similarly emphasised manoeuvre 
Col Maude argued that Manchurian lessons on the need for heavy artillery and 
additional ammunition would, if implemented, delay embarking an expeditionary 
force.7o Elsewhere he blamed indecisive Manchurian battles on: 'slow movement.' 
He argued that mobility determined victory; this view by an ex-sapper suggests that 
not all apostles of mobility were hippophiles. Col May, a gunner, argued similarly in 
CGS's presence.7} Grierson, when DMO, stimulated by Manchurian reports, 
criticised excessive British baggage as hampering mobility; this probably resulted in 
a committee which cut transport and impedimenta. The Committee cited Stonewall 
Jackson's campaigns as a reason for increasing mobility. Commentators condemned 
Japanese operational and strategic caution, insufficient cavalry, and sluggish 
pursuits, while postwar official reports emphasised that Japan was increasing her 
cavalry. 72 
Protection 
With one regular siege and periods when combat congealed into positional 
warfare, entrenchment was more extensive than in South Africa. Whether increased 
firepower or the slower pace of combat in Manchuria, caused by logistics and other 
factors, impelled such tactics is irrelevant here. British commentators noted the 
69 Oen Hamley and Col Kiggell The Operations of War (Edinburgh 1907), pp 380-1, 408; 'How 
Cavalry might have been used in the Russo-Japanese War' CI II (1907), P 478; 'What Cavalry 
Should Learn from the Late Campaign in Manchuria' ClII (1907), p 363; Chapter 5. 
7O'Economic Anny Reform' CRev XC (1906), p 218. 
71Lt Col Maude 'Mobility: Its Influence on Strategy' JRUSI LII (1908), pp 197,204, Clausewitz 
argued similarly, Chapter 9; 'The Employment of Heavy Artillery in the Field' JRA XXXV (1908-
1909), P 21. 
n AFPs 50317 'Report Japanese Transport,' WO 3217075 pI; Chapter 4; Capt Holbrook 'The Russo-
Japanese War' USMXXX (1904-05), p 623; OffiCial History (Naval and Military) of the Russo-
Japanese War III (1920), pp 716-8; JRUSI UI (1908), P 121. 
266 
change, but were divided on the cause. 
Fieldcraft 
MAs reported that Russian infantry were untrained in using cover and were 
thus vulnerable to enemy fire. It: 
was heavy in manoeuvre and not trained to fight in extended order. The 
losses due to close formations were very heavy ... After ... Mukden loose 
formations were practised, ... [but] to the last ... the Russians had not learnt how 
to use ground and they still moved slowly presenting a good target. 73 
Hamilton, with the Japanese, noted that: 
The closeness of the Russian formations left nothing to be desired. The men 
were shoulder to shoulder, usually quite visible lying along the top of a ridge 
while their officers stood up with field glasses.74 
He reported that the Japanese tended to extend more as the war progressed adopting: 
'South African' tactics. The Indian Staff College felt that Boer-style extension would 
have been more effective than the Russian close-order. That British MAs with both 
sides had clearly recognised Russian vulnerability to fire suggests that Dr Towle's 
point that the British had underestimated Russian casualties is overstated. 75 
Observers argued that Russian soldiers, due to poor education and rigid 
discipline, were incapable of dispersed combat and individual fieldcraft, Col Monro 
emphasised both points at CGS' 1906 conference. These failings partly explain 
Russian difficulties with reconnaissance. MAs reported the Japanese stress on 
concealment and camouflage. But South Africa had sensitised the British to 
fieldcraft and concealment, another tactical continuity between the wars. Later 
Aldershot stressed the importance of studying ground, citing Manchurian lessons.76 
Field Defences 
MAs carefully reported trench designs, praising good entrenchment and 
73 Capt Holman The Rwso..Japanese War Joinl Report I (1906), P 49. He served with the Russians. 
74 Maj Macomb 'The Russian Infantry Soldier' JRUSI L (1906), P 1167; BORs I P 152. 
" DAUSCMBs P 35. 
76 W Kirton 'With the Japanese on the Valu' JRUSI XLIV (1905), P 271; WO 279/9 P 120; WO 
33/1518 p 50; WO 27/506 'Training ... Aldershot...1907.· 
267 
excoriating exposed or poorly-dug trenches. That one critic was an Indian 
cavalryman suggests that arm's attitudes had altered since 1899. As combat 
continued, both sides appreciated field defences: 'more and more strongly.' Several 
MAs noted Japanese entrenchment during assaults and their increased carriage of 
entrenching tools. Agar's report devoted a section to both topics, emphasising the 
growth of firepower and the consequent need for defences. But South Africa had also 
stressed both points. 77 
MAs highlighted the tactical importance of anti-infantry obstacles, particularly 
barbed wire combined with machine guns: 
in almost every succeeding engagement the main difficulty to be overcome has 
arisen from these two creations of modem war. 
South Africa had taught similar lessons, though, due to Boer reluctance to attack, 
their salience was less. Guided by both campaigns, Callwell foresaw that: 'that wire 
will .... be very extensively used' in future wars. An infantryman commented: 
'Manchuria points to wire entanglements as being ... the best obstacle. ,78 Haldane 
deduced that sappers were needed to cut wire during attacks. He criticised CTrg 
1902' s statement that it was impossible to entrench during attacks. CTrg 1905 was 
later altered to reflect both lessons.79 
Manchuria reconfirmed the South African lesson on the need to hide defences. 
Observers reported careful Japanese camouflage and were highly critical of 
prominent Russian positions which were consequently vulnerable to artillery. Agar 
commented: 
hardly sufficient importance has hitherto been attached by us to this most 
important matter of concealment, invisibility only being given fifth place in the 
77 BORS II Reports 39,40&41; BORS I pp 182,166; BORS II pp 641,638-640 
71 Col Callwell The Tactics of To-Day (Edinburgh 1909),p 158; BORS I (1908),p 60; Maj Jennings-
Bramly The Execution of Infantry Entrenchments (1908), P 55. 
79 BORs It p226; Ibid p227. CTrg J 902 did not reflect 1899-1902 's experience; it probably meant 
formal entrenchment rather than hasty digging, see Chapter 6. For Haldane's original remarks, see 
WO 33/1518 p 118. 
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essential principles in the design of a fire-trench ... in the [MME].80 
Later The Manual of Field Engineering stressed: 
The value of concealment cannot be over-estimated and every effort must be 
made to conceal the site of all earthworks ... It must always be borne in mind 
that invisibility is often as valuable as cover itself. 
It is not possible to directly link this change to Manchuria as South Africa had 
already stressed concealment, but the publication date of Manual of Field 
Engineering suggests that Manchuria probably caused this change. It apparently 
influenced new trench designs.81 
Engineers 
Engineers felt that Manchuria was more representative for their arm as most 
tasks involved combat. In South Africa most had been logistica1.82 The Wood 
Committee, established to review the sappers, stated: 
The general trend of modem warfare, study of the South African War ... and 
also the reports of the [MAs] from [Manchuria] point to ... the greater 
employment offield engineers on the modem field of battle ... [and] an 
effective organisation for the quick transmission of information. 
Here a major committee recognised continuity of lessons. The Committee felt that 
engineers should be increased, citing, based on Manchuria, their greater role in 
combat, siege warfare and manning both communications and new technology. 
South Africa had also demonstrated the latter two tasks' importance. Gen French 
argued for RE expansion; later Britain increased engineers in infantry divisions from 
I to 2 field companies and wished to include more, but engineers were expensive as 
Dr Towle explains.83 But this increase was at the expense of overall RE numbers in 
10 BORs II pp 641-2. 
I. Manual of Military Engineering (1911), P 24; Suggested by Lt Col Heath who reproduced the new 
designs in his lecture • Field Engineering in the Light of Modem Warfare' JR USI L (1906). The plates 
show complex redoubts. very different from the designs used in South African field combat. MME 
1901 (Provisional) saw redoubts as not very useful in war, emphasis on them in the 1905 edition 
suggests Manchuria's influence. 
U Eg Capt Wilson 'Field Engineers for Our Next War' REJ VI (1906), P 89. 
13 WO 33/6805 'Wood Co Report' p 6; Towle Influence p 164. Brig Gen Baker-Brown Histor)' of the 
Corps of [REs] IV (Chatham 1952).p 57. 
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the BEF. The Committee recommended that senior RE officers of divisions be given 
greater powers, and stressed the need for speedy fonnation-wide communications. 
Both were also South African lessons. The British created a specialist Signals 
Service in 1912; this was an RE responsibility.84 This was not just a result of 
Manchuria; Tirah and South Africa had demonstrated the importance of signals in 
dispersed combat, but the continuity of lessons is important. Manchuria also 
influenced RE training.8S 
Positional and Siege Warfare 
Dr Towle suggested that Britain should have adopted more positional tactics 
after Manchuria. He has criticised Repington' s comment: 
Fortifications are the invention of the Evil One and that an army that 
intrenches, (sic) except offensively, is lost. War is an affair of activity, initiative 
and manoeuvre; the trench and the parapet are the negation of all three. 
But this was apparently directed at war's operational level, suggested by Repington's 
use of 'army,' rather than indicating his opposition to all tactical entrenchment. That 
Repington had also stressed manoeuvre immediately before and after the above 
quotation supports this argument. De Negrier shared Repington's concems.86 Lt Col 
Heath, a sapper psc who later served on the Siege Committee, argued that even 
elaborate defences could be outmanoeuvred.87 Edmonds, another sapper, writing 
about a campaign also involving extensive fortification, concurred.88 Col Agar, a 
sapper MA, felt that extensive entrenchment would be impossible in Europe; neither 
time nor labour would be available, but he stressed its value in slower-paced 
Manchurian combat. That a senior sapper MA argued thus suggests that not all critics 
14 Maj Priestley The Signals Service in the European War of 1914 to J 918 (Chatham 1921), P 5. 
IS WO 27/505 'CRE Aldershot Memorandum on Field Engineering Manchwia.' Though limited to 
Aldershot, the garrison's prominence was likely to have caused further dissemination. 
I6/nj1uence p 154; ANG XLVI (16/12105), p 1181; Influence p 150 citing The War in the Far East 
(1905), pp 315,314-5,316. Gen de Negrier Lessons pp 54-7. Also WO 271506 'Aldershot Army-Corps 
Notes on Field Engineering;' this had much Manchwian material. 
17 'Field Engineering.' pp 304, 306.309.314-5 . 
.. 'The Campaign in Virginia in May and June 1864' PRAls XXXV( 1908-1909), P 543. 
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of over-entrenchment were either reactionary or non-engineers.89 Col Ferrier, 
Commandant SME, emphasised to an all-arms senior officers' fortification course 
the dangers: 'of fortified areas in which armies are liable to be trapped. ,90 His 
comment possibly suggests Port Arthur where a substantial Russian force was 
encircled. Ferrier was rather critical of the course's value but one student was 
. ed . 91 Impress In retrospect. That such a course had been established suggests 
Manchuria's influence. Camberley felt that: 'MANOEUVRE is the ANTIDOTE of 
ENTRENCHMENTS (sic).,92 
Dr Towle argues that sappers generally advocated entrenchment and hence 
positional warfare. Here it is suggested that the division was more complex. Towle 
correctly identifies a number of junior engineers who supported such tactics. But 
some senior sappers appreciated that entrenchment was no ne plus ultra to 
manoeuvre.
93 Nicholson, the CGS, though an engineer and an ex-Manchurian MA, 
permitted MAT 1908 and FSRs 1909 to emphasise manoeuvre. Towle also argues 
that junior ranks, defying their superiors, prevented effective digging on manoeuvres. 
Here it must be stressed that the style of manoeuvres changed from the deliberate, 
positional Manchurian-based schemes, to highly mobile ones before 1914. It is hard 
to see Smith-Dorrien or Haig being powerless to force their juniors to dig while 
Hamilton noted that troops entrenched enthusiastically. However, French as IGF was 
worried: 
I do not believe that instruction in the practical and thorough entrenching of 
positions receives adequate attention, though a few years ago it was a 
prominent feature of all our larger exercises. 
I9BORS II P 637. The similar GS opinion cited by von Donop may be due to Agar's influence. But 
Nicholson was also present and was far more senior. 
90 FEPs pp 15-4. 
91 CAB 45/132 BirchlEdmonds an 130. Birch was a horse gunner; he became a senior artillery 
commander and heavy artillery expert in the First World War. 
92 ROBPs 1/2110 'Notes on Strategy by Col Henderson ... ' 1912 Edition. Operations DESERT 
STORM and COMPASS confinn the poin~ 
93 Towle Influence p 14; Chesney, an ex-sapper, had also stressed manoeuvre, Chapter 5. 
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Consequently French set a TEWT for the REs of 1,2 and 3 Divisions involving the 
defence of a 4 mile position. Rather earlier Smith Dorrien had caused a Manchurian 
style position to be prepared and attacked. The Army Council noted that next MA T 
would emphasise entrenchment. 94 
Port Arthur rekindled British interest in siege warfare, largely donn ant since 
Delhi. Here it is emphasised that South Africa's sieges were blockades rather than 
confonning to V aub an ' s classic principles. Previously the RGA had practised siege 
gunnery, siege trains existed and sappers studied fortification, but these had little 
discernible army-wide impact. Port Arthur emphasised that sieges were a distinct 
possibility for Britain; that it supported naval operations strengthened the argument. 
Dr Towle ignores the impact on Britain: 
[t]he importance of Siege Manoeuvres has of late years been recognised by 
more than one Continental Power, and the want of technical skill shewn by the 
Japanese troops in their attack on Port Arthur, directed the attention of the 
English Military Authorities to the great necessity for the instruction of troops 
in siege warfare ... It was thought that the day of mining and handgrenades were 
numbered. [Manchuria] has ... clearly demonstrated that this is far from ... the 
case.
95 
The 1907 Chatham siege manoeuvres resulted. These involved demolishing a fort 
and were on a considerable scale. But the report was clear as to why a major siege 
posed problems for Britain. It would demand at least 3 divisions, many batteries, as 
well as a multi-division covering force, and would last months. Here it is worth 
emphasising that Bloch had forecast that prolonged mass-warfare was economically 
and logistically impossible. No major state anticipated prolonged fighting in 1914.96 
94 Ibid P 156; manoeuvres primarily exercise commanders and staff; timescales are curtailed, low-
level tactics are less prominent. The GS were concerned at improving entrenchment on manoeuvres, 
WO 279/45 P 56, the problem was time and filling in trenches afterwards; 'Training of the Troops 
during 1906' JRUSI L (1906), P 1521. WO 279/48 p 26 stresses that British Infantry had many more 
digging tools than before. The IGF cited Manchuria, WO 271508 'Inspector RE Report Aldershot 
1904.' WO 27/508 'IGF Report 1910' p 5. There was not enough time on manoeuvres for extensive 
digging, while filling in trenches was slow and damage costly; Ibid pp 20-1. 
tS W0279/15 p 7. 
96 I Bloch Is War Now Impossible? (1899), pp xi. xxxii-xxxvi; Lt Gen von Freytag-Loringhoven 
Deductionsfrom the World War (1918), pp 15-6. 
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A siege committee was established in 1908. Its work was based on Manchuria and 
the 1907 manoeuvres. It recommended publishing a manual of siege warfare. Ex-
Manchurian MAs with experience of Port Arthur, drafted this work which was later 
subsumed within FSRs 1909. There it probably had a greater chance of influencing 
the other arms.97 Manchuria influenced subsequent siege training and inspired the 
development of grenades, Bangalore Torpedoes and 9.2" Howitzers.98 
Human Factors 
Initiative 
British commentators were convinced that superior Japanese human factors 
were partly responsible for their victory. There was great British interest in them, 
perhaps implicitly recognising British failures in South Africa. 99 That the British had 
overhauled their treatment of initiative and discipline after 1902 was a further reason 
for study. Many contrasted Japanese initiative with Russian inertia. 100 Hamilton 
commented: 'our allies are warlike ... by tradition; and upon patriotism ... their 
government has been careful to graft initiative, quickness and intelligence.' He 
linked these qualities to Japanese education. Hamilton criticised Russian frontal 
close-order attacks: '[n]ot even their companies still less their sections or individuals 
seemed to show much flexibility, dash or initiative.' He censured Russian failures to 
use ground, describing their volleys as: 'the negation of individualism and wide 
extensions. ,}Ol Col Waters thought that the Russians had problems adopting modern 
tactics due to their: 'lack of initiative.' 102 French stressed to the Aldershot Command 
that human factors were vital in successful combat, citing the Japanese as an 
97 WO 163/12 'Report IGF 1906' P 56; WO 33/2986 & 33/2987. 
91 WO 33/2986; Lt Col Sandes The Indian Sappers and Miners (Chatham 1948), p 446. 
99 OS Some Tactical Notes on the Russo-Japanese War (1906), pi; Maj Oen Colvile The Allies 
(1907). 
100 Eg 'Chasseur' 'A Study of the Russo-Japanese War II' BWMCLXXVII (1905),p 296; Holbrook 
'Russo-Japanese War p 605. 
101 Oen Hamilton A Staff Officer 's Scrapboolc I ( 1905), pp 10-11,16-7. 256-7. 1 13. 
101 Reports on the Campaign in Manchuria in 1904 (1905). pp 3.133. 
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example. Maj Bird, a Quetta DS, criticised Russian training, remarking that: 
'individual initiative [was] discouraged.' Col Ross, a Camberley DS, criticised the 
Russian Viceroy who: 'stamped out initiative, and thereby destroyed all offensive 
spirit.,103 These criticisms by two able middle-ranking officers suggest the Army's 
trend of thinking. Repington stressed the imperative need for: 'independence, 
initiative and intelligence,' which he felt Tsarism had repressed. Defective human 
factors had impeded the Russian ability to manoeuvre. 104 Maj Maurice, later DMO, 
praised Japanese soldiers' qualities and their army's training, contrastingly the 
Russians were: 'quite incapable of thinking for themselves.' 105 In a work translated 
and edited by serving British officers, Kuropatkin, the Russian CinC, condemned 
Russian officers and soldiers' poor initiative and recommended urgent 
improvement. 106 The as circulated an article by Capt Degtyarev, a Manchurian 
veteran, recommending low-level initiative.107 Others maintained that the Russians 
were unable to adopt open-order tactics due to their inertia, comparing: '[i]ntelligent' 
Japanese soldiers with their: 'stupid, cumbrous and ill-led' adversaries. lOS The 
Quarterly Review commented that: 'the necessity for education, personal initiative, 
and intelligence has been equally proved by [South Africa and Manchuria].' This is 
th 109 another example of contemporary parallels between e two wars. 
The above evidence suggests that British interest in initiative had not declined 
since 1902. All were effectively arguing that the Russians were incapable of 
dispersed, modem tactics due to their defective human factors. Dr Towle argues that 
10) WO 27/503 'Training lSI Army Corps' P 2; Lectures on the Strategy o/the Russo-Japanese War 
(1909), pp 15-6; An Outline o/the Russo Japanese War (1911), pp 147,442. 
104 Far East pp 314-5. made immediately before commenting on entrenchment, fn 86 above. 
105 Cambridge Modern History XII (Cambridge 1910), pp 584-5. FB Maurice wrote this section. 
106 trans Capt Lindsay ed Maj Swinton The Russian Army and the Japanese War I (1909), pp 227-8. 
107 'Notes upon Company and Battalion Tactics' JRUSI LII (1908), P 66. 
100lM Price & 'Miles' 'Mukden and After' MR LXXVII (1905). Gen Lyttelton concurred, WO 279/9 
P 129; FHE Cunliffe 'Some Causes of the Japanese Victories' CHMXVIII (1905), p 770; Col 
Phillpotts 'Some Lessons from the Russo-Japanese War' JRA XXXIII (1906-7), P 164. 
109 'The War in the Far East' QR 202 (1905), p 304; Maj Kenjiro 'The New Japanese Infantry 
Tnining ... 1906' JRUSI LI (1907). p 714. 
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British infantry tactics regressed after Manchuria This is examined later but what 
must be stressed here is that the contemporary British emphasis on human factors 
was essential for modern, dispersed tactics. Manchuria had reiterated the 
importance of initiative. I 10 
Training after 1905 continued to emphasise initiative. Col Macartney-Filgate 
described imaginative scout training, designed to develop initiative, based on 
Manchuria. Brig Gen Bloomfield's lecture 'Modem Warfare and Individual 
Initiative' cited many Manchurian and South African examples. Bloomfield linked 
firepower and extended battlefields, deducing that on them: 'individual intelligence 
became absolutely necessary.' III The Japanese stress on initiative influenced scout 
training, while the Pachmahi Musketry School instilled initiative on Japanese lines. 
Unfortunately the article did not describe their methods, but that a major school 
stressed both initiative and the Japanese example suggests that Manchuria was 
influential. 
Patriotism and the Japanese 
The Japanese example encouraged the cultivation of patriotism in soldiers. 
Capper, Commandant Quetta, stressed this and British manuals from 1905 
accentuated it. 112 CT 1907 emphasised: 
The soldier must be given a far higher aim than that of merely satisfying ... the 
drill instructor. He must be encouraged to feel that in perfecting himself as a 
fighting man he is preparing to take his part in furthering the aims of his 
country ... Among soldiers so trained, individuality and self-reliance can safely 
be developed without any fear of sacrificing discipline. The strongest fonn of 
discipline in an army is that which comes from the conception of duty in its 
highest fonn which is the spirit of loyalty to King and country. I 13 
110 Towle Influence pp 84-5; Capt Cunninghame Changes in Training and Infantry Formations 
(Dublin 1911), p 13. 
III 'Manchuria in the Mourne Mountains.' CHMXXVI (1909). It also included Peninsular LI 
~rience; USG (18/1/06), p 45. 
liZ Scouting and the Training of Scouts in Peace (Dublin 1907),pp3,5,8-9; Col Skinner' Fire 
DiSCipline' AR II (1912), pp 458,462; CPs 214/1 'Memoir for Junior Division-Lecture' 1908 pp 2-4. 
III CT 1907 P 18. 
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This quotation analyses 'internal' discipline well. CT 1904 was less emphatic, 
suggesting that the Japanese Anny and Manchuria had caused the change. Though it 
is impossible to prove Japanese influence directly, but when comparing these 
sentiments with Capper's remarks on patriotism, Maj Bannennan' s lecture 'The 
Creation of the Japanese National Spirit,' Diosy's lecture 'The Spirit of the Anned 
Forces of Japan' or Repington' s 'The Soul of a Nation,' the linkage is strong. Other 
manuals stressed patriotism, suggesting the shift towards 'internal' motivation 
argued in Chapter 7. 114 
It may be objected that both the press and schools had promoted patriotism 
heavily before 1899. Scholars have analysed both contemporary attitudes to and the 
efforts to instil it. But they have not cited official efforts to promote patriotism in the 
Army. The scholarly consensus is that patriotism was reasonably widespread in those 
classes which furnished the bulk of officers and soldiers. Furthermore the rush of 
volunteers in 1899-1900 suggests no lack of patriotism. 115 Baynes argues that 
patriotism was a deep-rooted but undemonstrative element in most officers and to a 
lesser extent in soldiers. 1 16 Had a lack of patriotism been perceived as a problem in 
South Africa, and there is no evidence of such attitudes affecting combat, it would 
have been logical to have used CTrg 1902 and IT 1902 to start inculcating it. 117 It is 
of course possible to argue that there would have been a lag before implementation, 
but the fact that CT 1904, a major manual, emphasised patriotism far less than CT 
114 PRAls XXXII (1905-6); The Times 4/10/04, Repington Far East Chapter XXXIII; IT 1911 stressed 
patriotism and morale, pp 1-2, IT 1905 issued on 112105, effectively before Manchuria's lessons were 
di,ested, has was far less emphatic than the former. 
II M. Blanch, 'British society and the war' in ed. P Warwick The South African War. The Anglo-Boer 
War /899-/902, (1980), pp 216-7, 230-1. R Price An Imperial War (1972) and R Samuels Patriotism p 989 ), this work written after the Falklands War contains remarks that suggest a lack of detachment. 
16 Lt Col Baynes Morale (NY reprinted 1988), Chapter 10. The work is secondary and has defects, 
but it is, however, the only detailed analysis of attitudes of soldiers in the Edwardian period and was 
based on research with veterans. 
117 General Viljoen My Reminiscences of the Anglo-Boer War (1902), P 519 praised British and 
decried Boer patriotism. He had been a senior Boer commander. Henderson praised the troops' 
patriotism. The Science of War (1905). pp 421-2. 
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1907 did, suggests that the Russo-Japanese War was the main reason. The Japanese 
provided a fonnidable example of patriotism, initiative and 'internal' discipline. This 
naturally appeared very relevant to inculcating these qualities, demanded by 
manoeuvre-based tactics, in British soldiers. The second point of interest is that the 
Army even made an official effort. Generally the British attitude to the official 
fostering of patriotism is well illustrated by Kipling's: 'Jelly-bellied Flag-flapper.' 
Here it must be emphasised that individual officers and units probably encouraged 
patriotism before 1904, though the evidence is poor.118 After Manchuria the Japanese 
were often cited as an example. 1 19 
Professor Travers argues that the British overemphasised morale and 
determination in 1914, though their doctrine was more restrained than the French, 
but his criticisms are somewhat overstated. Morale remains a principle of war, 
human factors are vital in manoeuvre warfare and, given the radical alterations in the 
British treatment of initiative and discipline, their interest in Japanese personnel 
qualities is defensible, being related to 'internal' discipline and open-order tactics. 120 
It may also be added that, despite far greater casualties and a far more testing 
combat-environment, the Army in 1916-18 did not suffer as large a dip in morale as 
occurred between 1941-2. How far its fostering of human factors before 1914 
sustained morale in the grim period 1915-1916 is remain a matter for further 
research. But on the evidence available here, the Army was probably right 
118 R Kipling Stalky and Co (1899), pp 211-1S. It may be noted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer's 
promotion of Britishness has equally failed to move the nation, Times various dates May-June 2007. 
The use of fiction may be deemed inappropriate but Kipling who had excellent links with the 
Establishment and Army has considerable credibility and was writing in the period. 
119 Col G Poignand • A Plea for Education in Patriotism and Home Defence' JLR I ( 1910), p282. 
110 The Killing Ground (1990). pp 43-4. R Leonhard The Art of Maneuver (Novato 1991), P 139 
suggests the importance of human factors in manoeuvre warfare. 
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to emphasise human factors before 1914.121 
Patriotism, Initiative, the Boy Scouts and Japan 
The creation of the Boy Scout movement gives an interesting sidelight on a 
number of issues with which this Chapter examines. The Scouts grew out of Baden-
Powell's manual Aids to Scouting which was spontaneously used by teachers, leaders 
of organisations such as the Boys' Brigade and private individuals to train youths 
from 1900. Allenby's governess used it to teach his son. She had been instructed in 
its educational value at her training college. 
It would be wrong to argue that the development of the Boy Scout movement 
was a planned top-down process, nor was it entirely military, though Baden-Powell 
used much military terminology early on. Then he wished to use 'corporal' and 
'adjutant' to designate subordinate scout leaders. The Army called their leaders of 
reconnaissance troops: 'scoutmasters,' like the Scouts. Baden-Powell's programme 
at Brownsea Island showed a heavy military influence, while his stress on training in 
living in rough conditions was an important South African lesson. He took his group 
at Brownsea out: 'on duty as "night picket'" and let them bivouac by patrols. His 
programme there was based on the following: 
Day 1 Duties, orders. Day 2 Campaigning, including cooking, health, camp 
resourcefulness. Day 3 Observation. Day 4 Woodcraft including stalking. 
Day 5 Chivalry including: 'Code of the Knights.' 'Patriotism,' 'Loyalty to 
King, employers and officers.' Day 6 Lifesaving. Day 7 Patriotism 
incorporating the Services, also marksmanship, History and Empire, duties as 
citizens. Day 8 Games for the above. 122 
121 It is hard to make direct comparisons and a large number of factors have to be taken into account 
when assessing morale in the two World Wars. The British Army in 1941-2 had suffered a series of 
humiliating defeats for which there was no equivalent in 1914-18. The Depression, the aftermath of 
1914-18 and criticisms of the Army undoubtedly had weakened morale. Boredom, separation from 
families who were in many instances more exposed to danger than soldiers provided a worse basis for 
morale than was the case in 1915-16. D French Raising Churchill's Army (Oxford 200), p 130, C 
Duffy Through German Eyes (2006), pp 121,328. Further it can be suggested that the combat 
environment in 1940-1 with tanks, aircraft attacking in depth was worse than the stresses that the 
German artillery and machine guns inflicted between 1914-18, despite the fact that the latter caused 
heavier casualties . 
IU P Everett The First Ten Years (Ipswich nd), p 13. Everett was closely associated with Baden-
Powell in the period and the summary above which precises Everett's quotation appears to have been 
taken from a contemporary document. 
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The Day 5 and 7 programmes suggest the Japanese influence. Bushido roughly 
interpreted equates to 'Code of the Knights.' Nitobe, a contemporary Japanese 
scholar, used knight as a synonym for samurai and chivalry for Bushido. Baden 
Powell explicitly acknowledged the Japanese in Scouting/or Boys. 123 
Jeal considers that Baden-Powell's emphasis on initiative and independence 
was inconsistent with his stress on discipline. 124 This is perfectly explained by the 
fact that the Anny was switching to 'internal' discipline fostered by patriotism, 
teamwork and comradeship. Baden-Powell stated that: 
Scout-craft includes ... resourcefulness, discipline, self-reliance, unselfishness, 
physical activity .. .loyalty and patriotism. 125 
These were exactly the qualities which the Army was now seeking to inculcate in its 
soldiers. That Baden-Powell selected as the basic element of his organisation, the 
scout, the most valuable type of Infantry and Cavalry private soldier is significant. 
Many of the elementary games which he used had military themes or were based on 
military methods. The movement developed fitness, critical in view of the revelations 
of the poor average physique that recruiting for South Africa had revealed. 126 
The Scout movement is an interesting synthesis of tactics, South African 
and Japanese influences mixed with civilian aspects. Howell, 2ic of the 4th 
Hussars stressed the need to arouse the Boy Scout spirit in the unit and in one 
Kitchener battalion the CO selected his JNCOs from ex-scouts.127 
General Tactics 
The British admired Japanese human factors but criticised their tactics, noting 
that they later started to adopt South African ones. MAs reported with a touch of 
123 I Nitobe Bushido (NY 1905), pp 4-4,6-7; Scouting/or Boys (Oxford reprinted 2004), p 212. 
124 T Jeal Baden-Powell (1989), pp 381, 413. 
115 Lt Oen Baden-Powell Scouting/or Boys. An Explanation (nd), p 1. 
126 Lt Gen R Baden Powell Scouting Games (1910); Memorandum by the Director-General. AmlY 
Medical Service, on the Physical Unfitness ... [Recruits] (1903) (Cd 1501). 
127 HowPs 8/4/1 Letter 16112113. 
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schadenfreude the failure of close-order Gennan tactics in Manchuria. Thus British 
interest was mainly directed therefore at the higher tactical levels. Roberts' tactics in 
1900 had been largely based on outflanking and this was reflected in post-war 
training. A brigade attacking an un entrenched Y2 battalion frontally was adjudged 
defeated. 128 Here it must be stressed that, though outflanking was then as it is now 
tactically advantageous, it is often unachievable. Manchuria renewed emphasis on 
tactically frontal attacks. Paradoxically this may have aided manoeuvre. 129 Smith-
Dorrlen conducted a 3 day frontal assault on an entrenched Manchurian-style 
position. A similar live-firing exercise occurred in Ireland which also involved 
artillery clearing barbed wire. In 1905 French outlined forthcoming training 
involving the: 
practice of great attacks which require several days to initiate, mature ... and 
bring to a successful conclusion. I mean the employment of such tactics as were 
used by the Japanese. 130 
The British had noted that terrain might, as at Nan-shan, compel frontal attacks and 
that very extended lateral lines restricted manoeuvrability. The Anny circulated the 
Japanese Opinions with regard to the Attack of Entrenched Positions, while Maj 
Home wrote a long article 'Reflections on the Tactics of the Attack' outlining 
deliberate, methodical assaults on positions. That Home, an MA with the Russians, 
became a staff officer at Aldershot in April 1905 weakens Towle's case that MAs 
with the Russians and their reports were ignored. But it would be over-stretching the 
evidence to suggest that Home decisively influenced Aldershot training in 1906. 
French was clearly using MA reports. Similarly Col Waters lectured to Camberley in 
121 Notes/or Guidance on South African Warfare (1900); WO 279/9 P 116; Maj Gilbert 'The Battle of 
Kinchau' JUSII XXXIII (1904), P 238. The ratio of relative strengths 8: 1 for the attackers exceeds 
r,resent nonns generally taken as 3: 1. 
:ttuMIUI7/5/1811 pp 57-8; 'Fantassin' 'Practice as Opposed to Theory ... · USM XXXVI (1907). p 
203. The Glossary explains the paradox. 
'JOarig Gen Ballard Smith-Dorrien (1931), pp 120-1. though secondary it is a factual statement; 
'Combined Training in Ireland' A NG XLVI ( 1905), P 898; AFPs 50321 'Training Aldershot ... 1905 . 
P 153. 
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1905.131 Similar deliberate tactics were used in the 'Manchurian attack' exercises 
held throughout Western India; these consisted of sapping towards objectives. 132 
Large-scale, deliberate frontal attacks posed problems for a small, regular 
army. They would be costly in casualties. Far more artillery would be needed, thus 
impairing mobility and complicating logistics. Such tactics would have locked the 
British into positional, attritional combat in which numbers would ultimately prevail. 
They would have clashed with the BEF's semi-independent role which demanded 
manoeuvre. French retrospectively criticised his failure to foresee positional warfare, 
but for a brief period he clearly had. The rationale which drove the Anny towards 
manoeuvre was implicit in its size and likely mission. 133 
Capper, writing about Manchurian night attacks, criticised positional, 
methodical operations, citing the Spion Kop campaign as an example. Capper saw 
night operations as a means of avoiding such deliberate tactics and Manchuria 
influenced night training, instanced by the Indian publication and FSRs J 909' s 
Chapter 9. 134 Night operations were a means of defeating defensive firepower and 
gaining surprise. Manchuria and South Africa inspired searchlight trials and the 
establishment of a searchlight company. Commentators were influenced by 
Manchuria but also foresaw that evading aircraft observation would make night 
operations more attractive. 135 Later the Anny issued Elementary Training in Night 
Operations J 9 J J. This summarised existing material but its production suggests the 
importance that the Anny attached to night combat. The IGF scrutinised night 
III Glossary; JRUSI LI (1907); Tactics ppI2,1; JRUS/LII (1908), pp 1633,1638; fn above; QAL 1908 
E lOa; IPs Diary 7/4/05. 
II UMIU 17/5/1810 P 60. Capper deprecated them for teaching over-caution. 
III J Gooch The Plans of War (1974), p 289. 
134 FM French 1914 (1919), pp 11-12; EPs 8704-35-17; WO 106/180 P 3. Here Capper meant the 
slow move and methodical operations before the assault, see SKDs (1902); DFANAMW(SimJa 1908): 
Lt Col Haldane 'Night Attacks' BORs II P 520. 
IlS Col Dawkins Night Operations For Infantry (1910),pp 1-2. Gen Haldane A Soldier's Saga (1948). 
p 271 trained his brigade extensively at night, particularly in withdrawal. 
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•• 136 Thi 
training. s was another link with South Africa 
Headlam argued that Manchuria modified South Africa's lessons and made 
B .. h . b' 137 ntis tactics etter sUIted to European warfare. This is a retrospective judgement, 
but Headlam, criticised for his opposition to Indirect Fire, partly a Manchurian 
lesson, would appear unprejudiced here. Dr Towle criticises Kiggell's comment that 
1870 was a surer model for British tactics than Manchuria, implying mental rigidity. 
But it is arguable that 1870, which saw manoeuvre, doctrine and initiative used at the 
operational level to defeat the French rapidly, may indeed be seen as superior to a 
war causing revolution and bankruptcy. 138 Kiggell, introducing his edited version of 
Hamley's The Operations of War, emphasised that tactics were constantly changing; 
he later analysed Manchuria and made a case for why combat there was abnormal 
and why manoeuvre on the lines of 1870 was still possible. It may be argued, though 
not conclusively proved, that Kiggell, an educated soldier, was commending 1870 
for its operational-level manoeuvre, rather than the continued validity of its minor 
tactics. Here one faces the problem that contemporaries used tactics to describe 
everything from section-level combat to the operations of an army corps. 
The British were very critical of Russian failures to persist in combats by 
committing reserves and for irresolution. 139 Here one can detect a parallel with 
South Africa, where Buller's failure to force through attacks and Roberts' avoidance 
of casualties were criticised. No British contemporary commentator made this 
point, career considerations would have made such criticisms risky, but stinging 
denunciations of Russian irresolution and praise for Japanese tenacity implicitly 
136 WO 271505 Capt Holloway' ... Night Operations' p 1; Gen Hamilton 'Remarks ... on Training 
19O5' JRUS/(I90S), pp 1549-50; WO 33/2967, the Committee's work was based on Manchurian. 
South African, trials and European evidence; UMIU 1715/1617 Appendix 13 p 7S; Baker· Brown REs, 
E 292; WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1907' p 7. 
37 Maj Gen Headlam The History of the [RA] II /899-/9/4 (Woolwich 1937). p 151. 
III Towle Influence pIS. 
139 Hamley &KiggeU Operations pp v, 403-4, 376; Home War p 17. 
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criticised British performance in 1899-1900. Here one can speculate that South 
Africa and Manchuria helped to foster the over-determination in attack and retention 
of even unfavourable terrain often seen between 1914-1918. 
Dr Towle sees the reports on infantry tactics as divided between progressives 
and conservatives, suggesting that tactics regressed after 1905. 140 His argument is 
largely based on the question of extension between men. Extensions in 1899-1902 
were abnormal, being up to 30 paces between men. These strained the ability to 
control and massively exceeded near-current British norms. At higher levels brigades 
and divisions deployed across frontages far exceeding European norms. Even 
extensions post-1902 ranged from 6-20 paces between men. 141 The reasons for such 
over-extensions were the very open terrain and Boer reluctance to counterattack. Gen 
Hutton, a tactically progressive rifleman, had already queried them, while Hamilton, 
not tactically reactionary, commented: 
Nothing in the war in the Far East justifies the idea that vigorously defended 
positions can be taken by thin lines of skirmishers. 
Hythe's trials discovered that closer intervals were feasible without undue casualties. 
Hamilton noted that over-wide lateral extensions hampered manoeuvre, arguing that 
they had become a South African fetish. 142 This suggests that Towle's argument is 
simplistic. Indeed reducing lateral extensions may enable depth to be increased, thus 
enhancing manoeuvrability. Hamilton argued thus, though he also warned that lateral 
intervals could not be contracted further. 143 Later Capt Cunninghame, a GS officer, 
advocated less stereotyped tactics based on greater depth. Such tactics would have 
increased manoeuvrability. They depended on low-level initiative. The final 
140 Towle Influence pp 76-7. 
141 Infantry in the late 1980s deployed roughly 10 yards apart. MA T 1908 pp 5-6 emphasises ~e 
difference between tactical and formation extensions and the dangers of over-extended formations. 
142 HuPs 50086 HuttonIWood 26/11/03; 'The Training of Troops during 1906' JRUSI L (1906), p 
1523; Towle notes Hamilton's support Influence p 84; WO 279/9 pp 119-120; 'Training 1906' P 
1523; Glossary. 
143 UMIUI7/5/1811 p56; 'Training of the Troops during 1901' JRUSI LlI (1908), pp 89-90. 
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argument against Towle' thesis that British formations were insufficiently extended 
are British criticisms of dense German formations and German reports of wide 
British extensions from 1906.144 
Dr Towle implicitly criticises Haig's warning against 'premature extension,' 
but here the dual meaning of 'extension' deceives him. This did not relate to the 
physical distance between men in combat but to deployment from manoeuvre to 
fighting formations. Haig's warning has validity.145 
Conclusions 
Current scholarship has interpreted the British assessment of Manchuria's 
lessons as a failure to foresee the tactical conditions which prevailed between 1915-
18. This thesis argues that Manchuria's lessons, seen without the benefit of hindsight, 
were not so straightforward. Many contemporaries, including several MAs, saw 
tactical continuities between Manchuria and South Africa. Gen De Negrier, a noted 
authority, and the Germans concurred. 146 Modem analysts have stressed the tactical 
discontinuities between the two wars. Here it is argued that, however correct these 
retrospective arguments are, they were not emphasised before 1914. 147 
Dr Towle has stated that Manchuria's results on Britain were small; here it is 
argued that his judgement must be qualified. Accepting that contemporary opinion 
saw much continuity, Manchuria's unique effects were certainly small, though it 
revived interest in sieges and more minor lessons were implemented than Towle 
cites. But continuity is significant in its own right. Dr Towle argues that the British 
failed to align their tactics with their new continental strategy. He implies that more 
144 'Training' pp7,10,13; Glossary; Capt Yate, an ex-Manchurian MA, The Manoeuvres of the 
Prussian Guard Corps in 1910 (1910), P 12; Edmonds MOFB 1914 I pp 70,72; Maj von Heydebreck 
'The British Anny of the Present Day' CR XCIII (1908), P 257. 
145 Glossary; Towle Influence p 88 citing Indian Training Memorandum 1910. 
146 Eg Hamilton WO 33/1518 pp 37-8, Nicholson disagreed; Lessons. p 8; 'Von Lobell Reports 1904' 
JRUSI XLIX ( 1905), P 1277, They were Gennan official documents, translated annually in Britain. 
147 Col Connaughton Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear (2004). pp 10,348. 
284 
emphasis should have been placed on firepower and positional tactics, the lessons 
that Manchuria, in his judgement, taught. But until 1911 British strategy was not 
dovetailed into French plans and thus demanded operational and tactical mobility. 148 
Nor could Britain assume that a major war would start with positional combat; 
neither France nor Germany planned for this. French tactics, though generally 
incoherent, were neither positional nor defensive. Had the British adopted such 
tactics, it is likely that there would have been problems in 1914.149 
Dr Towle claims that Manchuria damaged British tactics. Certainly extensions 
reduced, but these were probably excessive given existing communications. Some 
contemporary evidence contradicts him. Continued British interest in initiative, the 
antithesis of close-order tactics, weakens his argument, while the substantial increase 
in divisional artillery after Manchuria impugns his proposition that artillery was 
devalued. Manchuria links South Africa to FSRs 1909's emphasis on manoeuvre. To 
contemporaries Manchuria showed the dangers of congealed combat: bankruptcy in 
Japan, revolution in Russia. 
l"Towle Influence p 18. 
149 Not least because increasing artillery would have delayed the BEF's deployment. 
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Chapter 9 Doctrine, Command, the Staff and Training 
Introduction 
An' thus in memr'y's cinematograph, 
Now that the show is over, I recall, 
The peevish voice and 'oary mushroom 'ead, 
Of 'im we owned was greater than us all, 
'00 gave instruction to the quick an' the dead-
The Shuddering Beggar- not upon the StaID 
This Chapter argues the Anny advanced from drill towards doctrine in order 
to guide greater initiative and to facilitate manoeuvre in increasingly complex 
combat. This new theoretical emphasis demanded a substantial mental shift for a 
service with an anti-intellectual bias. l The Chapter analyses doctrine's links with the 
staff. Improvements in that organisation aided the introduction of doctrine, or if not 
purposefully intended so, they would have been beneficial. The training system 
altered to accommodate complexity and initiative and to develop judgement. These 
alterations also helped to introduce doctrine. This Chapter examines the principal 
manuals, CTrg 1902, 1905 & FSRs 1909. It concludes that the assessment that there 
was no British military doctrine before 1914 is wrong. 2 
Doctrine 
Definitions 
Doctrine is defined as: 'that which is taught' or 'teaching' and in this sense 
armies always have had doctrine. But this definition is inadequate as it can simply be 
applied to Dundas's 18 Manoeuvres, rigid drill with little scope for initiative. 
However the link made between training and doctrine is significant. The quantitative 
and qualitative improvement of training from 1900 demanded a more doctrinal 
approach. Reasoned deductions about future combat, ie doctrine, were needed in 
order to determine what must be taught. Furthermore to prevent confusion, such 
deductions had to be Army-wide with uniformity imposed in training. 
I ADP 2 Command (1995), p 2-A-4. 
1 Brig Bidwell and D Graham Firepower (1982), P 2. 
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However, a contemporary military definition of doctrine gives a better insight 
into its nature: 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in 
support of objectives. 3 
Such principles demand study to identify and thus have implications for the 
staff, the body charged with examining issues systematically.4 'Fundamental' also 
suggests that the principles so obtained should be consistent. The Army stressed 
identifying 'principles' from 1902 and, if they are accepted as essential components 
of doctrine, this suggests that it was being developed then.s Doctrine's link with 
objectives implies that it tends to relate to the higher military levels where aims are 
decided. Therefore it has a greater involvement with the strategic and operational 
levels of war rather than tactics. This further suggests that doctrine has a greater 
affinity with manoeuvre rather than tactically-dominated attrition. Manoeuvre 
stretches communications more than positional warfare and tends to be fought at a 
higher tempo thus making initiative and doctrine more necessary. 6 
A contemporary analysis of doctrine is valuable in comprehending its nature 
and benefits: 
Knowledge and understanding of doctrine ... aid clarity of thought in the chaos 
of ... war. Sound doctrine provides a common approach ... which is not bound 
by prescriptive rules. This will lead through training to consistent behaviour, 
mutual confidence and properly orchestrated collective action, without 
constraining individual initiative. Doctrine also encompasses organization and 
command, to ensure unity of effort. 7 
Neither quotation suggests rigid compliance. The second's reference to chaos 
suggests how doctrine guides initiative amidst complexity. The accentuation of 
initiative from 1897, analysed in Chapter 7, is another argument for doctrine's 
1 JA Simpson & ES Weiner The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford 2001),p 916; DMO (1996), pi-I. 
• Col Henderson The Science of War (1905). p 419. 
swo 3216782 'OMT/CGS 3/12104' refers repeatedly to 'principles' in tactics and training. 
6 C Bellamy The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare (1990). pp 60-2 suggests that increased 
dispersion fostered the operationalle\'el. Figure 3.2 shows combat's spatial expansion; Chapter 5. 
7 BDD (1996), p 1-4. The point on tempo can be deduced by comparing Megiddo to 3nf Ypres. 
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emergence, for, as the quotation above suggests, it balances control and 
independence. Applying doctrine catering for uncertainty demands judgement, 
developed by training and education, rather than rigid obedience instilled by drill. 8 
Henderson concluded that a key priority of the LI system was: '[t]o train the 
judgement of the officers, so that when left to themselves, they may do the right 
thing' supports this proposition.9 Developing judgement demands education and 
principles which serve as: 'a framework of understanding ... to provide direction' to 
thought. 10 Clausewitz commented on the importance of training in this process: 
peacetime manoeuvres are a feeble substitute for [ war] but even they can give 
an army an advantage over others whose training is confined to drill. To plan 
manoeuvres so that some of the elements of friction are involved, which will 
train officers' judgement. .. is far more worthwhile. 11 
It follows that training is different for doctrinally-reliant armies than for those 
imposing top-down control. The former involves delegation and complexity, aiming 
to develop judgement, with greater toleration of mistakes. Training indoctrinates 
commanders, training validates doctrine. This relationship has long been militarily 
accepted, having similarities with university research and tuition. 12 
Contemporary analysis suggests that relationships exist between doctrine, 
organization and command, linked by the staff, while 'unity of effort' emphasises 
aims' importance, ie that all activity must support their achievement. Armies 
emphasising doctrine are more likely to stress all-arms cooperation, partly because 
army-wide doctrine develops judgement and facilitates cooperation between the 
arms. In turn all-arms cooperation requires common standards of training. These 
encourage doctrine's development. British manuals from 1902 stressed inter-arm 
• Oen Langlois, translated OS, Lessonsfrom Two Recent Wars (1909), pp 144-5; Chapter 7. 
9 Henderson Science pp 347-8, 364; Chapter 2 
10 DMOp 1-2. 
"Col Callwell The Tactics of Home Defence (Edinburgh 19081 pp 4-5; Eds M Howard &P Paret Gen 
von Clausewitz On War (1993). p 122. 
12 ADP 2 p 3-3; Henderson Science p 347; eg MAT India /9/0-// extensively criticises violations of 
FSRs. AR II (1912),p 59. The British and American Armies link doctrine and training. eg TRADOC, 
OODT. DMO (1996), pp 4-4,4-39,4-44 analyses this; Ibid pp 4-45-6. 
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cooperation. This suggests that conditions were conducive to doctrine emerging. 
Modern military doctrine dates back to Clausewitz, being first implemented by 
Moltke. 13 Henderson analysed its development, stressing the importance of 
'judgement,' 'principles,' as well as training and the significance of strategy in the 
process. Before 1899 the British had no doctrine as currently militarily defined. IDB 
1896's very title suggests rigidity. Tirah had exposed its defects, emphasising that 
initiative, staffwork and coordination were essential in complex combat. From Tirah 
and the Peninsular LI, Vemer and Henderson developed a tactical model which 
emphasised initiative and judgement in such fighting. 14 This, Henderson's analysis of 
the Gennans and his stress on strategy at the start of Stonewall Jackson suggest that 
conditions likely to promote doctrine were developing. 
Doctrine and Staffwork 
Success in combat not only relies on initiative but also on transmission of 
command aims, co-ordination and synchronisation. I 5 The staff generates these 
effects, which may be broadly described as staffwork, allowing generals to 
concentrate on essentials. 16 Earlier it was argued that attrition influenced staffwork, 
putting a premium on the managerial accumulation of resources to generate 
firepower. However manoeuvre equally depends on intelligent staffwork as unguided 
initiative is dangerous. Control is as important in manoeuvre as it is in attrition. 
Indeed manoeuvre, dependent on careful selection of aims and their transmission, 
reliant on synchronisation and coordination, has perhaps greater need for intelligent 
13 B Condell & DT Zabecki On the German Art of War Truppenfuhrung (Boulder 200 I), P x. 
14 S Wilkinson The Brain of an Army (1890),pp 96-7; Gen von Caemmerer, The Development of 
Strategic Science during the 19th Century (1905), ix, examines Moltke's methods using mobility and 
initiative, which 'demanded uniformity of thought' ie doctrine; Henderson Science pp 4-7; Chapter 2. 
IS The section used no staffwork in its skirmish, but that it reached its start-line, its training, 
organization and logistics, represented vast staff effort, Chapter 1; It is probably more than a historical 
curiosity that the British Army in South Africa popularised the wearing of wristwatches, suggesting 
~ter synchronisation, JR Beniger The Control Revolution (Cambridge 1986),p 329. 
6 Brig Oen Aston Staff Duties and Other Subjects ( 1913 ),pp 3-5. 
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staffwork than attrition which can offset mistakes by numerical superiority.I7 In 
manoeuvre there is a greater requirement for creativity as instanced by Manstein' s 
concept for SICHELSCHNITT. This contrasts with the managerial dumping 
calculations required in attrition. The German Anny, originators of the modem staff 
system, doctrinally manoeuvrist, was superior in operational staffwork in the World 
Wars to the Allies, who relied more on attrition. The latter were better provided with 
resources and were arguably better at logistic staffwork.18 
Developing and disseminating doctrine and planning training, largely staff 
functions, are critical. Though initiating doctrine may not depend absolutely on the 
staff, its development and continuity depends on them as Arnold Foster emphasised: 
[i]t is impossible to secure continuity of policy and action without reasoned and 
well-ordered thought. At present, as in the past, every Officer ... has his own 
opinion on every conceivable military subject. .. Thus continuity of thought, of 
purpose and of action are wholly impossible. 19 
Continuity is essential to establishing doctrine, while developments in the staff and 
staffwork suggest increasingly complex combat, which in tum demands a more 
doctrinal approach and more advanced training. 
Doctrine and Weapons 
Purpose-designed weapons embody basic assumptions on warfare and thus 
represent crystallised doctrine. From 1900 Britain developed its new field guns, the 
Army's largest pre-1914 equipment programme, in a radically new way. This 
17 Lt Col Maurice 'The Use and Abuse of the Initiative' AR VII (1914),p8; Lt Col Henderson 
Stonewall Jackson (1898), pp 220-2; pre-manoeuvre assembly demands tight traffic control, eg poor 
staffwork prejudiced the reserves' move at Loos and during manoeuvre staffwork is critical, Brig Gen 
Edmonds MOFB /9/5 II (1928),pp 394-5; WO 108/299 ppl0-11 shows how uncoordinated 
interference damaged rail mobility in South Africa. 
18 BR Posen The Sources 0/ Military Doctrine (Ithaca 1984), pp 65-6 analyses German links between 
mobility and offence; Col Dupuy A Genius/or War (Fairfax 1989), pp 47,49,51-2. But the Germans 
suffered logistically. AR Millett and W Murray Military Effectiveness I The First World War (Boston 
1988),p 15 for the importance of C3 and staffwork on increasing German mobility, despite their 
poorer physical capabilities, eg in motor transport; FM von Manstein Lost Victories (1958), pp 1 03-
105; M van Creveld Supplying War (1977), Chapter 7. 
19S Bronfeld 'Fighting Outnumbered' JMH 71 (2007) for the influence of Gens DePuy and Starry in 
initiating doctrine; B Condell, DT Zabecki Truppenfuhnmg, p xi; Capt Lupfer The Dynamics of 
Doctrine (Leavenworth 1991),pp 8,56; AFPs 50321 'Memorandum ... Formation of the [GS).' Maj 
Oen Callwell Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson I (1927),p 63 claims this was Wilson's work. 
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involved user-specifications based on assumptions about future combat. Previously 
the Army had relied on manufacturers' ideas. The SMLE was developed similarly, 
though it was less technically radical than the new QFs.2o The introduction of 
purpose-designed weapons shows that combat was becoming more complex and that 
consequently greater intellectual effort was needed if weapons were to match the 
expected conditions of combat. Doctrinally developing weapons also encouraged 
thinking about future tactics, in tum causing adjustments to training. 
South African Defects 
South Africa revealed an array of defects in the Army's organization, its inter-
arm and inter-formation cooperation, staffwork and command. There were also 
defects in preparation for the war and strategic errors at its start. The latter are 
outside the scope of this thesis, but they all suggest serious defects in Army's 
command and staff system. Henderson blamed bad staffwork on the small numbers 
attending Camberley and the consequent lack of common principles.21 Ultimately the 
whole points to doctrinal defects, a want of thought about war, its needs and the 
principles involved. Col Clarke commented: 
The more I study the SA war (sic), the more I see that Staff incompetence, 
muddling and disorder lay at the very root of our humiliations. 
He diagnosed that staff-disorganisation meant that thinking about war, a pre-
requisite for developing doctrine was impossible.22 The RCWSA heavily criticised 
improvised formations, poor staffwork and the ensuing chaos, concluding: 
For an Army of 90,000 ... we had, probably as many trained staff officers as 
were required. But when the Army grew to ... 300,000 ... appointments had to 
be filled by men with whom want of experience was the rule ... [T]he absence 
of a definite system of staff duties ... was undoubtedly prejudicial to the smooth 
running of the military machine. Many instances of indifferent staffwork might 
20 BalPs RMMISAs /895-/928 I 'Memorandum ... ordnance factories' pp 4,6; Maj Gen Headlam The 
History o/the {RAJ /899-/9/4 II (Woolwich 1937),pp xi, 71-2: WO 33/192; Chapters 4&8. 
21Henderson Science pp 397-8. 
2l ClarkelEsher 1316104; 'Training of the Army' The Times 28/2/01 p 8. 
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be quoted, and it seems clear that the entire staff should be thoroughly trained; 
that a defmite system of staff duties should be laid down. 23 
Key staff officers were not psc qualified, this added to the fonnidable problems 
caused by an incoherent system of staff duties, while the SAFF had been muddled on 
mobilisation. Col Vincent commented that: 'the army corps, divisions, and brigades 
[mobilised for South Africa] were fonned upon no intelligent or predetennined 
scheme.24 As has been pointed out above, doctrine includes organisations. Hilyard 
remarked of his brigade, the only one to deploy intact to South Africa, that it: 
was composed of four battalions that had been under my command .... they had 
been through a course of company training, battalion training, and brigade 
training .... This ... practical work proved subsequently in the field of the greatest 
... value. The [COs] were thoroughly known to me and to one another; they 
understood one another ... [and] their company commanders.25 
Hilyard's stress upon cohesion is significant but equally important is his accentuation 
of training, particularly company training. This was an important means of injecting 
initiative. Amery commented: 
Englishman would not dream of sending a crew to Henley whose members had 
never rowed together before, were quite content that a general's staff should be 
hastily improvised at the last moment from officers scraped together. 
As Table 29 shows, he hardly exaggerated. French noted that the cavalry brigade 
staffs were new to their brigadiers, who were in tum unknown to their fonnations; 
this, just before the key manoeuvre which led to Kimberley's relief, he remarked 
laconically was: 'a great disadvantage.' 26 
Organisational incoherence did not end after disembarkation. In several battles, 
Colenso, Spion Kop and Paardeberg, command structures were unnecessarily 
disrupted and superiors interfered in details with unfortunate results.27 Coke who had 
23 RCWSA Report (1903),p 53. 
urable 29 Buller's COS, the AAG 1 Division and the Cavalry Brigade BMs were not psc; 'Lessons 
from the War for lnunediate Application' USMXXIV (1901), P 35. 
2S RCWSA Evidence II Q 15972. 
26 Chapter 7; RCWSA II Q16182. At least Barton and his BM were only separated by the length of 
Piccadilly, see Table 29 sers 45&6; LS Amery THWSA n (1902), P 38; RCWSA Report p 59. 
27 Eg Buller's attempt to organise the recovery of Long's guns at Colenso, Maj Gen Maurice BROHSA 
1(1906), pp 362-6. Consequently the senior neglects his own task and subordinates feel distrusted. 
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experienced confusion on landing in South Africa, commenting on Spion Kop where 
he assumed command of a division with an improvised staff in the middle of the 
operation: 'here was another of our many cases of "organisation disorganised. ",28 
The SAFF's unwieldy corps-based organisation which had to be broken down when 
fighting started, partly caused this disruption. 
Training is related to doctrine but the British Anny in 1899 was badly trained. 
Repington noted that manoeuvres before 1899 were poor, while Roberts commented 
after South Africa: 
manoeuvres on a large scale were so infrequent that it was impossible to 
ascertain by this practical test whether ... senior officers had kept their 
knowledge, whether they could handle troops in accordance with the principles 
of modem tactics ... Troops in action cover such a wide front and so great a 
depth, that control of a battalion today is more difficult than a brigade a few 
years ago. 
Roberts stressed combat's greater complexity and the reSUlting need for all-arms 
training. Haig commented that: '[t]he chief danger ... arises from the utterly false 
usages hitherto practiced ... at manoeuvres.' Clarke considered that the Anny in 
Britain was undertrained, while exercises were 'farcical' before 1899. He blamed 
these problems on the staff. Whatever the cause, manoeuvres neither effectively 
trained nor tested commanders, staffs and troops. 29 
Firepower-induced dispersion made coordination and signalling more 
important; both in turn influenced staffwork. South African distances and numbers, 
(the SAFF was vast by British standards), further increased complexity. Wartime 
improvisation of staffs, organisations and tactics no longer sufficed. Now systematic 
preparation for war was vital. This demanded staffs who would think about future 
tactics and weapons. In turn this demanded doctrine to give the staff a framework for 
21 RCWSA Evidence II Qs 20199-20205; Ibid P 442 and Appendix O. 
29 'Suggestions from the Front' 19CXLVIII (1900). p 714; RCWSA Report (1903),p 53; Haig. 
RCWSA II P 404; The Times 2812101 p 8. 
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analysing war and devising training. 30 
Poor tactical coordination in South Africa partly stemmed from bad staffwork, 
there was no army-wide system of staff duties, partly because there was no common 
understanding between commanders, a doctrinal problem, while many were unused 
to using staffs, suggesting inadequate training. Both Buller and Roberts disrupted 
command structures unnecessarily. Roberts often used his private secretary to issue 
operation orders, suggesting that he was trying to command personally, rather than 
using his senior operations staff officer.31 De Lisle, a psc, was scathing on the effects 
of poor staff work, generally involving muddled movement, and poor orders at 
Paardeberg. Buller was equally destructive, delegating to subordinates who had 
inadequate staffs and communications and then interfering, while failing to act 
decisively himself. Roberts criticised Buller's failure to intervene while Warren was 
mishandling the Spion Kop operation.32 Buller abandoned most of his staff when he 
moved to Natal and his exercise of command there was denounced by a future CIGS 
and brother rifleman.33 At Paardeberg, Kitchener, without staff, communications or 
clear authority, was unable to coordinate attacks. Later, when CinC, Kitchener 
proved reluctant to use his staff and had difficulty coordinating widely dispersed 
and generally very mobile counter-guerrilla combat. Roberts, despite personal errors, 
saw poor staffwork as a major problem and stressed the staffs role in training.34 
Operation orders, critical instruments of command, were often vague, due to 
poor staff work and the absence of standard formats, or over-prescriptive. Buller's 
»rable 44; EPs 8704-35-33 P 1. Similar criticisms had been made after Tirah; Chapter 2. Doctrine 
was needed not just because of poor tactical performance but because strategy undirected by doctrine 
had exposed Britain to serious defeat in 1899; DMO pl-3. 
31 Grierson assumed a roughly comparable post to Col GS Ops and systemised the issue of orders. B 
Williams THWSA IV (1906), pp 412-3 for the problems of Roberts both conunanding and acting as 
COS. Roberts also disrupted Intelligence unnecessarily. There was of course formally no G Staff. 
3i>LPs 2 'The South African War-I' pp 17,18,29. SKDs (1902), P 4; Chapter 3. 
33 Table 2; Maj Oen Colvile The Work o/the Ninth Division (1901), pp 22,69. Roberts had 
stellenbosched Colvile; HEWPs 3/115, pp 8,17,25. 
34 Gen Hamilton The Commander (1957), pp 101-2; RCWSA Evidence II Qs 13130-1; E Childers 
THWSA V (1907),pp 89-90, 270-3; BalPs RMMISAs I 'Minute by the [CinC] on ... training [GS].· 
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orders at Colenso and Spion Kop were defective. A veteran analysed the effect of 
over-prescriptive orders on subordinates indoctrinated in obedience: 
You must break down, by every means in your power, the paralysing habit of 
an unreasoning and mechanical adherence to the letter of orders. " when acting 
under service conditions. 35 
French commented: 
[t]actics crystallise in Orders (sic): it is essential for officers to be able to 
understand how to interpret orders, correctly and also how to be able to issue 
clear, complete, and concise orders.36 
There were clearly serious defects in the Army and its officers' intellectual standards. 
Wolseley had commented earlier during the Sudan Campaign that some COs were 
unfit to be corporals, staffwork was poor and that there was overmuch personal 
rivalry. Similar faults recurred in South Africa causing Col Clarke to deduce that: 
The only possible means of raising the educational standard and the military 
efficiency of our Army is to have a highly trained [GS] to leaven the mass of 
ignorance from the top downwards.37 
Clarke did not directly call for doctrine, but developing the Army's education and 
establishing a GS system would provide a intellectual coherence which would foster 
doctrine. 38 
The Demand for Doctrine 
Tirah had seen improvised formations, poor staffs and bad staffwork heavily 
criticised, but no direct demands for doctrine had resulted. From 1900 commentators 
not only denounced these failings, remedying them would have facilitated doctrine's 
introduction, but some argued for doctrine directly. A military journal commented 
that the lack of a system of tactics and strategy was responsible for the Spion Kop 
3'GEOHWSA I (1904),pp 53-6 ; SKDs. Enclosure D; Capt Russell The Employment of Artillery in the 
Field ... (1902), P 5. 
16RCWSA Report p 59; Chapter 3; GEOHSA II, pp 139-40,202; RCWSA Evidence II p 301. 'The Place 
of Doctrine in War' EDR CCXV (1912). p 27 highlights doctrine's value in interpreting orders; Capt 
Marindin Staff Rides (1907), p 55 criticised many orders written in training. 
37 H Kochanski Sir Garnet Wolseley (1999). pp 172-3; ClarkelEsher 13/6/04. 
31 DMOp 1-2. 
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debacle.39 Amery recommended establishing a common school of military training 
and thought, deploring the absence of anny-wide standards and commanders' 
tendency to play for their own ends rather than the Anny's. He blamed this on: 'the 
lack of a GS spirit.' This suggests the lack of animating anny-wide values, as well as 
poor intellectual standards. Doctrine would partly provide these, thereby enhancing 
cooperation. Roberts stressed the need for thorough staff training based on a 
combination of manoeuvres, staffrides and improvements at Camberley.4o Such a 
system would have translated into greater coherence by virtue of common training 
even if written doctrine was unchanged. But such enhancements would have 
probably led to formal doctrine. Buller also stressed staff training, remarking that: 
the great defect at present throughout ... the Anny is a want of a sense of the 
paramount importance of cooperation. 
He blamed this defect on over-regulation. Individuals naturally take no chances in a 
culture which accentuates blame. This is why forces which understand what 
professionalism entails tend not to be over-critical of honest mistakes in training. 
Buller continued: 
scarcely one officer in a hundred who has been taught any rule which would 
guide him how to act in deciding how to act when confronted by the problem ... 
''what ought 1 to do?" ... [I]t is a chance if he acts aright; because, owing to his 
defective training, he acts on the wrong impUlse. He does not ask himself how 
he can best further the operation as a whole.41 
Both quotations imply doctrine; the first is rather more obscure but doctrine 
enhances cooperation, differing sharply from the rigidity which Buller criticised. In 
the second, though his mention of 'rule' suggests more rigidity than doctrine usually 
involves, but Buller's reference to 'guide' and his stress on overall operational 
objectives imply it. French recommended that 
a large proportion of officers should yearly take part in Staff Tours ... By this 
19ANG XLI (21/4/00). p 378. 
40 RCWSA Evidence II pp 468-9; Ibid Qs 13163,13191. 
41 Ibid P 213; Chapter 7. Kipling's verse. 
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means uniformity of ideas in staff management and tactics generally would 
gradually be produced throughout the Army.42 
This suggests how training helps to generate doctrine. General Warren emphasised: 
We require complete uniformity in the army as to principles, but such 
uniformity does not constitute the army as a machine capable of acting only in 
a certain groove; rather it enables it to become an organisation trained to adapt 
itself ... an organisation which assigns to every man ... responsibility, 
animating the whole ... with a spirit of self-reliance. 
Uniform principles suggest doctrine and Warren saw that they would not inhibit 
initiative. Wood, the AG, stressed that: 'tactical principles' should be instilled during 
officer training.43 Principles, as argued earlier, equate to doctrine. Lt Col May, 
writing at Camberley, stressed war's varied nature and consequently the need for 
insisting on its spirit, rather than on rigid tactical rules. May did not formally 
advocate doctrine, but his diagnosis that: 'what we want ... is quick discernment of 
how best to apply to the case in hand ... knowledge' suggests it. That May wrote at 
Camberley may indicate the way the future elite were thinking. 44 An anonymous 
article, possibly officially inspired, emphasised the need to consider theory in 
relation to warfare. It warned against the staff becoming mired in administration and 
stressed instilling 'principles. ,45 
Both German and French authorities criticised Britain for ignoring doctrine 
between 1899-1902 Their criticisms were made somewhat later, but, given that 
British introduction of doctrine took time, their views are important. General 
Langlois was adamant: 
The drillbooks in England before [1899] were quite as good as those of other 
European armies; they were faithfully carried out to the letter, but they were not 
connected by a general common doctrine. This introduces a new factor, which 
is independent of textbooks, tactical education. or doctrine (sic) ... rendered 
indispensable by the increased necessity for initiative. 
42RCWSA Evidence II pp 213,301; Haig commented very similarly, Ibid p 404. 
o'Some Lessons of the South African War' NR XXXVIII (1901). P 182; Akers-Douglas p 125. 
44 A Retrospect of the South African War (190 I), pp 35-6, 37. 
45 'Communicated' 'General StafTDuties' JRUS/XLV(1901),p 863. As the RUSI had excellent links 
with the Army's hierarchy, this suggests that the author was either senior, writing officially or both. 
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He was charitable; Tirah and South Africa had seen IDB 1896's injunctions 
repeatedly violated, while the Akers-Douglas Committee had already condemned the 
British manuals as unsystematic and ill-thought out. The Germans concluded that: 
'[British] leaders ... had no mental grasp of the requirements of a modern battle.' 
They continued by criticising British training. The quotation is superficially unclear 
but British commentators were clear that they meant doctrine.46 
From almost the start of the war, soldiers and commentators were convinced 
that the Army's intellectual standard was insufficient for modern war. Doctrine was 
essential as control and initiative had to be balanced. 
Doctrine post-1902 
Training 
Earlier a relationship was suggested between training and doctrine. After South 
Africa training and its higher direction were revolutionised. Callwell commented on: 
'the great revival in training which took place consequent upon the experience of the 
South African War.' The Army switched from training largely based on drill to 
realistic manoeuvres over the period 1890-1914, with the main effort coming after 
1902. This encouraged the development of doctrine. Before training had been the 
AG's responsibility, but the Akers-Douglas Committee's recommendations led to the 
reestablishment of the DME with Hilyard as its first Director and Rawlinson and 
Wilson on its staff. Roberts selected Hilyard on the basis of his Camberley and South 
African service and he ensured that the DME was directly under the CinC.47 This and 
the posting of high-calibre individuals to the DME suggest that training would have 
greater priority than before 1899. 
46LessonsJrom Two Recent Wars (1909),p 145. Though published officially in 1909, Langlois wrote 
in 1904; Akers-Douglas Qs 595-600, 798-803; GEOHSA II pp 331,343-4; 'The British Army and 
Modem Conceptions of War' EDR CCXIII (1911),pp 922-3. Chapter 2 for IDB 1896's defects. 
4'BPs 49725 'Minute on ... Hilyard's Position'; ANG XLIV (31/1/03),p 10. 
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Major manoeuvres in Britain became standard from 1902. Before 1899 there 
had been few and these were often flawed by non-tactical phases and standing 
camps. After 1902 more frequent, more realistic manoeuvres not only improved 
formation and staff training but developed doctrine and trialled new equipments. The 
1903 Manoeuvres tested the use of dispersed batteries and artillery signals. The 1904 
Essex Manoeuvres examined invasion's feasibility. They also gave valuable lessons 
on close-country tactics and inspired an RNI Army conference on overseas 
expeditions. Later manoeuvres validated the new MT supply system and air 
reconnaissance.48 
Reporting on training increased. French issued annual training reports at 
Aldershot, as did many other commanders, including Ian Hamilton at Southern 
Command. These reports do not appear to have exact pre-1899 equivalents, thus 
suggesting greater emphasis on correcting mistakes and improving uniformity. 
Training consequently would have been more effective. Somewhat later Haldane 
issued a series of training notes for his brigade. These emphasised training the 
instructors before training the soldiers, thus ensuring more effective results, and 
systematic instruction.49 
The purpose of training also changed with a new emphasis on instilling 
principles. French stressed: 
During [1904] my great endeavour has been to set schemes ... which might 
illustrate the great principles of war. My object has been to stimulate 
intelligence and cultivate military instinct by inculcating those principles. 50 
French was developing both doctrine and initiative. No similar emphasis on 
"Chapter 2; Maj Geddes 'Communication between Artillery units in action' PRA! XXX (1903-4), it is 
unclear whether this was a fonnal objective; AFPs 50318; WO 33/620; Col Callwell The Tactics of 
Home Defence (Edinburgh 1908), pp 5-8. 
4'Hamilton 's were published in the J R US/. An exception is Buller's 1899 Memorandum; according to 
the usa 8/1/98 Connaught issued a training memorandum in 1897. That pre-I 899 reports do not 
survive in the NA. while many were produced after 1902 suggests greater attention to training; Notes 
on Training issued 1912-14 (reprinted Rhine Anny 1919). 
so WO 27/503 'Training ... III Anny Corps 28/9/04' P 1. 
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introducing principles in training has been traced in the Army before 1899. French 
also considered that the British must expect to be numerically inferior. He 
consequently stressed the need for 'all ranks' to know something of the art of war. 
The former implies reliance on manoeuvre rather than attrition and anticipates FSRs 
1909' s manoeuverist slant. French's second point suggests how doctrine links to 
initiative and the new attitudes to the junior ranks. French's emphasis on instilling 
principles was partly based on Japanese performance in Manchuria; French 
commended their morale. French also emphasised principles in 1905, stressing, 
similarly to CTrg 1902, that: 
if we would ensure success in war, knowledge must be absolutely instinctive 
and as it were, a second nature to us. To quote the words of one of the greatest 
leaders of the Franco-German War:-"The principles of our employment must 
form part of our flesh and blood.,,51 
'Knowledge' suggests greater intellectual effort, while 'principles' suggests doctrine. 
That French emphasised them in successive years suggests their importance. French 
made the same points on instinctive knowledge after 1918, suggesting that it had 
become deeply embedded in his mind. 52 
French criticised officers' understanding of strategy after his experience of 
training in 1904. Consequently he reissued Henderson's article on strategy to officers 
at Aldershot. This outlined how smaller forces could defeat larger ones through 
manoeuvre and surprise. 53 It also highlighted the importance of strategy, arguing that 
strategic unlike tactical mistakes were rarely recoverable. It stressed that many more 
officers than just CinCs needed to understand: 'strategical principles' because of the 
dispersed nature of modem combat. He recommended using staff rides to inculcate 
strategic knowledge.54 A shortened version of Henderson's paper was issued to 
Silbid pI; CTrg 1902 P 3. 
51 WO 163/16 'Annual Report IGF 1910' pp 219-220; FM French 1914 (1919),p II. 
S) WO 27/503 'Training ... III Army Corps' P I; WO 27/504 'Aldershot 1905.' 
54 WO 27/504 • Aldershot 1905' pp 2-3. Henderson stressed historical. theoretical study and staff rides. 
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Camberley students down till at least 1912.55 French's stress on strategy suggests 
greater focus on war's operational level and manoeuvre, while the fact that he was 
emphasising principles suggests that doctrine was being developed. 
French also wrote Theoretical Instruction in the Art of War. This is mechanical 
in tone, the most significant fact is that French wished to improve the professional 
training of his command and that he focussed on strategy. He also stressed the 
importance of strategy and principles on staff rides. 56 It is unclear how widely 
Theoretical Instruction was issued, but it was designed for non-pscs. This suggests 
more attention to theoretical training and greater emphasis on war's operational 
level. French continued this theme later, criticising senior officers' lack of 
'instinctive knowledge and perception of strategic principles.' French's stress 
supports the link, made earlier, between doctrine and the higher levels of war. 
French blamed these faults on the lack of a historical GS section able to undertake: 
the formulation and laying down of principles deduced from the highest and 
best war experience. I hold that these principles and the power of applying 
them to any given problem or situation must be, as it were, instilled as a second 
nature in the mind of any soldier who aspires to exercise high command in war. 
I regret to report that I observed a distinct lack of these qualifications in most of 
our higher leaders, and hence results the hesitation, ill-timed combination, 
faulty plans, and grave tactical errors which have been a marked feature of the 
larger manoeuvre[ s]. 
French describes doctrine as it would be understood today, stressing the staffs 
analytical role in developing it. South Africa had seen similar errors to those French 
observed and soldiers were probably able to read between the lines to see an implied 
criticism of British performance there. The emphasis on theoretical training of 
officers continued: in 1907-8 Aldershot promulgated details of such instruction, 
while Chesney's Waterloo Lectures were specifically reprinted for thiS. 57 French 
55 ROBPs IIVIO 'Notes on Strategy by Col Henderson. Compiled for the use of students at the Staff 
College' (6th edition 1912). That it had gone through 6 editions suggests its importance. 
"undated; WO 27/504 Aldershot StafTTour Final Remarks' pp 1-2. 
57 WO 27/491 'Training ... Winter 1907-08;' Col Chesney Waterloo Lectures (1907). 
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reiterated his idea of instilling principles in 1908 when he ordered his ann-inspectors 
to check that: 
the system of instruction develop [ s] in the minds of officers ... a thorough and 
instinctive knowledge of the main principles ... of war. 
Another concern was: 
AIe officers trained ... to approach the solution of strategic and tactical 
problems with sound definite ideas as to the irinciples of war and do they ... 
understand the "appreciation of situations?" 
The last point suggests that far greater attention was being given to intellectual effort 
with all that it implied for the development of professionalism and doctrine. Despite 
this French was scathing after his first inspections in 1908: 
I regret, however, to be obliged once more to record my conviction that a great 
deal more needs to be done in this direction [theoretical instruction in the 
higher branches of the art of war] before the highest level of efficiency ... is 
reached. In the staff tours which formed an important part of my divisional 
inspections, in written appreciations of officers of all ranks, at the conferences, 
and finally at the ... Anny Manoeuvres, I have seen evidence of a lack of 
knowledge of strategical principles, and a failure to appreciate any given 
situation accurately ... , combined with an inability to grasp the salient factors of 
the problem .... I become more and more convinced that many of the senior 
officers do not possess a sufficient knowledge of the principles and practice of 
war on a large scale. S9 
French also made stinging criticisms of senior officers; his criticisms led to the 
dismissal of Scobell as IGC for neglect of training, despite the latter's impeccable 
social connections and fine South African record. French in 1909 denounced the 
GOC 2 Division for lacking strategical knowledge and for handling his formation 
poorly. He criticised a brigadier: 
[he] does not yet show that he possesses sufficient knowledge of the art of 
war in its higher branches to fill his present post. 
These were strong criticisms in an institution that many have seen as a pleasant 
social club. Douglas, the next IGHF, concurred with French's criticisms of senior 
officers, stressing in 1912: 
sa WO 27/508 'IGF Report 1908' P 28. 
"Ibid 'IGF Report 1908' P 5; the words in brackets are taken from the paragraph above. 
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~till ~ many officers in command ... who are incompetent instructors, and 
Inefficient Comm~ders. If progress is to be sought, it must be by raising the 
standard of the urnt commanders by the elimination of the unfit. 60 
Both French and Douglas recommended the introduction of more selective 
promotion. 61 French's and Douglas' comments and actions suggest the swing 
towards professionalism, the emphasis on the strategic, or in current parlance, the 
operational level of war, and the fact that doctrine in the form of principles was 
emergtng. 
Grierson felt that the remedy for poor staff performance in South Africa was 
staff rides. These, copied from Germany, were becoming frequent by the mid-1900s. 
French commented of them: 
[t]he object is ... to illustrate by examples on the ground how the general 
strategic situation must always govern all tactical operations. I trust that the 
principles involved may be inculcated amongst all ranks. 62 
His point on strategy suggests greater theoretical emphasis, the shift towards war's 
operational level and more subordinate initiative. CGS held a major operational level 
ride in 1906. Haig's Indian rides were also set at this leve1.63 Regimental tours, less 
elaborate rides, were introduced and the topic inspired four books. They suggest 
much more attention to both theory and training.64 The 1908 Army Staff Ride, which 
included a preliminary wargame, tested the forthcoming FSRs. Afterwards CGS 
summarised its lessons and the main principles of staffwork. This was a more 
coordinated way of examining problems, developing doctrine and conducting 
training. Before 1899 manoeuvres had been conducted without such preparatory 
training.65 Haig emphasised FSRs' principles on staff rides as did Smith-Dorrien: 
60 WO 27/508 'IGF Report 1909' P 64; Ibid 'IGF Annual Report 1912' pp 564-5. 
61 Ibid 'IGF Report 1912' P 5. 
61 DS McDaiannid The Life of Lt General ... Grierson (1923), P 271 citing GriersonlStamfordharn 
7n1OO; WO 27/503 'Training .... Aldershot 1905' pISS. 
6JReport on Staff Ride in the Severn Valley J 906; Cavalry Studies Strategical and Tactical (1907) 
based on Haig's 1903-6 rides; Chapter 5. 
64 Col Haking Staff Rides and Regimental Tours (1908); Maj Fowle Notes on Staff Rides and 
Regimental and Tactical Tours for Beginners (1908); Capt Marindin Staff Rides (1905); Haig RidE's. 
6S WO 279/30 pI noted that the 1909 training season deliberately started with 2 rides. 
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'Avoid violating any great principle of war in your initial plan (sic).,66 More 
frequent staff rides and unit tours suggest more attention to theoretical training, 
staffwork and recognition of junior officers' increased tactical importance. French 
and Haig's stress on strategy in their rides also suggests that commanders were 
thinking more about war's operational level. This links with the developments 
analysed in Chapter 5. 
In India Kitchener emphasised the importance of training as the basis for 
greater professionalism: 
The whole secret of preparing for war is a matter of training and instruction, 
and [COs] ... who profess or show their incapacity as instructors and their 
inability to train and educate those under them for all situations of modem war 
must be deemed unfit for the positions they hold.67 
This increased emphasis on training also had implications for doctrine and the staff 
as argued earlier. Britain similarly emphasised officers' training duties. Kitchener's 
structural changes in India introduced decentralisation to promote initiative, while 
units were concentrated into permanent formations largely for training reasons. 
Proximity facilitates inter-arm and inter-unit training. It also shows that the Army in 
India was shifting from being organised primarily for IS to preparing for major 
warfare. 
The Staff Colleges and Doctrine 
Roberts in July 1901 emphasised that Camberley's instruction needed 
to become more practical.68 Camberley pre-1914 had three very successful 
commandants, Rawlinson, Wilson and Robertson. All impressed students, all had 
influential later careers. The pre-1899 academic atmosphere and remote relations 
between staff and students ceased and training became more practical, while 
66 WO 279/22; HOWPs 1/17 13n/ll; WO 279/21 p 22. 
67 RLKAI (Simla 1909), p 213, citing lAO 35 16/1/05. Kitchener had stressed the point to Roberts 
earlier, PRO 30/57/28 letter 4/6/03. Chapter 7 stresses that training had now become the main 
peacetime officer task. French's and Douglas' comments on the same point are included above. 
61 RPs 7101-23-124-1 F43. 
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Methuen's advice that DS posts should be plums reseIVed for the best was 
followed.69 Under Rawlinson Camberley looked at the higher military levels, 
stressing command rather than routine staffwork. This probably helped doctrine's 
introduction. Staff training expanded with Camberley's growth, the establishment of 
Quetta, the introduction of administrative staff training at the LSE and Command 
Intelligence courses. 70 
Kitchener overhauled the staff in India, establishing 'the art of war staff to 
plan future operations and founding a staff college.71 Much opposition to this was 
caused by fears that 2 different schools of military thought would develop, thus 
damaging combat effectiveness. Both the AG and QMG raised these concerns. 72 
Wolfe-Murray, the MGO, countered: '[i]t is better to have another school of 
thought. .. rather than no school of thought at all.' Kitchener concurred, feeling that 
India had no school of thought. He emphasised that incompatibility between Britain 
and India would not be allowed. This suggests that the Army's hierarchy appreciated 
doctrine's importance. Significantly Kitchener cited good Japanese staffwork when 
arguing for an Indian staff college. Emphasis on forming 'a school of thought' and 
common staff training suggests the contemporary pressure for adopting doctrine. 
Common syllabi, examinations, and exchanges of DS were instituted to prevent 
doctrinal divergence. 73 
Both staff colleges helped to develop doctrine. Wilson wrote annually to 
DSD highlighting issues which Camberley considered important. 74 In 1907 he 
highlighted the need for principles for starting campaigns, for handling strategic 
~aj Gen Fuller The Army in My Time (1934), P 122, Fuller was not easy to please, as a pre-1914 
student, his views, though retrospective have value; Maj Gen Aston Memories of a Marine (1919).pp 
239-40; RCWSA Evidence II (1903), Q 14290. Table 34 contrasts later careers of DS. 
70 WO 279/18 p 36; W02791515 for one course. Robertson, Haldane and Edmonds lectured, while 
Japanese Intelligence in Manchuria was stressed. 
71RLKIA, pp 90, 93-4,95-6; UMIU17/5/1617 pp 224-6 lAO 246: Chapter 7. 
nUMIUl7/5/1617 pp204-9; WO 163/9pp216,218. 
nwo 163/9 p218; PRO 30157/34 Kitchener/Clarke 5n105; WO 16319 P 332. 
74 Eg Quetta analysed Manchuria: see WO 1061180, DALISCMBs. 
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advance guards and the general reserve, as well as whether divisions should be 
concentrated or dispersed when marching? All suggest manoeuvre and the 
operational level. They differed from CT 1905's more positional emphasis, while 
Wilson's stress on the need for principles shows that doctrine was being developed. 
He also highlighted requisitioning, billeting, controlling lines of communication and 
systemising field intelligence, an issue that India was also tackling. All suggest the 
new importance of manoeuvre. 75 Wilson and Robertson emphasised doctrine at 
Camberley, the former aiming to develop 'a school of thought' there. Scholarly 
views on the significance of Wilson's school differ, but his emphasis on developing 
one suggests the British adoption of doctrine. 76 
Capper at Quetta emphasised studying strategy, noting that that cas was 
concerned that officers were ignorant of its principles. This ties in with French's 
criticisms and possibly reveals a concerted effort to improve strategic understanding 
in both Armies. This further suggests the development of judgement, delegation and 
initiative. Consequently Capper ordered students to write a strategic primer 
incorporating: '[0 ]nly general (sic) [principles] 77 of the widest kind.' Later, when 
lecturing on strategy, Capper stressed the importance of campaigns being based on 
the commander's overall concept: 
your idea must be framed to secure a decisive object; that you must preserve 
that ide~ no matter how adverse circumstances seem; and that you can only 
preserve your idea by keeping the initiative ... and that, to keep this initiative, 
you must maintain a vigorous and uncompromising offensive. 
Capper's stress on determination suggests Japanese influence. Though modem 
commentators would probably see Capper as dogmatic rather than doctrinaire, his 
7' HEWPs 3/3/9 'HWIDSD 30/10/07;'; UMIUI7/5/1810 Col Malleson 'System Intelligence: 
76 8J Bond The Victorian Army and the Staff College (1972), p 244 claims that Wilson drafted Arnold 
Forster's stress on continuity; Maj Gen Robertson 'Final Address ... Staff College' AR II (1912). pp 
297-8; Bond Staff p 259 suggests Wilson's school of thought mainly involved conscription and 
support for France. Professor Jeffrey Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (2006). pp 68-9 emphasises 
Wilson's stress on common training, education and staff working. 
77 CPs 214/1- ISC 'Memoir for Junior Division' p 1, Capper was stressing principles and the quotation 
demands the word's insertion. 
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insistence that campaigns were based on an overall concept demanded a more 
analytical approach which would in tum require doctrine. The stress on campaigns 
suggests the operational level. He continued: 
We must encourage by all means the power of movement and the mobility of 
our forces, so that we can by rapid and skilful marches place the enemy at a 
disadvantage by opposing our full numbers to only a portion of his force. 78 
Haking had already outlined such views, which were similar to Stonewall Jackson's 
tactics and Chesney's ideas. Robertson later articulated this theme at Camberley.79 
TheGS 
The Staff Colleges' development dovetailed with the Esher reforms and the 
GS's establishment; the combination synergistically improving doctrine and training. 
The GS' establishment was one, ifnot the Army's most substantial change between 
1897-1914 and the Esher Committee had ambitious objectives for it: 
[w]e desired to teach the highest branches of the art of war; we wanted men 
who could think for themselves and were qualified to form reasoned opinions 
on the great military questions ... We hoped to get hold of our ablest young 
officers and to give them an intellectual equipment which would fit them for 
high command and which, as they ~read throughout the Army, would help to 
create a higher standard generally. 8 
The GS would: 
as in Gennany and Japan, provide the means of raising the intellectual standard 
of the army ... [and] create and consolidate military opinion on sound and 
generally accepted lines. Such machinery has been hitherto absolutely wanting 
in our army.81 
Here the extract outlines doctrine's importance, though it did not use the word, but 
'reasoned opinions' and 'consolidation ... on sound and generally accepted lines' 
imply it. They continued by outlining how these 'reasoned opinions' were to be 
disseminated, as well as highlighting the need for greater intellectual effort. 
"Ibid 'Lecture on Strategy p 11 underlined in original; Ibid p 16. The last quote also suggests 
Henderson's comments, WO 27/504 'Strategy.' 
79 Robertson's quote is at fn 140 below. 
10 CAB 17/14 ClarkelKitchener 8/8/05 . 
.. AFPs 50321 'Esher Co Memorandum' 28/6/05 p 2. 
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The Japanese Influence 
The mention of 'Japan' and the Committee's comment: 'The Japanese have 
created such a staff, with the result that huge forces have been handled in the field 
with conspicuous success' shows Manchuria's influence.82 Capper, lecturing in 
Dublin, cited a Japanese officer: 'we attribute the success of [Manchuria] equally to 
the extreme efficiency of our staff.' Capper continued: 
We have learnt our lesson, we have learnt that leading in war means in peace 
time constant study, reflection, research, keeping up with modem 
developments, modem ideas, the study for the preparation of the strategical 
concentration and deployment. ' 
The Japanese example did not cause the GS to be established but it helped to 
consolidate it. Rawlinson was convinced of need for higher staff and command 
training based on his study of the Russo-Japanese War. 83 Hamilton also linked 
Germany and Japan when stressing that staff organisation should be the same in war 
and peace. Kuropatkin's criticism that the Russian Army lacked doctrine also 
influenced British military opinion.84 Montgomery-Massingberd stressed in his 
Camberley memoir the need for: 
a system thoroughly inculcated into the generals, staff & regimental officers for 
the whole army, so that all may work together on the same lines. Mutual 
support & mutual understanding were perhaps the most important features of 
this system. ,85 
He did not describe this as doctrine and it may be that he was just stressing the 
structural elements of cohesion, but doctrine, a lesson which others drew from 
Manchuria, is more likely. This conclusion is suggested by his use of 'system' and 
the fact that he then analysed training. At Quetta in 1912 and 1913 a Senior Division 
Il CAB 17/14 'The [GS]: 
IJ CPs 2/4/4 • Staff Duties' pp 7-8; ESHPs RawlinsonlEsher 7nl07 'Army Letters Volume 2: 
14 RPs 7101-23-220-6 'Comments Draft FSRs 1905;' 'British Army' EDR CCXIII ( 1911 ),pp 323-4 
citing Gen Kuropatkin trans Capt Lindsay ed Maj Swinton The Russian Army and the Japanese War 
~909), pp 178-80. 
MMPs 214 'The Lessons of 181S. 1862, 1866 and 1870 as Confirmed or Modified by the War in 
Manchuria' p 6. 
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essay-topic was: 
In both the Franco-German War and the Russo-Japanese War the comparative 
superiority of the "System of Command" and "Staff Organisation" of the 
victorious army contributed conspicuously towards its success.86 
This does not point directly at doctrine, though by this time others were emphasising 
Japanese doctrine as a factor in their success, while doctrine could well be described 
as: 'a system of command.' But the Staff Colleges saw the Manchurian staff lessons 
as important. 
Training and the GS 
The AO establishing the GS saw training as one of its major tasks and 
implied that it would develop doctrine: 
3. The functions of the [GS] are to assist ... in promoting military efficiency, 
especially in regard to the education of officers and the training of the troops 
and to aid ... in carrying out the policy prescribed by Anny Headquarters. 
4. With these objects in view, the [GS] will be drawn from the officers of the 
Anny who may be considered most likely to be capable of forming a school of 
progressive military thought. 87 
Both paragraphs acknowledge doctrine, though not specifically calling it so, but 
'policy' applied to tactics and a 'progressive school of military thOUght' both imply 
it. Both also suggest how doctrine was to be spread. Subordinate commands reflected 
this emphasis on the importance of training as a GS task: 
The general system on which [GS] Work (sic) of the [Irish] Command is 
carried out is that it may assist all ranks ... in training for war. 
Nine of the Irish BGS's 12 tasks and 10 of the GSO 2's 12 involved training. These 
instructions provide a mass of detail on training, how amendments to FSRs and 
feedback on training were to be generated.88 They were modelled on Col Haldane's 
Eastern Command instructions. This suggests that other commands similarly 
emphasised their GS's training responsibilities. India also accentuated the GS' 
16 MMPs 4/1 'Quetta Orders 1912 22/3/12.' 
17 AO 233 1219106. 
u WO 35156 'System of Work GS Irish Command' pp 2, 13-16. 
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training role.89 
Some formations held GS-Ied 'War Courses' for regimental officers. These 
covered the tactics of a battalion and battery and stressed teaching senior officers 
how to train their juniors. Individual pscs could influence their juniors profoundly. 
Montgomery wrote decades later but his comment which suggests reliance on 
another does not appear biased. Aldershot Command had for some years encouraged 
the study of campaigns, providing both lectures and a bibliography for young 
officers.90 Eastern Command established a very thorough training system to prepare 
officers for the tactical fitness exam. This consisted of a week on paper problems and 
TEWTS, a week's staff tour and a long attachment to another arm. The source does 
not state that the Command GS officers instructed but it would seem highly probable 
that they did. Such instruction shows the far greater attention to professional training 
than before 1899. The Aldershot and Irish Military Societies continued to flourish 
and their lectures after 1902 were of higher professional value than those before 
1899. 91 
The GS reforms made important structural changes at the War Office; two key 
directors directly under CGS were made responsible for training and doctrine. DSD 
dealt with doctrine and DMT training policy, while the IGF, not a GS officer, though 
an important part of the GS system, scrutinised training. It may be felt that the split 
between doctrinal development and training was unsound, DSD had many other 
demanding tasks, but despite this drawback, the GS structure gave much greater 
focus on training and doctrine than before 1899 when the WO was biased toward 
administration.92 
19 UMIU17/S/1617 P 211 ~ the ftrst Indian StafTConference stressed it. UMIU17/5/1810 pp 21-37. 
90 WO 279/18 pp 7-8~ FM Montgomery Memoirs (l958),p 31; WO 279/496 p 57, these were 
additional to the AMS lectures. 
91 Maj Moore Notes for the Tactical Fitness Exam (1907), pp v-vi; Bibliography of Military Societies. 
92 WO 123/48 AO 233. 
. 
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The GS Conferences 
Wilson originated the GS conferences, held annually at Camberley from 
1905 and later imitated in India. These included staff rides, updated GS officers on 
recent changes, sought ideas and developed doctrine.93 They covered many topics; 
the 1909 Conference scrutinised Infantry/Artillery communications, divisional 
frontages, training, to which a day was devoted suggesting its importance, and 




The Esher reforms established the post ofIGF, whose responsibilities stressed 
the methods of training to be adopted shall be such as to ensure uniformity 
throughout the [UK]; so that units on removal from one command to another 
may find the same ideals placed before them, the same system in vogue to 
arrive at these ideals, and may not have to unlearn in one place what they have 
acquired in another. It will be the first duty of the [IGF] to assist. .. in 
establishing and maintaining this uniformity. 95 
Unauthorised normal formations were prevalent before 1899 so establishing 
uniformity was an important advance, but it was not always achieved. Tactical 
confusion causes defeat and has often resulted in inferior British tactical performance 
and poor inter-arm cooperation. French noted that in one command all batteries fire 
Indirect yet the reverse was true in another.96 The IGF would receive many WO 
reports, which with his own inspections, would enable him to: 
report what steps have been taken to remedy any defects ... [Y]ou are also 
requested to remark upon the absence or insufficiency of training ... and to call 
attention to any direction in which military efficiency might be developed.97 
93WO 33/2747; UMIU17/5/181O; The 1909 Conference discussed operation orders; its conclusions 
were incorporated in FSRs. Ideas were sought, WO 35/56 'GS Folder' pp 55-6. WO 3214731 suggests 
the 1912 conference was important for developing staff procedures embodied within The Staff Manual 
War 1912. 
1)4'1909 Report' pp 3-4; WO 35/56 pp 56-7 
., AFPs 50305 'Letter 33IHd Quartersl91 (MU) 14/5/04.' 
96 WO 2791524 reports ditTerent tactics. FM Carver Tobrulc (1964),pp 267-268: WO 27/508 'IGF 
Report 1908' P 6. 
97 AFPs 50305 'Letter 14/5/04.' 
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The institution of a system of generating feedback on lessons learned was important. It may 
have inspired the lengthy Command annual reports on training which began to be issued at 
this time. The IGF was also to develop: 
a practical and intelligent system of instruction for both Officers and men. Regimental 
Tours, Staff Rides and War Games which form an integral part of military training 
should also ... receive close attention. 
Systemising practical and theoretical methods clearly provided more effective training than 
exercises which did not start with theoretical training. Furthermore any doctrine so 
developed would be more robust. Staff rides often now preceded manoeuvres, 
increasing the latters' effectiveness, while care was taken with the mechanics of 
umpiring. 98 In 1904 the Army Council replied to a point raised by the IGF on 
artillery's use of cover that FAT would be amended consequently.99 The IGF's 
annual reports provide a mass of detail and demonstrate his ability to improve 
training and alter doctrine. 100 
Arm inspectors supported the IGF. Though not all the arm inspectors' posts 
were new; there had previously been IGCs in both Britain and India, yet by being 
included in a structure under the IGF, they were better placed to champion change, 
enforce uniformity and develop their arm's doctrine. The IGC was perhaps the most 
significant of the IGF's subordinates, as, unlike the RA, which had a far greater 
institutional base, the Cavalry were regimentally organised. Hitherto they had been 
without centralised institutions, except a rather nebulous cavalry committee and 
central depot at Canterbury. 101 The new emphasis on training led to the establishment 
of cavalry schools in Britain and India and the establishment of the Cavalry Journal. 
The 1904 IGC's report demonstrates how defects could be remedied. Later the IGC 
9IWO 27/503 shows a tour immediately before the Army Manoeuvres; WO 35/56 'GS Folder 
~ndix C'; Col Forestier-Walker 'Umpiring' (AMS 1910). 
99 WO 27/491 'Report 1904' P 7. 
100 Ibid 'Report 1906' for ASC recruit training problems and the remedies adopted. 
101 WO 27/491 'IGF Report 1904'p 35. 
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became the designated cavalry divisional commander and trained the division. lo2 
Doctrine and Organisations 
Doctrine includes organisational issues. The adverse results of uncohesive , 
poorly structured organisations in 1899 have been examined above. Contrastingly in 
1914 brigades and divisions deployed with their peacetime units, staffs and the 
commanders under whom they had trained. There were defects including the 
improvised nature of II and III Corps and the Cavalry Division HQs, while infantry 
divisional staffs were undermanned, but the effects of more cohesion were great. 
Furthermore far more commanders and staff officers were psc than in 1899.103 
Consequently they were more likely to know each other and to be aware of common 
procedures. Here it is worth reiterating that settled structures, commanders who 
know and are known to their units and who have trained together have a powerful 
cohesive effect. This is not a substitute for doctrine but forces lacking structural 
cohesion are less able to use doctrine effectively 
The Army's organisation in 1899 for major war was based on the corps-level, 
with resources, particularly artillery, centralised there. In consequence infantry 
divisions were under-gunned. That they had only two brigades meant that they were 
unbalanced as generating a divisional reserve meant splitting a brigade. Divisions 
were seen as too clumsy in Tirah, after 1899 the corps-based organisation was 
condemned as inflexible. 104 A corps moving on a single road took some 6-7 hours to 
deploy into a fighting formation. lOS Roberts recommended that the main formation 
should be the infantry division or cavalry brigade, though he saw corps as useful 
102 WO 163/10 pp 343-4; WO 163/11 P 157. The Cavalry Committee's minutes do not survive; this 
conclusion is based therefore on negative reasoning. In 1899 the IGC did not command; in 1914 
Allenby did. WO 163/10 pp21.167-8. Baden Powell stated that the old committee had functioned 
ro:c!rly. WO 27/509 'Summary of Results of Winter Training' p 3. 
03 EDPs 3n/l p 4; Tables 2&3. 
104 'Centurion' 'Shall We Get A Sensible Army?' NR XXXVII (1901). 
105 'Army Organisation' BA 82 (1908),p 659. 
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administratively. Colvile was convinced that divisions were the correct formation as 
corps could not be controlled effectively. Repington argued that the anny corps 
organisation had failed; triangular infantry divisions were more suitable for 
expeditionary warfare. 106 
South African criticisms of the corps-based organisation partly caused the 
adoption of the large, triangular infantry division in 1907.107 As a result British 
infantry divisions in 1914 were better structured than their French or German 
equivalents. Their organisation into 3 brigades allowed greater flexibility than either 
the French or German divisions which were primarily divided into two brigades. The 
British division had one less level of command so that it could react faster. It had 
more artillery, with greater flexibility due to its mixture of howitzers, heavy and fieJd 
guns, and more engineers than continental divisions. The British had fewer corps-
level resources, but their delegation to divisions enhanced manoeuvrability; time was 
saved as weapons were available at the manoeuvre-level. But there was a price; 
delegation diminishes the senior commander's ability to control as assets are lost to 
him. 108 This weakens overall combat power, partiCUlarly in attrition. 109 This 
purposeful recasting of formations to emphasise the divisional-level suggests both a 
more doctrinal approach and greater stress on manoeuvre. 
But British organisations were imperfect. The Cavalry Division was too large 
with its 4 brigades and overstretched contemporary C3. That it did not exist in 
peacetime exacerbated this problem, which, in view of its key role, was a very 
substantial weakness. But the Germans also improvised their cavalry formations on 
I06RCWSA Evidence I p 453;lbid II QI7077-8; 'Suggestions from the Front' 19C XLVIII (1900),pp 86. 
107 WO 163/11 77th Meeting 2116/06. Divisions had been similarly criticised in Tirah; AO 282107. 
101 Liddell-Hart stressed that there should be an odd number of subordinate entities. One notes 
criticisms of Buller's disruption of the chain of command, see Chapter 3. Glossary, Table 30. It was 
proposed that GHQ would command divisions directly thus eliminating the corps-level. As with the 
e~riment with task forces in the late 19705, this was proved to be unsound. 
lot Maj Gen Bailey Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis 2004), p 345. 
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mobilisation. 1 10 
The growth of unit-types suggests the increase in complexity. In 1899 the 
Army deployed with few types of unit. In 1914 the categories of unit that had to be 
mobilised were listed over 3 pages and extended from GHQ (1 st Echelon) to an 
Aircraft Park. III This increased complexity had implications for staffwork, making 
doctrine and training more necessary. 
The Doctrinal Works 
Introduction 
This section analyses the key tactical works issued between 1902 and 1909. 
Essentially there are 3: CTrg 1902, CTrg 1905 and FSRs 1909, the latter 
foreshadowed by MAT 1908. That they were not titled 'drillbooks' suggests more 
scope for initiative and less rigidity. The Esher Committee saw the manuals as 
having an important relationship with the GS system. I 12 
The Key Works 
CTrg 1902 was the Army's first modem all-arms manual. Roberts emphasised 
that the: 'general principles on which the Army is to fight in war will be 
authoritatively laid down in a work [CT 1902] which will concern all branches of the 
service. ,113 His introduction stressed: 
In this manual are enumerated certain principles which have been evolved by 
experience as generally applicable to the leading of troops in war. These 
principles, however, are not to be taken as infallible guides. They demand 
respect, for their violation is often followed by mishap ... and they should be 
thoroughly impressed on the mind of every officer, that whenever he comes to 
give a decision in the field, he instinctively gives them their full weight. But 
they are to be regarded as pointing out the dangers involved rather than as 
precepts to be blindly obeyed. An officer before the enemy, after carefully 
reviewing the situation, should put into practice those measures which 
commend themselves to his common-sense, providing always that [they] are in 
accordance with the spirit of the orders that he has received, that they are 
110 'Mr Haldane and the Army' QR 206 (1907). pp 470-1; ED Brose The Kaiser's Army (Oxford 
2001), pp 155-6. 
IllWEs 1898; Regulations/or Mobilization 1914 pp 9-12. 
III R WORe (Part II) ( 1904). P 23. 
III EPs 8704-35 'AG/GOC Aldershot letter 31110/01;' 'Memorandum to AG 2918/01.' 
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calculated to ~ure coop~tion in. the attainment of the [aim], and that good 
reason can be given for theIr adoptIon ... [T]his manual is ... authoritative on 
every subject with which it deals. I 14 
This preface is undogmatic, starkly contrasting with IDB 1896's emphasis on control. 
Though doctrine is not mentioned directly, CT 1902's emphasis on thought, 
principles and cooperation clearly suggest it. '[T]hat good reason can be given for 
their adoption' and 'carefully reviewing the situation' both suggest the need for 
logical analysis. Unsurprisingly the Army developed the skill of writing 
appreciations in this period. I IS CTrg 1902 is stated to be authoritative as doctrine 
must be. IDB 1896's Part V did not mention 'principles' or logical analysis, made 
little reference to initiative and emphasised control. 
CTrg 1902's Sections 1-7 outline a series of principles analysing the arms, 
though curiously engineers were omitted, particularly view of the 1900 amendment 
to IDB 1896. It stressed all-arms cooperation, firepower, including cavalry's 
weaponry, QF artillery and the use of ground. I 16 CTrg 1902 was written principally 
by Henderson and expanded by Ellison who consulted the German, Major Balck, 
accepting his amendments, mainly involving frontal attack. 117 
CTrg 1905 was similar to CTrg 1902, though without Roberts' introduction, 
and its order was different. There are however shades of difference between the two 
editions. Both recommended flanking attack where possible, though CTrg 1905 
stressed later deployment, giving more emphasis to covering fire and 
Infantry/Artillery cooperation. tt8 Both emphasised Independent Cavalry. Both 
stressed reconnaissance more than IDB 1896. Both envisaged lengthy battles with 
114 CTrg J 902 pp 3-4. 
115 Glossary; Lt Col Henderson 'Strategy and Its Teaching' JRUSI XLII (1898), Appx II; Maj Cadell 
'On Writing an Appreciation ofa Military Situation' PRAI XXXI (1904-5). 
116 1DB J 896 had been amended to include them. Chapter 6. 
117 EPs 8704-35-34 'Proposed contents of General Service Manual Part I &11'; EPs 8704-35-818 
pp56, 58. It is possible that Wilson and Rawlinson were involved. Professor Jeffrey suggests that 
Wilson's involvement was small, Lecture NAM 19/9/07. 
III CT 1905 plOO. But CTrg 1902 stressed fire superiority. pp33-4. 
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methodical progress from locality to locality, consolidating captured positions. 1 19 
These tactics may have been derived from Buller's relief of Ladysmith or possibly 
the siege ofPaardeberg. CTrg 1905 had more on artillery than CT 1902 and 
described the tasks of each category of artillery. Both stressed counter-attacks, noting 
that increased firepower allowed more 
defenders to be reserved for them. Both had a 'Night Operations' section. Tactically 
the works were similar; the principal difference was one of structure with CTrg 1905 
being better organised. 
Both CTrg 1902 & 1905 recommended careful training, that it was designed for 
war, and that it was to be systematic, progressive, combining practical and theoretical 
instruction for all ranks; privates were to be taught so that: 
[they] may be able to comprehend the meaning and object of every 
movement. .. [Their] individual intelligence will thus be called into play.120 
The training section is long and stresses realism, thus suggesting the degree of 
change since 1899. IDB 1896, CDB 1898 and FAD1896 were far less emphatic on 
training. This reinforces the link, made earlier, between doctrine and training. 
MATs 1908&1909 
The next substantial doctrinal documents were the MATs, issued from 1908 to 
report on and influence training. MAT 1908 explained the basic principles of the 
forthcoming FSRs: 
the British Anny is ... small ... and it may conceivably be called upon to face 
opponents to whom it is numerically inferior. For this reason it is desired to 
instil ... certain fundamental principles. Perhaps the most important of these 
principles are the necessity to develop ... the maximum of mobility, to cultivate 
in the highest degree the art of manoeuvre, and to foster initiative and the 
offensive spirit. ... [T]he best chance of victory for the numerically weaker 
combatant, when acting against an enemy who is not inferior in moral (sic), 
arms and training, lies in seeking, by manoeuvre, to cause the enemy to 
. d' ~ bl . k h' 121 blunder, In order to create an seize a lavoura e opportunity to attac 1m. 
119 CTrgl905 plIO; Chapter 5. 
120 CTrg 1902 covered training in a separate section published in 1903; CTrg 1905 P 157; Chapter 7. 
III MAT 1908 P 2. 
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This extract is of great doctrinal importance, accepting that combat's mathematics 
favour greater numbers, fIrepower alone could not solve the British tactical problem. 
Manoeuvre had to redress numerical inferiority. The British had emphasised mobility 
after South Africa, but, as continental war became more likely, it became more 
critical in view of their likely numerical inferiority. Haking, a Camberley OS had 
already stressed at the 1905 GS Conference that: 
There is only one course open to the weaker army. It must manoeuvre, draw the 
enemy into an unfavourable position and then attack simultaneously with all its 
forces. 122 
Raking by implication advocated doctrine by emphasising that: 
our junior officers should thoroughly understand both the theory and practice of 
such detachments, so they can act intelligently, ably and without fear ... of 
doing ... wrong. 
Also Haking's very title 'The Application of the Principles of Strategy and Tactics' 
suggests doctrine was being developed. Haking' s lecture links Manchuria to FSRs. 
MAT 1908 discarded CTrg 1902 and 1905' s emphasis on methodical 
operations. It analysed the training needed to support manoeuvre-based combat, 
emphasising encounter actions, naturally more likely in mobile warfare. But MA T 
1908' s endorsement of manoeuvre was not new. Chesney' analysis of mobility had 
been developed by Henderson's Stonewall Jackson as well as South African and 
Manchurian experience. 123 MAT 1908 also stressed principles, effectively doctrine, 
emphasised training, its relationship to doctrine and the need for dynamic 
manoeuvre against an enemy able to react. MAT 1909 continued the stress on 
meeting engagements and developing tempo by rapid deployment from the line of 
march and swift decision-making by commanders who, it stressed, must seize the 
initiative from the unready. This emphasis on achieving superior tempo is key 
122 WO 33/2747 P 35, Chapter 8. 
III Chapter 5. 
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in modem manoeuvre theory. 124 
FSRs1909 
FSRs 1909 remained the Army's most significant doctrinal work in 1914. The 
Operations volume began similarly to CTrg 1902: 
The principles given in [FSRs] have been evolved by experience as generally 
applicable ... They are to be regarded by all ranks as authoritative ... They 
should be so thoroughly impressed on the mind of every commander, that 
whenever he has to come to a decision in the field, he instinctively gives them 
their full weight. 125 
There was no doubt of FSRs ' doctrinal nature. They stressed initiative similarly to 
CTrg. 126 FSRs contain more general principles than CTrg 1902& 1905 and are more 
logically structured. Most chapters begin with 'general principles,' indeed some sub-
chapters start so, thus suggesting their greater doctrinal emphasis. 127 FSRs have 
chapters on 'Intercommunication and Orders'; a natural combination as 
communications are necessary for orders' dissemination, this further suggests 
staffwork's new importance, while 'Movements' was logically placed at the start of 
FSRs and much expanded from CTrg 1905. This was a natural consequence of 
basing doctrine on manoeuvre. Generally FSRs 1909 emphasise offensive action 
more than CTrg 1902& 1905, but, compared to French doctrine, their tone is 
restrained. 128 This suggests that, though the British were looking more to France; 
senior officers had made several visits to French establishments, but it was not 
overwhelming. 129 The British envisaged defending, though they stressed activity 
Similarly withdrawal was not ignored; Robertson stressed it at Camberley. He also 
emphasised attack, but this was not to be a blind rush. 130 4 Division did two 
124 BA 84 (1910), pl04; DMO pp 43,48. 
III FSRs J 909 P 1. 
ll6para 13 iii p27 states similarly to CTrg J 902 the duty to disobey inappropriate orders. 
Il7 Eg Chapter 5 S 64 'General principles', while 'Protection ... at Rest' has its own S 75 on principles. 
121 Combat starts with orders, movement then follows. 
129 WO 33/2826 'Visit French Artillery 1908;' WO 27/507. 
IlO Maj Gen Robertson 'Final Address Staff College' ARV (1913), pp 334-5. 
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withdrawal exercises in 1913 and it seems likely that other formations practiced them 
in view of Camberley' s emphasis. FSRs contained details of meeting engagements. 
These were not included in CTrg 1905, suggesting that more mobile, less positional 
warfare was expected. 131 In such operations, skill and training had greater 
opportunities than in attrition. Training was shaped to support this with manoeuvre 
and meeting engagements, again accentuated in 1909.132 
FSRs outlined German versus French tactics. This was stimulated by official 
visits to France and the GS's translation of German Tendencies with regard to the 
Preparation and Development of an Action. 133 This work compared French tactics 
based on manoeuvre of a large reserve behind a strong advance guard with the more 
rigid German system of envelopment with fewer reserves. Some soldiers had 
reservations on cut and dried imitation; JE Gough reemphasised the need to: 
see our Army trained to a proper understanding of war, with a knowledge of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different methods, and ... to know how and 
when to apply this knowledge. 134 
Again one notes the stress on principles. Gough's analysis of initiative, orders and 
the aim in relation to FSRs and principles was farsighted. Essentially the difference 
between the French and Germans involved manoeuvre. The Germans emphasised 
envelopment, essentially aiming to exploit superior numbers and the strategic 
initiative. 135 They stressed constant attack and subordinate initiative but had few 
reserves. In consequence senior German commanders had less ability to influence 
events. In contrast the French emphasised manoeuvre behind a strong general 
advance guard, strong reserves, greater control by the CinC and consequently rather 
less subordinate initiative. Thus poised they would exploit enemy mistakes. 136 There 
IlIwo 279/535 P 7; positional warfare was being deprecated from 1907; BA LXXIX (1907), P 175. 
m 'Army Training 1909' BA 84 (1910), P 104. 
m Trans GS Capt Culmann (1908). He was a French GS officer. 
1)4 'Peace Training for Command' AR 1(1911), pp 242,244-5. 
IlS Envelopment featured in Japanese Manchurian tactics being rooted in German doctrine. 
116 Brig Gen Wilson 'Initiative and the Power of Manoeuvre' (AMS 1910), pp 1-3. 
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were sound reasons for the British recommending the French system, rather than just 
imitating an ally. They were numerically inferior but a regular force might hope to 
offset this: 
[s ]uperior numbers on the battlefield are an undoubted advantage, but skill, 
better organization and training, and above all a firmer determination in all 
ranks to conquer at any cost, are the chief factors of success. 137 
The British stress on human factors was based on Manchuria, British failures in 
South Africa and partly on the requirements of manoeuvre warfare. Professor 
Travers has criticised this stress on morale, but manoeuvre demands such qualities 
and morale remains a principle of war. 138 
Reactive tactics also suited an Army which would be strategically defending, 
even though its tactics emphasised attack. Unsurprisingly many, including Kiggell, 
later Commandant Camberley, and JE Gough stressed counterattacks. There was 
considerable contemporary interest in the battle of Salamanca and counterattacks 
featured in training. 139 Counterattacks are a distinctive feature ofmanoeuvrist 
doctrine as they enable the initiative to be regained. However there were substantial 
differences between later French teaching which emphasised attack from the outset, 
the British saw the need for greater cunning. Robertson outlined how: 
The situation may be such that we may be compelled to await a ... better 
opportunity of dealing with an enemy. For this we may have to march rapidly, 
lie hidden, deploy very quickly, strike with our whole weight suddenly before 
the enemy can bring up his, and then perhaps withdraw and avoid the return 
blow. There is no more difficult operation in war ... [It] calls for constant 
practice. 
Here Robertson suggests the importance of mobility and training for manoeuvre 
137F. 
'SRs 1909pp 111-2,107. 
III SHPs 215 'The Doctrine ofa 'Doctrine' p 5; The Killing Ground (1993), pp 67-9; M Creveld 
Fighting Power (1983), p 1 suggests human factors' importance for the Germans between 1939-45; 
DMO p 4-5. Generally manoeuvre combat places greater demands on training, initiative and 
intelligence; attrition demands sustained courage. 
139 French 1914 p 9; Gooch Plans pp 283-4,289; 'The Counter-Attack' (AMS 1905); ANG LlV 
(1913), pp 1240-1; Brig Gen May's Encounter and Counterstroke (Dublin 1909) is based on a 
battlefield tour; one division practiced them in 1909. Capt Marindin The Salamanca Campaign 
(1906); Maj Gen May 'Freedom of Manoeuvre' AR IV (1913). Salamanca was a counterattack. 
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warfare, as well as by implication the importance of C3. These tactics were practiced 
in training. 140 
Implicit in British doctrine and Wilson's analysis was manoeuvre. Wilson 
emphasised that Gennans, widely deployed, had: 'no general reserve, and no power 
to alter plans, and therefore, no power of manoeuvre.' Here it is important to 
distinguish between mobility and manoeuvre. Wilson stressed: 
[i]f ... we find ourselves with no superior mobility, unaccustomed to long and 
tedious marches, ... ignorant of how to requisition, ignorant of how to billet, 
still served by horse ... , instead of motor traction ... then I am in favour of 
... having a Slogging Match (SiC).141 
Wilson saw how attrition would harm a small professional army fighting a more 
numerous conscript force which would suffer less qualitatively. Here it is possible to 
extend his argument to suggest that a small, firepower-heavy army, with 
consequently less mobility, would have been unsuitable for the type of combat 
anticipated before 1914. Heavy artillery columns were long, slow and its ammunition 
ponderous. The pieces were deployed far back in the order of march and would 
consequently find it hard to engage the enemy in a timely fashion. Clausewitz had 
also anticipated the danger: 
An excess of artillery is bound to cause operations to partake more and more of 
a defensive and passive character. A shortage of artillery will on the contrary 
enable us to let the offensive, mobility and manoeuvring predominate. 142 
Professor Travers has criticised the British for downplaying firepower from 
1910 when IT was altered from: 'the decision is obtained by fire alone' to 'fire 
superiority makes the decision possible.' His argument is mistaken, both tactically 
I~S Lind Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder 1985),p 21; ROBPs 1/3/6 'War' 19/9/13; D Porch 
The March to the Marne (1981 ),pp 213-5 argues that the French were so divided that they were unable 
to fonnulate realistic doctrine, hence opting for all-out attack. The British and French fought very 
differently in August 1914. The British fought defensively, the French attacked, bands playing and 
officers in white gloves, Clayton Paths pp 20,28-9. Robertson's remarks clearly echo Henderson's 
ideas for defeating more numerous foes, WO 27/504 'Strategy' p 1; WO 27/508 'IGF Report 1912' p 
78 for an exercise involving withdrawal in contact set by the IGHF; Ibid '1913 Report' p 8. 
141 Wilson 'Initiative' pp 2,7. 
142 FSPB 1908 pp 29-30; a cavalry unit occupied 600 yds, an RFA one 2380. Since a key dimension of 
columnar movement is time past a point, column length is critical; Clausewitz War p 341. 
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and mathematically, as Chapter 1 and the Glossary argue. Furthermore the British 
were not notably inferior to other European annies in their proportion of firepower to 
troops. Indeed at the divisional level, key for manoeuvre, they were superior. The 
British continued to emphasise the qualitative aspects of firepower: Infantry 
marksmanship, covering fire and artillery support of other anns down to 1914. 143 
Wilson perceptively analysed command, arguing that the German system 
weakened their CinC's ability to control. Whether the Germans deliberately 
downplayed signals cannot be determined here; arguably they felt that doctrine and 
the Schlieffen Plan would compensate for inadequate communications. In 1914 poor 
signals capability hurt Germany, despite its advanced electrical industry. In contrast 
the British, relying on 1899-1902 experience, had invested heavily in 
communications and had the only separate Signals Service in Europe. l44 
Enhanced logistics, motorization and requisitioning improved British 
manoeuvrability strikingly. Several billeting exercises were held. Despite Professor 
van Creveld's view that many saw requisitioning as impossible in future European 
warfare, the British certainly planned to do so to improve mobility. 145 Mobile field 
kitchens, based on Manchurian reports, were introduced to save time, improve 
feeding and hence marching. The British emphasised mobility staffwork and march-
discipline in the period. 146 
143 T Travers Killing Ground ( 1993), P 67; Bidwell &Graham Firepower p 27; Table 15. The SMLE 
with its box magazine was superior to the French rifle's tubular magazine. The Vickers was better 
than the St Etienne machinegun, A Clayton Paths o/Glory (2003), p 77. British cavalry carried the 
SMLE rather than a 'pop-gun' carbine. Divisions were the key firepower level in manoeuvre. Corps-
level assets were too far back for prompt action. But had British pieces in each division been doubled, 
they would have naturally been inferior to the Germans in absolute terms. The importance of the 
divisional level in manoeuvre is that it represents a compromise between coordination, best achieved 
at higher levels, and responsiveness which is swifter when assets are further forward. WO 27/508 
'IGF Report 1911' P 44, Ibid 'IGHF Report 1912' p 10. 
144 M van Creveld Command in War (1985), pp 154-5; Maj Priestley The Signals Service in the 
European Waro! 1914 to 1918 (Chatham 1921). pp 5-8. WO 27/508 'IGHF Report 1913' P 53. 
145 Table 16; BA LXXVII (1906).p 586; Creveld Command, pp 154-5 and Supp~ving War ( 1977),p 
123; SIULRs 1911 discussed at the 1911 GS Conference; WO 279/38 'Report Billeting Scheme t 9 t 0.' 
This included using local supplies. 
146 Capt Davidson 'Staffwork with a Division on the March' AR II (1912),p 397; the West Yorkshires 
pioneered march-discipline, EDPs 3n/l p 5. 
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The Continuing Demand for Doctrine 
FSRs 1909 were not the last word on doctrine. From 1912 the IGHF's reports 
include a paragraph entitled: 'doctrine.' Nicholson, the CIGS, stated that: 
[the GS's] influence on the Anny is especially marked by its having brought to 
the front certain broad principles relating to training, war organization, the 
performance of staff duties, higher leading and command .... This REVIEW 
(sic) is the natural outcome of the creation of our [GS] and it will aim at 
amplifying and elucidating the general principles. 147 
Here, though Nicholson did not mention doctrine directly, it is implicit in his 
emphasis on principles. He also highlighted the need for study and professionalism; 
indeed the magazine's establishment suggests the greater importance accorded to 
theoretical training and disseminating doctrine. Nicholson's links between principles 
and factors such as organisation confirms the theoretical analysis made earlier in this 
Chapter. 
Nicholson's emphasis on doctrine was continued in two complementary, 
influential anonymous articles. The first stressed: 
A sound, comprehensive, all-pervading doctrine of war is as important to an 
army as its organisation ... [I]n this vital respect the British Army of 1899-like 
the Russian Army [in Manchuria] ... was completely lacking ... It is among the 
first duties of the [GS] ... to indoctrinate [its army] with a clear conception of 
the basic principles of war. 
Both articles were compulsory reading for the Senior Division at Quetta. This being 
the case, Camberley probably stressed them equally.148 It is probably more than 
coincidental that both appeared about the time of The Army Review's foundation. 
Senior serving soldiers probably wrote both, their professional tone and relevance to 
an important military issue suggest this conclusion. The articles stimulated some 
debate including an article: 'The Doctrine of a "Doctrine'" which criticised the 
current emphasis on doctrine. However French, after taking over as CIGS, reaffirmed 
147 WO 27/508 'IGHF Reports 1912 and 13' both p 6: 'Introduction' AR I (1911). p 5. 
141 'The British Army and Modem Conceptions of War' ER CCXIII (1911). P 324; 'The Place of 
Doctrine in War' ER CCXV (1912). Having checked with NLS. it has been impossible to establish the 
authors; MMPs 4/1 'Quetta Orders' 19n112. 
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that: 
assuming that our doctrine is only approximately sound, it is of incalculable 
benefit to the Anny that all its leaders, and especially its higher leaders, should 
act on the same inspiration, should be guided by identical principles, and 
should thus feel confident that their comrades ... are inspired by the same 
governing considerations and seek to attain by common action a common end. 
As argued earlier, the want of cooperation between higher commanders in South 
Africa had damaged perfonnance. French continued: 
we must still be catholic enough to encourage the expression of independent 
and original thought, and we must be ever ready to enfold all that is sound and 
useful in these new ideas within ... our accepted doctrine ... Between doctrine 
and dogma there is a wide gulf. 149 
It is a fonnidable analysis of doctrine's importance from an officer heavily criticised 
for lack of intellectual ability. 150 That successive CIGS stressed doctrine suggests its 
contemporary importance; that they made the case in the Army's new review 
suggests the change towards greater intellectual effort and professionalism. 
The RN illuminates the Army's interest in doctrine. Corbett outlined the need 
for doctrine, while progressive naval officers were deeply interested in doctrine and 
staffwork. They cited the value of doctrine to the Japanese Army in Manchuria and 
were influenced by Henderson's work, the Army's problems in South Africa and the 
subsequent changes. That Corbett's key work was entitled Some Principles of 
Maritime Strategy suggests how keen the British were to develop them. In it Corbett 
suggests the importance of doctrine: 
It is not enough that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his 
subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his decision ... For this 
every man must have been trained to think in the same plane: the chief s order 
must awaken in every brain the same process of thought. 
Dr Gordon analyses Beatty's stress on general principles. lSI That Beatty commanded 
149 SHPs attributes this to Gen T Capper; FM French 'Memorandum' AR II (1912),p viii. 
150 R Holmes The Little Field Marshal (2004),p ix. Generals may not originate everything that they 
sign but they remain responsible for the contents. That French repeatedly mentioned 'instinctive 
knowledge' over many years suggests that this was a personal belief. 
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the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the fastest part of the Grand Fleet and the one in which the 
most initiative was needed again suggests the link between doctrine and initiative. 
This thesis cannot examine the links between the Army and Navy, but that the two 
Services were both advocating doctrine at roughly the same time shows its 
importance. 
Kiggell, the DSD, gave a backbearing in 1913 on doctrine and its relationship 
with the manuals: 
We know the problems of war cannot be solved by rules, but by judgement 
based on knowledge of general principles. To lay down rules rather than 
general principles ... would tend to cramp judgement, not to educate and 
strengthen it. For that reason our manuals aim at giving principles but avoiding 
laying down methods. 152 
Here Kiggell, occupying a key post for the development of doctrine, confirms this 
thesis' identification of the relationship between principles, judgement and doctrine. 
Control, Doctrine and the Differences between Military and Civil Methods 
At this point it is illuminating to compare the Army's changed methods of 
command with alterations in industrial control. But caveats must be made as there 
are deep divisions between the two. First any military force is faced with a number of 
C2 dilemmas. They must prepare for a state of activity, war, which is profoundly 
different from their normal peacetime existence as Wavell argued: 
In acquiring proficiency the [industrialist] has many advantages ... he is 
"always in the field" while the soldier ... may be compared to a man learning 
to be an MPH by practice on an electric hare in a riding school. 
Here it must be further emphasised that armies are generically less exposed to 
friction in peacetime than the active elements of navies and air forces. 153 In 
peacetime administration tends to predominate in the military and, as Chapter 2 
lSI Some Principles o/Maritime Strategy (1911), pp 2-3; 'AX' 'The Executive Command and Staff in 
Naval Warfare' NavRev 1(1914), pp 66-7, 70-1. It cited Henderson and poor stafTwork in South 
Africa. A Gordon in W Murray& RH Sinnreich The Past as Prologue (2006) pp 162-3. 
In WO 279/48 P 17. 
IS] FM Wavell The Good Soldier (1948), P 28. Wavell used 'politician' in the original. Since this 
section is examining industry the substitution has been made. 
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argues, the late Victorian Army was tangled in red tape. 
Industry is always in action, although the conditions under which it operates 
are inherently more benign than combat. Executives are not summarily killed, 
factories are not liable to destruction and communications, telephones, telegraphs 
and mail, generally stable state monopolies of growing technical efficiency, were, 
relative to their military equivalents, invulnerable. Beniger argues that commerce 
was in the period becoming more centralised with more means of control becoming 
available. He argues that there was a: 'smooth transition from control crisis to 
Control Revolution' in industry. One symptom of this change was the creation of 
large firms: Krupp's, Vickers-Armstrong etc with their horizontal and vertical 
integration and reSUlting economies of scale. Another symptom of the change to a 
more structured system which exerted greater low-level control was the use of time 
and motion experts, who drained initiative from the coalface employees. 154 This was 
not the case in the Army which indeed saw the reverse, initiative being delegated 
downward. 
Armies were also experiencing the effects of technical change, though this, in 
the shape of enhanced firepower, promoted decentralisation and initiative at least 
when manoeuvre was the desired outcome. Here Chapter l's analysis of attrition and 
firepower must be remembered. Contrastingly attrition-based massed firepower, 
subject to similar forces as industry, economy of scale, or in artillery's case the fact 
that concentrated fire is more effective than dispersed. Improved communications, 
less vulnerable for the RA than for other arms, saw, like Industry, control being 
centralised and therefore pushed up the chain of command in artillery and in 
154 Beniger Control, p 291. The control crisis in armies caused by the growth of firepower was not 
technically solved until the widespread use ofRT in the 1940s; Chapter 7. 
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positional warfare. 155 Interestingly in the Infantry and Cavalry, both slanted towards 
manoeuvre, the tactical unit emphasised after South Africa was the company or 
squadron. In both low-level initiative was emphasised from 1902. 156 
Here it is worth emphasising that armies particularly have a control dilemma. 
Manoeuvre demands initiative, delegation and creativity with imposed downward 
control relaxed, albeit with command direction maintained.157 Attritional warfare 
emphasises control and centralisation with command exercised at the highest 
possible level. Furthermore administration which promotes system, centralisation 
and uniformity, tends to predominate in peacetime. This further complicates the 
process of developing the attributes needed for manoeuvre. Also large parts of an 
army, the logistic corps, have administration as their raison d'etre. For many logistic 
personnel, say a clerk in a supply depot, the qualities that are required of them by the 
Army are essentially civilian and not martial. ISS 
Transition between manoeuvre and attrition may be fast. One notes Haig's 
comment in 1918 that it was a commander's duty to take risks which a month before 
would have been criminal. Perhaps the dilemma was most acute for navies in the 
period. Jutland demanded that captains adapted from rigid control by Jellicoe to 
having to show great initiative within a few hours. 159 
155 RA forward conununications were equally exposed. But the critical RA higher conununication 
cables, dug in 6 feet of earth, were far less vulnerable. It was these links in static warfare which 
enabled massive fIrepower to be applied to areas, even if much fire was misdirected. Oen Famdale 
History o/the Royal Regiment 0/ Artillery. Western Front 1914-18 Woolwich 1986), pp 143-4,156. 
Artillery centralisation has been taken further in the late 20th Century. There is an interesting analysis 
to be done between the RN and RAF, both relatively centralised Services and the Anny whose teeth 
anns were decentralised into a regimental system. Theoretically this should have promoted initiative. 
In practical terms the results have been less impressive.! 
156 Caveats are needed here. Infantry is generically split between the tactical functions of frrepower, 
mobility and for that matter protection, but relative to artillery it has greater mobility on the 
battlefield. It must also be emphasised that in manoeuvre artillery is decentralised to provide 
responsiveness at the expense of concentration. Chapters 5, 4 and 7. It should also be noted that the 
RA continued to allow considerable scope to young officers. Bidwell argues that the gunner system 
was better at developing initiative than the other arms. Here the Sappers fonn a possible exception. 
IS7Undirected manoeuvre is risky. Ludendortrs failure to control the March 1918 offensive led to 
e~loitation in a direction without strategic value. C Barnett The Sword-Bearers (1963),pp 314-6. 
lSI Brig Bidwell Modem Warfare (1973),p 127. 
159 A Gordon The Rules o/the Game (2002), Chapters 21and 22. 
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Conclusions 
Adoption of doctrine from 1902 reflects combat's greater complexity and the 
imperatives of balancing initiative and control. The process suggests a more 
intellectual and theoretical emphasis by an Army whose general attitude has been 
described as: 'complacent anti-intellectualism.' 160 There were problems; some were 
confused and gave different meanings to doctrine; an example being the stress on 
French versus German tactics rather than on examining the underlying principles. 161 
But despite these errors, there is no doubt that there had been a considerable advance 
in thinking about war's fundamentals. The enhancement of the staff was critical for 
this and for developing and disseminating doctrine. 
Doctrine was instilled in a number of ways, organisational, through manuals 
in professional literature and by changes to training. The variety of means suggests 
both the strength of demand for doctrine and that systemic change was occurring. 
Inculcating initiative was one objective of doctrine but the advantage of having 
standard procedures, organisations and tactics should not be underestimated. 
Training was transformed; this encompassed improvements at Camberley, the 
opening of the Indian staff college, more frequent manoeuvres, changes to basic 
training, development of training establishments and introduction of new manuals. 
The doctrine promulgated in 1908-9 emphasised manoeuvre and mobility, 
complementing the changes analysed in Chapter 5. It is argued that there were sound 
military reasons for this and not reactionary social forces. The latter undoubtedly 
existed in the Army, however. Similar forces caused the adoption of manoeuvrist 
doctrine in the 1980s. 
leo Clausewitz War p 42. 
161 A point made by Haig in a 1912 document, cited in J Terraine The Educated Soldier (1963),p 49. 
Hlig emphasised adaptability, mobility, manoeuvre and detennination rather than penetration or 
envelopment. JE Gough raised similar concerns, cited above. 
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Introduction 
Chapter 10 Conclusions 
Things have transpired which made me learn, 
The size and meaning of the game, 
I don't know when the change began, 
I finished as a thinking man. 
Hindsight is the prerogative of historians and senior officers; in contrast this 
thesis has tried to work forward towards 1914 to understand why British tactical 
doctrine developed in the way that it did. Many mistakes were made jUdging by the 
dour, attritional battles fought between 1915-1917, but overemphasising them 
obscures prewar reasoning. Bloch's forecasts were not of prolonged, attritional 
warfare but its impossibility. Most experts assumed that any major European war 
would be short as otherwise nations could not stand the financial or social strains. 
Thus manoeuvre rather than firepower-dominated attrition predominated across 
Europe. 
The start date of this thesis simplifies complexity. Tactics had begun to alter 
before 1897, though the rate of change increased from Tirah, further accelerating in 
1899. Often the discontinuity in the trend is more significant than the exact point of 
origin. The process of change was complex, the evidence, slanted towards change, 
distorts. By weight of evidence this thesis suggests that the reformers' views were 
reasonably representative, but it may be justly criticised for an attritional approach. 
Similarly its termination is simplified. FSRs 1909 were not the last significant 
doctrinal work; Indirect Fire, pregnant with significance for 1914-18, was not 
confirmed as the RA's normal means of engagement until 1914. 
1902-1914' s contexts are important when assessing tactical changes; static 
budgets from 1904, eroded by inflation, pay increases and costly new equipments. 1 
I D Stevenson Armaments and the Coming of War (Oxford 1997), Table 8; Statement on the AmI.\' 
&ttmates /914-15 (1914),p 2. 
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Britain faced a wide array of threats. Diplomacy resolved some, others 
received little attention, but all potentially distracted from tactical development. The 
Army had global, expensive commitments, while weapons had to work on the 
Frontier and in Flanders. The great organisational refonns are another context which 
diverted attention from tactics. 
The Change 1897-1909 
The most significant change was that the British adopted a more intellectually 
coherent system which placed more emphasis on the operational level of war. This 
was based on doctrine as it would be understood today. There were flaws; failure to 
list the principles of war officially was one, while the system had little time to bed-in 
before 1914.2 But for an Anny till then largely driven by the heroic improvisations 
demanded by colonial warfare and an empirical national intellectual tradition, this 
switch towards doctrine was highly significant. The Anny's training, education and 
staff systems altered radically; the relationship between these, tactical change, 
emphasis on the operational level and doctrine was symbiotic. The GS was needed to 
create and articulate doctrine; training developed and validated doctrine, whilst 
combat's complexities, which demanded doctrine, in turn meant that training and the 
GS were vital. The GS was a strong force for spreading doctrine, vitali sing 
intellectual development and supervising training. Improved soldier and officer 
education underpinned the whole system. 
British doctrine was based on manoeuvre and mobility rather than firepower 
and attrition. This emphasis, natural in an expeditionary army with a likely semi-
independent role, meant that it could thus hope to defeat superior numbers. 
Conscription, the only means of redressing numerical inferiority, was practically and 
Z n Alger The Questfor Victory. The Quest/or the Principles 0/ War (Westport 1982), pp 100-2 notes 
that neither the French nor Germans defined them before 1914. 
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politically impossible.3 Doctrine emphasised mobile forces, principally cavalry. The 
British developed their logistics to improve manoeuvrability and were the most 
motorised anny in 1914. All these suggest an attempt to resort to operational level 
manoeuvre. Greater firepower at the divisional level, key for manoeuvre, supported 
this. 
Modern frrepower forced dispersion and thus required increased initiative and 
ultimately doctrine. Here the contrast between IDB 1896's qualified endorsement of 
initiative and CTrg 1902's advocacy of it is stark. Firepower made close control 
impossible, complexity made initiative essential and doctrine steered the latter. 
Improved administration, education and basic training promoted initiative. That 
soldier education certificates doubled and that they became mandatory for Service 
Pay, suggests a major shift in the Army's priorities. Now in dispersed combat 
soldiers had to read maps. Emphasis on this skill suggests the switch from top-down 
to delegated tactics. Tactically the stress on skirmishing, scouting and detached 
duties from 1897 made individual initiative vital. Professor Travers has criticised the 
Army for over-emphasising human factors, particularly after Manchuria. But the 
changing conditions of combat with soldiers self-dependent rather than being 
physically led by their officers, demanded attention to morale and motivation. Now 
officers had to lead more subtly; one notes the post-South African stress on 
professionalism and officer responsibility for training. Enforcement altered from the 
externally imposed towards self-discipline. That courts-martials halved while 
education certificates doubled suggests that human factors had altered substantially. 
The 3 Tactical Factors 
The Army's firepower was greatly strengthened; from having the lowest 
proportion of artillery of the major powers in 1897, the British had almost the 
J Rotating conscripts to and from India within 2-3 years would have been logistically challengtng. 
Conscription was politically problematic, given the rise of the Labour Party. 
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greatest in 1914. Firepower had also improved qualitatively. There were more 
howitzers, while Indirect Fire and inter-arm coordination had improved. The weight 
of shells had increased while the new weapons had longer-ranges. Institutionally the 
RA had altered, it now stressed divisional artilleries and units rather than batteries as 
it had in 1897. From 1899 the RA began developing its communications. Scholars 
have criticised the slow adoption of Indirect Fire. But it was accepted as the normal 
means of engagement in 1914, while the new QF weapons were developed 
doctrinally. Both suggest greater analytical effort. 
Infantry firepower improved with the introduction of the SMLE and the 
doubling of unit machine guns. It has been suggested that machine guns were 
devalued after South Africa; this was not the case. But the most significant change 
was the replacement of volleys by independent fire. This demanded individual 
initiative. The Army stressed rapid independent fire at medium ranges to maximise 
firepower. 
The Army strengthened its mobility and manoeuvrability from 1899. There 
were the raw lessons of South Africa, but the change was also impelled by European 
warfare's expected conditions and Manchuria's perceived lessons. MAT 1908 and 
FSRs 1909 increased the doctrinal stress on manoeuvre. The development of 
marching, motorization, animalmastership, requisitioning and billeting shows 
mobility's importance. But perhaps the most significant change was in the Cavalry. 
Historically the British Cavalry has been substantially criticised; one notes 
Wellington's irascible comments, and for a colonially-oriented army, massed cavalry 
was largely a luxury. From 1902 cavalry training, armament and tactics were 
thoroughly overhauled. These changes represented increased emphasis on European 
warfare. The focus of scholarship, the shock versus fire controversy has somewhat 
obscured the fact that the arm's importance increased in the Anny and that the BEF 
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in 1914 was exceptionally cavalry-heavy. Furthermore these cavalrymen had rifles, 
thus having greater firepower than their French or German equivalents, and marched. 
Both enhanced mobility; both were eccentric by European standards. 
The Anny gave far greater attention to fieldcraft, extension, protective duties 
and engineering from 1899. The British infantry's fieldcraft led Europe; in 1914 
British infantry divisions had more engineers of a higher quality than those in 
continental formations. 4 Similarly the British were not technologically backward; 
their Signals Service was the first such European arm. Protection is a less visible 
factor, if the pun may be excused, than either mobility or firepower. But it was 
firepower's growth, principally modem magazine rifles, which enforced fieldcraft. 
The above paragraphs briefly summarise the 3 tactical factors. In the period of 
this thesis all increased. Due to the differing characteristics of each it is hard to 
correlate their relative importance. It is impossible to equate the purchase of motor 
vehicles with introducing fieldcraft training. The QF programme was a firepower 
enhancement, yet theory suggests that this would also have increased the Army's 
mobility. Probably mobility was the factor which increased the most. The emphasis 
on manoeuvre doctrine and march discipline, the long marches on prewar 
manoeuvres, the cavalry-heavy composition of the BEF and the development of 
initiative support this conclusion. But these efforts did not translate into an 
equivalent increase in the Anny's ability to manoeuvre in 1914. Firepower saw the 
largest equipment programme, the new QFs, while the BEF's shooting shocked the 
Germans. British tactical protection was generally good in 1914, though there were 
problems at Le Cateau.s 
4 C DutTy Through German Eyes. The British Army on the Somme (2006),p 108. 
sPoor staffwork in the BEF in 1914 impaired manoeuvrability, Brig Gen Edmonds MOFB 19141 
(1933),pp 120-1. Maxse, a brigadier, denounced stafTwork for impairing mobility in 1914, Lt Col 
Baynes Far From a DonJcey (1995), p 115. citing Maxse's own analysis. Edmonds MOFB 1 pp 134-
S. 
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There were tensions between the 3 factors in 1914; protectio~ particularly 
entrenchment, could not have been developed much further without damaging 
mobility; much the same applied to firepower, while had the British enhanced 
mobility further, frrepower and protection would have declined. In general the three 
were roughly balanced in 1914, though there was a slight bias towards mobility. 
The Wars 
Three wars dominate this thesis, Tirah, Manchuria and South Africa, with the 
latter undoubtedly the formative experience for the senior commanders of 1914-18.6 
All posed analytical problems. Two were fought against irregular though formidable 
foes on terrain atypical of Western Europe, while Manchuria saw a backward army 
fighting in adverse terrain at the far end of the Trans-Siberian railway against an 
enemy with unique qualities. The British effort to analyse Manchuria was 
considerable, though it probably over-emphasised manoeuvre. The lessons, 
subsequently perceived as heavy artillery, entrenchment, positional warfare and 
attrition, have been seen as being at variance with South Africa's mobility and 
manoeuvre. Historians have criticised the British failure to implement what they 
have deduced as Manchuria's lessons. But for the British, faced with numerical 
inferiority, mobility and manoeuvre seemed to provide a solution to defeating 
superior numbers that entrenchment and firepower-dominated attrition could not. 
Furthermore the discontinuities between South Africa and Manchuria were more 
visible after 1918 than they were before 1914. Professor Holden Reid has noted that 
the American Civil War has been reinterpreted at various times as a paradigm of 
manoeuvre and a precursor of trench warfare.7 It is argued that Manchuria has been 
similarly assessed and then reassessed. Furthermore armies inevitably have to 
interpret lessons in the light of their own strategy and situation and rather than 
6 Table 5. Analysis of the annex to the ALs listing operational service supports this. 
7 Professor Holden Reid 'The American Civil War' Lecture IHR 2006. 
335 
adopting them uncritically. 
The three wars showed many common lessons, firepower, mobility, protection. 
the enhanced need for doctrine and initiative. The divergences between the wars' 
lessons were more apparent in hindsight. 
The Wider Implications 
In the broader historical field this thesis suggests that an organisation which has 
been seen as anti-technology, anti-intellectual and socially static was in fact altering. 
The Army's stress on soldier initiative, education and that it planned to commission 
2000 soldiers on mobilisation shows that it was less socially rigid than scholars have 
assessed.s The Army's recruitment of graduates, its attempts to improve civilian 
education and its switch towards doctrine demonstrate a more intellectual response to 
problems. Similarly the official promotion of academic research into aeronautics and 
motorization has implications for understanding Edwardian attitudes towards 
technology. 
However the most significant feature of this thesis is that it illuminates the 
ideas which influenced the commanders who fought the First World War. Professor 
Sheffield argues that 1918 on the Western Front saw the birth of operational level 
combat. This thesis maintains that many of the concepts required for this were 
developed between 1897-1909. Furthermore Allenby, who served as IGC from 1910· 
14, fought two of the British Army's most successful manoeuvre battles; Beersheba 
in 1917 and Armageddon in 1918. The latter, based on surprise, deception, mobility, 
risk-taking and a commander's concept of striking boldness mounted at the 
operational level of war, overwhelmed the Turkish Army in Palestine. Horsed 
cavalry advanced faster and further than the Israeli tanks in 1973, while animal 
casualties, despite days without water, were minute compared to those sustained 
'wo 163/15 2113/10pp 1-2. 
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during the relief of Kimberley. 9 
Last Post 
A ship's compass shows the vessel's heading but not the distance sailed over 
ground. Similarly this thesis does not attempt to measure how far the Army 
progressed in implementing its new tactics. It is tempting to suggest that the changes 
constituted a tactical revolution; it is more correct to argue that, between 1897 and 
1909 the British switched from tactics rooted in the 18th Century to those which 
modem soldiers find not unfamiliar. There were precursors, the LI pioneers, whose 
ideas, analysed by Verner and Henderson, influenced the Army. Strikingly the 
changes were not just tactical; the Army overhauled its disciplinary, training, 
educational as well as its command, staff and administrative systems partly to 
support the altered tactical conditions. Here caveats must be made; society-wide 
forces were present which would have required adjustments particularly in the fields 
of pay, discipline and education. This thesis has largely ignored these social 
pressures. The Army's development after 1900 of education, initiative, doctrine, and 
fieldcraft had similarities with the LI system. The tactical changes described in this 
thesis were important but perhaps the most significant was the impact on the Army's 
culture, the development of professionalism, the combination of and stress on 
leadership, initiative, education and training, rather than relying, as hitherto, on status 
and rigid discipline. The effects of this combination were synergistic. 
British tactical doctrine matched the expected short war, the Army's strength as 
a professional force and mitigated numerical inferiority. It could even be argued that 
that manoeuvre were not carried far enough. The last possibility for victory before 
entrenchment, physical and mental, meant prolonged attrition was on the Marne. Just 
'0 Sheffield Forgotten Victory (2001). pp 245-6; Capt Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestint' 
o (1930). pp 448-452. 641-2. The contrast between the animal casualties in 1900 and 1918 suggests 
the attention given to animalmastership after 1900, though by 1918 the animals of Allenby' s force 
were acclimatised. 
337 
conceivably more vigorous action by the BEF might have led to decisive \ictory over 
von Kluck's Anny.IO 
The British trained for a mobile, short war; they would exploit technology and 
be supported by considerable firepower. The other European powers equally 
expected a short war. II The Germans had more heavy artillery but could anticipate 
having to assault permanent fortifications. The British hoped to outmanoeuvre their 
enemies. Criticism of this doctrine may be legitimate for the serving soldier, but 
demands understanding of contemporary conditions and an attempt not to apply 
modern mental attitudes anachronistically; here this author may be deemed guilty as 
charged. For scholars it is no doubt gratifying to castigate Roberts, French, Haig et 
al for failure to foresee the future. But the legitimate question is whether British 
tactical doctrine matched the expected type of war? Broadly it did; whether 
prolonged firepower-dominated attrition should have been anticipated is another 
question which this thesis does not attempt to answer. All, however, that can be said 
here is that few contemporaries regarded the results of 4 years of attrition in 1918 as 
eminently satisfactory. But then as now the future is obscure. Had in 1980 an officer 
forecast that the equivalent ofan infantry division and most of the RN would sail to 
the South Atlantic, he would have been deemed more suitable for psychiatry than 
promotion. In 1990 a senior British official categorically stated that in no 
circumstance would an armoured division be sent to the Gulf. In 2000 anyone 
predicting that the Anny would be soon be engaged in protracted combat in 
Afghanistan would have been accused of incurable nostalgia for the 'Great Game.' 
And the rest is history. 
10 Maj Gen Maurice British Strategy (1929). p 18; FM Haig eds G Sheffield and J Bourne Doug/as 
Haig. War Diaries and Letters (2005), p 69, entry 9/9/14. 
II LL Farrar The Short-War Illusion (Santa Barbara 1973). p 6. 
338 
BIBLIOGRAPHIES, INDEXES, GLOSSARIES :\:\D 
TABLES 
A great and glorious thing it is, 
To learn, for seven years or so, 
The Lord knows what of this and that, 
Ere reckoned fit to face the foe. 





Bibliography of Primary Books 
Bibliography of Secondary Books 
Bibliography of Regimental, Unit, Ann and Service Histories 
Bibliography of Military and Official Works 
Bibliography of Training Manuals pre-1899 
Bibliography of Training Manuals 1899-1906 
Bibliography of Training Manuals post-1906 
Bibliography of Indian Military Publications 
Bibliography of Official Translations 
Other Records 
Bibliography of Military Societies' Lectures and Articles 
Bibliography of Web Articles 
Civilian, Academic and Service Magazines and Newspapers Consulted 
Private Papers Consulted 
National Archives and India Office Library Files Consulted 
Thesis Consulted 





1. British units Tirah and South Africa. 
2. pscs South Africa. 
3. pscs 1914 BEF 
4. South African and Frontier Service Key Individuals. 
S. Major Generals 1914 with South African and Frontier Service. 
6. South Africa Reports. 
7. Disciplinary Offences 1898-1912. 
8. Certificates of Education 1903-1912. 
9. Cavalry as a proportion of Orders of Battle Western Front, Britain, France and 
Gennany 1914. 
10. Mobility versus Staffwork 
11. Views on Machineguns South Africa 
12. Brigadiers and above. Views on Machineguns 1900. 
13. Cavalry Views of Carbine Accuracy 1900. 
14. Increases in the Arms between 1899/1900-1904/1905. 
1 S. GunslMen Ratio Selected European Armies 1896-1914. 
16. MT Compared to Other Transport 
340 
17. Trained Soldiers Rangework 1898-1903 
18. Comparison in use of Cover in Rangework 1898-1903 
19. Comparison in Ranges 1898-1903. 
20. Increases of Artillery 1899-1908. 
21. Artillery Engagement Ranges Training 1897-1901. 
22. Ranges in Action 1896. 
23. Ranges in Action 1902. 
24. British, French and German Field Guns 1914. Technical Comparisons. 
25 The Age of Selected Commanders 1900. 
26 OXLI Recruit Education Statistics. 
27 Educational Attainments Recruit Sappers after dismissal from Drill 1910-11 
28 MAs and Observers Manchuria 
29 Commanders and Staff 18t Army Corps 1899 
30 Recruit Education on Enlistment 1895-1908 
31 Divisional Organisations Britain, Germany, France 
32 Staff Rides 1893-1899. 
33 Staff Rides 1902-1914. 
34 Subsequent Careers Staff College DS. 
35 Major manoeuvres in Britain. 
36 Covering Fire Pieters and Colenso. 
37 Artillery South Africa 
38 To show the Ratio ofField to Heavy Artillery South Africa 
39 Frontage of an Infantry Division 1898. 
40. To Show Relative Proportion Cavalry/Infantry between Britain and other Powers 
1901. 
41. Relative Strengths to Perimeter Length Ladysmith, Kimberley, Mafeking. 
42. Logistic Calculation Forage and Artillery Ammunition Expended South Africa. 
43. The SMLE and Martini-Henry Compared. 
44. MT in the BEF 1914. 
45. Distances and Areas in South Africa. 
Annexes 
A. Areas for Further Research. 
There are peculiarities in the bibliography of primary books; the most significant 
being that many works that are historically secondary are, for this thesis, primary as they 
give direct views on contemporary opinions. Some books on weapons technology 
outlining scientific principles are treated as primary material. An array of acronyms has 
been unleashed upon the hapless reader for which the author apologises. A glossary of 
abbreviations is provided, though some regimental titles may not be included. All books 
are published at London unless otherwise specified. In citing works by officers in 
footnotes, the rank held when the work was written has been used rather than the author's 
initials. The correlation between seniority and sense is inexact, but generally the more 
senior the individual the greater the influence. Rank therefore provides military context 
which naturally alters as individuals are promoted. The bibliographies give initials so 
individual officers are traceable. An exception has been made for officers \\"ith the same 
surname who are cited in close proximity. Official works whose titles include their date 
of publication eg FSRs 1909 do not have their date of publication inc luded in chapter 
citations unless this is different from the title date. \lagazine references are sometimes 
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non-standard as some editors did not include volume numbers and sometimes duplicated 
page numbers. No index is provided of individual magazine articles consulted for reasons 
of space. Thesis cited have the university at which they were undertaken listed. Lectures 
given at the Aldershot Military Society and at the Military Society of Ireland are referred 
to in the footnotes thus (AMS) or (MSI). 
This thesis includes some anachronisms; staff college professors ha\'e been entitled 
OS and brigadier generals commanding brigades are referred to as brigadiers in the text. 
Cavalry privates are generally called troopers, though this did not become their formal 
designation until later. Article titles of the Duncan Medal essays in the PRAIs ha\'e been 
curtailed to 'Duncan Medal.' As they are sentences long, the change makes citation 
simpler. Web references are listed in a separate index and are identified by a unique serial 
number as are contemporary maps. 
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J Cromb and DL Cromb The Highland Brigade (Stirling Mackay 1902) 
Ed J Cromb The Majuba Disaster. A Story of High land Heroism told by the Officers of the 92"d 
Regiment (Dundee J Leng Edinburgh J Menzies London Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton Kent 
1891) 
J Cromb The Story of Majuba Hill (Glasgow Bryce 1899) 
Maj FM Crum With the Mounted Infantry in South Africa (Cambridge private 1903) 
Maj FC Crum Memoirs of a Rifleman Scout South Africa 1899-1902 (Helensburgh private nd) 
Capt WGFC Cumming The Use of the Telescope and Scouting (G&P 1903) 
'Cyclist Commander' The Scouts' Alphabet (G&P 1903) 
Capt J Dalby Questions and Answers on the Management and Care of the Horse (Illustrated) A 
Manualfor Mounted Soldiers) (Woolwich Cattermole 1903) 
P Danby The Red Army Book (Blackie 1904) 
Col WH Daniel The Military Forces of the Crown (Casse111901) 
Capt D' Arcy-Evans Field Training Made Easy (G&P 1898) 
Cpl G Darling A Volunteer's Letters (Wi shaw W Pomphrey 1902) 
Capt L Davidson Catechism on Field Training (G&P 1898) 
Capt L Davidson Company Drill Made Easy (Aldershot G&P 1902) 
Capt L Davidson ed Maj ST Banning Catechism on Field Training (G&P 1902) 
RH Davis With Both Armies in South Africa (NY Scribner's 1902) 
Col CT Dawkins Night Operationsfor Infantry (G&P 1910) 
'Defender' Sir Charles Warren and Spion Kop (Smith Elder 1902) 
'Democritus' The Great Army Scandal (Manchester A Heywood nd) 
Col GT Denison A History of Cavalry (Macmillan's 1913) 
Gen FO De Negrier Lessons of the Russo Japanese War (H Rees 1906) 
Lt Col C Delme-Radc1iffe and JW Lewis A Territorial Army in Being (J Murray 1908) 
Capt JC Demangel Vade-Mecum of Organization and Equipment (Yorktown Webb 1899 and 
1903) 
Capt JC Demangel Questions and Answers on Tactics (Yorktown Webb 1899 & 1903) 
Capt JC Demangel Applied Tactics (Yorktown Webb 1897) 
Maj CG Dennison A Fight To the Finish (Longmans, Green 1904) 
CDe Wet Three Years War (Constable 1902) 
N Devitt Galloping Jack (H F &G Witherby nd) 
WKL Dickson The Biograph in Battle (Fisher Unwin 1901) 
CW Dilke Army Reform (Service& Patton 1898) 
WK-L Dickson The Biograph in Battle (Fisher Unwin (1901) 
Capt CM Dixon The Leaguer of Ladysmith (Eyre &Spottiswoode nd) 
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Capt JWE Donaldson The Application of Military History to Modern Warfare (Calcutta Thacker 
Spink 1905) 
Capt JWE Donaldson and Capt AF Becke Military History Applied to Modern Warfare (H Rees 
1907) 
Capt JWE Donaldson and Capt AF Becke Waterloo (H Rees 1907) 
R Donajowski A Soldier's Aid to Scouting (E Donajowski nd) 
Col WT Dooner The Infantry of Our Army and Mr Arnold Forster's Proposals (Simpkin, 
Marshal Hamilton& Kent 1905) 
U Col FH Dyke Lectures on Tactics (W Clowes 1912) 
U Col FH Dyke itA" to "0" of the Military Synopsis (Harrison nd) 
CW Earle Last Letters of Capt Sydney Earle (Smith Elder 1903) 
'Editor The Review of the Week' The Scapegoat (Bickers 1901) 
SSM R Edmondson John Bull's Army from Within (Arnold 1907) 
Maj FM Edwards The Defence and Defensive Positions (W Clowes 1902) 
Lt Col FM Edwards Notes on the Training, Equipment, and Organisation of Cavalry for War (W 
Clowes 1910) 
Majs L Edye & E Rhodes Catechism of the Manual of Instruction on Army Signalling (G&P 
1894) 
Brig Gen CC Egerton Hill Warfare on the North- West Frontier of India (Allahabad Pioneer Press 
1898) 
Col GGA Egerton Miniature Range Shooting (H Rees 1909) 
A Egmont-Hake Soldiers of the Queen Library (London Publishing Co nd) 
Maj Gen GF Ellison Lecture History of Military Administration (LSE 18/1/21) 
Capt GF Ellison Home Defence (Stanford 1898) 
Capt G Elsmie Sudden Attacks and How They May be Met (Lahore Civil and Military Gazette 
1897) 
Viscount Esher The Committee of Imperial Defence (Murray 1913) 
Capt HC Evans Company Training Made Easy (G&P 1902) 
Capt HC Evans Notes on Writing Orders in the Field and Reports in the Field (G&P 1902) 
Maj HC Evans & Capt RF Legge Company Training Made Easy (G&P 1905) 
Maj W Evans-Gordon The Cabinet and War (Constable 1904) 
Surgeon Maj GJH Evatt The 'Death March' through the Khyber Pass in the Afghan Campaign 
1878-79 (Calcutta Thacker Spink 1891) 
Surgeon-General GJH Evatt Our Songless Army (Curwen nd) 
Maj W Ewbank Tactical Studies (Bombay Thacker 1905) 
Gen Falkenhayn General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical Decisions (np 1919) 
Col J Farquharson The Principles of Army Organisation as Applied to English Army Service 
(Stanford 1898) 
Lt Viscount Fincastle & Lt PC Elliot-Lockhart A Frontier Campaign (Methuen 1898) 
M Fitzgibbon Arms under Arts (Longmans Green 1901) 
Capt FP Fletcher Vane Pax Britannica in South Africa (Constable 1905) 
'Fleur De Lis' The Scouts' Alphabet (G&P 1905) 
Marshal Foch The PrinCiples of War (Chapman and Ha111918) 
J Fonnby The First Two Battles of Plevna (W Clowes 1910) 
A Forbes The Afghan Wars (Seeley 1892) 
G Forrest Wellington to Roberts (Edinburgh 1901) 
G Forrest Life of Lord Roberts, VC (Cassell 1914) 
JW Fortescue The British Army 1783-1802 (Macmillan 1905) 
1W Fortescue Military History Lectures delivered at Trinity College Cambridge (Cambridge 
CUP 1914) 
Col H Foster Organization (H Rees 1911) 
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Col H Foster Staff Work (H Rees 1912) 
Col H Foster War and the Empire (Williams & Norgate 1914) 
Maj TE Fowle Notes on Staff Rides and Regimental and Tactical Tours for Beginners (G&P 
1908) 
JS Fowler Extracts from the Diary of John S Fowler RE. Chitral 1895 (Dublin np 1897) 
J Fox Following the Sun-Flag (Constable 1905) 
Capt TB Franklin Tactics and the Landscape (G&P 1914) 
Capt TB Franklin Tactical Essaysfor Certificate "A" Candidates (G&P 1913) 
D Fraser A Modem Campaign (Methuen 1905) 
FE Freemantle Impressions of a Doctor in Khaki (Murray 1901) 
FM JPD French 1914 (Constable 1919) 
LtGen von Freytag-LoringhovenDeductionsfrom the World War (Constable 1918) 
'Frontier' Frontier Warfare (Bombay Thacker nd) 
Capt JFC Fuller Hints on Training Territorial Infantry (G&P 1913) 
Capt JFC Fuller Training Soldiers for War (H Rees 1914) 
Col GA Furse Scouting (W Clowes 1902) 
Col GA Furse The Art of Marching (W Clowes 1901) 
Col GA Furse Information in War (W Clowes 1895) 
Capt HR Gall Modern Tactics (WH Allen 1897) 
Capt HR Gall Supplement to Modern Tactics (WH Allen 1897) 
Capt HR Gall Questions and Answers on Combined Training 1902 (H Rees 1903 and 1904) 
Capt HR Gall Questions and Answers on Combined Training 1905 (H Rees 1906) 
Capt HR Gall Tactical Questions and Answers on Cavalry Training (Foster Groom 1908) 
Lt S Galvayne War Horses Present and Future (Everett 1902) 
Col G Gawler The Essentials of Good Skirmishing (parker, Furniva11852) 
trans Capt Gawne A Summer Night's Dream (Kansas City np nd)8 
Maj JM Gawne and S Wilkinson The Order of Service of the German Army (Manchester 1893) 
EL George National Defence and Army Reform (W Clowes 1913) 
The German GS Trans Col WHH Waters The German Official Account of the War in South 
Africa I (J Murray 1904) 
The German GS Trans Col H Du Cane The German Official Account of the War in South Africa 
n (J Murray 1906) 
The Gennan as Trans K von Donat The Russo-Japanese War: The Yalu (H Rees 1908) 
'A Gennan Staff Officer' trans F Bolton The Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (Swan Sonnenschein 
1898) 
Lt Gen MG Gerrard Leaves from the Diary of A Soldier and Sportsman (J Murray 1903) 
'GJY' (Lt Col Y ounghusband) Two Lectures to the Guides in 1908 (poona Scottish Mission 
Industries 1908) 
Lt Giffard Memorials of a Young Soldier (Clowes 1898) 
Maj G Gilbert The Evolution of Tactics (H Rees 1907) 
SH Gilbert Rhodesia and After (Simpkin Marshall, Hamilton Kent 1901) 
W Gilbey Small Horses in Warfare (Vinton 1900) 
W Gilbey Horse-Breeding in England and India and Army Horses Abroad (Vinton 1901) 
R Gillham-Thomsett Kohat, Kuram and Khost (Remington 1884) 
HE Graham The Defence of Bowler Bridge (W Clowes 1929) 
Maj Gen Gleichen A Brigade of the Old Army (Blackwood 1917) 
CS Goldman With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa (NY Macmillan 1902) 
W Gordon Skirmishing Attack &Defence for a Company, Battalion & Brigade (Chatham G&P 
1889) 
• Attribuled to Col Meckel but he is not cited on the title. 
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Sgt Maj W Gordon revised Sgt Maj FS Speed Hints for Young Soldiers (G&P nd) 
L Gordon Duff With The Gordon Highlanders (Staplehurst Spellmouot 2000)9 
Surgeon General AA Gore A Medical Statistical Sketch of the Operations on the North-West 
Frontier of India 19th June 1897, to sth April 1898 (Dublin Falconer 1899) 
Col JE Gough Fredericksburg and Chancellorville (H Rees 1913) 
Maj SC Gough Notes & Schemes ... For "Q" (Allahabad Pioneer Press 1901) 
Maj C Grant The XYZ of Musketry (Lahore Civil and Military Gazette 1897) 
J Grant Recent British Battles on Land and Sea (Cassell 1904) 
U Col SHP Graves Notes on Mobilization of a Native Infantry Regiment (Allahabad Pioneer 
Press 1898) 
WW Greener The Gun and Its Development (Cassell 1899 &1907) 
U Col WH Greenly Notes on Billeting/or Cavalry (H Rees 1913) 
Maj OFWT Griepenkerl Letters on Applied Tactics (H Rees 1897) 
Col OFWT Griepenkerl Letters on Applied Tactics (H Rees 1905) 
Col 1M Grierson Scarlet into Khaki (Sampson Low 1899) 
Maj W A Griesbach Observations on Cavalry Duties (May 1914) 
H Grosser Field-Marshal Lord Roberts (Melrose 1900) 
Capt CM De Gruyther Tacticsfor Beginners (G&P 1899,1902 & 1904) 
HM Guest With Lord Methuen and the 1st Division (IGerksdorp HM Guest 1902) 
HM Guest Vicissitudes of a Transvaal Dorp (Klerksdorp HM Guest 1901) 
Lt Col E Gunter. Outlines of Modern Tactics (W Clowes 1899) 
HA Gwynne The Army on Itself (Warne 1904) 
Maj A Haggard The Social Status of the Soldier in Connection with Recruiting (United Service 
Gazette 1906) 
Maj Gen D Haig Cavalry Studies (H Rees 1907) 
FM D Haig eds G Sheffield and J Bourne Douglas Haig. War Diaries and Letters (Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson 2005) 
FM D Haig ed D Scott The Preparatory Dialogue. Douglas Haig's Diaries and Letters 1861-
J 9 J 4 (Bamsley Pen and Sword 2006) 1 0 
Col RCB Haking Staff Rides and Regimental Tours (H Rees 1908) 
Brig Gen RCB Haking Company Training (H Rees 1913) 
Maj Gen H Hallam Parr The Further Training &Employment of Mounted Infantry and Yeomanry 
(G&P 1900) 
Capt A Haldane How We Escapedfrom Pretoria (Edinburgh Blackwood 1901) 
AG Hales Campaign Pictures of the War in South Africa (Casse111900) 
Lord Haliburton Army Organization (E Arnold 1905) 
FS Hallowes The Wedge of War (Elliot Stock 1900) 
Col HJ Hallowes Drill and Working of the Three Arms (W Clowes 1890) 
Lt L Halsey Letters from Ladysmith (Berkhamsted Dacorum Trust 1995)11 
A Hamilton In Abor Jungles (Everleigh Nash 1912) 
E Hamilton Soldier and Aviator (CW Daniel 1912) 
Gen I Hamilton The Commander (Hollis and Carter 1957)12 
Gen I Hamilton National Life and National Training (PS King 1913) 
Gen I Hamilton Compulsory Service (J Murray 1911) 
Capt I Hamilton The Fighting of the Future (Keegan, Paul, Trench 1885) 
Lt Gen I Hamilton A Staff Officer's Scrapbook 1& II (E Arnold 1905, 1907) 
Gen I Hamilton The Body and Soul of an Army (E Arnold 1921) 
, 
.. Contemporary diary published later. 
Letters and Diary . 
.. Contemporary work. 
II Written in the thesis' period, published later. 
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JA Hamilton The Siege of Mafeking (Methuen 1900) 
Capt RS Hamilton-Grace Finance and War (H Rees 1910) 
Col Hamley Staff College Exercises 1874 (Edinburgh Blackwood 1875) 
Gen EB Hamley The Operations of War (Edinburgh Blackwood 1900) 
Gen EB Hamley and Col LE Kiggell The Operations of War (Edinburgh Blackwood 1907) 
CE Hands Souvenir of the Siege of Mafeking (The Smith Premier Typewriter Co nd) 
U Gen GM Harper Notes on Infantry Tactics &Training (Sifion, Praed 1919) 
H Harper The Handy Man in China (Hong Kong Walsh and Kelly nd) 
P Harrington & FA Sharf Omdurman 1898 The Eye-Witnesses Speak (Greenhill 1998)13 
F Harris How to Beat the Boer. A Conversation in Hades (Heinemann 1900) 
11 Hart Incidents of the South African Campaign (St John's Telegraph Press 1901) 
W Hart-McHarg From Quebec to Pretoria (Toronto W Briggs 1902) 
Maj Gen RC Hart Reflections on the Art of War (W Clowes 1897 & 1901) 
Col CL Harvey The Organization and Tactical Use of Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry (Chatham 
G&P 1893) 
Lt Col CO Head The Art of Generalship (G&P nd) 
Maj Ee Heath Examinations in Combined Training (Christopher's 1906) 
Lt Col P Hehir The March: its Mechanism, Effects and Hygiene (Calcutta Thacker Spink 1912) 
K Helfferich Der Weltkrieg IT (Berlin 1919) 
Col D Henderson Art of Reconnaissance (Murray 1907 & 1914) 
Bvt Maj GFR Henderson The Campaign of Fredericksburg (G&P nd) 
Bvt Maj GFR Henderson The Battle of Spicheren (G&P nd) 
Col GFR Henderson ed Capt N Malcolm The Science of War (Longmans 1905) 
Col GFR Henderson ed J Luvaas The Civil War (NY Da Capo 1996) 
Col GFR Henderson Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (Longmans 1898 & 1899) 
Lt Col WCG Heneker Bush Warfare (H Rees 1907) 
H Hensman The Afghan War of 1879-80 (WH Allen 1881) 
Pte IE Hill The Diary of a South Notts Imperial Yeoman (Titchfield Adams 2000)14 
A Hilliard Atteridge The Wars of the Nineties (Cassell 1899) 
A Hilliard Atteridge Famous Land Fights (Methuen 1914) 
HC Hillegas With the Boer Forces (Methuen 1900) 
Lt Col HWL Hime Stray Military Papers (Longmans Green 1896) 
Lt Col HWL Hime Army Reform (Stanford 1898) 
Historical Manuscripts Commission National Register of Archives Report on the Papers of FM 
Wolseley in Hove Central Library (np nd) 
Maj EAP Hobday Sketches on Service (J Bowden 1898) 
Col TH Holdich The Indian Borderland (Methuen 1901) 
Maj P Holland Infantry Tactics and Modern Weapons (Allahabad Pioneer Press 1903) 
Gen A Horsetzky trans Lt KB Ferguson A Short History of the Campaigns in Europe since 1792 
(Murray 1909) 
Maj H De B Hovell A Soldier's Training and Other Notes (G&P 1900) 
C Hovey Stonewall Jackson (Boston Small Maynard 1900) 
Maj P Howell The Campaign in Thrace 1912 (H Rees 1913) 
Col HD Hutchinson The Campaign in Tirah 1898 (Macmillan 1898) 
Col HD Hutchinson Military Sketching Made Easy and Military Maps Explained (G&P 1891) 
Col HD Hutchinson Tactics Made Easy for NCOs and Men (G&P 1902) 
Maj Oen HD Hutchinson Field Fortifications (G&P 1897 & 1904) 
Maj Gen HD Hutchinson Operations in the Peninsula 1808-1809 (H Rees 1905) 
lJ 
14 Contemporary material published afterwards. 
Contemporary work. 
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E Hutton A Manual of Light Drill (Dublin E Ponsonby 1876) 
U Gen E Hutton Colonel Henry Bouquet (Winchester Warren 1911) 
Capt EA Innes Guide for Infantry Officers (Auxiliary Forces) (Aldershot G&P 1907) 
U HA Ironside The Machine Gun (Rees 1914) 
UVAJacksonMachine Guns (Foster Groom 1910) 
DH James The Siege of Port Arthur (T Fisher Unwin 1905) 
L James The Indian Frontier War 1897 (W Heinemann 1898) 
Chasseur (L James) A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Edinburgh Blackwood 1905) 
Capt WH James Handbook of Tactics (G&P 1895) 
ed Capt WH James Gen J von Verdy du Vernois With The Royal Headquarters in 1870-71 
(Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 1897) 
ed Capt WH James Count Y orck von Wartenburg Napoleon as a General I, IT (Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner 1902) 
ed Capt WH James Lt Gen von der Goltz The Conduct of War (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
1899) 
ed Capt WH James Gen Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen Letters on Strategy I, IT (Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trubner 1898) 
ed Capt WH James Col Epauchin General Gurko's Advance Guard 1877 (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner 1900) 
Lt Col WH James Modern Strategy (Edinburgh Blackwood 1903, 1904 1908) 
Surgeon TT Jeans RN Naval Brigades in the South African War (Sampson Low Marston 1901) 
Maj H Jennings-Bramly The Execution of Infantry Entrenchments (H Rees 1908) 
H Jerningham From West to East. Notes by the Way (J Murray 1907) 
CS Jerram The Armies of the World (Lawrence and Bullen 1899) 
Capt HME Johnstone A History of Tactics (H Rees 1906) 
Capt HME Johnstone Tactics and Training (Edinburgh Oliver & Boyd 1908) 
H Josting The Autobiography of a Military Great Coat (J arrold 1907) 
Maj A Keene Memoria Technica for Cavalry Officers (Allahabad Pioneer Press 1899) 
Maj A Keene Memoria Technica for Infantry Officers (Allahabad Pioneer Press 1899) 
C/Sgt RE Kemp Khaki Letters from My Colleagues in South Africa (postal Telegraph Service 
nd) 
Lt Col RJ Kentish The Maxims of the Late Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley and the Addresses 
on Leadership, Espirit de Corps & Moral (Aldershot G&P 1916) 
Maj ER Kenyon Notes on Land and Coast Fortification (Chatham REI 1894) 
C Kernahan An Author in the Territorials (Arthur Pearson 1908) 
JD Kestell Through Shot and Flame (Methuen 1903) 
J Kinahan From the Front (Marshall 1900) 
M Kinai The Russo-Japanese War (Official Reports) I, IT (Tokyo The Shimbashido nd) 
A Kinnear To Modder River with Methuen (Bristol Arrowsmith 1900) 
R Kipling Verse Definitive Edition (Hodder and Stoughton 1977) 
Maj E Kirkpatrick The Training of an Infantry Company (G&P 1913) 
H von Koenigsmarck A German Staff Officer in India (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 1910) 
Maj Oen WG Knox The Flaw in Our Armour (H Jenkins 1914) 
Gen PH Kritzinger and RD McDonald In The Shadow of Death (private 1904) 
Gen Kuropatkin trans Capt AB Lindsay ed Maj ED Swinton The Russian Army and the Japanese 
War (Murray 1909) 
FW Lanchester Aircraft in War (Constable 1916) 
Ed W Lane The War Diary of Burgher Jack Lane (Capetown Van Riebeck Society 2001) 15 
Gen H Langlois The British Army in A European War (Rees 1910) 
as Contemporary work published later. 
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U Col J Layland Needham The Solution of Tactical Problems (H Rees 1905) 
U Col J Layland Needham Mistakes in the Solving of Tactical Problems (H Rees 1909) 
U Col Layriz Mechanical Traction in War (Sampson Low 1900) 
Col H de B de Lisle The Training of the Remount (Bombay Thacker 1909) 
H Lea The Valor of Ignorance (NY Harper 1909) 
Capt J Learmonth Notes on Horsemastership with hints on Various Subjects connected with the 
Maintenance of Discipline (penrith Herald 1912) 
Capt RF Legge Mainly About Shooting (G&P 1904) 
Maj RF Legge Mainly About Discipline (G&P 1914) 
Maj AB Letts The ABC of Min or Tactics (W Clowes 1885) 
Maj RC Lewis & F Morton On the Veldt (Hobart J Walch 1902) 
GW Lines The Ladysmith Siege (Maritzburg P Davis 1900) 
'Linesman'(Capt MH Grant) Words by an Eyewitness (Edinburgh Blackwood 1901) 
'Linesman' (Capt MH Grant) The Mechanism of War (Edinburgh Blackwood 1902) 
Lt FM Livingstone-James Notes on Scouting and Reconnaissance (W Clowes 1911) 
Col EM Lloyd A Review of the History of Infantry (Longmans Green 1908) 
Cdr EW Lloyd RN and AG Hadcock Artillery Its Progress and Present Position (portsmouth J 
Griffin 1893) 
Maj FV Longstaff &Capt A Hilliard Atteridge The Book of the Machine Gun (H Rees 1917) 
CR Lowe Battles of the British Army (Routledge 1908) 
CR Lowe Our Greatest Living Soldiers (Chatto and Windus 1900) 
IL Low FG Tait (J Nisbet 1900) 
EP Lowry With the Guards' Brigade from Bloemfontein to Koomati Poort and Back (Marshall 
1902) 
Capt HT Lukin Questions and Answers on the Maxim Machine Gun (G&P nd) 
Capt CP Lynden-Bell A Primer of Tactics, Fortification .... (Edinburgh W Blackwood 1899) 
Col J Macartney The Development of Tactics Since 1740 (H Rees 1906) 
D Macdonald How We Kept the Flag Flying (Ward Lock 1900) 
Brig Gen JHA MacDonald Fifty Years of It (Edinburgh Blackwood 1909) 
Lt Col JHA MacDonald On Tactics (Edinburgh Blackwood 1873) 
JCO Mack Tactics for the Rank and File (G&P 1895) 
HV Mackinnon War Sketches (Charlottetown Examiner Office 1900) 
Col W Mackinnon The Volley and The Instruction of Recruits and Trained Soldiers. Being Two 
Lectures being delivered at the School of Musketry (Clowes 1897) 
AHH Maclean Public Schools and the War in South Africa 1899-1902 (E Stanton 1903) 
Maj H Maclear Night-Marching by the Stars (Bedford Hockliffe 1915) 
Maj G MacMunn The Armies of India (Crecy i984)16 
Capt CEK MacQuoid Strategy Illustrated by British Campaigns (Cassell 1904) 
T M Maguire Notes on the Outlines of Strategy (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent 1902) 
TM Maguire The Development of Tactics (H Rees 1904) 
T M Maguire The Development of Tactics Since 1866 (H Rees 1904) 
T M Maguire Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges (W Clowes 1904) 
T M Maguire The Campaign of 1805 (W Clowes 1912) 
T M Maguire The Campaign of 1806 (W Clowes 1913) 
T M Maguire The Campaign in Virginia May and June 1864 (W Clowes 1908) 
TM Maguire The British Army under Wellington 1813-1814 (W Clowes 1907) 
1M Maguire Cavalry Actions in Virginia (Harmsworth 1903) 
T M Maguire Elements of Strategy (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent 1902) 
.. ~ 
nwted Originally in 1911. 
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T M Maguire and Capt WV Herbert The Campaign Between the Prussians and the Austrians in 
1866 (G Harmsworth 1897) 
Capt AT Mahan USN Story of the War in South Africa (Sampson, Low, Marston 1900) 
Capt VD Majendie & Capt C Orde Browne Handbookfor the Martini-Henry Rifle (Aldershot 
G&P 1893) 
GH Makins Surgical Experiences in South Africa (Smith Elder 1901) 
UCol N Malcolm Bohemia 1866 (Constable 1912) 
Col MP Manson Guns, Rockets &Mortars (Brassey's 1997) 
LMarch Phillips With Rimington (E Arnold 1901) 
Capt AH Marindin The Salamanca Campaign (H Rees 1906) 
Capt AH Marindin Staff Rides (H Rees 1905) 
Capt AH Marindin Staff Rides (H Rees 1907) 
ECR Marks The Evolution of Modern Small Arms and Ammunition (Marks& Clerk 1898) 
W Marriott The War and Its Cost (Argus 1901) 
D Martin Duelling With Long Toms (Ilford D Martin 1988) 17 
Lt Col AR Martin Mountain and Savage Warfare (Allahabad Pioneer Press 1899) 
Capt R Martin The Officer's Vade Mecum (Foster Groom 1906) 
Capt R Martin The NCO's Pocket Book (Foster Groom 1907) 
Lt LEL Maton Some Notes on the Formula and Calculations required for Indirect Fire with 
Particular Reference to the Maxim Machine Gun (np 1911) 
••• (Lt Col FN Maude) The New Battle of Dorking (Grant Richards 1900) 
Lt Col FN Maude Notes on the Evolution of Infantry Tactics (W Clowes 1905) 
Lt Col FN Maude Cavalry: its past and future (W Clowes 1903) 
Lt Col FN Maude The Evolution of Modern Strategy (W Clowes 1905) 
Capt FN Maude Military Letters and Essays (Kansas City nd) 
Col FN Maude War and the World's Life (Smith Elder 1907) 
Capt FN Maude Cavalry versus Infantry (Kansas City Hudson Kimberley 1896) 
Lt Col FN Maude The Science of Organisation and the Art of War (1912) 
Capt FN Maude Attack or Defence (Keliher 1896) 
Col FN Maude The Jena Campaign 1806 (1909 reprinted Greenhill Books 1998)18 
Col FN Maude 1813 The Leipzig Campaign (Swan Sonnenschein 1908) 
Maj F Maurice The Russo-Turkish War 1877 (Swan Sonnenschein 1903) 
Maj Gen F Maurice British Strategy (Constable 1929) 
Col IF Maurice War (Macmillan 1891) 
Lt F Maurice The Wellington Prize Essay (Edinburgh Blackwood 1872) 
Capt FI Maxse Our Military Problem (JM Dent nd) 
Col FI Maxse Seymour Vandaleur (National Review 1905) 
W Maxwell From the Yalu to Port Arthur (Hutchinson 1906) 
Capt CB Mayne The Late Battles in the Soudan and Modern Tactics, A Reply (Chatham G&P 
nd) 
LtCol CB Mayne The Infantry Weapon and Its Use in War (Smith Elder 1903) 
Maj CB Mayne Review Herbert 's Defence of Plevna (Chatham REI 1896) 
Lt Col ES May A Retrospect of the South African War (Sampson Low Marston 1901) 
Maj ES May Guns and Cavalry (Boston Roberts 1896) 
Maj ES May Achievements of Field Artillery (Woolwich RAI 1893) 
Col ES May Geography in Relation to War (H Rees 1907) 
Lt Col ES May Imperial Defence (Swan Sonnenschein 1903) 
Maj ES May Field Artillery with the Other Arms (Sampson, Low Marston 1898) 
n 
II Contemporary diary published later. 
Coatemporary work reprinted. 
1G Maydon French's Cavalry Campaign in South Africa (C Arthur Pearson 1901) 
RlMacHugh The Siege of Ladysmith (Chapman & Hall 1900) 
JR McDonough The Defense of Hill 781 (Novato Presidio 1989) 
F McCullagh With the Cossacks (Everleigh Nash 1906) 
U Cdr NA McCully USN The McCully Report (Annapolis Naval Institute Press 1977) 19 
FA McKenzie From Tokyo to Tijlis (Hurst and Blackett 1905) 
Capt M McNeill In Pursuit of the "Mad" Mullah (pearson 1902) 
AE Melish Canadians in South Africa (Charlottetown 1900) 
'Men at the Front' Pen Pictures of the War (H Marshall 1900) 
M Menpes War Impressions (Black 1901) 
V Meynell Julian Grenfell (Bums and Oates nd) 
Col RF Meysey-Thompson Reminiscences of the Course, the Camp and the Chase (E Arnold 
1898) 
ed P Mileham Clearly My Duty (East Linton Tuckwell Press 1996)20 
WS Miller The School of Musketry at Hythe (W Clowes 1892) 
P Millington A Homeward Mail (Smith Elder 1912) 
P Millington On the Track of the Abor (Smith Elder 1912) 
J Milne The Epistles of Atkins (Fisher Unwin 1902) 
E Milton Small Told from the Ranks (A Melrose 1897) 
Maj RCW Mitford To Kabul with the Cavalry Brigade (Allen 1881) 
JE Mitton The Boer War. A Bombardiers (sic) Memories (Knebworth Able Pub 1996) 
Maj FJ Moberley Notesfor two Lectures on the Russo-Japanese War up to the 25th August. 1904 
(Darjeeling Visitor Press 1909) 
Lt Col AF Mockler Ferryman Annals of Sandhurst (W Heinemann 1900) 
Lt Col AF Mockler Ferryman Military Sketching and Reconnaissance (E Stanford 1903) 
Lt B Moeller Two Years at the Front with the Mounted Infantry (Grant Richards 1903) 
Pte EC Moffett and Sgt FJB Lee With the Eighth Division (Kingston Knapp, Drewett 1903) 
Bvt Maj FW Moffitt Infantry Field Work Lectures to NCOs (H Rees 1914) 
Capt FS Montague-Bates The Infantry Scout (H Rees 1913) 
Maj E Montague Precis of the Russo-Japanese War (Simla usn nd) 
Lt Col Montanaro Hints for a Bush Campaign (Sands 1901) 
Col Monsenergue trans Lt L Spiers Cavalry Tactical Schemes (H Rees 1914) 
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Command (HMSO 1910) 
Report on the Mobilisation of 1st Brigade, 1st Division, 1 Army-Corps (HMSO 
1896) 
Report on the Musketry Training of the Regular Forces serving at Home including 
the School of Musketry, and also on the Musketry Training of the Militia, Yeomanry 
and Volunteers during the Year 1897 (HMSO 1898) 
Report on the Musketry Training of the Regular Forces serving at Home including 
the School of Musketry, and also on the Musketry Training of the Militia, Yeomanry 
and Volunteers during the Year 1898 (HMSO 1899) 
Report on the Musketry Training of the Regular Forces serving at Home, including 
the School of Musketry, and also on the Musketry Training of the Militia, Yeomanry 
Cavalry and Volunteers during the Year 1899-1900 (HMSO 1901) 
Report by the Commandant School of Musketry, Hythe, on the Instruction and 
General Work at the School of Musketry, and on the Musketry Training of the 
Regular and Auxiliary Forces serving at Homefor the Year 1901 (HMSO 1902) 
Report by the Commandant School of Musketry, Hythe, on the Instruction and 
General Work at the School of Musketry, and on the Musketry Training of the 
Regular and Auxiliary Forces serving at Homefor the Year 1902 (HMSO 1903) 
Report by the Commandant School of Musketry, Hythe, on the Instruction and 
General Work at the School of Musketry, and on the Musketry Training of the 
Regular and Auxiliary Forces serving at Homefor the Year 1903 (HMSO 1904) 
Report ... Board of Visitors [RMC} Sandhurst ... 1900 (HMSO 1901) 
Report ... Board of Visitors [RMA} Woolwich ... 1900 (HMSO 1901) 
Report of the Committee on Army Telegraph Units 1904 
Report by Lieut-General ... Colvile on the Operations of the Ninth Division at 
Paardeberg (HMSO 1901)(Cd 520) 
Report from Lieut-General Lord Methuen on the action that took place near 
Tweebosch on 1h March 1902 (HMSO 1902)(Cd 967) 
Report from Brigadier-General Dixon on the Operations at Vlakfontein on 29h May, 
1901 (HMSO 1901)(Cd 693) 
Report on the Curragh District Manoeuvres 1895 
Report of the Committee ... to enquire into the nature of the Expenses Incurred by 
Officers of the Army ... (HMSO 1903) (Cd 1421) 
Report on Staff Ride in the Severn Valley 1906 (HMSO 1906) 
Report on the Tactical Operaiions South East District 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Report of the Telephone Co Aldershot Army Corps 1905 (np nd) 
Report of Trials of Self-Propelled Lorries for Military Purposes held at Aldershot 
from 4th to 19h December 1901 (HMSO 1902) 
Reports on the Sanitary Condition of Piershill Barracks Edinburgh (HMSO 1906) 
Return Relating to Army Commissions (HMSO 1903) 
Return Average Time to Reach Rank ... Captain ... and Major (HMSO 1903) 
Return Average Time to Reach Rank ... Captain ... and Major (HMSO 1909) 
Rhodesian Field Force Standing Orders (np nd) 
Royal Commission on the War in South Africa Report (HMSO 1903) (Cd 1789) 
Royal Commission on the War in South Africa Evidence I (HMSO 1903) (Cd 1790) 
Royal Commission on the War in South Africa Evidence II (HMSO 1903)(Cd 1791) 
Royal Commission on the War in South Africa Appendices to Evidence (HMSO 
1903) (Cd 1792) 
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The Royal Military College of Science Risk Chance and Judgement. (Shrivenham 
nd) 
Royal Military College Text Book of Military Administration and Law (provisional) 
(HMSOnd) 
The Russo Japanese War. Reports from British Officers I (HMSO 1908) 
The Russo Japanese War. Reports from British Officers IT (HMSO 1908) 
The Russo Japanese War. Reports from British Officers ill (HMSO 1908) 
The Russo Japanese War m (HMSO 1905) 
The Russo Japanese War Medical and Sanitary Reports from Officers Attached to 
the Japanese and Russian Forces in the Field (HMSO 1908) 
GS WO The Russo-Japanese War Part I (1906) 
School of Gunnery. Report 1901 Coast Siege (np nd) 
The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Serve to Lead (np nd) 
The Soft Spot (1919)(Infantry Training Leaflet 13) 
GS WO Some Tactical Notes on the Russo-Japanese War (1906) 
South African Constabulary Handbook (np nd) 
South African Despatches I (HMSO 1901) (Cd 457) 
South African Despatches II Natal Field Army (HMSO 1901) (Cd 458) 
South African Despatches Supplementary (HSMO 1901) (Cd 463) 
South Natal Field Force Standing Orders with notes on Supply and Transport, etc 
(Pietermaritzburg Davis 1899) 
Special Committee on Small Arms Report on Jamming of Cartridges in Martini 
Henry Rifles and Complaints with regards to Bayonets in Egypt 15 Oct 1885- 19 
April 1886 (HMSO 1886) 
Spion Kop Despatches (HMSO 1902) (Cd 968) 
Staff College Regulations (HMSO 1901) 
Staff College Regulations (HMSO 1905) 
Staff College Regulations (Camberley) (HMSO 1905) 
Staff Duties (HMSO 1890) " 
Staff Officer's Handbook 
Standing Orders for a Brigade of Mounted Artillery (HMSO 1904) 
Standing Orders Provisional- Battalion (Dover Chaplin 1904-5) 
Standing Orders of the r l Battalion The Prince Albert's (Somerset Light Infantry) 
(Lahore Civil and Military Gazette 1894) 
The Standing Orders of The Prince Albert's (Somerset Light Infantry) (Devonport 
Swiss 1910) 
Standing Orders of the 2"d Bqttalion the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
(Aldershot G&P 1906) 
Standing Orders of the ~ Battalion the Durham Light Infantry (Aldershot G&P 
1907) 
Standing Orders of the Suffolk Regiment (Aldershot G&P 1910) 
The Standing Orders of the r l Battalion The Prince of Wales ' Leinster Regiment 
(The Royal Canadians) (Aldershot G&P 1908) 
Standing Orders ~ Battalion Prince of Wales' Leinster Regiment (Royal 
Canadians) (1900 np) 
System of Training of Staff Officers in Foreign Armies (HMSO 1901) 
Standing Orders r l Battalion Oxfordshire Light Infantry (portsmouth Charpentier 
1890) , 
Statement on the Army Estimates 1914-15 (HMSO 1914) 
Technical Instructions for the use of Telephones in the Field (Provisional) (HMSO 
1908) 
Telegrams Concerning the Siege of Ladysmith (HMSO 1902) (Cd 987) 
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Text Book of Military Small Arms and Ammunition 1894 (HMSO 1894) 
The Army in India and Its Evolution (Calcutta Superintendent Government Printing 
India 1924) 
Translationsfrom Foreign Journals relating to the Recent War in South Africa 
(Intelligence Division WO 1902) 
War Establishments Section L No.tes on War Establishments 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
War Establishments. 1907-1908 (PrOVisional) (HMSO 1907) 
War Establishments. 1908-1909 (HMSO 1907) 
War Establishments. Part I Expeditionary Force 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Weekly Tank Note No 23 18 January 1918 (1919)4 
Official Publications with a named Author 
Col EHH Allenby Standing Orders of the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers (Aldershot G&P 
1904) 
Maj Gen Baden-Powell Notes Cavalry Manoeuvres 1904 (nd np) 
Col J Bailey The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare (Camberley 
SCSI Paper No 22 nd) 
Col CH Bridge Notes on Manoeuvres (HMSO 1898) 
Lt Gen WF Butler Record of the Western District Staff Ride Conducted rt to 5th 
September, 1902 (1902 np) 
Capt CE Callwell Small Wars·(HMSO 1896) 
Maj CE Callwell Small Wars (HMSO 1899) 
Col CE Callwell Small Wars (HMSO 1906) 
Col FC Carter The Training and Use of Scouts (HMSO 1905) 
Lt Col M Claire Garcia Report on the Discipline and Management of Military 
Prisons 1899 (HMSO 1900) 
Lt Col M Claire Garcia Report on the Discipline and Management of Military 
Prisons 1900 (HMSO 1901) 
Lt Col M Claire Garcia Report on the Discipline and Management of Military 
Prisons 1901 (HMSO 1902) 
Maj EG Clayton Report on the Discipline and Management of Military Prisons 1902 
(HMSO 1903) 
Brig Gen JJ Collyer The Campaign in German South West Africa 1914-1915 
(pretoria Government Printer 1937) 
Col HE Colvile History of the Sudan Campaign 1& II (HMSO 1889) 
JS Corbett Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War I & II (Annapolis and 
Newport Naval Institute Pres~ and Naval War College Press 1994)5 
Maj IE Edmonds Handbook of the German Army (HMSO 1900) 
Maj JE Edmonds Organisation of Voluntary Medical Aid in War (HMSO 1901) 
Brig Gen JE Edmonds Military Operations France and Belgium 1914 1- 1918 V 
(Macmillan 1922-1947)6 
Ed Capt RF Edwards Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers XXV 
1899 (Chatham W&J Mackay 1900) 
Ed Capt RF Edwards Professional Papers of The Corps Of Royal Engineers XXVI 
1900 (Chatham W&J Mackay 1901) 
Ed Capt RF Edwards Professional Papers of The Corps Of Royal Engineers XXVII 
1901 (W&J Mackay Chatham 1901) 
Maj LF Ellis The War in France and Flanders 1939-1940 (HMSO 1953) 
4 Misdated, clearly written in 1919. 
, Facsimile copy of the 1914 edition. 
6 Various authors. but the entire work should be traceable via Edmonds only. 
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Maj Gen GF Ellison Lecture History of Military Administration (np 1921)7 
Capt C Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestine I (HMSO 1930) 
Capt C Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestine II (HMSO 1930) 
Capt V Ferguson A Dictionary of Russian Military and Naval Terms (HMSO 1906) 
Gen IDP French Memorandum on Theoretical Instruction in the Art of War (np nd) 
Maj JG Geddes Notes on Japanese and Russian Artillery in Manchuria (HMSO 
London 1907) 
Lt Col EPC Girouard History of the Railways during the War in South Africa, 1899-
1902 (HMSO 1903) 
Ed J Gooch The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine (SCSI 1997) 
Lt Gen WH Goodenough and Lt Col JC Dalton The Army Book of the British Empire 
(HMSO 1893) 
Capt HM Grant History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 IV (Hurst and 
Blackett 1910) 
Maj Gen WH Greenly Russo-Japanese War-Cavalry Reports (np nd) 
Gen A Haldane Notes on Training (AP&SS Rhine Anny 1919)8 
Col L Hale What to Observe and How to Report It (HMSO 1898) 
DOW Hall The New Zealanders in South Africa 1899-1902 (Wellington War History 
Branch 1949) 
Ed Maj WA Harrison Professional Papers of The Corps Of Royal Engineers Fourth 
Series II 1908-11 (Chatham W&J Mackay 1911) 
Brig Gen RC Hart Standing Orders for Field Manoeuvres (Belgaum Dhundiraj Press 
1896) 
RG Haycock, P Caddick-Adams, M Bechtold. DI Hall, EC Kiesling & Brig M 
Melvin The Relevance and Role of the Battlefield Tour and Staff Ride for Armed 
Forces in the 21st Century (Shrivenham SCSI 2005) 
Lt Col RA Henderson Report on the Discipline and Management of Military Prisons 
1903 (HMSO 1904) 
Col AM Heniker Transportation on the Western Front (HMSO 1937) 
Capt HC Holman The Russo-Japanese War Joint Report Part I (GS WO 1906) 
R Holmes Army Battlefield Guide Belgium and Northern France (HMSO 1995) 
Maj 1M Home The Russo-Japanese War up to 15th August 1904 (HMSO 1905) 
Col R Home revised Lt Col SC Pratt A Precis of Modern Tactics (HMSO 1896) 
FJ Huddleston Catalogue of the War Office Library Part III Subject Index (HMSO 
1912) 
Inspector General Cavalry Notes on the Cavalry Schools in Italy and on the Training 
of Recruits in France and Italy (HMSO 1905) 
Maj ER Kenyon Notes on Land and Coast Fortification (Chatham REI 1894) 
MD Krause and R Cody Phillips Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art 
(Washington Center of Military History 2005) 
Maj JF Lewis Text Book of Fortification and Military Engineering Part I Field 
Fortification and Military Bridges (HMSO 1892) 
Maj JF Lewis Text Book of Fortification and Military Engineering Part II Permanent 
Fortifications, Historical Development, Siege Works Coast Defence (HMSO 1893) 
Lt Gen G MacMunn and Capt C Falls Military Operations Egypt and Palestine I 
(HMSO 1928) 
Lt Col WG Macpherson Lecture on the Removal of Sick and Wounded from the 
Battlefield (HMSO 1908) 
Col JF Maurice Military History of the Campaign in Egypt (HMSO nd) 
7 Given School of Military Administration 18 Jan 1921, bound with it are other versions including one 
chaired by RBS Haldane. 
• Prepared for 10 Brigade 1913-1914. Haldane was the Brigadier. 
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Gen F Maurice History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 I (Hurst and Blackett 
1906) 
Gen F Maurice History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 IT (Hurst and Blackett 
1907) 
Lt Gen AGL McNaughton The Development of Artillery in the Great War (np nd) 
Brig AB McPherson Discipline (War Office 1950) 
Maj GHG Mockler The Russo-Japanese War Joint Report Part II (GS WO 1906) 
Ed Capt AT Moore Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers XXVIII 
1902 (Chatham W &J Mackay 1903) 
Ed Maj AT Moore Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers Occasional 
Papers XXX (Chatham REI 1904) 
Ed Maj AT Moore Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers XXX 1904 
(Chatham W &J Mackay Chatham 1905) 
Compiled Lt Col PL Murray Official Records of the Australian Military Contingents 
to the War in South Africa (Melbourne Government Printer 1911) 
Brig AL Pemberton The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment (WO 1950) 
Brig ISO Playfair The Mediterranean and Middle East I (HMSO 1954) 
Brig ISO Playfair and Brig CJ Molony The Mediterranean and Middle East IV 
(HMSO 1966) 
W Raleigh The War in the Air I (OUP 1922) 
Bvt Col SWH Rawlins A History of the Development of the British Artillery in 
France 1914-1918 (np nd) 
Col JS Rothwell Military Administration and Staff Duties. Tables and Data for the 
Use of Staff College Officers (HMSO 1891) 
R de M Rudolf Short Histories of the Territorial Regiments of the British Army 
(HMSO nd) 
Lt Col RJS Simpson The Medical History of the War in South Africa; an 
Epidemiological Essay (HMSO 1911) 
Maj Gen F Smith A Veterinary History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 (H&W 
Brown 1919) 
EM Spiers Wars of Intervention: A Case-study-The Reconquest of the Sudan 1896-99 
(HMSO 1998) 
Capt WJ Stopford Report on the Discipline and Management of Military Prisons 
1897 (HMSO 1898) 
RL Wallace The Australians at the Boer War (Canberra The Australian War 
Memorial and The Australian Government Publishing Service 1976) 
Col WHH Waters Reports on the Campaign in Manchuria in 1904 (HMSO 1905) 
S Wilkinson Moltke 's Projects for the Campaign of 1866 against Austria (HMSO 
1902) 
Surgeon Gen WD Wilson Report on the Medical Arrangements in the South African 
War (HMSO 1904) 
Capt AH Wolley-Dod Reconnaissance Reports on the Lines of Advance through the 
Orange Free State (Intelligence Division WO 1897) 
Lt Col FW Young The Story of the Staff College (Camberley The Staff College 
1958) 
Pre-1900 Training Manuals 
Cavalry Drill 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Cavalry Drill 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Cyclist Drill 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Field Artillery Drill (HMSO 1896) 
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Field Engineers Drill 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Field Service Manual Infantry (Provisional issue) 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Field Service Manual Infantry 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Field Service Manual Mounted Infantry 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Field Exercise Infantry Drill Part X Rules for the Conduct of Field Manoeuvres 1896 
(HMSO 1896) 
Garrison Artillery Drill II (HMSO 1891) 
Garrison Artillery Drill I (HMSO 1892) 
Garrison Artillery Drill 11895 (HMSO 1895) 
Garrison Artillery Drill II 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Garrison Artillery Drill I 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Garrison Artillery Drill II 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Handbookfor the 0.303 Maxim Machine Gun ... 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Handbook for the 0.303 Maxim Machine Gun ... 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Handbookfor the 6 Inch BL Howitzer 30 cwt (Mark 1) (HMSO 1899) 
Handbookfor the 6 Inch BL Howitzer 25 cwt (Mark 1) (HMSO 1899) 
Handbook for the 40 Pr RML Gun of 35 Cwt Siege and Movable Armament 1897 
(HMSO 1897) 
Handbook for the 5-inch BL Howitzer (Mark I) (Field or Siege) 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Handbookfor the 5.4in BL Howitzer (Mark 1) 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Handbook for the 6 inch BL Howitzer (HMSO 1899) 
Handbook for the 6.3 Inch RML Howitzer for Movable Armament and Armament of 
Works (HMSO 1895) 
Handbook for the 15 Pr BL Gun (Mark I) (Field Batteries) 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Handbookfor the 12 Pr BL 6 Cwt Gun (Mark I) (Horse Artillery) 1898 (HMSO 
1898) 
Infantry Drill 1892 (Provisional) (HMSO 1892) 
Infantry Drill 1893 (HMSO 1893) 
Infantry Drill 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Infantry Drill 1896 Amended (HMSO 1900) 
Instruction in Military Engineering I Part II Military Bridges (HMSO 1887) 
Instruction in Military Engineering I (Part I) Field Defences (HMSO 1888) 
Instruction in Military Engineering I (Part I) Field Defences (HMSO 1894) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Instructions for Practice Siege Artillery 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
Manual of Military Engineering (PrOVisional) (HMSO 1899) 
Military Engineering Part 2 Attack and Defence of Fortresses 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Mountain Artillery Drill 1891 (HMSO 1891) 
Musketry Regulations 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Regulations for Mounted Infqntry 1897 (HMSO 1897) 
Regulations for Mounted Infantry 1899 (HMSO 1899) 
RegulatiOns for Musketry Instruction Lee-Metford Rifle and Carbine 1896(HMSO 
1896) . 
Regulations for Supply Transport and Barrack Services (HMSO 1899) 
Rifle Exercises (Lee Metford Rifle) Manual Exercises and Bayonet Exercise 1892 
(HMSO 1892) 
Rifle and Carbine Exercises (Martini Breech Action) Care of Arms and Ammunition 
and Firing Exercise 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
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Rifle and Carbine Exercises (Lee Metford) Manual Exercise, Firing Exercise, 
Bayonet Exercise and Firing Exercise for Webley Pistol 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Rifle and Carbine Exercises Manual Exercise, Firing Exercise, Bayonet Exercise, 
Firing Exercise for Webley Pistol and Instructions for Cleaning Arms 1898 (HMSO 
1898) 
Rules for the Conduct of Field Manoeuvres (Provisional). Infantry Drill Part X 
(HMSO 1899) 
Rules for the Conduct of the War-Game on a Map (HMSO 1896) 
Siege Artillery Drill 1891 HMSO 1891 
Siege Artillery Drill 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Signalling Instructions 1896 (HMSO 1896) 
Signalling Instructions 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Staff Duties in the Field (HMSO 1891) 
Text Book of Gunnery (HMSO 1897) 
Text Book of Military Topography Parts I and II (HMSO 1898) 
War Establishments 1898 (HMSO 1898) 
Trainine Manuals 1900-1906 
Appendix to Training Manuals· (HMSO 1905) 
Army Service Corps Training (Provisional) 1903 (HMSO 1903) 
Cavalry Training (Provisional) 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Cavalry Training 1907 (HMSO 1907) 
Cavalry Training 1907(reprinted with amendments, 1910) (HMSO 1910) 
Combined Training (Provisional) 1902 (HMSO 1902) 
Combined Training (Provisional) 1903 Parts VI-IX (HMSO 1903) 
Directions for use of the Signalling Disc (HMSO nd) 
Field Artillery Training 1902 (HMSO 1902) 
Field Artillery Training 1902 Amended 1902 (HMSO 1902) 
Field Artillery Training 1903 Chapter 4 (Revised) (HMSO 1903) 
Field Artillery Training 1906 (HMSO 1906) 
Firing Exercises. Pistol Exercise and Instructions for Aiming and Judging Distance 
(Provisional) 1901 (HMSO 1901) 
Frontier Warfare and Bush Fighting 1906 (Calcutta Government Printing 1906) 
FSRs Part 1 Combined Training 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
FSRs India (Provisional Edition) (Calcutta Government of India Press 1906) 
Garrison Artillery Training 1902 I Provisional Edition (HMSO 1902) 
Garrison Artillery Training 1902 III (HMSO 1902) 
Garrison Artillery Training 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Garrison Artillery Training 1904 II Provisional Edition Coast Defence and Practice 
(HMSO 1904) 
Garrison Artillery Training 1905 I Coast Defence (HMSO 1905) 
Garrison Artillery Training II 1906 Siege and Movable Armament (HMSO 1906). 
Garrison Artillery Training 1905 III (HMSO 1905) 
Handbookfor the 5-inch BL Howitzer (Mark I) 1901 (HMSO 1901) 
Handbookfor the 9.45 Inch BL Howitzer (HMSO 1906) 
Handbook for the 15 Pr BL Gun (Mark I)(Field Batteries) 1900 (HMSO) 
Handbook (Provisional) for the 2. 95-in QF Mountain Gun (Mark 1)(Mule 
Equipment) 1901(HMSO 1901) 
Handbookfor the 0.303 Maxim Machine Gun ... 1901 (HMSO 1901) 
Handbookfor the Converted 0.303and 303 converted Maxim Machine Guns ... 1903 
(HMSO 1903) 
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Handbook for the 15 Pr BL Gun (Mark l)(Field Batteries) 1900 ( HMSO 1900) 
Heavy Artillery Training (provisional) 1903 (HSMO 1903) 
Heavy Artillery Training 1904 (Provisional) (HSMO 1904) 
Imperial Yeomanry Training (provisional) (HMSO 1902) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1900 (HMSO 1900) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1901 (HMSO 1901) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1902(HMSO 1902) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1903(HMSO 1903) 
Instructions for Practice Heavy Artillery 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Instructions for Practice Horse Field and Mountain Artillery 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Instructions for Practice Heavy Artillery 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
Instructions for Practice Horse and Field Artillery 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
Instructions for Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1906 (HMSO 1906) 
Instruction in Military Engineering Part I Field Defences (HMSO 1902) 
Instructions for Training Imperial Yeomanry (HMSO 1905) 
Infantry Training Provisional 1902 (HMSO 1902) 
Infantry Training 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
Manual of Field Sketching and Reconnaissance 1903(HMSO 1903) 
Manual of Horse and Stable Management (HMSO 1904) 
Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1906 (HMSO 1906) 
Manual of Military Ballooning Part I (HMSO 1905) 
Manual of Military Engineering (Provisional Edition) (HMSO 1901) 
Manual of Military Engineering (Provisional) (HMSO 1903) 
Manual of Military Engineering (HMSO 1905) 
Mountain Warfare (Simla 1900) 
Mounted Infantry Training Provisional 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Mounted Infantry Training 1906 (HMSO 1906) 
Musketry Regulations Provisional 1903(HMSO 1903) 
Musketry Exercises (Provisional) 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Musketry Regulations 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
Regulations for Intelligence Duties in the Field 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Remount Manual (HMSO 1906) 
Regulations for the Equipment of the Regular Army Part 2 Section z XIII Details for 
Staff Units in Time of War (HMSO 1901) 
Siege Artillery Drill 1900 (HMSO 1900) 
Signalling Regulations (HMSO 1904) 
Text Book of Small Arms 1904 (HMSO 1904) 
Transport Manual (Provisional) (Field Service) 1905 Part I (HMSO 1905) 
War Establishments. 1905 (HMSO 1905) 
Training Manuals from 1906 
Amendments to Combined Training 1905 (HMSO 1907) 
Amendments to Garrison Artillery Training 1905 I (HMSO 1907?) 
Animal Management 1908 (HMSO 1908) 
Army Doctrine Publication 1 Operations (HMSO 1994) 
Army Doctrine Publication 2 Command (HMSO 1995) 
The Army Field Manual I The Application of Force (HMSO 1985) 
Air Power Doctrine (HMSO 1993) 
Army Motor Reserve (HMSO 1907) 
Army Service Corps Training Part I 1909 (HMSO 1909) 
Army Service Corps Training Part IV Mechanical Transport (HMSO 1912) 
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Artillery Training ill War (HMSO 1928) 
British Defence Doctrine (HMSO 1996) 
Cavalry Training 1907 (HMSO 1901) 
Cavalry Training 1912 (HMSO 1912) 
Cavalry Training Indian Supplement (Simla Government Monotype Press 1911) 
Cyclist Training (Provisional) 1908 (HMSO 1908) 
Cyclists Training 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Cyclist Training (Provisional) 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Cyclist Training (Provisional) 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Design for Military Operations. The British Military Doctrine (HMSO 1986) 
Design for Military Operations. The British Military Doctrine (HMSO 1996) 
Education and Training of the Japanese Field Artillery (HMSO 1909) 
Elementary Training in Night Operations 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Engineer Training 1912 (HMSO 1912) 
Engineer Training 1912 Amendments 1913 (HMSO 1913) 
Expeditionary Force War Establishments. 1909-1910 (HMSO 1909) 
Amendments to Field Artillery Training (HMSO 1908) 
Field Artillery Training 1906 Amendments (HMSO 1907) 
Field Artillery Training 1908 (HMSO 1908) 
Field Artillery Training 1908 (Appendix IV Mountain Artillery 1910) (HMSO 1910) 
Field Artillery Training (Provisional) 1912(HMSO 1912) 
Field Artillery Training 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Engineer Training 1912 (HMSO 1912) 
Field Service Manual 1907 Cavalry Regiment (HMSO 1907) 
Field Service Manual 1907 Infantry Battalion (HMSO 1907) 
Field Service Manual 1908 Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade (5 Inch BL) (HMSO 
1908) 
Field Service Manual 1908 Field Artillery (18 Prj Brigade (HMSO 1908) 
Field Service Manual 1908 Horse Artillery Brigade (HMSO 1908) 
Field Service Manual 1908 RE Field Company (HMSO 1908) 
Field Service Manual 1908 Infantry Battalion (HMSO 1908) 
Field Service Manual 1910 Cavalry Regiment Expeditionary Force (HMSO 1910) 
Field Service Manual 1911 Headquarters Units (Expeditionary Force) (HMSO 
1911) 
Field Service Manual 1913 Cavalry Regiment. Expeditionary Force 1913 (HMSO 
1913) 
Field Service Manual 1914 Infantry Battalion (Expeditionary Force) (HMSO 1914) 
Field Service Manual 1910. Heavy Artillery- B.L. 60-pr Bty and Ammo Colm. EF 
1910 (HMSO 1910) 
Field Service Manual 1910 Infantry Battalion (Expeditionary Force) (HMSO 1910) 
Field Service Manual 1910 RE Field Company Expeditionary Force (HMSO 1910) 
Field Service Manual 1910 RE Field Troop Expeditionary Force (HMSO 1910) 
Field Service Manual 1910 Mounted Infantry Battalion Expeditionary Force (HMSO 
1910) 
Field Service Manual Engineers 1910 (HMSO 1910) 
Field Service Manual 1913 Infantry Battalion Expeditionary Force (HMSO 1913) 
Field Service Manual 1913 Mounted Infantry Battalion Expeditionary Force (HMSO 
1913) 
Field Service Manual 1913 Mounted Infantry Battalion Expeditionary Force (HMSO 
1913) 
Field Service Manual 1913 Signals Service Sigs Coy with Division (HMSO 1913) 
403 
Field Service Manual 1914 RE Field Company Expeditionary Force (EF) (HMSO 
1914) 
Field Service Pocket Book (Provisional) 1907 (HSMO 1907) 
Field Service Pocket Book 1908 (HMSO 1908) 
Field Service Pocket Book 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Field Service Regulations Part I Operations 1909 (HMSO 1909) 
Field Service Regulations Part II Organisation and Administration 1909 (HMSO 
1909) 
Field Service Regulations Part I Operations 1912 (HMSO 1912) 
Field Service Regulations Part I Operations 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Field Service Regulations 1920 (HMSO 1920) 
Garrison Artillery Training 1907 (HMSO 1907) 
Garrison Artillery Training 11910 (HMSO 1910) 
Garrison Artillery Training II Siege 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Garrison Artillery Training ill 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Garrison Artillery Training 11910 (HMSO 1910) 
Garrison Artillery Training II (Siege) 1911 (HMSO reprinted 1914) 
Garrison Artillery Training III 1911 (HMSO 1914) 
Garrison Artillery Training I 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Handbook on Military Bicycles (HMSO 1910) 
Indian Cavalry Pocket Book (Lahore Civil and Military Gazette Press 1910) 
Instructions for Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1908 (HMSO 1908) 
Instructions for Practice Siege Artillery and Movable Armament 1909 (HMSO 1909) 
Instructionsfor Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1910 (HMSO 1910) 
Instructionsfor Practice RGA Siege and Movable Armament 1910 (HMSO 1910) 
Instructionsfor Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Instructions for Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1912 (HMSO 1912) 
Instructionsfor Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1913(HMSO 1913) 
Instructionsfor Practice RGA Siege and Movable Armament 1913 (HMSO 1913) 
Instructionsfor Practice Horse, Field and Heavy Artillery 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Instructions for Practice Royal Garrison Artillery Siege and Movable Armament 
1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Infantry Training 1905 (HMSO Reprinted with amendments 1908) 
Infantry Training 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Infantry Training 1914 (HMSO 1914) 
Instruction in Bayonet Fighting 1907 (HMSO 1907) 
Instruction in Bayonet Fightingfor Competitions 1911 (HMSO 1911) 
Manual of Field Engineering (HMSO 1911) 
Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1912 (HMSO 1912) 
.303 Maxim Guns (HMSO nd) 
Memorandum Reorganised System of Supply ... Introduction of[MTJ 1912 to Supply 
Manual (War) 1909 (HMSO 1912) 
Military Engineering Part I Field Defences 1908 (HMSO 1908) 
Military Engineering Part II Attack and Defence of Fortresses 1910 (HMSO 1910) 
Mounted Infantry Training 1906 (HMSO 1906) 
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Maj Gen HJ Scobell 'Cavalry' LXXXVII Dec 1905. 
Brig Gen TD Pilcher 'Some Considerations Connected with the Formation of Infantry in 
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S The transactions do not have other bibliographic details. They are available at the RUSI. 
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Government Central Printing Office 1902) LIMIU7/l 0839 
Annual Report 1902-03 by the Inspector General of Artillery in India (Simla 
Government Central Printing Office 1903) LIMIL/7 1108393 
Annual Report of the Royal Artillery Practice Bombay Command 1900-1901 Roval 
Garrison Artillery LIMIL/7/l 0840 . 
Annual Report of the Royal Artillery Practice Bombay Command Horse and Field 
Batteries 1900-1901 LIMIL/7/10840 
Catalogue of Books in the Library of the Intelligence Branch of the QMG's 
Department in India (Calcutta Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing 
1901) LIMILI17111149 
Conference of Staff Officers Agra Jan 1909 (Simla Government Monotype Press 
1909) LIMILI17 1511810 
Report of a Conference Jan 1910 (Simla Government Monotype Press 1910) 
LIMILI17/5/1811 
Extracts from the Report by Major General L W Parsons, CB, RA Inspector General of 
Artillery in India for the season 1903-04 UMIU7 I 10839 
General Report on the Agra Concentration Jan 1907 (Calcutta Superintendent 
Government Printing India 1907) LlMIU17/5/1809 
A Godley East India Military Bullet (HMSO 1899) LlMIL/7/120264 
The Intelligence Department Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War (Simla 1905) 
LIMILI17/20/22 5 
Mountain Warfare (Simla Government Central Printing Office 1900) 
LIMIL/17/5/2204 
Notes for the Guidance of Cavalry Officers by the Inspector General of Cavalry in 
India 1900 (Simla Government Central Printing Office 1900) UMIU7/15140 
Brig Gen JW Ottley Report on The Engineer Operations of the Tirah Expeditionary 
Force 1897-8 (np nd) LIMIU7115911 
Record of Lord Kitchener 's Administration of the Army in India 1902-1909 (Simla 
Government Central Branch Press 1909) LlMIU17/5/1617 
Records of the Staff College, Quetta (Simla Government Central Printing Office 1908) 
UMILI17/5/2276 
Records of the Staff College, Quetta (Simla Government Central Printing Office 1911) 
UMIUI7/5/2276 
Report of the Ambulance Transport Committee 1898 (Simla Government Central 
Printing Office 1898) UMIL 3/1090 
2 There are several reports on one file. 
1 There are several reports on one file. 
4. This was the Dum-dum. 
S Reprinted from Journal des Sciences Militaires ( 1905). 
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Report of the Committee on Mobilisation of the Horse, Field and Mountain Artillen' in 
India 1898 (Simla Government Central Printing Office 1899) UMIU7/10139 . 
Report on the Attock Manoeuvres Feb 1900 (Simla Government Central Printing 
Office 1900) LlMIL117/511807 
Report on the Cavalry Manoeuvres .... Delhi 1898-99 (Simla Government Central 
Printing Office 1899) LIMIL/7115139 
Report on the Commissariat-Transport Arrangements of the Peshawar Valley Force 
(Allahabad North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Press 1898) 
LlMILI17/5/1850. 
Report on the Commissariat-Transport Arrangements of the 2nd and 3rd Resen'e 
Brigades ordered to be held at readiness at Rawal Pindi 1897 (Allahabad North-
Western Provinces and Oudh Government Press 1898) UMILI17/5/1851. 
Report on the Commissariat-Transport Arrangements of the Kurram-Kohat Force 
(Allahabad North-Western Provinces and Oudh Government Press 1898) 
LIMILIl7/511852. 
Report on the Commissariat-Transport Arrangements of the Malakand (Including 
Buner) Field Force 1897-98 (Lahore Caxton Printing Works 1898) UMIUI7/5/1854. 
Report on the Commissariat- Transport Arrangements of the Tirah Expeditionary 
Force (Calcutta Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India 1899) 
LIMILI17/5/1856. 
Report on the Engineer Operations of the Buner Field Force 1898, Reports 
on the Engineer Operations of the Malakand Field Force and Utman Khel Column 
1897-98 (Calcutta Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing India 1898) 
LIMIL/7115911. 
Report on the Inter-Divisional Manoeuvres Northern Army 1912 (1913) 
LIMILI17/5/1814. 
Report on the Working of the Army Veterinary Department with the Mohmand, 
Malakand and Buner Field Forces 1897 and 1898 (Calcutta Office of the 
Superintendent of Government Printing India 1899) LfMIL/3/1 090. 
Report on the Working of the Army Veterinary Department with the Tirah 
Expeditionary Force 1897-98 (Calcutta Office of the Superintendent of Government 
Printing India 1899) LIMIL/3/1 090. 
Summary of Measures ..... 1894-1898 (Calcutta Office Superintendent Government 
Printing India 1899) LIMILI17/511616. 
Notes for the Guidance of Cavalry Officers by the Inspector General of Cavalry in 
India 1900 (Simla Government Central Printing Office 1900) UMIU7/15140. 
Index of Theses Consulted 
Dr SD Badsey Fire and the Sword. The British Army and the Arme Blanche 
Controversy 1871-1921 (Cambridge 1981) 
Dr WS Marble The Infantry cannot do with a gun less (KCL 1998) 
Dr PA Towle The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War on British Military and Naval 
Thought (KCL 1973) , 
Dr TR Moreman "Passing It On: " The Army in India and the Development of Frontler 
Warfare 1849-1947 (KCL 1995) 
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Index of Contemporary Maps Consulted6 
1. Capt H Dehne-Radcliffe Key Map to Show the Positions and Advances on 
Ladysmith Relief Map (Stanford 1902). 
2. Siege of Mafeking. Sketch to show the state of the defence at the time of relief 
(Intelligence Division WO August 1900). 
3. Siege of Mafeking. Sketch of typical Boer Field work employed (Intelligence 
Division WO August 1900). 
4. Capt H Dehne-Radcliffe Military Sketch Map to show Sir R Buller's advance from 
Chievely to relieve Ladysmith (Stanford 1902). 
5. Intelligence Division WO 1558 Spion Kop and Vaalkrantz Sheets 1&2 
(Southampton Ordnance Survey nd) 
6 All in the British Library 
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Biographical Index 
This Index is designed to provide context for this thesis and is not intended as an absolute 
record. Consequently some individuals' later careers are not covered. Figures such as Winston 
Churchill have only those details included that are relevant to this thesis. Manchurian MAs are 
not recorded here unless they have wider significance, but their details are at Table 28. Civil 
honours and titles are not recorded unless, like Dundonald, they were acquired during the 
subject's career. Only military decorations are listed. This Index's material is derived from 
Army Lists, the Dictionary of National Biography supplemented by other works in the 
Bibliographies. 
Lt Gen EAH Alderson psc, com Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard otherwise the 1st Foot from 
Militia 1878, Adjutant MI 1888, DAAG Aldershot 1897-99, served with MI Mashonaland 
1896, MI comd South Africa 1899-1900, Brig Gen MI South Africa 1900-1901, IG MI South 
Africa 1901-03, Comd 2 Brigade 1903-1907, Division Commander India 1908-12, Divisional 
and Corps Comd 1914-15, Inspector Infantry 1916-
FM EBB Allenby psc, com 6 Dragoons 1882, served in unit South Africa 1899-1900, colm 
comd 1901-2, Cav Bde comd 1905-1909, IG Cav 1910-1914, Cav Div Comd 1914, Cav 
Corps then Corps Commander 1914-15, Army Comd BEF 1915-17, CinC Egypt 1917-19. 
Lt Gen EA Altbam psc, com R Scots 1876, Assistant MS and ADC GOC South Africa 1896-
7, DAAG Int Army HQ 1897-99, AAG Int South Africa 1900, WO Int 1901-4, GSO 1 South 
Africa 1906-7, BGS South Africa 1907-8, Brig Gen Admin N Comd 1908-10, Maj Gen 
Admin S Comd 1911-15, IG Communications 1915-16, Acting QMG India 1917-
LS Amery graduate of Balliol, fellow All Souls 1897. Correspondent Times South Africa 
1899-1900, Editor THWSA. MP 1911-, served Intelligence Staff France, Balkans, Gallipoli, 
Salonika 1914-16, Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet 1916. Later Cabinet Minister. 
Interested in Army Reform and anti-Buller, thus the THWSA has considerable biases, but these 
are significant in their own right. Amery received much official help in compiling THWSA and 
serving soldiers wrote Volume VI's technical chapters. Amery had good links with many 
senior officers. 
Brig Gen A W Andrew com from NZ Rifle Vols into Devons 1886, IA Cavalry 1889, Lt Col 
1912, Bde Comd 1917-. 
Maj Gen JC Ardagb psc, passed top into Woolwich from Trinity College Dublin, com REs 
1859, present Franco-Prussian War, served Balkans and technical delegate Congress of Berlin, 
instructor SME 1882 but deployed for Egyptian War 1882, served Sudan 1884, appointed 
AAG WO for mobilization 1887. Private Secretary Viceroy of India 1888-1895, Commandant 
SME 1895-6. Director of Military Intelligence 1896-1901, the branch was the forerunner of 
the Directorate of Military Operations. The DMI was the forerunner of the DMO. Ardagh also 
served at First Hague Conference. Active in quasi-diplomatic and legal roles after retirement 
from the Army. 
Mal Gen GG Aston psc, com RM 1879, served Sudan 1884, Professor Fortification RN 
College Greenwich 1896-9, served South Africa 1899-1900, DS Camberley 1904-7, StafT 
South Africa 1908-1912. Bde Comd 1914. Latter Military Correspondent The Times. 
Mal BFS Baden-Powell com Scots Guards from Militia 1882, enthusiast for kites, cars and 
aircraft, served Sudan 1884-5. Served South Africa 1899-1902; used kites to raise a WT aerial 
there. Editor Army Annual. Brother of: 
Lt Ceo RSS Baden-Powell com direct into 13 Hussars 1876, served South Africa and later 
Ashanti 1895; the latter apparently at Wolseley's instigation. Served Matabeleland 1896, CO 
Dragoon Guards 1897, introducing reconnaissance training. Present in Tirah, SSO South 
Africa 1899, commanded at Mafeking. Inspector South African Constabulary 1900-02, 
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appointed IGC 1902. TF Divisional Commander 1908-10; Led the Boy Scouts Movement. 
This can be seen as part of the post-South African changes. See Bibliography. 
General W Balck German officer. Tactical authority, friend of Ellison, corresponded with 
him and Ian Hamilton and indirectly contributed to IT 1902. Senior commander Gennan 
Army 1914-1918. His son Gen H Balck served as a general on the Eastern Front 1941-5. 
Gen EG Barrow com 102nd Foot 1871, IA 1883, DAA&QMG Indian Contingent Egypt 
1882, Int Staff 1884-7, AAG India 1897-9, AAG TEF 1897-98, Colon Staff and DAG India 
1899-1901, Chief Staff Officer China Expedition 1900-01, Secretary Military Department 
1901-03, District Commander 1904-08, Divisional Commander 1908, Army Comd India 
1908-1912, Military Secretary India Department 1914-
Capt C Battine com 7 DG from Militia 1887. Retired before South Africa. Sometime 
Military Correspondent of The Daily Telegraph. Corresponded with Allenby during the First 
World War. See Bibliography. 
Maj Gen HM Bengough psc, com 77th Foot 1855, served Crimea, Zulu War, Bde Comd 
Aldershot 1894-97. 
Maj Gen WD Bird psc, DSO, com R W Surreys 1888, served Nigeria 1897, Tirah 1897-8, 
South Africa 1899-1900, CI School of Musketry 1903-1905, DS Quetta 1905-1909, attended 
Indian Staff College Manchurian Battlefield Tour, GSO 2 WO 1910-13, GSO 1 WO 1915-16, 
DSD WO 1916-17. 
FM WR Birdwood DSO, qs, com 12 Lancers 1885, IA 1886, Deputy Provost Marshal rEF 
1897-8, SSO South Africa 1899-1900, BM South Africa 1900-2, Mil Secretary CinC South 
Africa 1902, Staff India 1902-09, Brigade Comd India 1909-1912, QMG India 1912, 
Secretary Army Department 1912-14, Comd ANZAC Corps 1914-15, CinC Mediterranean 
Expeditionary Force 1915-6, Australian Corps Comd 1916-18, Comd 5 Army 1918. 
I Bloch: Russian magnate and financier. His military predictions were more accurate than the 
soldiers, but his economic and logistical conclusions completely failed to realise that sustained 
attritional war was practical. 
Gen B Blood com REs 1860. Several Frontier campaigns, Zulu War, Egypt 1882, COS 
Chitral Relief Force 1895, Commander Malakand Field Force, personally shot a ghazi 
following an attack during a truce, later commanded Buner Field Force 1897-8, divisional 
commander India 1898-1900, served South Africa 1901. Commander Punjab 1901-1907. 
Friend of Winston Churchill. 
Maj Gen JP Brabazon qs, com 16 Lancers 1862, transferred to Guards, retired 1870, 
gentleman volunteer Ashanti ranked as Captain, reinstated in the Army, BM Afghanistan 
1879-80, served Sudan 1884-5, Winston Churchill's CO 4th Hussars, Comd Cav Bde 1899, 
Cav Bde Comd South Africa 1899-1900, fell out with French in South Africa over his 
criticisms of the latter's morals or lack of them. Inspector Yeomanry South Africa 1900. He 
has been seen as typical cavalry reactionary, though his views on small arms were ahead of his 
time. Electrified the RCWSA with his advocacy of tomahawks as his preferred cavalry steel 
weapon, perhaps pour epater les bourgeois. 
Gen H Brackenbury com Canadian Militia 1853, RA 1856, Served Mutiny, observed 
Franco-Prussian War, served Ashanti and accompanied Wolseley to Natal 1875 and 1879, 
Private Secretary Viceroy India 1880-1881, served Ireland 1882 and Sudan 1884-5. Director 
Military Intelligence 1886-1891. Member Viceroy's Council 1891-1896, President Ordnance 
Co 1896-99 and Director Ordnance 1899-1904. 
Lt Gen RG Broadwood psc, com 12 L 1881, served Egypt 1892-99, commanded the 
Egyptian Cavalry Omdurman, Cav Bde Cmd and Colm Comd South Africa 1900-1902, 
Colonel 011 Staff Natal 1902-1904, Brig Gen Orange River Colony 1904-1906. Commander 
troops South China 1906-10. Comd 57 Div 1916-17, KIA 1917. Buried at his own request 
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between a soldier and a subaltern. 1 
Mai Gen CED Budworth com RA 1889, Adjutant HAC 1899-1904, served CIV South 
Africa 1900, Gunnery Instr 1904-1908, CRA 1915, Maj Gen 1916-. 
Gen R Buller VC, com KRRC 1858, served under Hawley, a noted exemplar of the 
principles of Shorncliffe, served Red River Rebellion, attended but did not graduate from 
Camberleybeing instead sent to Ashanti 1873, South Africa 1878-9, Egypt 1882, Sudan 1884-
5, Special Commissioner Ireland 1886, QMG 1887-1890, did much to found ASC 1888, AG 
1890-97, fell out with Wolseley when Buller looked likely to succeed Cambridge as CinC in 
1895. Comd Aldershot 1898-9, Comd SAFF 1899-1900, after relief by Roberts Comd Natal 
1900. Resumed Command Aldershot 1901, then GOC 1 Corps 1901 but dismissed following 
an incautious statement to the press.2 
Brig Gen JF Bum-Murdoch psc, com 1 Dgns from Militia 1878, BM 1 Cavalry Bde 
Aldershot 1891-4, Egypt 1894-6, Cavalry Bde Comd South Africa 1900, served till 1902 in 
theatre. District Comd South Africa 1902-1906. 
Lt Gen CJ Burnett psc, com 15th Foot 1863, served Ashanti, BM Afghan Campaign. GOC E 
District 1896-98, acting QMG 1898, Maj General India 1898-1903, ChiefMA Japanese 
Forces Manchuria 1905. GOC Western District 1907-. 
FM JS Byng psc, com 10 Hussars from Militia 1883, DAAG Aldershot 1897-99, PM South 
Africa 1899, CO South African Light Horse 1899-1900, Commandant Cavalry School 1904-5, 
Comd 2 Cavalry Brigade 1905-7, Comd 1 Cavalry Brigade 1907-09, Comd TF Division 1910-
12, GOC Egypt 1912-14, GOC 3 Cavalry Division 1914-15. Canadian Corps Comd 1916-17, 
Comd 3 Anny 1917-19. Later Governor General Canada then Commissioner Metropolitan 
Police. 
Capt WE Cairnes com Militia 1882, transferred to 3 DG 1884, then to S Staffs, then R Irish 
Fusiliers, Volunteer adjutant 1897-1902, wrote for The Westminster Gazette 1899-1901. Did 
not serve in South Africa. Secretary of the Akers-Douglas Co and the Remount Co, died 1902. 
Ma; Gen CE Callwell psc, com RA 1878, served 2nd Afghan War, SC Int WO 1887-1892, 
BM RA 1893-6, observer with Greek Anny 1897, author Small Wars, served Natal as BC 
heavy bty and then mobile colm comd, wrote Tactics of To-Day, DAQMG Int Army HQ 
1903-4, GSO 1 and Asst Director MO 1904-7, retired as Col 1909, recalled 1914, promoted 
and served as DMO 1914-16. 
Maj Gen T Capper DSO, psc, com East Lancs 1882, attended Camberley 1896-7, Sudan 
1898, served Natal 1899-1900 divisional staff, later commanded mobile colm, DS Camberley 
1902-1905, Commandant Indian Staff College 1906-1911, toured Manchuria with them. Bde 
Comd 1911-1914, ally of Hubert Gough, GOC 7 Division 1914-15, KIA Loos. 
Col FC Carter com 5th Fusiliers 1878, transferred to R Berks, wrote on Frontier warfare and 
scouts, served 2nd Afghan War and NW Frontier 1888, 1891 and NE Frontier, Lushai 1889. 
Col JE Caunter psc: com 69th Foot 1878. Instr RMC 1898-9, DAAG South Africa 1899-
1900, Deputy Commandant RMC 1900-06, GSO 2 1908-11, AAG WO 1911-13. 
Col N Chamberlain com Devons 1873, invented Snooker 1875, transferred IA 1876 and 
served on Roberts' staff 2nd Afghan War, Private Secretary to Roberts South Africa 1900. 
Appointed to Royal Irish Constabulary 1900. Sacked 1914. 
Lt WS Churchill; com 4 Hussars 1895, served Malakand and Tirah 1897-8, attached 21 
Lancers Om dunn an 1899, resigned 1899, war correspondent South Africa 1899, captured 
1899, escaped, com SALH 1900 under Byng. Served in Natal and under Roberts, MP 1900. 
Col GS Clarke com RE 1868, served Egypt assessing affects bombardment Alexandria and 
Sudan 1885, Secretary Colonial Defence Co 1885-92, Secretary Hartington Co 1889-90, 
Superintendent Woolwich 1894-1901, Member Dawkins Co administrative refonn WO, 
I F Davies and G Maddocks Bloody Red Tabs (1995),p49. 
1 Satirised by Saki' 'Alice Lunches in Westminster' The Penguin Complete Saki (1982). 
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Governor Victoria 1901-1903, Member Esher Committee 1903-4, Secretary cm 1904-7, 
Governor Bombay 1907-1913, wrote for The Times, see Bibliography. 
Lt Gen CF Clery psc, com 32nd Foot 1858, Camberley 1868-1870, instructor RMC 1871-75 
and wrote Minor Tactics. Served Zulu War and as BM in Egypt 1882, Staff Gordon Relief 
Expedition, Commandant Camberley 1888-1893, served WO 1896-99, GOC 2 Division Natal 
1899-1900; great reputation as a theorist till the bullets flew. 
Maj Gen IT (Talbot) Coke com 21 st Foot 1859, fought Canada 1866, Sudan 1888, AAG 
Ireland 1891-6, AAG then DAG Aldershot 1896-98, Colonel Staff Mauritius 1898-99 Bde 
. , 
Comd South Africa 1899-1900. Acting Divisional Commander at Spion Kop. 
Lt Gen HE Colvile com Gren Gds 1870. Served Intelligence Sudan 1884-5 and further staff 
service Sudan 1884-5. Commissioner Uganda 1893-95, comd Bde Gibraltar 1899 and Guards 
Bde South Africa 1899-1900. GOC 9 Division South Africa 1900, stellenbosched by Roberts 
being blamed for Sannah's Post and Lindley disasters. Retired 1901. Killed in a motor 
accident with Rawlinson 1907. 
Col EMS Crabbe com Coldstream Guards 1872, served Egypt 1882, Sudan 1884-5, South 
Africa 1899-1902. 
Maj FC Crum com KRRC 1893, served South Africa 1899-1902, mainly with MI. Later MI 
instructor, retired prewar and became a senior leader Boy Scouts. Recalled 1914-18 
Col WL Davidson com RA 1869, 1900-1901 Colon staffRA, with French for relief 
Kimberley, Colon staffRA NE District 1901-
Maj Gen L Dening DSO com 75th Foot 1867, Bengal Staff Corps 1871. Served 2nd Afghan 
War, Sudan 1896, NWF 1897-8, Bde Comd India 1902-. Judging by his papers he was keen 
on training as a formation commander. 
Maj Gen JBB Dickson com Bengal Cavalry 1860, transferred 1 Dgns 1875 then 5 Dgns 
1885, SSO Cape 1879, DAA&QMG Nile 1884-5, Comd Cav Bde Northern District 1897-99, 
Col Staff Straits Settlements 1899-1900, Comd 4 Cav Bde South Africa 1900-
Gen CWH Douelas qs, com 92nd Foot 1869, later Gordons, served 2nd Afghan War and 
marched with Roberts to Kandahar, served 1st Boer War, DAAG Suakin 1884. BM 1 Brigade 
1893-1895, 1898-9 AAG Aldershot, AAG Buller's staff. 1899-1900 Comd 9 Bde South 
Africa and then colm comd, 1900-01, Comd 1 Bde 1901-2, Comd 2 DivisionI902-4, AG 
1904-1909, GOC Southern ComdI909-12, IGHF 1912-14, succeeded French as CIGS 1914, 
but died. 
Lt Gen JP Du Cane psc,l com RA 1884, staff officer then colm comd South Africa, BM RA 
1904-5, GSO 2 DS Staff College 1905-7, GSO 1 War Office 1908-11, CRA 3 Div 1911-12, 
BGS to IGF 1912-1914, BGS 3 Corps 1914-15, MGRA HQ BEF 1915, Ministry of Munitions 
1915-6, Corps Comd 1916-18. CinC Western Command and Rhine Army postwar. 
Maj FC Dundas psc: A&SH 1889, DAAG for Instr Scotland 1900-05, DAA&QMG Straits 
Settlements 1906-10, DAA&QMG 6 Division 1912-1914. 
Lt Gen Earl of Dundonald: com Life Guards 1870, served Sudan 1884-5, CO LGs 1895-99 
and stressed shooting. Went to South Africa on own initiative and made Mounted Bde Comd 
Natal 1899-1900. Inventor, a disability which was hereditary. Later commanded in Canada 
1902-4. Unpopular with some cavalrymen, nicknamed Dundoodle. 
Brig Gen JE Edmonds psc, com REs 1881, instructor fortification RMA 1890-96; served Int 
Div WO 1899-1901, legal adviser 1901-1904, WO monitoring Manchurian War 1904-7, MI 5 
1907-1911, GSO 1 4 Div 1911-1914, apparently suffered a mental breakdown in 1914. Served 
GHQ 1914-18 Engineer Branch, later Official Historian World War 1 1919-49. Nicknamed 
'Archimedes' due to his brains, dismissive of lesser intelligences eg Haig. 
Col FJM Edwards DSO, psc, commissioned R W Surreys 1881, IA 1883, GSO 1 India 1911-
13, Bde Commander India 1913-14.Served Mohmand and Tirah 1897-8, China 1900. 
) Not shown as psc but qualified as being a OS at Camberley. 
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Lt Gen GF Ellison psc, com 1882 North Lancs, Camberley 1888-9, Staff Capt HQ of Army 
1894:98, DAAG Aldershot 1898-9, served South Africa 1899-1900, Secretary Esher Co 1903-
4. Private ~ecretary Haldane 1905-8, Director Organisation WO 1908-11, staff IGOF and 
BGS MedIterranean Command 1911-1914. MGS Central Force UK 1914-15, Staff 
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force 1915-16, then admin appointments UK 1916-20. Friend 
ofBalck, worked with Henderson on drafting CTrg 1902. 
Col FB Emslie com RA 1875, BC howitzer battery Omdunnan. Has been heavily and 
retrospectively criticised for his fire tactics there. DAAG Ordnance 1899-1901, Deputy Asst 
Director Ordnance 1901-3. President of the Self-Propelled Lorry Trial 1901. 
Lt Gen WE Franklyn psc, com Green Howards 1874, CO Green Howards Tirah, Bde 
Commander 1902-1904, Director Personnel Services WO 1904-6, GOC 4 and 3 Divs 1906-
10, MS 1911-
FM JDP French com 8th Hussars in 1874 after RN service 1866-1870 and Suffolk Artillery 
Militia 1870-1874, served Sudan 1884-5, AAG WO 1895-7, Comd 2 Cav Bde 1897 and then 
1 Cav Bde Aldershot 1899. Sent as cavalry commander to Natal and escaped Ladysmith. 
Cavalry Division Commander SAFF 1899-1900, served South Africa as senior comd 1900-
1902, CinC Aldershot 1902-1907, on cm 1905, IGF 1907-1912, CIGS 1912-14, resigned 
after Curragh, IGF 1914, CinC BEF 1914-1915. CinC Home Forces 1915-18. 
Maj Gen JFC Fuller DSO, psc, com Ox and Bucks LI 1898, served South Africa first with 
unit and then as Intelligence Officer. Served as a TF Adjutant and student Camberley 1914. 
Served on the staff 1914-18, and as GSO 2& 1 Tank Corps 1916-18, GSO 1 DSD 1918-20. 
Possibly the only British enthusiast of Black Magic to have attained the rank of major general. 
Wrote extensively on LI as well as on strategical and weapons-related topics. 
Lt Gen WF Gatacre psc, com 7ih Foot 1862, Camberley 1873-5. Served with Roberts in 
India 1880s but not part of the Ring. Served Chitra11895. Divisional Commander Sudan 
1898, GOC Eastern District 1898-9. Commander 3 Division South Africa 1899-1900, sacked 
by Roberts. Returned Eastern Command 1901-3. Nicknamed General Backacher, his orderly 
who carried his general's pennant was killed at the Atbara at Gatacre's side while the latter 
was tearing the Dervish zariba down. Gatacre then offered the duty to his staff clerk who 
declined. Gatacre was astounded. 
Geo AJ Godley psc com R Dub Fus 1886, served Rhodesia 1896 MI, Camberley 1899. 
Appointed Irish Gds 1900, served Mafeking, prominent MI advocate, colm comd South 
Africa 1900-1902, DAAG MI 1902-1903 and CO Aldershot MI School 1903-1906, AAG and 
GSO 1 2 Div 1906-1910, GOC NZ 1910-1914. NZ Divisional and then Corps Comd 1914-. 
Col JE Goodwyn psc, com 29th Foot, Camberley 1878, DAAG Bengal 1881-6, retired 1897, 
no war service. See Bibliography. 
Brig Geo JRP Gordon com 15 Hussars 1879, Cav Bde Comd South Africa 1900-1901, AAG 
Cav under IG Cav 1903-1905, Comd 4 Cav Bde 1905-
Geo H de la P Gough psc, com 16 Lancers 1889, served Tirah, South Africa 1899-1902, 
latterly as colm comd, BM 1 Cav Bde 1902-1904, fell out with Scobell when he was the 
latter's BM. DS Staff College 1904-6, Comd 3 Cav Bde 1911-14, heavily involved in the 
Curragh Incident, later Cav Bde Comd BEF, Cavalry and Infantry Division commander 1914-
5, Corps 1915-16 and Comd 5 Army BEF 1916-18. Sacked 1918 as GOC 5 Anny. One of the 
very few Goughs not to win a VC. Reputation as a 'Thruster' in both South Africa and France. 
Younger brother of: 
Brig Gen JE Gough VC, psc, com Militia 1890, transferred to RB 1892, served South Africa 
1899-1902 and Somaliland 1902-3 and 1909, awarded VC, Camberley 1904-5, DAAG Ireland 
1905-6, OS Camberley 1909-1913, BGS Aldershot 1913, BGS 1 Corps 1914, BGS 1 Army 
1914-15. DOW 1915. 
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Lt Col MH Grant com Devons 1892, served Natal staff 1899-1900, DAAG Int SA 1900-1, 
DAAG Army HQ 1902-5, wrote for BWM as "Linesman," later final official historian South 
Africa. Retired 1909, Lt Col TF. 
LtCol FJ Graves com.20th Hussars 1869, served Sudan 1885, AAG Imperial Yeomanry 
1901. Best known for his controversy at the RUSI with Bloch. 
Lt Gen JM Grierson psc, com RA 1878, DA&QMG Indian Contingent Egypt 1882, 
Camberley 1884-5. DAAG Int Anny HQ 1890-1894, BM RA Aldershot 1895-6, MA Berlin 
1896-1900. Bear-led the foreign MAs in South Africa, then became AAG Roberts HQ South 
Africa 1900, effectively as principal Operations Staff Officer. Staff Officer on Waldersee's 
staff China 1900-1901. AQMG then BGS 2 Corps 1901-4, DMO 1904-1906, GOC 1 Div 
1906-1910, Commander Aldershot 1910-12, GOCinC Eastern Comd 1912-1914, died on 
active service 1914 commanding 2 Corps. Victim of many a hard fought battle with knife and 
fork. 
HA Gwynne: chief Reuter's correspondent South Africa, later editor Morning Post, had many 
links to influential soldiers including Roberts and Kitchener. Latterly head of British Union of 
Fascists. 
FM D Haig psc, com 7 Hussars 1885, ADC to IG Cav 1894-5, served Sudan 1898, BM 
Aldershot Cav Bde 1899, DAAG Natal 1899, DAAG Cavalry Division South Africa 1899-
1900, AAG South Africa 1900-1901, Column Comd 1901-2, IG Cav India 1903-1906, DMT 
1906-7, DSD 1907-9, Chief of Staff and CGS India 1909-1912, GOC Aldershot 1912-14, 1 
Corps Comd 1914, 1 Army Comd 1914-15, CinC BEF 1916-1918. 
Lt Gen ReB Haking psc, com R Hampshires 1881, DAAG Cork 1898-99, DAAG South 
Africa 1899-1901, DS Camberley 1904-06, GSO 1 Scotland 1908-11, GSO 1 WO 1911-14, 
Bde Comd 1914, later divisional and Corps Comd BEF. Seen as an ineffective corps 
commander but his Company Training was influential. 
Gen A Haldane DSO, psc, com Gordons 1882, cousin of Haldane the War Secretary, served 
DAAG Tirah, fought Elandslaagte and WIA, captured with Churchill 1899 escaped and 
served SA. Staff Capt and DAAG Int Army HQ 1903-1906. MA Manchuria 1904-1905, GSO 
1 WO 1906-9. Bde Commander 1912-1914, Div Comd and later corps commander 1914-18, 
GOC Mesopotamia post-1918. Made a mesalliance, his wife is carefully not mentioned in his 
autobiography. 
Col Sir Lonsdale Hale psc4 com RE 1852, Garrison Instr 1870-1878, Professor of 
Fortification Camberley 1878-1883, Special Service South Africa 1879. Commentator and 
analyst, edited Haig's Cavalry Studies. See Bibliography. Knighted for his contribution to 
military science. After his retirement was active at Staff College and RUSI. 
Gen Ian Hamilton DSO, qs: com 12th Foot 1872, transferred Gordons. Served 1st Boer and 
2nd Afghan Wars. Member Roberts' Ring, friend of White, they were both Gordons. ADC 
Roberts, AAG Musketry Bengal 1890-1893, Bde Comd Tirah, possibly the first British officer 
to be x-rayed on operations, keen rifle shot, Comdt Hythe 1898-9, Bde Comd 1898 Mans, 
tactical commander Elandslaagte and defensive section Ladysmith. Later served under 
Roberts as comd of corps-sized formation. Corresponded with Maj Balck, British observer 
with Japanese Army 1904-5, GOC Southern Command 1905-9, AG 1909-10, GOCinC 
Mediterranean &IGOF 1910-1914. CinC Gallipoli; twice missed a VC, once rejected as too 
junior and the other too senior; see Bibliography. 
Lt Gen A Hamilton Gordon psc, com RA 1880, BM RA Malta 1894-1897, BC and . 
developed Indirect Fire techniques, BC Howitzer Bty Natal 1900, DAAG Int South Africa 
1901, Instr School of Gunnery 1901, DAQMG 1 Corps 1901-1904, GSO 1 Army HQ 1904-
1908, GSO 1 E Command 1908-1910, DMO India 1910-1914. Maj Gen Admin and GOC 
Aldershot 1914-1916. Later GOC IX Corps BEF. 
• Not shown as psc but qualified as having been a DS there. 
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Mai Gen AF (Fitzroy) Hart psc, com 31st Foot 1864, served Ashanti, Zulu Campaign and 
1 It Boer War, Egypt 1882, Brigade commander Aldershot 1897-99 and Natal 1899-1900 
South Africa 1901-2; legendarily brave, asked where he could be found, the common \"ie~ in 
Natal was: 'in no man's land standing on a rock.' Hart was, however, a cultured soldier who 
implemented prewar theories on close-order and control. Brother ofRC Hart, father of Hart-
Synott the Manchurian MA. 
Lt Gen RC Hart VC, psc, com RE 1881, Director Mil Education India 1889-1896, Bde 
Comd India 1896-1901, succeeded Hamilton as bde comd Tirah, a great theoretical student of 
war but constantly outmanoeuvred by the Afridis.5 Comdt SME 1902-1905, GOC Thames and 
Medway Defences 1905-6, GOC and CinC SA 1907-9, 1912-
Lt Col J Haughton com 24th Foot 1871, transferred IA 1876, Russian interpreter, served as 
SC Int Division WO 1890-1, CO 36 Sikhs Tirah. KIA 1898 at Shinkamar in the aftennath of 
Tirah.' Had not seen active service previously. 
Maj Gen J Headlam com RA 1883, lnstr School Gunnery 1892-1897, DAAG RA South 
Africa 1900-1902, Asst Director Arty ArmyHQ 1903-1904, AQMG HQ India 1904-1906. 
Staff officer then DSD and DMT India 1908-1913,CRA 5 Div 1913-1915. Highly criticised 
for his command of artillery at Le Cateau, regarded as opponent of Indirect Fire.6 Maj Gen RA 
1915-1916; historian of the RA. 
Ma; Gen GM Heath, DSO, psc, com REs 1882, DAAG SA 1901-2, Instr SME 1902-6, GSO 
1 India 1910-11, BGS SA 1912-
Col GFR Henderson com York &Lancasters 1878, Instructor RMC 1890-92 and Camberley 
1892-1899. Toured US Civil War battlefields when stationed at Bermuda. Noted by 
Brackenbury and Wolseley, correspondent of Roberts, wrote for The Times, Director 
Intelligence South Africa 1900, evacuated sick after Paardeberg, involved drafting IT J 902 
and CT 1902. First historian BROHSA. Died 1903. 
Ma; Gen HP Hickman com RA 1875, many technical and gunnery instructor's posts. Wrote 
a quasi-official pamphlet on howitzer training in 1900. Served South Africa 1901-2. President 
ofa siege committee formed in September 1914 to prepare for besieging the Gennan 
Rhineland fortresses. 
Maj Gen W Hill com 39th Foot 1866, transferred Bengal Staff Corps 1869, AAG Musketry 
India 1895-1900, served Afghan War 1878-80, NE Frontier, comd Kurram Mobile Colm 
during Tirah. 
Gen HJT Hilyard psc, served RN 1859-1864, com 15 th Foot 1864, later transferred, BM 
Gibraltar 1878-1882, DAA &QMG Egypt 1882, DAAG Army HQ 1883-89, AAG Aldershot 
1889-1891, AAG Army HQ 1891-1893, Commandant Camberley 1893-1898, Bde Comd 
Aldershot 1898-1899, Bde Commander SAFF 1899-1900, Divisional Commander South 
Africa 1900, Lt Gen comd Natal 1900-01, Acting GOC 2 Corps 1900-1901, Director Mil 
Education and Training 1903-1904, GOC South Africa 1904-1905 
Col TH Holdich com REs 1862, Chief Surveyor TEF 1897-8, served Abyssinia and other NE 
and NW Frontier Expeditions. 
Col JM Home psc com RA 1886, transferred to IA 1889, Int Staff India 1904-5, Manchuria 
{Russians 1904), DAAG Aldershot 1904-9, GSO 1 1914-16, AA&QMG 1916-
Geo A Hunter DSO, com R Lancs 1874, served Egypt and Sudan 1884-1899, major general 
India 1899, COS SAFF 1899 but besieged in Ladysmith, Divisional Commander South Africa 
1900-1, GOC Scotland 1901-3, Lt Gen and GOC Southern Anny India 1903-8, Governor 
Gibraltar 1910-13. 
L.t Geo AG Hunter-Weston DSO, psc, com REs 1884, DAAG Cavalry Division South 
Africa and to Lt Gen South Africa 1900-01, mobile colm comd 1901, various stafTposts 
s NAM 7908-62-1 p 216. 
6 Maj Oen Bailey in W Murray& RH Sinnreich The Past as Prologue (Cambridge 2006). p 193. 
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1904-14, comd infbde 1914-15, division and corps commander Gallipoli then France 
nicknamed 'Hunter-Bunter,' viewed as a 'dud.' ' 
Lt Gen HD Hutchinson com 77th Foot 1867, transferred IA 1869 served with GR. Served 
Chitra11895. Director of Mil Education India 1896-1901, sent to Tirah by White as observer 
and acted as Times correspondent. DSD WO 1904-1907. 
Lt Gen ETH Hutton psc, com 60th Rifles 1867, served under Hawley, Zulu War, 1st Boer 
War and Egypt 1882, Sudan 1884-5, MI expert and trained MI at Aldershot 1888-92, 
commanded New South Wales 1893-6, Canada 1898-9, South Africa 1900. Commanded 
Australia 1902-4, Maj Gen Admin E Command 1905-6; served briefly as divisional 
commander 1914-15 
L James Reuters journalist who covered Tirah, South Africa and the Russo-Japanese War, 
assistant editor THWSA, later TF unit CO. 
Lt Col WH James psc, late RE author, crammer, tutored WS Churchill and JFC Fuller, 
lecturer and writer on military subjects. 
Gen T Kelly-Kenny psc, com 2nd Foot 1858, served China 1860, Abyssinia 1867-8, GOC 6 
Division South Africa 1899-1901, fought Dreifontein, AG 1901- 1904. 
Brig Gen FJ Kempster DSO, ADC, com 100th Foot 1875, possibly a protege of Roberts, 
served Ashanti 1895-6 and made ADC to Queen, AAG Madras 1897, Divisional Commander 
not dismissed post-Tirah, but given a damning rating. A contemporary Indian Anny saying 
was: 'Well I'll be Kempstered!' Bde Comd 1914-18. 
Lt Gen Kiggell psc, com R Warks 1882, Instr RMC 1895-97, DAAG Instr SE Dist 1897-99 
DAAG & AAG South Africa 1899-1902, GSO 2 DS Camberley 1904-1906, GSO 1 WO 
1907-9, DSD 1909-13, Commandant Camberley 1913-1914, DMT 1914, Director Home 
Defence 1914-1915, Asst to CIGS Nov-Dec 1915, COS BEF 1915-18, GOC Guernsey 1918-
Lt Gen FW Kitchener psc, com 14th Foot 1876, served Mghanistan under Roberts, DAAG 
Instruction Bengal 1891-6, Special Service Sudan 1896-9, CO 2 W Yorks South Africa 1899-
1900 then Bde Comd Natal, Div Comd India 1902-07. Brother of: 
FM nn Kitchener qs com REs 1871, having visited Franco-Prussian War unofficially. 
Served Egypt 1886-1899, COS to Roberts 1899-1900, CinC South Africa 1900-1902, CinC 
India 1902-1909. Agent General Egypt 1911-14, Secretary of State War 1914-16. Probably the 
most inept tactician to have ever attained a British Field Marshal's baton,7 KIA 1916. 
Nicknamed K of Chaos. 
Maj Gen Kitson psc com 1st Foot 1875, transferred to KRRC 1876, Comdt RMC Kingston 
Canada 1896-1900 and revived it, MA Washington 1900-1902, Commandant RMC 1902-
1907, Bde Comd India 1907-1909, QMG India 1909-1912, GOC Division 1912-1914. 
Lt Gen H de B de Lisle DSO, psc, com DLI 1883, trainer of polo teams, unique in having 
piloted the DLI to win the India polo championship to the Cavalry's chagrin. MI and Colm 
Comd South Africa 1900-1902. Transferred to the Cavalry 1906. GSO 1 2 Division 1910-1, 
Comd 4 Cavalry Bde 1911,2 Cavalry Bde 1911-14, division and corps comd 1914-18. 
Geo WSA Lockhart com IA 1858, served Abyssinia, NW Frontier, attached Dutch Army 
Achin various dates 1875-8, served Second Afghan War, Upper Burma, Comd Punjab Field 
Force 1890-5, Comd TEF 1897-8, CinC India 1898-1900. 
Col CJ Long com RA 1870, served Afghanistan comd Egyptian Artillery 1897-1898; CRA 
Natal 1899 and WIA Colenso; very much criticised for his handling of artillery at Colenso. 
Also blamed for the armoured train fiasco which saw Churchill captured. Contrary to popular 
myth, Long's guns neutralised the Boer positions at Colenso without undue casualties before 
firing ofT their ammunition. The surviving gun crews were marched ofT the gunline. Returns 
show that the casualties were not excessive.s Afterwards served on Lines of Communication. 
7WR4. 
• HedPs 'Relief of Ladysmith Folder' 'Extract Staff Diary' P 2. 
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Gen G Luck com 15
th 
Foot 1858, transferred to 6 Dgns 1861, IGC India 1887-1893 IGC 
1893-98; fonnidable drillmaster of Cavalry, but seen by the critical as no better than'a 
superior RSM. Luck, however, was more than a martinet, and to advance to doctrine, drill is 
probably a necessary foundation. 
FM NG Lyttelton com Rifle Bde 1865, served Egypt 1882, Bde Comd Omdunnan 1898 and 
Aldershot 1899, Brigade then Divisional Commander South Africa 1899-1902, CinC South 
Africa 1902-1904, CGS 1904-1908, viewed as ineffective see DNB, CinC Ireland 1908-1912. 
Brig Gen JHA Macdonald: Volunteer officer, comd Forth Infantry Bde, Commandant MVC. 
correspondent ofWolseley, author On Tactics. 
Maj Gen N Malcolm DSO, psc, com A&SH 1889. Swinton's predecessor on British Official 
History o/the Russo-Japanese War. Edited Henderson's The Science o/War. DS Quetta and 
Camberley 1912-1914, GSO 2,1, BGS and MGS 1914-18. Chief of Staff to Gough and had a 
bad reputation for acerbic comments. 
Maj Gen GH Marshall com RA 1861, CRA Artillery Aldershot 1897-9, chiefRA officer 
South Africa 1899-1901, strongly criticised by Roberts after South Africa, Comd RA I Corps 
1902-4. 
Brig Gen AR Martin com from Militia 1874 to 13 th Foot, then IA 1877,5 GR, served 2nd 
Afghan War, 5 NW Frontier expeditions, AAG 2 Division Tirah and given Brevet Colonelcy.9 
DAG India 1899-1901, Assistant Military Secretary for IA at WO 1901-. 
Lt Col J Masters DSO, psc served 4 GR NW Frontier 1930s. Chindit brigade BM then 
commander 1944, GSO 1 Indian Division Burma 1944-5, DS Camberley 1946- . Retired and 
became author in US. 
Lt Col FN Maude, psc, late RE author, member The Organisation Society, active at the 
RUSI, influenced JFC Fuller. Served with volunteers 
Maj Gen FB Maurice psc, com Derbyshires 1892, DS Camberley 1913 GS02 and GSO 1 3 
Division BEF 1914-15, selected to head Operations Division GHQ BEF by Robertson 1915, 
DMO 1916-8. Sacked following his criticisms of Lloyd George 1918, later military journalist 
and professor Military Studies University of London. Son of: 
Maj Gen JF Maurice psc, com RA 1861, winner of Wellington prize essay 1872, served 
Ashanti, South Africa, Egypt 1882 and Sudan, instructor Camberley 1885-1892, member of 
the Wolseley Ring. Owned The USM from early 1890s until post-1900, involved National 
Efficiency Movement post-South Africa. Editor BROHWSA. 
Gen FI Maxse qs, com R Fusiliers 1882, transferred to Coldstream Guards 1891, served 
Sudan and South Africa, Comd 1 Bde 1910-1914, later Division, Corps Commander and IG 
Training BEF 1918, later GOC Northern Command; brother of Leo Maxse owner of The 
National Review. Patron of Liddell-Hart. See Bibliography. 
Mai Gen ES May psc 10 com RA 1875, Instr RMA 1885-95, served with RHA, DS 
Camberley 1901-03, GSOI Mil Educationffraining WO 1903-07, Staff Irish Comd 1907-11, 
Bde Comd India 1913. Div Comd India during 1914-18. See Bibliography. 
Lt Gen GF McMunn DSO, psc, qs, com RA 1888, APM South Africa 1900, GSO 2 Army 
HQ India 1910-12, Deputy Asst Director & Asst Director Remounts WO 1912-15, IG Comms 
1916-, later an official historian of the Palestine Campaign. 
FM Lord Methuen com Scots Guards 1864, saw Franco-Prussian War, served Ashanti under 
Evelyn Wood, nominated to Camberley but did not attend. MA Berlin 1878-1880. Served 
Egypt 1882. Served Bechuanaland 1884-5 as CO improvised unit but saw no combat. Did 
some work at Camberley under Maurice 1886. 1888 DAAG South Africa and served 
Rhodesia. GOC Home District 1892-1897 and much involved with Volunteers. Volunteered 
Tirah 1897 and saw several actions serving as censor. Divisional commander SAFF 1899-
9 Brevet Tirah Mil Dept Despatch 19/1899 on UMIL 3/1091 
10 QAL Oct 1913 not shown as psc but qualified in light of serving as a DS at Camberley. ~ 
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1900. Fought Belmont, Graspan, Modder River, Magersfontein, following which he was 
nearly sacked. Continued to serve in South Africa until 1902. Wounde<L defeated and 
captured at Tweebosch 1902. GOC 4 Corps 1904-5, GOCinC Eastern Command 1905-1908 
GOCinC SAI908-1912, Governor Natal 1910-12 Governor Malta 1915-19. ' 
Lt Gen HSG Miles psc, com 101 st Foot 1869, garrison instructor Aldershot 1881-87, 
DA&QMG Aldershot 1887-8, DA&QMG HQ Army 1893-98, AAG Aldershot 1898-9. 
Known irreverently as 'Miles the soldier' at Camberley, a pun on the Latin and his lack of war 
service. Commandant Camberley 1898-99, AAG Corps South Africa 1899, ChiefStafT 
Officer Buller Natal 1900. Sending the Commandant of the Staff College on operations as an 
AAG suggests that Camberley was not respected. Returned to Camberley 1900-1903, Maj 
Oen South Africa 1903-1904, Director of Recruiting and Organisation 1904-1908, QMG 
1908-. 
Lt T Miller Maguire Barrister, military crammer, military lecturer, though he had difficulties 
sticking to his subject, author see Bibliography. Volunteer officer. Well regarded by some 
soldiers. 
Lt Col AF Mockler-Ferryman com 1876, 43rd Foot 1877, editor OXLIC, friend of Verner 
and did Peninsular Battlefield tour with him. Served RMC 1892-1900. 
Gen CC Monro psc: com R West Surreys 1879, Camberley 1889-90, served Malakand and 
Tirah. BM Gibraltar 1898-9 DAAG 6 Div 1899-1900, Chief Instructor Hythe 1901, 
Commandant Hythe 1902-. Commander 13 Infantry Bde 1907, 1912 GOC 2 London Div, 
GOC 2 Div 1914, GOC 1 Corps 1914, temporary Army Comd 3 Army 1915. CinC 
Mediterranean 1915-16, GOC 1 Army 1916. CinC India 1916-1920. 
FM AA Montgomery-(Massingberd) psc com RA 1891, student at Camberley 1905-6, later 
DS Quetta and Camberley. Served under Rawlinson for most of war as a staff officer rising to 
MGS. CIGS 1933-36. 
FM Nicholson qs com RE 1865, Mil Secretary CinC India 1890-1892, Member Roberts Ring, 
COS TEF 1897-1898, AG India 1898-1899, Military Secretary to Roberts South Africa 1899-
1900, Director Transport South Africa 1900, Director Mobilisation and Intelligence Army HQ 
1901-1904, removed after Esher Co. Senior MA Manchuria 1904-1905, QMG 1905-1908, 
CGS/CIGS 1908-1912. Nicholson did not get on with Ian Hamilton in Manchuria despite the 
fact that both had been members of the Roberts Ring. 
Maj SL Norris RE, com RE 1878, served Egypt 1882. 
Lt Gen LW Parsons: comm RA 1870. CO brigade division Natal 1899, acting CRA Natal 
1900 and controlled artillery at Pieters. Commandant Salisbury Plain Gunnery Camp 1902-3, 
IGRA India 1903-1906, Div Comd Ireland 1906-1909. 
Maj Gen TD Pilcher psc, com 22 Foot 1879, early advocate of Indirect Fire, DAAG Dublin 
1895-1897, West African Field Force 1897-9, Special Service South Africa 1899-1900, MI 
and column comd 1900-1902 South Africa, Bde Comd Aldershot Corps 1904-1907, Bde 
Comd India 1907-1911, Div Comd India Jan 1911. Divisional Commander 1914-18 
Brig Gen FH Plowden com 43rd Foot 1872, CO OXLI Tirah, WIA, Comd Bde Attock Mans 
1900, i i no active service pre-1897. Brigade Comd India 1902- . 
Lt Col A W A Pollock: com Somerset LI from Militia 1875, served South Africa 1878-9, 
SUdan 1885, Times Correspondent South Africa 1899-1900, author and contributor to military 
journals. Recalled to instruct at RMC during South African War, Editor USM 1901, Bde 
Commander 1914-18. 
Col TC Porter com 6 Dgns 1872, Cav Bde Comd South Africa 1900-01. 
FM US Rawlinson psc com KRRC 1884, transferred to Coldstream Gds 1892, BM Aldershot 
1895-8, served Sudan staff 1898, DAAG and AAG South Africa 1899-1902, AAG Directorate 
Mil Education 1903, Commandant Camberley 1903-1906, toured Manchuria and Japan, comd 
1\ UMIU17/5/1807 'Report on the Attock Manoeuvres Feb 1900' p 12. 
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2 Bde Aldershot 1907-9 GOC 3 Division 1910-1914, divisional, comd corps 1914-5 and 
Army Commander 1915-1918, Representative Supreme Allied Council 1918, Anny Comd 
1918-19, later CinC India. Protegee of Roberts. 
D Reitz: son of the Transvaal Attorney-General. Fought against the British until 1902 then 
~ent int~ ~xile. Returned and entered South African politics as an associate of Smuts.' Fought 
m the Bnttsh Army 1914-18 latterly as CO 1 RSF. Prominent in South African politics post-
1918. Later High Commissioner in London. 
LtCol CaC Repington 12 psc: com Rifle Brigade 1878, served Afghanistan 1879, Burma, Int 
Div under Brackenbury, Sudan 1898, MA Belgium and Holland, DAAG South Africa, retired 
from the Army following a scandal, Military Correspondent The Times until 1918, involved 
with THWSA, he aided Amery select the writers of the specialist monographs in Part II of 
Volume VI,13 later wrote for Morning Post then Daily Telegraph. Inveterate enemy of Henry 
Wilson. See Bibliography. 
Maj Gen M Rimington com 6 Dgns 1881, comd Rimington's Tigers, irregular scouts, 1899-
1900, Colm Comd 1901-2, Comd Irish Cavalry Brigade 1903-1907, supporter of the lance, 14 
Bde Comd India 1907-1911, IGC India 1911-1914. Divisional commander 1914-16, Comd 
Reserve Centre 1916-18. 
FM FS Roberts VC, com Bengal Artillery 1851, later Bengal Horse Artillery, served Mutiny, 
served QMG Staff India 1859, served NW Frontier, transferred to RA 1861, commanded 
Kurram Column 1878, captured Kabul 1879, relieved Kandahar 1880, served South Africa 
1881, CinC Madras 1881-1885, CinC India 1885-1893, CinC Ireland 1895-1899, CinC South 
Africa 1899-1900, CinC 1900-1904. Later served on the CID. 'England's only other soldier.' 
FM W Robertson DSO, psc, 10 years soldier service, comm 3 Dgns 1891, IA Int 1892-1896, 
DSO Chitral1895, Int ArmyHQ 1899-1900, DAAG Roberts' HQ South Africa 1900, Army 
HQ Int 1901-1907, AQMG Aldershot 1907, BGS Aldershot 1907-1910, Commandant 
Camberley 1910-1913, DMT 1913-1914, QMG BEF 1914-15, later COS BEF, then CIGS 
1916-8. 
Brig Gen EH Rodwell psc, com 70th Foot 1878, transferred IA 1880, served 1 st Punjabis, 
DAAG Instr India 1897-1901, GSO 1 Army HQ India, Bde Comd 1910-, served NWF 1878-
9,1881, 1894-5. See Bibliography. 
Maj Gen CRoss DSO, psc, com R Norfolks from Militia 1884, Div sigs offr SA 1900, 
DAAG Int SA 1900-02, RMC 1904-8, GSO 2 Camberley 1908-14 
Maj LJ Shadwell psc, com from Militia to East Surreys then Suffolks 1882, DAAG 
Instruction India 1895-1902, PM and special correspondent in Tirah. See Bibliography 
Geo Smith-Dorrien DSO, psc, com 95th Foot 1876, served Zulu War, Sudan 1885-6 and 
1898, Tirah where he commanded several raids, CO unit and Bde Comd South Africa 1899-
1901, AG India 1901-1903, Divisional Commander India 1903-1907, Commander Aldershot 
1907-1912, CinC Southern Command 1912-1914, GOC 2 Corps 1914. Comd 2 Anny BEF 
1914-15, fell out with French, sacked 1915, Robertson broke the news to him thus: 'you're for 
'orne 'Orace.' Later CinC East Africa. 
Maj Gen ED Swinton DSO, com RE 1888, instructor SME 1896-9, served South Africa 
1899-1902 as adjutant and then CO engineer unit, edited British Official History Russo-
Japanese War. Secretary of the Wood Co on REs 1906. Member The Organisation Society.ls 
Later official correspondent 1914-5, involved with tank development and CID. 
Mal Gen AW Thorneycroft com 21 st Foot from Militia 1879, then RS Fusiliers, ~e 20 
stone, Army racquets champion, machinegun enthusiast. DAAG Natal 1899, then ~s~ ~d 
commanded Thorneycroft's MI. He spent some £ 1200 equipping this unit, presentmg It WIth 
11 Often referred to by his previous surname of A Court. 
13 Ed LS Amery THWSA VI (1909), pp vi, viii. 
14 WO 3216782 Rimington Memorandum 'The Anns of the Cavalry.' 
IS 'I1Ie Organisation Society Constitution and Rules p 12. 
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2 machineguns. Appointed to command on Spion Kop at Buller's suggestion. Commanded 
mobile colm and later a group of colms 1900-02. AAG 7 Division 1902-05, Brigade 
Commander 1905-09, Later a TF Divisional Commander 1911-
Maj Gen HF Thuillier com RE 1887, Bde Comd 1915-16, Special Appointment 1916-17, 
Ministry Munitions 1917-
Maj Gen J Vaughan, DSO, psc. Com 7th Hussars 1891. Did his staff college exam in polo 
kit, an event of such frequency that one suspects it was de rigeur for the cavalry bloods. 
Served in South Africa as a staff officer under French and then as a BM of a brigade. Fell out 
with Scobell in 1904 and resigned as his BM over the latter's inattention to detail and training. 
Commandant of Cavalry School 1911-14 and thus had the shadow post ofGSO 1 of the 
Cavalry Division. His perfonnance in 1914 has been severely criticised. Though it is possible 
to suggest that Vaughan's personal priority was pig-sticking, he was keen on training and 
competent staff officer who faced a hard task coordinating unruly brigadiers with inadequate 
communications. Promoted to command first a cavalry brigade 1914 and then a cavalry 
division. 
Col W Verner psc, com from Militia 1873 to 18th Foot, RB 1874, Editor RBC, DAAG Instr 
1885-1892, RMC Instr 1896-1899, DAAG Topography South Africa and SO under Methuen 
in South Africa 1899; invalided after his horse rolled on him after Graspan. Historian of the 
RB. Friend of Henderson and Mockler-Ferryman. Did several battlefield tours. 
Brig Gen B Vincent psc, com RA 1891, served South Africa BM, Observer Manchuria 
(Japan) 1904-5, transferred to 6 Dragoons 1908, DS Quetta 1910-11 but dismissed probably 
for health reasons, he suffered from 'gunner ear.' Later toured Manchuria with Barrow. 
Served as a senior staff officer 1914-18 and is unique in being praised by Fuller who served 
under him. Later Bde Comd. 
Col H Vincent MP and volunteer officer, prominent at RUSI. 
Col DR Ward com REs. 1882, Instr RMA 1897-1900, Instr SME Member of the Efficiency 
Movement. 
Gen C Warren attended Sandhurst and passed exam for Woolwich while there. Com REs 
1857, served Palestine, South Africa 1876-80, Bechuanaland 1884-1885, Sudan 1886, 
Commissioner Metropolitan Police 1886-88, criticised for his failure to arrest Jack the Ripper 
and for insisting on muzzling dogs. Commander Straits Settlements 1889-1894, fell out with 
the Governor, GOC Thames District 1895-1898, commanded division in 1895 Manoeuvres. 
GOC 5 Division SAFF 1899-1900, his force attacked Spion Kop, Military Governor North 
Cape 1900, held donnant commission to take over as CinC if Buller was incapacitated. Had a 
reputation for being difficult, allegedly put Churchill in arrest at Spion Kop, summarised in a 
contemporary jingle. 
Now Buller devised an unworkable plan, 
That he handed to Warren an obstinate man, 
Brig Gen WHH Waters psc, com RA 1875, SC Int WO 1891-93, MA Russia 1893-97, 
DAAG Int 1897-99, DAAG South Africa 1899-1900, MA Berlin 1900-1903, MA Manchuria 
with Russians 1904. Later commanded in China. See Bibliography. 
FM AP Wavell MC, psc: com BW 1900, served South Africa, att Russian Army and 
interpreter, involved with British Official History Manchuria. GSO 3 WO 1912- ~ 4, GSO 2 
HQ BEF 1914, WIA as BM 1915, Later commanded an experimental infanlI?' bn~ade, 
Division, Palestine, Southern Command, CinC Army Middle East, CinC india.. Viceroy. 
Fonnidable record as trainer of troops. 
FM GS White ve, com 27th Foot 1853, transferred to Gordons, served Afghanistan 1879, 
Won VC, member Roberts Ring, friend of Ian Hamilton, they were both Gordons, served 
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Egypt 1884-5, Bde Comd Bunna 1885-9, CinC India 1893-1898, QMG 1898-99, Comd Natal 
1899-1900, besieged Ladysmith, Governor Gibraltar 1900-1904. 
Lt Col CB (Holmes) Wilson16 com RA 1890, CO TF Field Artillery unit 1911-, served Natal 
1899-1900. Prolific if not particularly profound writer on artillery. 
FM BB Wilson DSO, psc, com from Militia to Rifle Bde 1884, Int Army HQ 1895-7, BM 
Aldershot 1897-1899, BM Lyttelton's Bde Natal 1899-1900, Staff Roberts' HQ 1900, HQ of 
Army 1901-2, DAAG then AAG Training DME and GSO 1 Directorate ofSD WO 1903-
1906, Commandant Camberley 1907-1910, DMO 1910-1914, Sub ChiefGS BEF 1914, GOC 
4 Corps, and several liaison posts, CIGS 1918-1922, MP 1922, assassinated. Developed links 
with Foch during his time at Camberley. Rival of Rawlinson, enemy of Repington, protegee of 
Roberts. Regarded as a politician and too slippery by half; involved in the Curragh Incident. 
HW Wilson; commentator and author on military and naval matters. 
FM GJ Wolseley com 12th Foot 1852, served Crimea, Mutiny, China, Canada and visited US 
Civil War, led Red River Expedition 1870, Ashanti 1873-4 where he formed the Ring, served 
South Africa 1875, Cyprus 1878-9, South Africa 1879, QMG 1880-82, AG 1882-1890, 
interrupted by service in Egypt 1882 and the Sudan 1884-5, Irish Command 1890-1895, CinC 
Army 1895-1900. Rival of Roberts, probably distrusted Buller from 1895 when the latter 
looked as ifhe would be the next CinCo 'England's only soldier.' 
FM HE Wood VC, psc, served in Crimea with RN, transferred to Army and com 13 Light 
Dragoons 1855, served Mutiny, Ashanti, called to the Bar 1874, served South Africa 1878-79, 
served 1 st Boer War, Egypt 1882, Sirdar Egyptian Army 1882-5, Commander Colchester then 
Aldershot 1886-93, QMG 1893-97, AG 1897-1901, Commander 2 Corps 1901-1904. See 
Bibliography. 
Maj Gen E Wood com REs 1864. CRE Malta 1894-99, CRE South Africa 1899-1902. 
Viewed as lacking ability by Roberts. 
16 Often referred to as Holmes-Wilson. 
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Glossary of Terms 
This t~esis contains a number of technical military terms; this Glossary explains the 
most Important. 
A: this describes either the AG's staffbranch which dealt with personnel matters or the 
issues themselves such as discipline, manning etc. Formally the A staff were established 
with the G or General Staff. 
Animalmastership: the care of beasts to ensure their military effectiveness. 
Appreciation: an estimate, based on logical analysis, of the best course of action in a 
given situation. Appreciations were introduced to the British Anny before 1914. I 
Artillery Superiority: there are two dimensions to be considered in assessing artillery 
superiority. The first is the absolute scale of attack in terms of weight of shells fired into 
a given area. For example had the British had one piece in South Africa and the Boers 
none, though their ratio of superiority relative to the Boer artillery would have been 
infinite, it would have been immaterial due to the country's vast area. This probably 
explains Lanchester's surprising claim that artillery was ineffective in South Africa due 
to the open terrain there. In fact open terrain favours long-range weapons as their fire 
and observation is unobstructed. Artillery is at a tactical disadvantage in jungle or urban 
warfare. The relationship between weight of attack and area is significant as it affects 
neutralisation and destruction of defences and defenders. Artillery in and just after this 
thesis' period was undergoing a profound switch. Until the introduction of Indirect Fire, 
artillery fired to hit. But when this was introduced the effect of weight of fire became 
more important as hitting a point target became much harder and therefore areas known 
or suspected to hold enemy increasingly became targets. This may explain Lanchester's 
comment. 2 The ratio between pieces on either side is important for CB where tactical 
conditions are equivalent. But, as Roberts emphasised when recommending dispersion 
of batteries, tactical conditions were changing.3 The introduction of smokeless 
ammunition made locating pieces even firing Direct hard. It is also possible to suggest 
that this ratio was becoming less important as Indirect Fire was adopted. Using the latter 
required skill, thus crude superiority was less important. However, in some situations it 
is possible to blanket areas with Indirect CB fire. 
Artillery Formation: an arrangement of small columns in a cheque red formation 
designed to reduce casualties from shrapnel by making ranging difficult, while ensuring 
that dispersal was maintained. It was introduced after 1905 and was probably inspired 
by MA reports from Manchuria. 
Attrition:4 the defeat of an enemy by firepower at primarily the tactical level. In 
attritionalland warfare combat tends to be more positional than in manoeuvre and is 
generally slower in tempo. Casualties over sustained periods of attrition are likely to be 
greater than in manoeuvre combat. The latter is not, however, cheap, when the forces are 
matched. But many manoeuvre battles there have been wide disparities of both skill and 
casualties between the victor and vanquished. In COMPASS and in SICHELSNITT, the 
winning side had substantial advantages in mobility, in command, in tactics and 
arguably in technology. In many manoeuvre battles the manoeuvre force has been 
I Maj Cadell 'On Writing an Appreciation of a Military Situation' PRAls XXXI (1904-5). However. 
though this is the fll'St guidance on writing them, they were probably taught at Camberley before. 
lFW Lanchester Aircraft in War (1916),pp 86-7. Jungle warfare, involving very close-range comba(, 
inhibits artillery, AFM I (1985), pp 89,94. Chapter 6 examines Lanchester's deductions on firldcraft. 
3 RPs 7101-23-124-3 F646 21/11/02; Chapter 4. 
4 EN Luttwak & S Koehl The Dictionary of Modern War (NY 1991). 
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inferior in overall numbers. S This was the case in both the operations cited. Numbers 
were more event in the latter but the Gennans were a monolithic force fighting a 
multilingual coalition, there was an element of practical numerical parity. 
Battle Procedure: a system whereby concurrent activity allows time to be used to best 
effect. A simple method is to let commanders move ahead of their units. This allows 
time for prior reconnaissance.6 One of the advantages of Double Companies was that 
their OCs were mounted and thus capable of reconnoitring ahead of the main body of 
their sub unit. The same argument was made for authorising machine gun officers to be 
mounted. 7 
British: this thesis uses British to represent all forces of the Empire. The exception is in 
Chapter 2 where distinguishing between British and Indian troops is important; here 
Imperial is used when a collective description is needed. This thesis follows the practice 
of many contemporaries from Australia, Canada, New Zealand etc. 
Carbine: a shorter ranged, lower velocity firearm with an inferior perfonnance to a 
rifle. Carbines were carried mainly by cavalry, thus putting them at a disadvantage to 
infantry when fighting dismounted. 
Converging Fire: tactically such fire is more likely to enfilade the target (T) and it 
concentrates the firepower of dispersed weapons. Longer-ranges made converging fire 
more effective. Return fire from T diverges and is thus disadvantageous. Spion Kop 
demonstrated converging fire's effectiveness. 
Figure 1 To Show Converging Fire 
C 
Fire converging from A,B C is more effective than T to ABC, this 
scatters and there is less chance of enfilade effect. 
Covering Fire: fire designed to cover friendly movement or other exposure. Covering 
fire is a basic tactical principle established in the period. It will not necessarily inflict 
casualties unless the enemy are forced to expose themselves ie by infantry advancing. 
Fire unsynchronised with movement wastes ammunition as the enemy quite simply 
ducks into their trenches and may prejudice surprise. This occurred in several battles in 
1899-1900. 'If not cover from fire, then cover by fire.'s 
CRE: the position of the CRE before and during South Africa was difficult. He was 
treated as purely a technical adviser. This made it harder for him to coordinate engineer 
operations with other activity. . 
Dead Ground: ground into which observation or aimed flat-trajectory fire IS 
impossible. 'Dead ground, live soldiers.,9 In Figure 7 ther~ is a considerable ~ea of 
dead ground at the foot of the kopje. But artillery can fire mto dead ground usmg 
Indirect Fire providing its trajectories permit. 
S Brig Playfair The Mediterranean and Middle East I (1954). pp 362-3. 
6 Lt Col Bethell Modern Guns and Gunnery (1907), P 176. 
, Chapter 4. ., . 
• Tactical maxims Lt Col. later General W Walker Bunna 1944 Cited m A Child at . .frms 
'Ibid. 
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D~libe~a~e Method: the use of ground and cover by artillery to reach a gun position 
With mlmmUtn exposure and with less emphasis on speed than in the Direct. The former 
method gained importance in South Africa as detecting guns firing smokeless 
ammunition, even when using Direct Fire, was hard. Pre-l 899 the RA put great 
emphasis on dashing movement into action, sacrificing concealment for speed using the 
Direct Method. 10 
Depth: in attack depth of formation facilitates manoeuvre as problems of controlling 
movement in a linear formation, illustrated at Outflanking below, are avoided. A 
shallow formation, A-B, is more or less committed when meeting the enemy at C-D. A 
deeper .formation, E-F, at worst is likely to only have troops at E pinned down, leaving 
the main body, F, free to manoeuvre. Theoretically F's columnar formation may 
facilitate this. If troops at E can take fire positions along A-B their fire may pin the 
enemy and prevent them reacting to outflanking moves to G or H. In defence depth 
allows the defender time to react and enables him to surprise the attackers who 
encounter troops whose existence ground based-reconnaissance has been unable to 
detect. 
F 
Figure 2. To show depth in manoeuvre. 
Destruction: far more artillery ammunition is necessary to destroy rather than to 
neutralise defenders and defences. Typically heavier weapons are needed if destruction 
is to be effected speedily. 11 Weeks of fire may destroy defences but the ensuing 
devastation hinders movement and creates many craters which serve as excellent 
improvised emplacements. Destruction demands HE ammunition which is less 
effectively delivered by guns than it is by howitzers 
Detached Duties: patrols, pickets, outposts, scouting, reconnaissance and similar 
tactical tasks which, by virtue of their widely dispersed nature, demanded subordinate 
initiative. In shock action cavalry were concentrated and less initiative was needed. 12 
Direct Fire: the layer can see the target through his weapon sight. Till after South 
Africa most guns were designed for Direct Fire by virtue of their relatively flat 
trajectories and fixed ammunition which was predominantly shrapnel in the major 
European armies. Traditional tactics massed guns firing over open sights in long lines 
to obtain concentration of fire by the firing pieces' physical proximity. Theoretically C
3 
may be easier, but passing orders down a line of weapons which are firing and probably 
10 FAD 1896 P 15 defines the Deliberate and Direct methods. 
II VDPs 69n4/1 The Supply of Jtfunitions to the Army. letter 20/12114 Smith Donien/von Oonop. 
12 Brig Gen Rimington RCWSA Evidence II Qs 12729-30. 
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under attack themselves is challenging. There is also the question of target indication to 
every individual gunlayer. When targets are at greater ranges, target indication is hard 
when firing Direct. Firing Indirect the target is simply a bearing and elevation. thus 
physically designating the target to individual gunlayers is unnecessary. 
Director: an instrument designed to provide angles of fire to artillery pieces firing 
Indirect. 
Double Company: until just before 1914, British battalions were divided into 8 small 
rifle companies, usually commanded by a captain. This was argued to have benefits in 
small wars by ensuring that there were many sub units and thus increasing tactical 
articulation. The drawback was that their commanders were relatively junior and in 
peacetime their OCs' initiative was restricted. Furthermore in Britain company strengths 
were so small, sometimes as little as 20-30 men, that realistic training was impossible in 
peacetime. By doubling the size of the company this disadvantage was partly 
overcome.
I3 As the double company commanders were somewhat more senior, usually 
majors, they were more likely to be allowed initiative. Another advantage was that the 
career pattern was improved and the gap between becoming a company commander and 
CO was less. Organisationally the companies were stronger with a 2ic, CSM and 
CQMS. Furthermore command was eased as the CO had only to deal with 4 and not 8 
oes. Double company organisation facilitated battle procedure. Double companies were 
adopted in the Indian Army first, but they were often used in training in Britain from 
1902. 
Drift: South African for a ford. Usually drifts formed bottlenecks for vehicles as their 
approaches were often steep and narrow. This made it necessary for engineers to start 
work on them as soon as possible. 14 
Enfilade: the tactical maxim is: 'enfilade fire from defilade positions.' 15 In the Figure 3 
A is defiladed from D. This maximises protection from enemy covering fire. In turn A 
enfilades enemy troops at B-C. It is particularly effective when machineguns are used as 
their cone of fire may cover right down the line B-C. 
Fipre 3 To Illustrate Enfilade 
+D 
d A=> B c 
A weapon at A enfilades troops lined Be. When a machine gun is 
used casualties will be substantial. Most effective is when A is 
defiladed from supporting troops for example at 0 who cannot give 
covering fire. 
Longer ranged weapons increases the effect as there are more positions from which 
defences can be enfiladed. 16 
Extension: either the distance between elements of a force or troops or the act of 
deploying, typically from marching to fighting formations. Generally armies manoeuvre 
in column and fight in line. The transition is critical, as premature deployment causes 
delay, while late deployment is lethal. In tactical extension between individuals hard. and 
fast rules are impossible to prescribe definitively. Generally a more ext~nded forma~lOn 
allows ground to be used for cover more effectively than a close formatIOn. But at ~ght 
or in very dense cover the latter may be necessary and in some cases a close fo~a~lon 
may enable ground to be used more effectively. Generally when a close formation IS 
13 RCWSA Report (1903),p S6 outlines the organisational benefits and describes.the RA's system. 
14 Maj Gen Maurice BROHSA (1906), Glossary for all South African topographical words. 
IS WO 1 (RSM) J Davey ISllOnO. 
16 Maj Gen Swinton The Defence of Duffers Drift (Debra Dun nd), pp 40-1 . 
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used, subordinates have no need to decide how best to use ground and little initiative. It 
is a perennial feature of poorly trained troops that they find difficulty in fighting in 
extended formations. This is true of New Army units on the Somme, German students 
in the Kindermord or Russian conscripts in Manchuria in 1904-5 or in 1941. 
False Front: a deployment of troops in a position forward of the main defensive line 
designed to deceive the enemy and make him waste time and ammunition in assaulting a 
position from which the defender has withdrawn. The overall effect is similar to putting 
one's foot on a non-existent step. Smokeless ammunition naturally made using false 
fronts easier. 
Field: a term used to distinguish between weapons used in field combat and those 
deployed in siege warfare. 
Field Artillery: a generic term for artillery that usually supported Infantry or Cavalry ie 
the RHA and RFA. The 4.7",5" and 60 Pounder Gun batteries were heavy artillery 
manned by the RGA, generally used for formation tasks. Horse artillery, the RHA or 
RF A are referred to specifically when the distinction is important. 
Fielderaft: the use of ground, extension, cover and concealment for protection and 
surprise to enable unscathed movement or fire. Fieldcraft blends into low-level tactics. 
Smokeless ammunition made fieldcraft much easier. It is important to note that 
movement makes objects significantly easier to detect. When static objects are exposed 
at a distance frequently they cannot be detected. The general effect of smokeless 
ammunition and long ranges was to aid the defence and to increase the importance of 
initiative. 
Field Firing: this involves the combination of fieldcraft and shooting in a simple 
tactical setting. Such field firing takes place on a range representing real country, or 
even in countryside cleared specially for firing. This is unlike less advanced shooting 
which uses a gallery or equivalent range. 
Figure of Merit: an average, usually applied to annual range firing. Because the Figure 
of Merit was published Army-wide and performance reflected on the unit, artificialities 
were encouraged. This particularly applied to shooting. 
Fire and Manoeuvre: the close integration of fire and movement to execute a plan. 
Firing over Cover: as Figure 4 shows, firing over cover (A) is far more visible than 
firing round it as in (B). The firer is also better protected. Similarly anyone standing on a 
skyline is far more exposed. 
B 
Figure 4 Firing round or over cover. In A the firer's head and. s.h~~lders are silhouetted 
over the top of cover. In B there is more protection and less vISlblIaty. 
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~ixed Amm~nitio~: used of ~illery, this consists of projectile and propellant fixed 
Into a metalltc cartndge case like a small arms round. Fixed ammunition, combined \\ith 
QF weapons, resulted in faster firing. There was, however, a drawback the trajectory 
co~ld not be ~justed by a~tering ~he power of the propellant charge. The only way to 
adjust the trajectory was via the piece's elevation. In consequence it was much more 
difficult to engage defiladed targets, a prime requirement of Indirect Fire, with fixed 
ammunition-frring pieces. 
FJat-Trajectory Fire: on the whole the higher the muzzle velocity the flatter the 
trajectory and the greater the range. As can be seen from Figure 11 many targets are best 
engaged by flat trajectory fire and the flatter the fire the less important estimating the 
correct range is. But due to accidents of ground etc, flat trajectory fire is rarely useful 
over extended distances. 17 Newtonian physics suggests that as muzzle velocities rise 
calibres and projectile weights tend to drop if recoil is to be minimised. This is true of 
small arms, but artillery which can minimise recoil, is not so constrained. For the 
tactical effects see Plunging Fire. 
Forage: logistically forage is inconvenient compared to petrol. It is bulky, and bulk is 
often a more critical logistic dimension than weight. It decays, suffers from exposure to 
water, vermin eat it and it has a lower calorific value. Handling forage is often 
inconvenient. A realistic horse ration is some 12-22 lbs per day. It can be seen from 
Table 42 that far more forage was imported into South Africa than artillery ammunition. 
One of the great advantages of oxen in South Africa was that they could live by grazing 
and thus did not require forage to be carried for them. But they moved slowly in 
consequence. 
Formation: the physical deployment of troops in a tactical formation on the ground. 
Secondly a brigade, division, corps or army formed of units and sub-units of more than 
one branch of the Army. Military theory emphasises that formations should not be 
unnecessarily disrupted. For French and German Infantry divisions in 1914, organised in 
two brigades, this meant that to generate a formation reserve, either a complete brigade 
had to be allocated, wasting combat power as 50% of the division was thus committed 
or a brigade had to be split. Reliance on an over-large formation means either that these 
have to be divided, straining C3, as occurred in South Africa with the Army Corps, or 
that routes are choked. This happened in Tirah due to the use of divisions. Similarly it is 
necessary to ensure that formations have the right proportion of arms within them. A 
weakness of the British Infantry division before 1899 was that it had only one artillery 
unit to support 2 brigades of Infantry. This meant that if both brigades were to be 
supported the gunner unit had to be broken down impairing its performance. Similarly 
howitzer brigade divisions were broken down in South Africa and Hamilton-Gordon's 
battery was split at times. This impaired effectiveness as there were insufficient 
signallers, while unit commanders and BCs were unable to provide the specialist advice 
to ensure howitzers' effectiveness. 
Frontal and Flanking Attack: in general flanking are preferable to frontal attacks for 
the reasons advanced under Manoeuvre below. But the movement needed to reach a 
flanking position means delay. Furthermore there comes a point at which even most 
flanking attacks become frontal as the enemy retains his ability to switch troops on 
internal lines. There is also the very real need to break through an enemy line of defence 
to allow for subsequent outflanking and exploitation. The Army's greater stress o~ 
frontal assault after Manchuria may paradoxically have benefited manoeuvre as With 
greater emphasis on frontal attacks when an outflanking force encounters resistance an 
17 DOAE Engagement Ranges Western Europe (West Byfleet nd) states that in Western Furope in only 
5% of terrain is it possible to see over 4000 metres. 
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immediate frontal attack maintains momentum and tempo better than further 
outflanking. 
Figure 5. Breakthrough and Exploitation. 
Frontier: for this thesis there is only one Frontier, the NW. 
G: this describes the G or General Staff Branch, concerned with operations. Though the 
G Branch was superior and coordinated that activities of A and Q in practical terms: 'G 
proposes, Q disposes.' Ultimately operations depend on logistics. 
Gun: a flat-trajectory, high-velocity artillery piece, optimised for shrapnel, long-range 
or Direct Fire. However, many use the term incorrectly as a generic description for all 
artillery weapons. When the generic term is required this thesis uses piece, rather than 
the anachronistic 'barrel' or the ugly 'tube.' As can be see in Figure 6 below, when the 
arrival of an HE round is at a relatively shallow angle (A), typical of guns, many 
splinters go harmlessly into the air or earth and this is on the assumption, invalid till the 
development of sensitive fuzing, that detonation is at impact. IS HE is more effective at 
(8), but such angles are more typical of mortar and howitzer trajectories. 19 
A 
Figure 6 Gun angle of impact (A) and Howitzer (B); B is exaggerated but makes the 
point.2o Fire in Case B is more likely to inflict casualties as the splinters are better 
distributed. 
Heavy: this thesis uses heavy in relation to artillery piec~s in the sam~ way.that . 
contemporaries writing during the period of this thesis dId .. Heavy artiller: In the ~nod 
encompassed everything greater than field artillery. There IS a shade of dIfference In 
II KJW Goad and DHJ Halsey Ammunition (Oxford 1982). pp 34-5. 
"'& F· .t; 19 Col Lee Introduction to Battlefield Weapons Systems and Technology (1985). pp 61-_ Igun: • 
suggests that the steeper the descent trajectory the better the fragment distribution. 
20 Goad and Halsey Ammunition pp 29.36. 
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heavy fieldguns. Contemporaries saw these as implying guns firing shells of 25 lbs 
weight. There was debate after South Africa when some gunners argued that the 18 
Pounder had sacrificed firepower for mobility. 21 
Holding .Attack: an attack designed to hold the enemy in position or prevent him taking 
other actIon. Generally troops would not make a final assault and the aim was not to 
suffer undue casualties. 
Howitzer: a lower velocity weapon with a more curved trajectory than a gun and thus 
more suited to Indirect Fire and searching into cover or dead ground. Typically its 
elevation is much greater and it is designed to engage targets behind cover, see Figure,7 
unlike guns. Howitzers are more suited to firing HE shells as the steeper angle of 
descent maximises the shells' efficiency?2 Howitzers used variable charges unlike many 
guns in the period, which used fixed ammunition, and therefore were better suited to 
Indirect Fire. But not all high-trajectory fire is Indirect. 
Human Factors: initiative, morale and discipline and the like. 
Independent Cavalry: a cavalry formation, in Britain usually of divisional strength, 
deployed on independent missions directly under the CinCo Normally this involved 
operational-level reconnaissance. They were termed Independent as they necessarily 
enjoyed a very wide degree of initiative. 
Indirect Fire: the gunlayer cannot see his target and is directed by an FOO or uses 
predicted data. This latter was unusual in the period. The adoption of Indirect Fire by 
artillery in the period was one of the most significant tactical changes between 1899-
1914. Initially it was slower and less effective at destroying point targets than Direct 
Fire. It has an excellent neutralising effect largely because it is distributed over an area 
due to inaccuracies. Due to its area coverage and artillery's relatively heavy 
ammunition, it is logistically demanding. As Figure 7 illustrates, it needs more elaborate 
C3 than Direct Fire. As with so many tactical issues the argument is not which is best 
but which is most effective in the given circumstances. Knocking out a single 
machinegun firing from an emplacement is probably best dealt with by a rifle grenade or 
tank: firing Direct, neutralising an area by artillery firing Indirect. The former might take 
5 rounds to secure a hit, the latter will take far more as the projectiles are subject to far 
greater atmospheric and other influences on their more curved trajectory, while longer 
range fire means that propellant and firing inconsistencies are magnified and thus the 
SSKP is far less. 23 As technology had developed the advantages of each type of fire 
have altered; today with projectile terminal guidance Indirect Fire is capable of 
destroying point targets. Pieces firing Indirect remain less vulnerable to CB and are less 
constrained by enemy action than those firing Direct. In the thesis' period Indirect-firing 
artillery was largely immune to CB. Target indication is much easier when firing 
Indirect as it is simply a range and bearing. Firing Direct targets have to be individually 
pointed out to all gunlayers. But it should not be automatically assumed that firing with 
a curved rather than a flat trajectory is automatically Indirect Fire. Some weapons, 
typically light mortars, may find high-trajectory fire more effective than flat, even 
though the target is in sight of the No 1. 
21 Brig Oen Wolfe-Murray 'Do we require Field Artillery?'PRAI XXIX (1902-3). 
12 The Royal Artillery Commemoration Book (1950). P 40. 
2l 1W Ryan Guns, RocJcets and Mortars (Oxford 1982). pp t 8-20. 
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Figure 7 Indirect Fire 
A howitzer at A can engage a target, B, firing Indirect due to 
• ife 
curved trajectory while a gun at A would be incapable unless C 
lower . 
B 
An FOO would be needed in the area of D to observe 
Internal Discipline: based on factors internal to the soldier, eg morale, regimental 
feeling, patriotism, cohesion with comrades and so on. It contrasts with External ie 
discipline imposed by the chain of command. 24 ' 
Jawan: the IA designation for an Indian soldier. Used generically it includes Ghurkhas. 
Kop or Kopje: South African for a hill, often isolated and rising steeply from the veldt. 
This meant that defenders found it difficult to engage troops at the base. Kopje is the 
diminutive. 
Krantz: South African for a cliff. 
Laager: a camp or bivouac. The term has entered British Army terminology from the 1 sl 
South African War. 
Leapfrog: a static unit covers the movement of another which advances beyond it. The 
concept also involves a change in artillery tactics which saw batteries moving 
alternately. This enabled fire to be kept up continuously. Previously the RA had 
emphasised that batteries should move together to present massed targets against enemy 
Direct Fire CB. 
A .. ... 
/ 
Figure 8. Leapfrogging. Unit A moves to C covered by fire from B. 
Y: used as a generic term for Light Infantry or Rifle units and specifically for units such 
as the KOYLI. 
Light Company: these were companies in non-LI infantry units trained as skirmishers. 
The other specialist company were grenadiers. This organisation was at its height in the 
Napoleonic era. By 1897 Light Companies not longer existed in the British or Indian 
Armies. 
Linearity: this is used in Chapter 5 in two senses. Firstly it is used to express the 
mathematical idea that firepower is capable of achieving effects proportionate to inputs. 
Secondly the idea that attritional, firepower intense battles tend to ~ ge~graphically 
linear in nature.2S There is a connection between the two senses of lmeanty as can be 
deduced from Figures 9 and 9a below. In 9 a fire engagement will result in prolonged 
24 M Janowitz The ProfesSional Soldier (Glencoe 1964), Chapter 3. 
lS M van Creveld. KS Brower & S Canby Air Power and Manuel/t'r Warfare (Honolulu 2(02), P Q 
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attrition until the result is ground out. In 9a manoeuvre allows fire to enfilade the enemy 
and to concentrate strength against weakness. Here the value of the manoeuvre force' s . 
fire is considerably increased. However, it is much harder to quantify the psychological 
effects on enemy commanders and soldiers. Manoeuvre may overwhelm weak 
commanders psychologically, or dynamically overload inefficient C3 systems. This is 
clearly far less easy to represent mathematically. 
Magazine: usually a boxlike structure typically mounted underneath the Lee-Metford 
and Enfield rifles, capable of holding a number of rounds, typically 10. The magazine 
meant that rounds did not have to be individually loaded in crises. This substantially 
increased firepower. Later in the Lee-Enfield, the magazine could be loaded with a clip 
holding a number of rounds further increasing the rate of fire. The Boer Mauser was a 
cliploading magazine rifle and could be reloaded faster than the Lee-Metford. 
Manoeuvre: the purposeful exploitation of mobility to implement a commander's plan 
for defeating the enemy. Manoeuvre allows concentration against weakness. At the 
tactical level it may make fire much more effective. Flanking or reverse fire from 
positions gained by manoeuvre has considerable surprise value. Manoeuvre tends to 
stress time more than positional warfare and because in the period before widespread 
RT, signal communications were imperfect, it put a premium on subordinate initiative to 
speed tempo. Inevitably manoeuvre stresses ground-based reconnaissance more than 
positional warfare.26 In the latter, the period 1915-18 forms an example, there is such a 
density of troops, that apart from patrolling in no man's land there is little opportunity 
for ground-based reconnaissance. Manoeuvre generally is over considerable distances. 
Examples are Marlborough's advance to the Danube in 1704, SICHELSCNITT, 
COMP ASS, the Allied breakout from Normandy or the Soviet attack on Manchuria in 
1945. This has implications for logistics as a manoeuvre which runs out of gas in mid-
stream is doomed. Here examples run from the Ardennes in 1944 to the Japanese attack 
on Imphal. Patton summed up the problem well: 'my troops can eat their belts but my 
tanks have got to have gas.' Slim's attack on Deir es Zor is instructive. Manoeuvre 
poses tougher challenges for logistics than attrition despite the latter's scale.27 In 
attrition there is greater ability to tailor combat to logistic reality. In operational level 
manoeuvre in the period of this thesis the most significant subordinate command level 
was probably the divisional. Divisions were at about the level where responsiveness and 
the ability to coordinate were balanced. Corps-based resources were too far back and the 
distance from the point of contact meant delay. But in firepower-heavy attrition the need 
to coordinate a heavy weight of fire focused on the corps level; this was the experience 
of firepower intense attrition between 1915-18. 
26 Col Henderson Art of Reconnaissance (1907). p 1. Henderson tied his empha~is to ~n~u\"Te battles. 
The argument can however be proved from basic principles: two forces locked m attntlonal combat do 
not have the space available for ground reconnaissance. . . 
27 FM Slim Unofficial History (1959). pp 155-163. Slim's account of the mterplay oftllTlC. ~n~~\Te and 
logistics suggests the problems which logistics pose to man~uvre; Col Shaw SUPP~\' In Moei( rn If arfar," 
(1938), pp 54-5: DMO (1996). p C-I0. 
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Figure 9. Frontal Fire. Fire from A-B to C-D and the reverse is likel t ul' 
gradual . . .. y 0 res t m attritIon over a long penod as neIther side has a sigm' ficant advantag d fire . frontal. e an IS 
~~~----.---~--~--~ ! 1 
13 
cC 3 ~------------------Figure 9a. Manoeuvre to enhance Fire. 
A:"'--'--jr-----r--1 -'--1 --'---1 ----'1 B 
[,--I __ _ 
C 
Manoeuvre to E enfilades C-D and makes fire far more effective. There is also the effect 
of surprise and that troops assaulting from A-B or E can be given covering fire for 
longer. 
March Discipline: a system of common low-level procedures eg fixed halt times, 
closed-up columns and standard gaps between bodies which maximise mobility. 
MI: Infantry mounted or carried to increase their mobility. Pre-l 899 MI undertook no 
mounted combat. MI could also be carried in carts and on MT and borne by camels. 
British commentators pre-l 899 were adamant that MI were distinctive to the British 
Empire. Professor Holmes has justly pointed out that Cossacks and French colonial 
forces contained equivalents; the British saw Cossacks as cavalry, while they felt that 
British MI were unique as they would be used in major warfare and were regular 
Infantrymen. Whether contemporary British commentators were correct or not is 
immaterial, but they certainly thought they were. British instructions emphasised that MI 
soldiers were to be high quality, and MI theorists eg Hutton saw them as a corps d'elite. 
Mutual Support: used of defensive positions sited so that no position can be attacked 
without the assailants being fired at from another position. In attack covering fire 
between sub units or units may represent mutual support. 
Figure 10. An enemy advancing on Position A from B is enfiladed by fire from Position 
C. In attack troops advancing on B from A can be covered by fire from C. Similarly 
troops advancing from C to D can be supported from A. Using intermediate positions 
the troops advancing from A and C can offer each other mutual support. 
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Nek: South African for a pass or low ground between hills. 
Neutralisation: the use offire either to prevent enemy activity, or describing the 
endstate so achieved. Neutralisation is likely to be for a specified period eg to cover 
other t~oops moving and is less logistically demanding than destruction. Typically to 
neutralIse an enemy platoon position for 5 minutes might require a battery firing at rate 
3 to cover an infantry assault. The total weight of ammunition is as follows: 
6 guns firing 3 rounds per minute for 5 minutes= 6x 3x5 = 90 rounds or 90x 25 Ibs 
or about a ton (it should be noted that an allowance must be made for packaging 
and cartridge cases). To destroy the same target a medium battery, using Soviet 
norms would have to fire 670 rounds of much heavier ammunition or 670x 120 
lbs= some 32 tons.28 The time taken would be considerably longer. Due to the fact 
that heavier rounds are used and that these take far more effort to shift on the gun 
position; the rate will probably be 2 rpg per minute at best. This assumes that such 
weapons had recoil mechanisms. Destruction will therefore take: 600/(6x2)= 50 
minutes. But a straight arithmetical calculation that equivalent destruction to 
medium artillery fire can be made by firing the same weight of ammunition from 
fieldguns is incorrect. Such ammunition contains less explosive than medium 
artillery's shells, and though fired at a higher muzzle velocity, this flatter 
trajectory fire is less effective at delivering HE. 
Normal Formation: a standard template formation of troops in which ground and threat 
are less emphasised than regularity and control by superiors. 
Operational: capable troops or serviceable equipment. Alternatively warlike activity or 
describing the intermediate level of war between tactics and strategy. The latter was not 
a term recognised by contemporaries, but, like M Jourdan's prose, existed. 
Order of March: the location of combat and administrative units in a logical sequence 
speeds reactions and enhances administrative efficiency. It is sensible to start cavalry ofT 
first as their pace is not checked by following slower-moving infantry. Tactically it 
usually makes sense to station most artillery well up in the order of movement as their 
long-range fire early in an engagement covers the remainder's deployment and pins the 
enemy in position. Sappers well forward are able to undertake tasks in time to ease the 
movement of the main body. Logistical transport moves logically behind fighting 
troops as with primitive routes wheeled vehicles are more likely to cause delays. \\'hen 
combat is anticipated ammunition and ambulances should lead the transport columns. 
when it is not, ration wagons are needed first so that troops can be fed as soon as 
possible after marching. 
21 C Bellamy Red God of War (1986), P 182. 
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Organisation: the organisation of units and fonnations has considerable effect on their 
potential for combat and mobility. Over-many subordinate HQs complicate command.29 
As troops usually move in column, overlarge fonnations may cause delay as their 
extended columns take more time to pass a point. Another important aspect of 
organi~ation.is the ~pr~priate ~ouping ofanns and services. For example organising a 
formatIon wttho~~ bnd.gmg equipment would severe!y impede mobility, particularly in 
Western Europe. ArtIllery has great firepower but Its columns are long and its 
ammunition usage is insatiable. Ovennuch artillery therefore impedes manoeuvre. 
Mobility also depends on sappers. A land-based fonnation without or with few sappers 
would have deeply impaired mobility. The influence of traffic is another factor affecting 
mobility. As a key dimension is the ratio between routes and vehicle numbers, this 
suggests that larger forces are more likely to have their mobility impaired. A significant 
organisational flaw before 1899 was that the Infantry Division only had one artillery unit 
to support two brigades. This meant that there were too few guns for effective support, 
but it also meant that the unit had to be divided ifboth brigades were to be supported. 
Brigade divisions were not designed to be divided; they were the accepted tactical unit. 
Furthermore their division meant that they were comparative strangers to the units they 
were supporting.31 
Overhead Fire: fire which is directly above friendly troops. By its very nature such fire 
is likely to be high trajectory, due to safety requirements, and is possibly Indirect. 
Contemporary field guns were poor at providing such fire due to their flat-trajectories. 
The use of overhead fire before 1897 was very unusual. 
Outflanking and Extension: a widely extended line has geometrically greater 
capability to outflank. 
Enemy Position Enemy Position 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. (5 paces extension) ........................................ (10 paces). 
Against this must be balanced the fact that the further extended the line the greater the 
difficulty of command and manoeuvre and the less depth for the same number of men. 
Picket: a group deployed for the protection of a camp on the Frontier or convoy. During 
Tirah the system changed with pickets pushed further out to counter modem rifles' 
longer ranges. 
Pointing: a sword designed to kill with the point rather than a cutting weapon or hybrid. 
The pointing British cavalry sword, introduced after South Africa was seen as an 
excellent weapon. 
Pom Pom: a transitional weapon produced by Vickers of37 mm calibre. It was 
basically an up-scaled machinegun, firing a small explosive shell. Originally fielded by 
the Boers, the British deployed them to counter the Boer weapons. The porn porn was 
QF. It proved useful in South Africa's open terrain, but it had neither the range nor ~e 
firepower of gun, yet needed almost as many crewmen and was not much more mobile. 
29 As suggested by the Anny's brief experimental use of task forces in the 1 ~70s and BuUer's failure to 
form his mounted troops in a division in 1899. The former eliminated the bngade le\'el of command was 
found to be unworkable as the span of command was too wide. ., . 
)0 / (BR) Corps Te"ain Study (nd) suggests that there is on average an obstacle tha~ needs bndgmg e\er 
10 kilometres traveUed in NW Europe with larger ones 50 kilometres apart. Even m the ~esert bndgmg IS 
needed as the 8da Army found at Mareth, Brig ISO Playfair and Brig CJ Molony The Medllt'rranean ami 
Middle East IV (1966), pp 339-40. 
31 Brig Bidwell Gunners at War (1970). p 167 for the organisational and psychological benefits of !>Iable 
formations. Hilyard makes a similar point. cited in Chapter 3. 
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It was disliked by senior gunners and was later passed to the CaV'31~, wh . 
&'. d l' . . QU], ere It was 
10un to comp Icate trammg. Porn poms were eventually used as AA wea ns' 191 t 
PI ' F' th gh . . po In ... ~ngmg Ire: ou ~SltlOns on hilltops may be tactically advantageous, flat 
trajectory fire fro~ ~em IS wasted against targets on level ground. Consequently hills 
are often ~oor POSItIOns for small arms whose flat-trajectory fire is far more effective 
wh~n dehvered over level ground. Initial assaults on Boer positions sited on top of 
kOPJes were consequently protected while the defenders furnished a good target for 
artillery. 32 
Figure 11. To Show Plunging Fire 
C D 
Fire from B is dangerous all along the line BC and 
beyond to D. From A only C is at risk. 
QE: the French 75mm was the first true QF fieldgun. A recoil system meant that the 
carriage was motionless only the barrel recoiling. The guncrew was spared the task of 
repositioning the weapon and relaying was much simplified. The crew was not forced to 
move away from the piece when it was fired. This meant that the rate of fire could be 
more rapid. As only the barrel instead of the whole piece recoiled, this meant that some 
of the guncrew could use the shield's protection. QFs fired fixed ammunition in the 
period raising the rate of fire, though this limited trajectories and the resulting ability to 
search into cover.33 The Army's next fieldgun, the 25 Pounder, had a variable charge 
system. 
Regimental Transport System: this was based on each unit being supplied with its 
own dedicated unit transport to move combat supplies.34 The problem which Roberts 
felt was an argument not to adopt it in South Africa was that units on static tasks still in 
theory kept their transport. This meant that the transport bill was bigger than with a 
more centralised system. 
Reverse Slope: in Figure 11 troops at E are on the reverse slope to enemy at D and are 
shielded from Direct and observed Indirect Fire. Enemy artillery may be unable to shell 
E due to problems of crest clearance. Their fire will also be undirected and is thus 
unlikely to inflict serious casualties. 
Royal Artillery: the Royal Regiment of Artillery poses terminological problems. 
Though a regiment, it was not an arm that was regimentally based, ie one in which 
soldiers served in one or two linked units for their entire career. Gunners, particularly 
officers were transferred between units and sometimes between branches; an officer 
might start in a field battery and then serve in a fortress and then transfer to mountain 
artillery. By virtue of the RA's size, the fact that officers were enlisted from the more 
educated entrants and because of the RA' s central institutions the average gunner was 
more exposed to Army-wide forces and encouraged to develop a more professional and 
general outlook. The RA, particularly in its field and mounted branches delegated more 
32 WS Churchill From London to Ladysmith (1900). pp 317-8. See Chapter 3 for the early battles when 
hilltop Boer positions favoured British attacks by providing approaches in dead ground. 
n QF development and technology is summarised by JW Ryan Guns, Rockets and .Morr~Ts (Oxford 
1982). pp 4-6. Its Figure 5 on p 18 illustrates the effects of different charges on trajectories 
)4 Col Richardson With the [ASC] in South Africa (1903). pp 83-4, 105-6 suggests the Reg,"~cntal 
System's problems there. Richardson was a senior ASC officer who had served in South Africa-
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freely to juniors. In the period the RA's field branches were very centred on baneries.3S 
~e ~ was the most pr~stigi?us of the 3 RA branches, and it is perhaps more than 
cOlncldental that many seruor FITst World War gunners were RHA, despite the fact that 
the war was very much a heavy artillery war. 
Sangar: a rais~d de.fensive structure usually of rough stones and adopted by the British 
from the Frontler tnbes. The term has entered into British Army terminology for a raised 
defensive structure. 
Shelter Trench: a shallow protective scrape. It can be seen that, due to its length and 
shallowness, it was very vulnerable to shrapnel fue.36 The spoil heap at the front was 
prominent. 
Figure 12. A Shelter Trench. Shrapnel searches into long shallow defences easily. 
Shikar: stalking for usually big game, a shikari is either the hunter or his professional 
guide. Big game shooting was a popular officer recreation and officers saw it as giving 
excellent training in fieldcraft and marksmanship. 
Shrapnel: an AP munition, which projected shrapnel balls forward using the parent 
projectile's residual velocity and a small burster charge designed to open the shell but 
not propel the shrapnel balls.37 High velocities and flat trajectories increased shrapnel's 
efficiency at targets in the open and on flat ground. It is thus best suited for flat-
trajectory fire. As it is an airburst munition with wide area coverage, shrapnel is more 
effective than groundburst HE, see Figure 6, at exposed targets in the open and for 
neutralising men in cover. Shrapnel was usually detonated by a time fuze but could be 
set to initiate on impact and had a limited effect on structures. Considerable skill was 
required to burst shrapnel at the optimum height. In contrast HE fragmentation and 
fuzing were very inefficient till well into the First World War. Even modem 
groundburst HE sends 50% of its splinters into the ground or skywards.38 
3' Bidwell Gunners. Chapter 3. 
361DB 1896 Plate XVI. 
37 Goad and Halsey Ammunition p 137 shows a diagram of a shrapnel shell. 
31 Brig Bidwell Gunners at War (1970). p 24. 
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F~gur~ 13. ~o show shrapnel's effectiveness on open ground. A narrow, deep trench 
will give a high degree of cover against frontal shrapnel fire if the defenders are not 
forced to expose themselves, eg by infantry assaulting. Shrapnel will however neutralise 
entrenched defenders even though it does not inflict casualties by pinning them down. 
Skirmishing: low-level fire and manoeuvre requiring individual initiative, independent 
fire and fieldcraft. Plowden's definition in Chapter 2 encompasses its elements. 
Small-bore: the thesis uses this term as it was used in about 1900 to differentiate 
between the generation of rifles comprising the .450 MH and the .577 Snider and the 
current .303 and .276 generation of weapons. 
Smokeless Ammunition; the new propellant such as Cordite were not entirely 
smokeless, but, as can be contrasted between Plates I and II of Noble's work, it is much 
less visible than black powder.39 They were more energetic and this meant that 
trajectories were flatter, thus increasing Direct Fire hit-probabilities. They left less 
fouling in the barrel and less smoke on firing. Typically they produced 70% gas and 
30% solid residue, gunpowder produces 35% and 65% respectively.4o Both enabled 
rates of fire to increase. The more energetic propellants and higher velocities meant that 
ammunition could be lighter so more could be carried. 
Span of Command: correct organisations make command and staffwork easier. A 
commander will find it easier to deal with 4 rather than 8 subordinates, a point made for 
double companies. Secondly it is easier for a superior HQ to deal with a division rather 
than individual brigades. Forming brigades into divisions also means that the resulting 
formation is better able to tackle higher-level tasks than individual brigades as there is a 
senior commander immediately at hand to coordinate action.41 For example had GHQ 
tried to command cavalry brigades directly, as WEs 1898 implied, this would probably 
have meant the freedom of the brigades would have been limited as GHQ tried to 
maintain control with primitive communications. 
Squadron System: the British instituted the Squadron System in the 1890s. Previously 
there was no squadron-level in cavalry. It should in theory have promoted 
decentralisation and initiative by increasing the power of squadron leaders at the 
expense of COs. In practice many regiments implemented the system poorly. 
Staff Duties: the standardised vocabulary, formats, abbreviations etc which enable 
staffwork to be clear and concise. 
39 A Noble Artillery and Explosives (1906), pp 523-4. 
40 WW Greener The Gun (1910), P 560. . 
41 Here the lack of coordination between western Gennan annies in 1914 suggests the pomt. Moltke "3.. .. 
acting as the western theatre commander and effectively as supreme commander. 
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Staffwork: the procedures and products which enable the staff to coordinate and 
synchronise military activity. Examples include Operational orders or movement 
graphics developed in the period. 
SteUenbosch: the South'African equivalent oflimoger. Like Limoges it was a town 
remote from combat where the incompetent or simply unlucky could do little damage. 
Swingletree: a term used of hippophile RA, usually RHA officers who had no interest 
aft of the swingletree, the point at which the piece is attached to the limber. S\\ingletree 
gunners' tactical ethos was based on simple dashing tactics. Indirect Fire which was 
slow and scientific was anathema to them. Bidwell cites a distinguished gunner who 
advised his son that, with the advent of elementary mathematics, the RA was no longer 
the profession for a gentleman.42 
Tactics: the conduct of combat; Clausewitz's comments on potential combats should be 
noted. 
Tempo: a relative time advantage over the enemy, produced by a combination ofC3. 
movement and so on.43 
Traversing: By zigzagging trenches, enfilade is prevented in A. In B all troops are 
vulnerable to fire searching down the trench. Though traversing had long been employed 
in siege warfare, it was not a usual feature of Infantry trenches until South Africa. 
R 
Figure 14. Traversing. 
Two-Sided Exercises: these have an enemy force with a wide degree of freedom and 
are therefore better at promoting initiative than when the enemy is rigidly controlled. 
But such exercises may not bring out those lessons that commanders want to instil. 
Unit: A regiment of cavalry, battalion of Infantry or brigade division of artillery us~ly 
commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Batteries, companies and squadrons were sub uruts. 
Veld or Veldt: the high rolling plateau covering large parts of South Africa. 
Intervisibilty is much greater than in Western Europe. Many regiments adopted the 
veldtshoen as their officers' formal shoe after South Africa. 
Wall Battering: the target area diminishes as the projectile's angle of impact . 
approaches the vertical (E), while more horizontal fire (B) tolerates greater m.argms. of 
error in ranging. Furthermore the correct target is the base of the waIl as gravity asSists 
the undercutting effect of the shells. Even shells landing short of the .wall at. (F) may 
ricochet and detonate effectively thus increasing the margin of error m rangmg. 
42 Bidwell Gunners p 16. 
43 DMO (1996), pp 4-24-5. 
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Figure 15. Battering a wall. 
Wing System: Indian infantry units were formally organised into half battalion wings. 
This naturally reduced the span of command to either the CO controlling 2 wings or the 
CO and 2ic each controlling one each. Control was eased at the expense of combat 
power. Rejection of wings effectively delegated initiative from 2 wing to 4 double 
company commanders. This improved the career structure. Though wings were not 
formally instituted in the British Army there are frequent references to half-battalion 
deployments or even to wings themselves. 
Glossary of Operation Titles 
Operation COMPASS. Wavell and O'Connor's offensive against the Italians in 1940-1. 
Made with few resources against a numerically far superior enemy it led to the Italians' 
crushing defeat. 
Operation DESERT STORM. The Coalition's liberation of Kuwait in 1991. 
Operation GERICHT. The German attack on Verdun in 1916, probably intended to 
inflict attrition on the French Army. 
Operation SICHELSCHNITT. The German attack on France, Belgium and Holland in 
1940. Dr Todman points out that SICHELSCHNITT was not an official designation. 
This author feels that the title was used reasonably contemporaneously to describe the 
German operational plan and has retained it in this thesis for convenience. The question 
of whether the title should be capitalised has been referred to the SD team at the JSSC. 
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Abbreviations 
J 2 RLI J 2'h Royal Lancers Journal 
95 I'm Ninety Five 
AA Army Annual 
AAG Assistant AG 
AC Army Code 
ADM Admiralty (NA reference) 
ADP Army Doctrine Publication 
AFM Army Field Manual 
AFPs Arnold Foster Papers (BL) 
AG Adjutant General 
AHQ Army HQ (usually used of India) 
AIR (NA reference) 
ALArmyList 
AMS Aldershot Military Society 
ANG Army &Navy Gazette 
AOArmy Order 
AOD Army Ordnance Department 
AP Anti-Personnel 
APs Allenby Papers (LHCMA) 
AQ Army Quarterly 
AR Army Review 
ARDPs Ardagh Papers (NA) 
ARS Army Records Society 
ARSG Annual Report of the School of Gunnery 
ASC Army Service Corps 
ASCJIQ ASC Journal lQuarterly 
AT A Army Temperance Association 
A VD Army Veterinary Department 
BA Broad Arrow 
BalPs Balfour Papers (BL) 
BaPs Barton Papers (NAM) 
BAR The British Army Review 
BC Battery Commander 
BDD British Defence Doctrine 
BePs Beynon Papers (IOL) 
BEF British Expeditionary Force 
BGS Brigadier GS 
BHG Black Horse Gazette 
BIHR Bulletin o/the Institutefor Historical 
Research 
BL British Library or Breech Loading 
BM Brigade Major 
BMGO Brigade Machinegun Officer 
BORs Reports of British Officers (RJ War) 
BPs Birdwood Papers (NAM) 
BPPs Baden Powell Papers (NAM) 
BROHRJW British Official History of the Russo-
Japanese War 
BROHSA British Official History South Africa 
BRPs Brooke Papers (LHCMA) 
BSPs Burnett-Stuart Papers. (LHCMA) 
BULPs Buller Papers (NAlDRO) 
B WM Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 
cJI Command, Control, Communications and 
Intelligence (and pennutations) 
CA Cape Archive 
CAB Cabinet (NA reference) 
CB Counter BatterylBombardment 
Cd Command (published by Command) 
CDB Cavalry Drillbook 
CE Chief Engineer 
CGS Chief of the GS 
CHM CornhiIl Magazine 
CI Chief Instructor 
cm Committee of Imperial Defence 
CIGS Chief of the Imperial GS 
CISOCS 'Considerations Influencing the Selection 
of Officers for Command and the Staff (EPs) 
CIY City Imperial Volunteer/s 
CJ Cavalry Journal 
CM Court-martial 
CO Commanding Officer 
COLPs Coles Papers (IOL) 
COS Chief of Staff 
COSCM Chief of Staff Circular Memorandum 
CPs Capper Papers (LHCMA) 
CRA Commander RA 
CRE Commander RE 
CR The Contemporary Review 
CRMPs Crum Papers (NLS) 
CT Cavalry Training 
CT Cape Town 
CTrg Combined Training 
CUP Cambridge University Press 
D Deputy 
DALISCMBs Diaries and Lectures of the Officers of 
the Indian Staff College Visiting the Manchurian 
Battlefields in 1907 
DF ANAMW Deductions from accounts of night 
attacks during the Manchurian War 
DGDT Director( ate) General Doctrine and Training 
DLPs De Lisle Papers 
DME Directorate of Military Education 
DMO Director/ate Military Operations 
DMO Design for Military Operations 
D(M)MI Director/ate (Mobilisation and) Military 
Intelligence 
DMT Director/ate Military Training 
DOAE Defence Operational Analysis Establishment 
DPs Denning Papers (NAM) 
DPS Director/ate of Personnel Services 
DS Directing Staff 
DSD Director/ate Staff Duties 
EDPs Edmonds Papers (LHCMA) 
EDR Edinburgh Review 
EPs Ellison Papers (NAM) 
ER Empire Review 
ESHPs Esher Papers (Churchill College) 
ESTS East of Scotland Tactical Society 
FAT Field Artillery Training 
FePs Ferrier Papers (IOL) 
FM Field Marshal 
FO Foreign Office (NA reference) 
FOM Figure of Merit 
FOO Forward Observation Officer 
fps feet per second 
FSPB Field Sen'ice Pocket BooA: 
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FSM Field Service Manual 
FSRs Field Service Regulations 
FR Fortnightly Review 
GAR General Annual Report 
GEOHSA German Official History SA 
GHG Green Howards Gazette 
GOC General Officer Commanding 
GO General Order 
GOI Government of India 
G&P Gale and Polden 
GR Gurkha Rifles 
GS General Staff 
GSW Gunshot Wound 
GSO GS Officer I 
HamPs Hamilton Papers (LHCMA) 
HBM Household Brigade Magazine 
HCM Household Cavalry Musewn 
HOP Haldane Papers (NLS) 
HOTS Home District Tactical Society 
HEWPs Wilson Papers (LHCMA) 
HE High Explosive 
HedPs Headlam Papers (RAI) 
HOPs Hamilton-Gordon Papers (RAJ) 
HLIC Highland LI Chronicle 
HMSO Herl His) Majesty's Stationary Office 
HOWPs Howell Papers (LHCMA) 
HPs Haig Papers (NLS) 
HRJ Hampshire Regimental Journal 
HuPs Hutton Papers (BL) 
HWPs Hunter Weston Papers (NAM) 
IA Indian Army 
IAR Indian Artillery Report 
IGC Inspector General of Cavalry 
IDB Infantry Drill Book 
10 Inspector General 
IGF IG of the Forces 
IGHF IG Home Forces 
IGOF IG Overseas Forces 
IHR Institute of Historical Research 
IME Instructions in Military Engineering 
IPs Isacke Papers (LHCMA) 
10L India Office Library 
lOR India Office Records 
IT Infantry Training 
IWM Imperial War Musewn 
JCH Journal of Contemporary History 
JHR Journal of the Hampshire Regiment 
JLR Journal of the Leinster Regiment 
JMH Journal of Military History 
JModH Journal of Modern History 
IPs Jourdain Papers (NAM) 
JRAI Journal of the RAI 
JRUSI Journal of the RUSI 
JUSII Journal of the United Services Institute of 
India 
JUSCA Journal of the US Cavalry Association 
KCL King's College London 
KRs King's Regulations 
I Graded usually 1-3 for capts to It eols. 
KRRCC King's Royal Rifle Corps Chronicle 
LAD Light Aid Detachment 
LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives 
l1MIL lOR File Reference 
LV A Late Victorian Army 
MA Military Attache 
MA Military Affairs 
Map 1 etc (see Index p) 
MAT Memorandum on Army Training 
ME Military Engineering 
MePs Methuen Papers (Wiltshire Record Office) 
MFF Malakand Field Force 
MGO Master General of the Ordnance 
MI Mounted Infantry 
MIT Mounted Infantry Training 
MM Macmillan 's Magazine 
MME Manual of Military Engineering 
MOFB Military Operations France and Belgium 
MPs Maconchy Papers (NAM) 
MMPs Montgomery-Massingberd Papers LHCMA 
MR Monthly Review 
MR Mounted Rifles 
MRs Musketry Regulations 
MSI Military Society of Ireland 
MT Military Training:!! Motor or Mechanical 
Transport 
MTS Manchester Tactical Society 
MUP Manchester University Press 
MURPs Murray Papers (IWM) 
MVC Motor Volunteer Corps 
MW Mountain Warfare 
MXP Maxse Papers (IWM) 
NA National Archives 
NAA Navy and Army 
NAM National Army Museum 
NavRev Naval Review 
NCO Non Commissioned Officer 
nd not dated 
ND National Defence 
NHL Naval Historical Library 
NLS National Library of Scotland 
np no publisher 
NWF North West Frontier 
NR National Review 
NY New York 
OB Ordnance Board 
OCFW Oxford Conference on the Future of War 
OPs Ormsby Papers (IOL) 
ORC Orange River Colony 
OUP Oxford University Press 
OXLIC Oxfordshire LI Chronicle 
PC Prince Consort's (Library) 
PFF Punjab Field Force 
PI Punjab Infantry 
PP Parsons Papers (RAJ) 
PPCREs ProfesSional Papers o/Ihe Corps o/RB 
PRAI Proceedings ollhe RAI 
2 WO Branch 
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PRO Public Records Office (NA reference) 
psc passed staff college 
PT Physical Training 
Q Question,3 also QMG's staff branch concerned 
with logistics 
QF Quick Firerling 
QMA WC Queen Mary and Westfield College 
QMG Quartennaster General 
QOG Queen's Own Gazette 
QR The Quarterly Review 
qs qualified staff 
RA Royal Artillery 
RAC Royal Annoured Corps 
RAI RA Institute 
RAL RA Library 
RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps 
RASC Royal Army Service Corps 
RA VC Royal Army Veterinary Corps 
RBC Rifle Brigade Chronicle 
RCTI'EF Report on the Commissariat Transport 
A"angements of the Tirah Expeditionary Force 
RCWSA Royal Commission on the War in South 
Africa 
RE Royal Engineer( s) 
REJ Royal Engineers Journal 
REI RE Institute 
REL RE Library 
REOTEF Report on The Engineer Operations of 
the Tirah Expeditionary Force 
RF A Royal Field Artillery 
RFC Royal Flying Corps 
RGA Royal Garrison Artillery 
RHA Royal Horse Artillery 
RHS Royal Historical Society 
RLKAI Record of Lord Kitchener's Administration 
of the Army in India 1902-1909 
RM Royal Marines 
RMA Royal Military Academy (Woolwich), or 
Revolution in Military Affairs 
RMC Royal Military College (Sandhurst) 
RML Rifled Muzzle Loading 
RMMISAs Reports and Memoranda on Military 
and Inter Service Affairs (BalPs) 
ROBPs Robertson Papers (LHCMA) 
RPs Roberts Papers (NAM) 
RPrs Remount Proceedings 
RRCCTWSA Report of the Royal Commission ... 
upon the Care and Treatment of the Sick and 
Wounded during the South African Campaign 
RSM Regimental Sergeant Major. 
RSO Railway Staff Officer 
RT Radio Telephony 
RUSI Royal United Services Institute 
RWORC Report o/the War Office (Reconstitution) 
Committee 
S Section· 
3 Used when citing from the RCWSA and similar 
long reports. 
• Used when citing from British manuals. 
SA South Africa 
SAD South African Despatches 
SAFF SA Field Force 
SCSI Strategic and Combat Studies Institute 
SL Scottish Life 
SHPs Shea Papers (LHCMA) 
SIULRs Special Instructions for the Utili=ation of 
the Local Resources of a countn' ... 1911 
SKDs Spion Kop Despatches -
SLR Self Loading Rifle 
SM Scribner's Magazine 
SME School of Military Engineering 
SMLE Short Magazine Lee Enfield 
SNCO Senior NCO 
SO Standing Order or Staff Officer 
SP Spectator 
SR Saturday Review 
SRO Scottish Record Office 
SSKP Single Shot Kill Probability 
SSM Squadron Sergeant Major 
SUPP Supply (NA reference) 
SWPs Spencer Wilkinson Papers (LHCMA) 
TA The Antelope 
TE The Eagle 
TEF Tirah Expeditionary Force 
TEWT Tactical Exercise without Troops 
TF Territorial Force 
THWSA Times History o/the War in South Africa 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command (US) 
TVA Transvaal Archive 
USG United Service Gazette 
USM United Services Magazine 
VDPs von Donop Papers (JWM) 
VS Victorian Studies 
WE War Establishment (also an official work WEs) 
WO War OfficeS 
WOL WOList 
WPs White Papers (lOL) 
WR Web Reference6 
WT Wireless Telegraphy 
WYNPs Wynne Papers (NAM) 
19C The 19th Century (and After) 
S Usually a reference at the NA. 
6 These are listed, each citation has been given a 




Table 1 British Battalions serving in Tirah and South Africa 
Ser Unit served Tirah I Attended 1899 Attock Fought South AfricaJ 
Manoeuvres2 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 2 Derbyshires No Ist Bn4 
2 1 Devons Yes Yes 
3 2 Green Howards No 1st Bn ' 
4 1 West Surreys Yes 2nd Bn 
5 1 Gordons Coy 2na Bn Yes6+ 2na Bn 
6 1 Dorsets Yes 2nd Bn 
7 2 KOSB No 1st Bn 
8 1 Northants No 2nd Bn 
9 2 R Inniskillings Yes 1 st Bn +2na Bn 
10 20XLI N07 1 st Bn IS 
11 2 KOYLI No Yes 
12 1 DCLI No 2nd Bn lJ 
13 2 R Sussex Coy only Ist Bn lO 
14 1 SLI Yes 2nd Bn 
15 1 RSF (wing) No 2nd Bn 
Many Tirah veterans would have fought in South Africa, even if the unit listed in 
Column (b) did not, due to their mobilisation in the linked British-based battalion. A 
crude arithmetical calculation would suggest that with generally 7 years regular colour 
service some 117 of a unit's privates would pass to the reserve. 
Table 2. pscs South Africa mid-1900. 11 
Ser Post Total Pscs 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 CinCs 21z 0 
2 Divisional Commanders 13 3 
3 Brigadiers 32 11 
4 HQ Combatant Staff 32 24 
5 Divisions and Brigades Staffs .1 83 42 
1 Capt HF Walters Operations of the Tirah Expeditionary Force 1897-8 (Simla 1900). 
2 DPs 7810-106-40 '1899 Attock Report: 
3 J Stirling Our Regiments in South Africa /899-1902 (Edinburgh 1903). 
4 The CO was Smith-DorrieD, a Tirah veteran. 
S Both the CO and 2ie were Tirah veterans, GHG VII (1900), P 147. 
6600 Tirah veterans present in unit, RCWSA Evidence 0 (1903). Q 19557. 
7 Unit attended Dalhousie 1900 Manoeuvres; OXLI Chronicle (1900). pp 219-221. 









9 The One and All XI (1900), P 204 notes Tirah veterans serving in the unit. 
10 Ed A Harfield The Life and Times of a Victorian Officer (Wineanton 1986), p 206. Col Donne sen·ed an 
Tirah as 2ie of the tMi Bn transferring to lSI Bn as CO. 
1\ Col Hale 'The StatTWork in the War' 19CXLVIII (1900). P 365 with Col (e) and Sen 8 and 9 added. 
12 Buller attended but did not graduate from Camberley. 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 6 Lines of Communication 129 22 17% Staffs*) 
7 Special Service Officers*z 169 18 11% 8 Totals 420 120 29% 9 Total less Ser 7 251 102 41% 
*1 . Some were ASC o~c~rs who w~re less likely to have attended Camberley. They 
were employed on lOgistIc staff dutIes. This did not mean that they were capable staff 
officers. *2 Many not in staff posts. 
Table 3. BEF key appointments and pscs 1914. 13 
Ser Post Total Of which % (d) 
(a) 
pscs /(c) 
(b) (c) (d) (e) 
1 CinC 1 0 -
2 Corps Commanders 6 5 83%14 
3 Divisional Commanders 14 12 85% 
4 GHQ Principal Staff 6 5 83% 
Officers 
5 Corps BGS 5 5 100% 
6 Divisional GSO 1 s 11 11 100% 
7 Total 44 38 86% 
Table 4. The 1914-1918 Elite. South African and Tirah Service 1S 
Ser Name Tirah SA Service Category in 
Service Service 16 SA l7 
(a) (b) (c) (d) lel 
1 Kitchener No Yes Command llS 
2 Wolfe- No Yes Staff 
Murray 
3 Robertson No1'J Yes Staff 
4 Douglas No Yes Staff /Command 
5 Murray No Yes Staff 
6 Wilson No Yes Staff 
7 Milne No Yes Staff 
8 Beauchamp- No Yes Staff 
Duff 
13 Based on BJ Bond The Staff and the Staff College (1972). Appendix V. 
14 There were 5 corps but includes Grierson who died on active service. 
IS J Terraine The Smoke and the Fire (1992), Table H. 
16 QAL Ju11914. 
17 QAL Jan 1914. 
II Nominally COS but never employed so. 





CinC India, SotS 
QMG, MOO, CIGS 
See Biographies 
Div Commander, 







AG India, CinC 
India 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
9 French No Yes Command See Biographies 
10 Haig No Yes Staff/Command See Bio~hies 
11 Allenby No Yes Regt/Command See Biographies 
12 Hamilton Yes Yes Staff/Command! See Biographies I 
Staff/Command I I 
13 Cavan No Yes Command CinC Italy. CIGS 
14 Nixon Yes No N/A CinC Mesopotamia 
15 Lake No No N/A CinC Mesopotamia 
16 Maxwell No Yes SSO/Command IGF's staff, GS 
Mediterranean, Cine 
Egypt 
17 Monro Yes Yes Staff See Biographies 
18 Maude No Yes Staff CinC Mesopotamia 
19 Lawrence No Yes Staff/Command COS BEF 
20 Kiggell No Yes Staff DSD, Commandant 
Camberley. later 
COS BEF 
21 Home No Yes Staff/Command Anny Commander 
BEF 
22 HGough Yes Yes Regt /Command See Biographies 
23 Byng No Yes Staff/Command Div, Corps and 
Anny Commander 
24 Birdwood Yes Yes SSO/Staff/ Staff India, corps 
Command and Anny Comd 
25 Smith- Yes Yes RegtlCommand See Biographies 
Domen 
26 Plumer No Yes Command QMG, Divisional 
Commander, Corps 
and Anny Comd 
BEF 
27 Rawlinson No Yes Staff/Command See Biographies 
Regt = subordinate service in unit, Command = CO unit/column or formation. 
468 
Table S. Serving Major Generals in 1914 with South African or NW F . 
Service.2o ronher 
Ser Ann All Of which NWF No Totals 
War South 1897- War 
Service Africa 8 Service (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1 Cavalry 7 7 
- - 7 
2 Infantry 47 34 4 
- 47 
3 RA 17 13 1 1 18 
4 RE 9 4 2 
- 9 
5 ASC 2 2 
- 1 3 
6 IA 23 4 9 1 24 
7 RM 4 1 
- 2 6 
8 Totals 109 65 16 5 114 
9 Total BR 82 60 7 2 84 
Annyonly 
Roughly 60% had served In South Africa, when the IA and RM are removed; the 
proportion is some 75%. Some 15% (less RM and ASC) served on the NWF 1897-8. 
Table 6 Official Reports 1899-1902. 
Ser Short Title NA Reference Initiated by Date 
(a) (b) ic) (d) (e) 
1 AOD 108/244 SA 
2 AOD 108/245 WO nd .1 
3 Engineer Arm 108/246 WO/SA 21 Jul 1900 
4 Steam Road Transport 108/247 WO/SA 511010011 
5 Organisation and Equipment Engineer 108/248 WO/SA7.7. 1900 
Arm (Auxiliary Forcesl 
6 Steam Transport ... Heavy Guns 108/249 WO/SA 
7 Cavalry 108/250 SA 8-16/11/001J 
8 Lines of Communication 1081251 SA 
9 Medical 108/252 SA 1617100 
10 11 Division 108/253 SA 1717/00 
11 7 Division 108/254 SA 2617100 
12 Chaplain's Department 108/255 SA 1017100 
13 Signalling 108/256 SA 1417/00 
14 Postal 108/257 SA 1417/00 
15 Transport Services 108/258 SA 1517/00 
16 Provost Marshal 108/259 SA 1517/00 
17 AG's Dept 108/260 SA 1417100 
18 Remounts 108/261 SA 17,700 
19 Press Censorship 108/262 SA? 7/00 
20 AL /9/4. 
21 Date sent by Roberts. 
n Much data from RE main report. This version printed 1901. compilation m 1900. 
1) WO 108/250 P 2 states 1901, in view of other letters. this date was a typographic error. 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 20 Imperial Yeomanry 108/263 SA 16110/00 21 Casualties 108/264 SA 13'11100 22 AVD RCWSAz4 SA 15 700 
23 PomPoms 108/265 WO 1900 ·1 
24 PomPoms i., SA 
25 Heavy Artillery 
1900? 
108/266 WO nd·7 
26 Machine Guns 108/267 WO 1900 
27 Lso~Natal 108/268 SA? Dec 1900 
28 Medical Report ... Natal Z() SA? 1/1101 
29 Field Intelligence Nov 1900-1902 108/269 SAl' 1316/02 
30 Field Intelligence 108/270 SA? Jul 1900? 
31 Pigeon Posts 108/271 SA? 19/9/02 
32 Reports by OCs Units SA 1899-1901 108/272 WO 1816/01 
Small . 
Anns 
33 " " " "" "Swords, Lances, 1 08/273 WO 9/9/01 
Pistols 
34 " " " "" "Valise Equipment 108/274 WO nd· 
etc 
35 " " " "" "Mule Harnesses etc 108/275 WO nd·4 
36 " " " "" "V ehic1es 108/276 WO nd·3 
37 " " " " " " Blankets etc 108/277 WO nd·5 
38 " " " "" "Signals Equipment 108/278 WO nd·6 
etc 
39 " " " " " Guncotton etc 108/279 WO nd·6 
40 " " " " " Clothing 108/280 WO (1901 ) 
41 Answers to Questions from Various 108/281 WO (1901 ) 
Branches ofQMG's Department by 
Various Officers .. [SA] 
42 Remounts 108/282 WO 5/9/02 
43 History of the Telegraph Operations 108/376 WO (1903) 
During the War in [SA] 1899-1902 
44 Report on Steam Transport in [SA] 108/377 WO (1903)Z8 
45 Report on Surgical Cases Noted in the 108/389 WO (1905) 
[SAl War 
46 Report ... Medical Arrangements ... [SA] 108/390 WO (1904) 
War 
47 Lt Gen Lyttelton's Reports on Horses 
Z':J WO 5/7/023U 
Supplied during the [SA]W ar 
24 RCWSA Appendices pp 101-2. It does not apparently survive elsewhere. 
25 WO 108/265 refers. It was typed by July 1900 and probably was part of the SA series. It does not 
seem to have survived. 
26 Contained within WO 108/390. 
27 The signature block is South Afric~ but the WO may have demanded it. 
28 Report signed 27/9/02 at Capetown. 
29 Not apparently in NA but Appx 58 RCWSA Appendices reproduces it 
)0 Data requested by SA AO 1212102. The WO later asked for information on 915/02. The formal was 
apparently a questionnaire to column conunanders. 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 48 Report by Field-Marshal ... Roberts ... on RCWSA WO 25'3 '01 the Field Transport Appendices 
49 A Report on the Demobilization of the TVA SA 1/4/03 South African Field Force 1st June 1902-
2sth February 1903 HQ Pretoria 1 April 
1903 (Pretoria J Keith 1903) 
50 Recommendations of the Committee WO 33/195 31 BR? 2717/01 directed to consider Sir Thomas 
Gallwey IS Medical Report of the 
Campaign in Natal 1899-1900 
51 Report upon the Organisation and 
Equipment of Medical Units ... South 
WO 33/1953z SA 7/7/00 
Africa 
52 Lt Col Girouard History of the Railways 
During the War in South Africa 1899-
1902 (1903) 
53 Report on the Working of Annoured 
Trains 
WO 108/414 SA 1711/02 
*1 5/01 may be date printed. *2 9/01 may be date printed, contains a report made on 16n /00 following a 
letter of 9/6/00. *3 9/01 may be date printed *4 (E&S 8/01) went to press 13/8/01. 
*5 (E&S 10/01) may be date printed. *6(E&S 11101). *7 (E&S 5/01) South Africa Circular Letter 
forwarded 1111101. *8 E&S 8/01 to press 12/8/01 *9 to press 9/9/01 
Table 7. Disciplinary Offences 1898-1912.33 
Ser Year Average Number 
Strength CMs 
(a) (h) (c) (d) 
1. 1898 225,027 9676 
2* 1904 287,240 12,017 
3 1906 263,117 8125 
4 1908 251,324 7181 
5 1910 252,686 6433 
6 1912 253,762 5161 
* Incomplete data 1899-1903. 
31 Does not contain report just comments. 
32 Does not contain report just comments. 











Number %of % of men 
Imprisoned Anny fined 
CMed drunk 
-(f) (g) (h) 
8001 4.47% 6.6% 
10243 4.50/0 5% 
6725 3.24% 4.5% 
6338 3.11% 6.80/0 
6345 2.72% 5.00% 
4380 2.180/0 4.62% 
Table 8. Education Certificates 1903-1912.34 
Ser Year Average Strength NCOs and Men on 0/0 (d) of (c ) 
Regt Strength with 
Education Certificates 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1. 1903 303,600 79,860 26.3 
2 1904 267601 111,928 41.8 
3 1905 254,748 120,754 47.4 
4 1906 245,978 128,749 52.3 
5 1907 232,154 129,308 55.7 
6 1908 235,409 139,065 59.0 
7 1909 237,205 148,025 62.4 
8 1910 236,496 159,778 67.6 
9 1911 237,722 168,148 70.7 
10 1912 234,901 172,670 73.5 
The totals in Cols (c) of Tables 7 and 8 do not agree. The author is satisfied that he has 
copied correctly and suspects that Table 7 involves the Anny's total strength while 
Table 8 just totals soldiers, perhaps less recruits; officers were assumed, correctly or 
not, to be educated. 
Table 9. Cavalry Ratios Western Front August 1914.35 
Ser Formation Britain France Gennany 
(a) (b) (b) (c) (d) 
1 Infantry Divisions 6 62 72 
2 Cavalry Divisions 3 *1 9 10 
3 Ratio 1 :2 1:7 1:7 
* 1 The British total is expressed in continental cavalry division equivalents (ie a 6 
regiment cavalry division). The British cavalry division of 4 brigades was double the 
French and German and is treated as 2 divisions. The third divisional equivalent 
consists of an independent brigade, 3 units acting as divisional cavalry and anny 
mounted troops. If cyclist companies are added this would add a further 1 Y2 units. It 
has not been possible to include German and French divisional cavalry in the totals in 
ser 2. Even if these were included, the ratio would be unlikely to approach 1 :6. 
Table 10. To Illustrate Mobility versus Staffwork. 
Ser Hours Distance Distance 
Elapsed travelled at 4 travelled at 4.4 
Kph Kph 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 1 4 4.4 
2 2 8 8.8 
3 3 12 13.2 
4 4 16 17.6 
After 4 hours the faster force will have gaIned 1.6 kms or a time interval of 24 
14 GARs 1909& 1912. 
35 MOFB I Appendices 2,3, 6. 
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~utes. But sup~or ~taff and co~~cations which allow faster decisions say 
savmg an hour WIll gam 4 kms. Savmg tIme means less expenditure of effort, unlike 
faster marching. 
Table 11. South Africa. Views on Machine Guns. 36 
Ser Arm of Number Positive UndecidedlNo Reply Anti % (d)' 
Re~ondent (cl (a) ill (c) (d) (e) (0 (g) 
1 Cavalry 24 18 4 2*1 75% 
2 MI 19 13 5 l*z 68% 
3 Infantry 119 69 35*3 15 58°·0 
4 RA 2 0 1 1*4 *~ 
5 Total 164 100 45 19 
Notes: 
.1 Lt Col Miles, one of those critical, had his unit's weapons withdrawn but felt that 'each ... battalion 
should have two. ' 
.2 Maj Gen Hutton noted their theoretical value but commented that, due to carriage defects, they were 
of 'small value'. He was incorrectly recorded as cavalry; in fact he was a rifleman and MI expert .• 320 
had not used the weapon in action or used it only once .• " Possibly due to this unit's obsolescent .45 cal 
Maxims . • S Too small for statistical confidence. 
Table 12 Brigadiers and above South Africa. Views on Machine GunS.37 
Ser Arm Total Positive Undecided /No Reply Anti 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) if) 
1 Cavalry 3 2 1 0 
2 MI 1 0 0 1 
3 Infantry 18 10 4·\ 4*l 
4 Total 22 12 5 5 
Notes: 
• lOne admitted to little experience, another commented on machine guns' size problem in attack . 
• 2 Methuen criticised machine guns' handling and commented that South African conditions were 
unsuited to the weapons but felt they had defensive value as did Maj Gen Jones. 













19lbid pp 146-8, Nos 72, 75, 91. 










Tablel4. Increases in the Arms between 1899/1900 to 190411905.40 
Ser Item Increase Decrease 
(al (b) (~) (d) 
1 CavRe~s -
-
2 RHABtys +9 
3 RFABtys + 55 
4 RGACoys +4 
- 2 Mtn Btys 
5 Engr Tps, +21 Y2 
COLs 
6 Bns Inf + 14 
7 ASC + 1263 Pers 
There were reductions in batteries and battalions after 1905; what is 
significant, however, is the trend 
Table 15. GunslMen Ratio 1896-1914 in Major Annies. 
Ser Nation Guns/l 000 bayonets 
in anny CO!])S 189641 
(al ill (c) 
1 Britain 4 
2 France 4.5 
3 Austria 3 
Hungary 
4 Russia 2.9 
5 Germany 5 
6 Average 3.8 or 4.5 for 
sers 1 ,2,5 on1~ 
40 AFPs 50314 • Marker Memorandum. ' 









4.8 or 5.4 for 
sersl,2,5 only. 
41 FSPB 1914 P 258. . 
43Maj Bailey Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford 1989), Figure 3. 
44 FSPB 1914 disagrees with Bailey, who gives the French 4.8 guns, and Germany 6.4. 
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Table 16. Methods of Transport Compared, based on moving an Infantry Division's 
Supplies.45 
Ser Means Men Animals Vehicles Speed Max Daily 
Needed Needed Needed (mph) Distance 
(Miles) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1 Current 1910 3820 436 3 30 
(horsed) 
2 140 Lorries 280 - 280 (includes 6 100 
140 trailers) 
3 47 traction 94 - 188 4 60 
trains 
4 Pack Horses 1900 7600 - 4 30 
5 Porters 56,000 - - 2.5 ? 
Ser 1 shows the current means of moving supplies, sers 2-5 show other types of 
transport moving the same quantities of supplies. 
Table 17. Musketry Comparison 1898-1903. 
1898 Trained Men Range Course4b 1903 Trained Men Range Course47 
Ser Type of Rds Remarks MRs Type of Rds Remarks MRs 











(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
1 Deliberate 42 1-6 Independent 
Individual 
2 Deliberate 21 7,10, Rapid 
Volleys 13 Independent 
3 Rapid 21 8,11, Snap 
Volleys 14 
4 Rapid 14 9,12 Moving 
Independent 
5 Attack 21 15 Skirmishing 
Practice 
6 Moving *3 - Fixed Sight -
7 Long-range 
Independent 
8 Totals 119 
Cols (e) and (i) refer to the relevant practice In MRs. 
·1 Includes magazine practices . 
• 2 Marksmen and 151 Class Shots only 800 yds. 
. . I 48 
.3 Discretionary practice, no ammumtlon sea e. 
4S Lt Col Terry 'The Future of the Corps ... • ASCQ III (1909), pp 271-3. 
46 MRs /898 pp 26-7. 
47 MRs /903 pp 9-11. 
41 MRs /898 p 103. 
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(g) (h) (i) 
35 1,3,5,6, 
8 
28 *1 2,4,7,9 










Table 18. Use of Cover Trained Soldiers' Practices 1898-1903.49 
Ser Type 1898 Practices 1903 Practices 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 Lying 3,5,6,13,14 8,19 
2 Lying using cover - 4,7,9,12 
3 Using other cover - 2,11,13,15,16 
. . Numbers In cols (c) and (d) refer to practices In MRs. Attack and skinnishing practices 
have not been included. 
Table 19 Range Comparison Trained Soldiers' Practices 1898-1903.50 
Ser and 1898 1903 
Practice Range Range 
No 
(a) (b) (c) 
1 200 200 
2 200 200 
3 500 300 
4 500 300 
5 600 400 
6 800 500 
7 300 500 
8 300 600 
9 300 400 
10 500 150 
11 500 150 
12 500 200 
13 600 200 
14 800 150 
15 200-800 200 
16 - 200 
17 *1 200 
18 - 200 
19 - 800 *2 
* 1 Attack Practice no range given. It is likely that this involved some use of cover but 
as conditions varied with the ranges used there is no certainty of this. *2 Marksmen 
and 1 st Class Shots only. 
It is apparent that ranges were considerably less in the 1903 practices. 
49 MRs 1898&1903. 
50 MRs 1898&1903. 
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Table 20. Artillery Increases in Fonnations 1899-1908. 
Ser Type 1899:>1 1902:>.l 190853 Notes 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
1 Infantry 18 36 54 Col (e) sers 
Division 5,6 are 
Fieldguns divisional 
2 CorpsRHA 12 12 - figures. 
3 Corps Fieldguns 18 - - cols(c) 
4 Corps 5" 18 18 - and (d) sers 7 
Howitzers and 8 include 
5 Divisional 4.5" - - 18 a share of 
Howitzers corps 
6 Heavy Guns - 12*1 4 artillery. 
7 3 divisions' 54 (3x18) + 108(36x3)+ 76x 3= 228 
guns + Corps 48 (corps 42(corps 
pieces wpns) = 102 wpns) = 15054 
8 Barrels per 34 50 76 
division 
Howitzers in 1899 were 17% of ser 7 col (c), in 1908 25% of total in ser 7 col ( e). 
Furthermore the 4.5" Howitzer was qualitatively much superior to the 5" Howitzer 
being QF. There was also an increase in heavy artillery, while with the elimination of 
the Corps RHA the average calibre rose. For ser 7 it has been assumed that like the 
SAFF, the corps contained 3 divisions. Continental practice was usually for 2 
divisions; however WEs 1898 does not specify this. The 1908 total is unaffected by 
this issue as there were no corps based pieces. In 1902 assuming a 2 division corps 
there would have been 57 pieces per division. 
* 
1 Corps weapons. 
Table 21 Artillery Engagement Ranges in Training.55 
Ser Year Range Remarks 
(a) (1) (c) (d) 
1 1897 1500 
2 1898 1540 
3 1899 2148 
4 1900 2329 
5 1901 2648 12 batteries 
3209 10 " 
In India 11 batteries of one command fired at an average of4210 yards in 1901-2.
56 
51 FAD 1896 P 2. 
'2 FAT 1902 pp 1-2. 
'l FAT 1914. 
S4 Depends whether 3 or 2 divisions in the corps. 
" RCWSA Evidence I p 79. . 






Table 22. Planned Ranges in Action 1896.~-
Ser Type i Range (yds) 
(a) (b) (c ) 
1 Distant Artillery i 3500 25(J() 
2 Medium Artillery 2500-15()( ) 
/Long Infantry 
3 Decisive 0-1500 500 
i ArtillerylInfantry 
Table 23. Planned Ranges in Action 1902.58 
Ser Type Rifle I Field Gun Heavy Gun I 
(a) (b) (c ) (d) ~- . I I (e) 
1 Distant 3000-2000 6000-'+500 i 10,000-6000 
, 
2 Long 2000-1500 4500-35()0 6001 )--+1 H H ~ 
3 Effective 1500-800 3500-2000 4000 2500 I 
4 Decisive 800-0 2000-0 
-~--. 
2500-0 
Table 24. British, French and German Field Guns. 
Characteristic 18 Pounder59 75mm (,() 1896~~ hi mm 
(a) (b) (c ) (d) 
Max elevation + 16° to - 5" +12°to-5.5" + 1()0 to -Lt 
Max Range 6200 6010 shrapnel 7 () 55 shrapnel • \ 
(yards) 9295 HE 9186 HI 
~~-~ - -
Weight of Gun 25.1 cwt 18.75 cwt 19.3c\\\ 
Ammunition Natures Shrapnel 18.5 lbs Shrapnel 16 lbs Shrapnel] 15lbs 
and shell weights Stariincendiary ·4 HE 1 1 lbs 3 DIS HE] 
Rounds per gun·\ 176 312 0<; 
. , 7()2 -
Ammunition Type Fixed Fixed Fixed 
(<;:pp n1,,<;:<;:~rv\ 
Shield Thickness .125 in .197 in .15.+ in 
Muzzle Velocity (fps) 1590 1736 1526 
I ThIS IS the rounds per gun held In the battery first lIne scale. 
*~ 36 were HE (WO 33/61'+). Using the carriage figures (sers 167-171 nfthe 
reference) and the vehicle holdings (ser 186) per battery: I calculate that this as 172 
rpg, 792 rpg could not ha\'c been carried with the transport listed in the documell\ .3 
WO 33/61.+ notes the maximum sight setting as 6600 and the maximum fU/e ran~l' as 
5500 yards. *4 FAT 191./ gives no starshell scale. It can possibly be deduced that till' 
French and Germans intended to fire Direct at closer ranges than the British due II) the 
greater armour thickness on their gun-shields .• ~ 3() \\ere H L. 
S7 fA n 181)(, 
~8 F..' T 190~ 
S9 \\'0 3J (11 4 'Comparative Table :\rtillery Equipment 191 ~.' 
()() Hom/hook oftht' Fre"ch .~ml\' 19J.1 (\ashville Republished 1 Ill):'). 







Table 25. The Ages of Selected Officers 1900.62 
Ser Name Age Subsequent Career 1 
1900 
! 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1. Roberts 68 CinC, member cm 
2 White 65 Governor Gibraltar i 
3 Clery 62 None 
4 Buller 61 Briefly reverted to CinC Aldershot 
5 Kelly-Kenny 60 AG 
6 Warren 60 None 
7 Gatacre 57 Briefly reverted to Eastern District 
8 Methuen 55 Corps then CinC S Africa 
9 Kitchener 50 CinC India, Egypt, Secretary of State War 
10 French 48 CinC Aldershot, IGF, CIGS, Cine BEF 
11 I Hamilton 47 MS, MA Manchuria, GOC S Command, 
AG, lGOF & CinC Med, CinC Gallipoli 
12 Smith Domen 43 Div Command India, CinC Aldershot, Corps 
and Army Comd BEF, CinC East Africa 
13 Haig 40 Corps, Army and CinC BEF 
14 HGough 30 Brigade-Army Commander BEF 
15 Rimington 42 Bde Comd, IGC India, Cavalry Division 
16 Robertson 41 Staff, QMG and COS BEF, CIGS 
Table 26. Education Statistics Recruits OXLI 1907-11.63 
Ser Standard 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)*1 (f) (g) 
1 Good - 2 12 9 
2 Fair 72 14 45 49 
3 Moderate 138 85 27 50 
4 Inferior 7 123 51 48 
5 Illiterate 1 162 14 7 
6 Untested 10 8 - 4 




-I Not available. 
62 Sers 1-10 'Englishman' 'The Causes of Reverse' NR XXXIV (1900), p 838; sers 11· 16 QAL ,'anoU! 
dates. 
63 OXLIC for respective year. 
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Table 27. Education Recruit Sappers after dismissal from Drill 1910-11.64 
Ser Section After dismissal Final Education 
from Drill FOM 
Education FOM 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 1 42.9 42 
2 2 44.3 45.9 
3 3 38 45 
4 4 37.5 55.5 
. . . Col (b) represents the dIVIsIon of the mtake into 4 sections . 
In Cols (c) and (d) a 1st Class Certificate counted 100 marks 
" 2nd "" " "" 70" 
" 3rd "" " "" 50" 
Sub-categories of 3rd Class ranged from 50-10. 
Table 28 British Officers Observing the Russo-Japanese War or in the Theatre. 65 
Ser Name Affiliation 
(a) (b) ic) 
I Capt DS Robertson** RS Fusiliers 
2 Lt Col AL Haldane psc GS and Gordons 
Int 
3 Col JWG Tulloch IA 
4 Lt Gen I Hamilton qs Ob Gordons 
5 Capt JB Jardine* 5 Lancers 
6 Capt AHS Hart-Synott E Surreys 
psc * FR Int 
7 Brevet Col WH Birkbeck I DG 
8 
psc 
Lt Col CV Hume psc -os- RA 
Int 
9 Capt B Vincent69 * RA later Cavalry 
10 Capt CAL Yate psc FR KOYLI 
GElnt 
11 Col W A Smith psc RA 
12 Maj CM Crawford 70 5 Ghurkhas 
64Ward Standardisation pp 6-8. 
6sBased on ALs and FO 46/592 Schedule. 
66 FO 461592 listed Indian SSO. 
Attached Remarks 
(d) (e) 
Japan Later psc 




Japan u " 
Japan Bde Comd 14-
18 
Japan 01 
Japan Later major 
general 
Japan MA Tokyo & 
Korea 
Japan Later psc, OS 
Quetta. Senior 
staff officer 
and bde comd 
1914 
Japan KIA 1914 
wonVC 
Japan 
Japan Indian rep 
67 Served Tirah. 
61 Hume had served under Roberts as an ADC and as senior 10 in South Africa. See WO 10519 File 
Cincn92 Note 27 Aug 1900. Described as MA Tokyo and Korea Army ~ist 1905. . . 
69 Served Boxer Rising. Later DS Quetta; has the rare distinction of attractIng IFe Fuller s praise! 
70 Served China 1900-01. 
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(a) (b) (c) 
13 Capt Sir A Bannennan71 RE 
14 Lt Gen CJ Burnett psc Tl. Late E Yodes 
15 Lt Gen WG Nicholson qs Late RE 
Int 
16 Lt Col EAgar psc RU RE 
Int 
17 Maj JM Home psc RU Commissioned RA 
GEInt transferred IA Infantry 
18 Col WHH Waters psc LateRA 
RUGEFRInt 
19 Gen M Gerrard RU, Int 6 years RA, then IA 
cavalry 
20 Maj GHG Mockler,j IA 
21 Capt Eyres RN-'4 RN 
22 LtCol WG RAMC 
Macpherson 75 
23 Maj R W Boger psc -,() RA 
24 Cdr EW Wemyss RN 
25 LtH Edwards RN 
26 Lt AC Barnaby RMLI 
27 Capt HC Holman psc" IA (cavalry) 
IntRU 
30 Maj RT Tokens * Infantry 
32 Maj GE Pereira Pl Infantry 
33 Col R Bannatine- RA 
Allason8o 
71 First CO the Air Battalion, appointed GS Jan 1908. 
72 MA Japanese Anny o 1103/05-211 V05. 
73 Served China 1900-02. 
(d) (e) 




Japan later CIGS 
Japan 
Russia Only 4 years 
inRA 
Russia MA Berlin 
and Russia 
Russia MA Russia 
1892-3 
Russia 
Russia MA with Far 
East Fleet. 













Japan AMA Tokyo 
Japan MA Seoul 
Japan 
74 Attempted to join Russian fleet at Port Arthur and entered Japanese lines, causing dismay in Russia. 
7SAttached Japanese 24/03/04-2111V05. Later PMO 4 Division Quetta and lec~r at Quetta. 
76 No mention in BORs but mentioned in Haldane (AMS 3/4/06). He served Wlth 2 Japanese Army. Boger 
died while MA Tokyo 1911. 
n,Previously did 2 Intelligence jobs, one in China. . . 
71 AMA Tokyo 19/4/04- 27/11105 then special employment Tokyo Feb-Mar 06. Had served an Otina 
during Boxer Rising. 
79 Served in China 1900. Later qualified in Chinese though not by 1906. 
10 ANG (1909), P 53, served Manchuria Apr-Dec 1905. 
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-(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
34 Capt ThackerlS 1 Canadian Artillery Japan 
35 Lt Col GH Fowke lSZ RE Japan Later general 
36 Maj CM Crawford IA(Int) Japan 
37 Col Hoad83 Australia Japan 
38 Col Lewis1S4 RE Japan 
39 Capt W A Adams*** 5L Japan Language 
student 
40 Lt FSG Piggott*** RE Japan Language 
student 
41 Lt W A Harrison RElS~ Japan Language 
student 
42 Capt EF Calthorp *** RA Japan Language 
student 
Only those RN and RM officers who either made reports on army operations or were 
ashore for long periods are included. 
*** Listed Schedule FO 46/592 as Language Officer 
* * Qualified Japanese and Chinese see AL 1906 
GE German interpreter 
Int previous Intelligence job 
* Qualified JA see AL 1906 
FR French interpreter 
RU Russian interpreter 
81 See Haldane Saga p 207, BL Add Mss 50317 for his report on Japanese Field Artillery. 1M ,Hitsman 
and D Morton 'Canada's flfSt Military Attache: Capt He Thacker in the Russo-Japanese War M,hlarr 
Affairs 34 (1970). . 
&2WIV (1906), P 163, accompanied Nicholson. present at the siege and capture.~fPort Arthur. 
8) HuPs 50086 HuttonlNicholson 8/4/04. Hoad was apparently appointed for political reasons. He latCf 
had an influential career in the Australian Army. 
84 In Japan 1905 and corresponded with WO, FO 461592 but not on schedule. 
IS Piggott Thread p 25. 
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Table 29. Commanders and Staff of 1 st Army Corps 189986 
Ser Name Post psc Previous Post (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1 Gen Buller GOC Corps no GOC Aldershot 
2 Col Stopford Mil Sec to GOC yes WO 
3 Maj Gen COS Corps no None given 
Hunter ( GOC Quetta)87 
4 Col Wynne Deputy AG Corps no AMSWO 
5 Col Miles AAGCorps yes Comdt Camberley 
6 Col Douglas AAGCorps no AAG Aldershot 
7 Lt Col a Court DAAGCorps yes MA Brussels 
8 Maj Kiggell DAAGCorps yes DAAG Instr Dover 
9 Maj Lewis DAAG Corps (ASC) no Portsmouth 
10 Maj Thomas DAAG Corps (AS C) no Not~ven 
11 Maj Byng PM Corps yes DAAG Aldershot 
12 Maj Altham AAG Int, Corps yes DAAG Int Army HQ 
13 Maj Evans DAAG Int, Corps yes DAAG Instr York 
14 Capt Gordon DAAG Int, Corps yes BM Malta 
15 Lt Col Verner DAAG Topography yes RMC instructor 
Corps 
16 Maj Sclater SORA Corps no BM RA Aldershot 
17 Maj Bethell SORE Corps yes Aldershot 
18 Maj Jones Censor Corps yes " 
19 Maj Rhodes Director Sigs Corps no DAAG Signals 
Aldershot 
20 LtGen GOC 1 Div no Corsham Court 
Methuen 
21 Col AAG 1 Div no AAG Portsmouth 
Mainwaring 
22 LtCol DAAG 1 Div yes Commissioner Gold 
Northcott Coast (on leave) 
23 Maj Warner DAAG 1 Div (ASC) yes Devonport 
24 Maj Gen Comd 1 Bde 1 Div no Comd InfBde 
Colvile Gibraltar 
25 Capt Ruggles- BM 1 Bde 1 Div yes BM" " 
Brise 
26 Maj Gen Comd 2 Bde 1 Div yes Comd InfBde 
Hilyard Aldershot 
27 Maj Monro BM 2 Bde 1 Div yes BM " .. 
28 Maj Gen Clery GOC2 Div yes DAGHQ 
29 Maj Cooper ADCGOC2Div yes DAAG Int WO 
30 Maj Bvt Col B AAG2 Div yes Depot E YORKS 
Hamilton Beverley 
31 CaptGogarty DAAG2Div yes BM Shomc1ifTe 
32 Capt Boyce DAAG 2 Div (ASC) no Staff captain Cork 
86 WYNPs 7508-32; signed Coleridge Grove 2110/99. 
87 DH Doolittle A Soldier IS Hero (Namngasset 1991). P 187. 
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
33 Maj Ellison APM 2 Div yes DAAG Instr 
Aldershot 
34 Maj Gen Comd 3 Bde 2 Div no Niddrie nr Edinburgh 
Wauchope 
35 Bvt Lt Col 
Ewart 
BM 3 Bde 2 Div yes DAAG Devonport 
36 Maj Gen Comd 4 Bde 2 Div no Comd 2 Bde 
Lyttelton Aldershot 
37 Capt Wilson BM 4 Bde 2 Div yes BM 2 Bde Aldershot 
38 Maj Gen GOC 3 Div yes GOC Eastern District 
Gatacre 
39 Col Allen AAG3 Div yes AAGHQ 
40 Lt Col Waters DAAG3Div yes DAAG Int Branch 
41 Maj Hobbs DAAG 3 Div (AS C) no DAAG Woolwich 
42 Maj Sladen APM3 Div yes DAAG Colchester 
43 Maj GenHart Comd 5 Bde 3 Div yes Comd 1 Inf Bde 
Aldershot 
44 Maj BM 5 Bde 3 Div yes BM Aldershot 
Mac Gri gor 
45 Maj Gen Comd 6 Bde 3 Div yes United Service Club88 
Barton 
46 Capt MacBean BM 6 Bde 3 Div yes Army and Navy Club 
47 Col French GOC CavDiv no Comd Cav Bde 
Aldershot 
48 Col Gough AAGCavDiv yes W0
89 
49 Maj Haig DAAGCavDiv yes BMCavBde 
Aldershot 
50 Maj Welch DAAGCav no Edinburgh 
Div(ASC) 
51 Capt Lawrence DAAG Intelligence yes DAAG lnt wo 
52 Maj Gen Comd 1 Cav Bde no Temporarily comd 
Babington Cav Bde Aldershot 
53 Capt Briggs BM 1 CavBde no Temporarily BM Cav 
Bde Aldershot 
54 Col Brabazon Comd 2 Cav Bde no Comd 2 Cav Bde 
55 Capt Brand BM 2 Cav Bde no BMCavBde 
Table 30 Organisation of Divisions Britain, France and Germany 1914.
90 
Britain 
Infantry Division of 3 Brigades, each brigade of 4 battalions, each battalion of 4 rifle 
companies. Two battalion machine guns. Total 12 battalions. . 
Divisional Artillery 3 Field Artillery Brigades, each of 3 battenes, each of 6 x 18 Pdr 
88 One assumes this was a leave address. 
89 RPs 7101-23-110-2 F297 RobertslLansdowne 111100, Buller had not allowed Gougb to take o\'er as AAG 
due to his excitability, be bad been viewed as insane since the 18805! 
90 MOFB 1914 I (1922), Appendices 2, 4, 7. 
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Guns. 
t Fie~d Artillery Brigade of 3 batteries, each \\ith 6 x 4.5" 
HowItzers 
RGA Battery of 4 x 60 Pdr Guns Total 76 pieces. 
2 Field Companies RE 
1 Signal Company RE 
t Squadron Cavalry 
t Company Cyclists 
Cavalry Division 4 brigades, each of 3 regiments, each of 3 squadrons, each of 4 
troops. 2 machine guns per regiment. 
Div~s~o~al Artillery of 2 RHA Brigades, each of 2 batteries, each of 6x 13 Pdr Guns 
1 DIVISIon Signals Squadron 
1 Field Squadron RE 
France 
Infantry Division of 2 Brigades, each of 2 regiments, each regiment of 3 battalions. 
Total 12 battalions 
Each battalion of 4 rifle companies and 2 unit machine guns. 
3 Artillery groups, each of3 batteries each with 4 guns (36 guns) 
I Cavalry Squadron 
1 Engineer Company 
Cavalry Division 3 cavalry brigades, each of 2 regiments 
1 Horse artillery brigade of 2x 4 gun batteries 
Cyclists 324 soldiers 
Germany 
Infantry Division 2 Infantry brigades, each of 2 regiments, each regiment of 3 
battalions. Total 12 battalions. Machine gun company (6 guns) for each regiment. 
Artillery Brigade (72 guns and light howitzers) 
Cavalry Regiment. 
1 and Yz companies pioneers.91 
Cavalry Division 3 cavalry brigades of 2 regiments each 
Horse Artillery Abteilung 3x4 gun batteries 
Battalion Jaegers and machine gun company. (12 machine gunS)92 
Both French and Gennan Infantry organisations were clumsy as there was an 
additional level of command which meant additional staff officers, stafTwork and 
slower passage of orders. 
91 One division had 2 companies and the other one. Pioneers unlike British sappers WC:~ not tradesmen 
92 Some divisions had more jager battalions. Edmonds does not include the jager ma(hineguns A 
correct total is included here. Some jaegers were lorry-borne. 
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Table 32. All Staff Rides, Tours and Similar Exercises held between 1893-1899. 
Ser Dates Location Reference Type Remarks 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) ! 
1 7- Chichester Hamley3 Exercise Staff College 
11/9/74 
2 Sep Sussex Hamley4 Exercise Staff College 
1874 
3 1892 Leith Hill JRUSI TEWT HOTS 
4 1893 Reading JRUSI TEWT HOTS 
5 1894 Sussex BA TEWT HOTS 
6 1894 Unclear MePs TEWT Probably Home 
District 
7 1895 Sussex MePs Staff Ride Led by Buller 
8 1895 Ascot MePs TEWT Probably Home 
District 
9 1897 Ireland HuPs Staff Ride Irish Command, 
probably first ride 
held in Ireland. 
10 1897 Goring ANG Cavalry Staff Haig chief soy, 
Tour 
11 1898 Aldershot usct6 StafTRide Aldershot Command 
12 1898 Ireland HuPs Staff Ride Irish Command 
13 1899 India JUSII Staff Ride District levelled by 
Brig Gen Hart 
14 1-5 Apr Sussex BA'J1 Army Staff Tour led by Wolseley 
1899 
Table 33. To Show Staff Rides, Tours etc 1902-1914. 
Ser Dates Location Reference Type Remarks 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (0 
1 17- Bombay OXLIC Staff Ride 
19/2/02 
2 12- Hastings! W0279/5 Staff Tour II Army Corps 
17/4/02 Seven Oaks 
WO 279/6 Staff Ride Eastern District 3 7-1117/02 East Anglia 
4 1-5/9/02 Somerset Report
98 District Staff Ride Conducted Lt Gen 
Devon 
5 29/3- Salisbury- WO Corps GS officers 
4/4/03 Andover 279/516
99 Staff Ride 
6 27/4- Calne- WO Selected generals 
2/5/03 Amesbury 279/516
100 others 
93 Col Hamley Staff College Exercises 1874 (Edinburgh 1875). pp 10-72. 
M Ibid pp 73-110. 
95 HPs 3155-32a 'Scheme for a StafTTour 4-9/10/97' may refer to this tour. 
96 USG 2613/98 p 248 claims it as the first held at Aldershot. 
Butler 
Led byCSO 
Led by Wood 
97 BA 18/3199 P 304. I tit 902 
91 Lt Oen Butler Record of the Western District Staff Ride Conducted r to 5 September ( 1 np). 
99 'II Corps Report on Preliminary Training 13/10/03' P 3. 
100 'Ibid. 
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(a) (b) (c) 
7 22- lhelum 
27/2/04 
8 Feb 1904 Barbados 
9 Mar 1904 Sussex 
10 Mar 1904 Thames 
District 
11 May 1904 Dorchester 
12 1904 Portsmouth? 
13 7- Midlands 
13/08/04 
14 Sep 1904 Southern 
District 
15 Sep 1904 Home 
District 
16 Autumn Ireland 
1904 
17 4-0ct Stirling 
1904 
18 27/2/- Delhi 
3/3/05 
19 Mar 1905 NE Dist 
20 lO- S Coast 
14/4/05 
21 Sep 1905 Central 
England 
22 15- Aurangabad 
22112/05 
23 Autumn Kerry 
1905 
24 24-0ct East Coast 
1905 Scotland 
25 17- Medak 
23/1/06 
101 ANG XLV (27/2/04), P 195. 
102 BA 72 (26/3/04), P 376. 
(d) (e) (f) 
Cavalry Cavalry Staff Ride Set by Haig 
Studies 
ANG/UJ 
WO 27/503 1 st Anny Corps subordinate finns 
Staff Ride had held their own 
tours 
BA lUl Staff Ride Under Gen Hart 
BA IUJ Staff Ride Sir E Wood 
Report lU4 Staff Ride II Corps 
WO 27/503 Staff Ride French involved. 
prior to mans 
BA I05 Staff Ride 
BA 1Utl Staff Ride 
ASCQIUl Staff Ride 
WO Staff Ride Details in WO 
279/504 279/504 very thin 
Cavalry Cavalry Staff Set by Haig 
Studies 108 Ride 
BA IUIJ Staff Ride 
WO Eastern Command 
2791509 Staff Tour 
W027/504 Aldershot Staff . 
Tour 
Cavalry . Staff Ride Set by Haig 
Studies 110 
ANG111 Staff Ride Lord Grenfell 
WO Staff Tour GOC Scotland 
279/511 
Cavalry Staff Ride Set by Haig 
Studies 112 
103 BA 72 (14/5/04), P 583. . 
104 Extracts from a Report on a Staff Ride ... Disembarkation and Establishment of ~ Bose ~ 1904). ~1S 
was almost certainly triggered by the 1904 Essex manoeuvres which involved a major landmg exertlse. 
IDS BA 73(24/9/04). 
106 Ibid. 
101 Capt Napier Nunn 'Outline of [ASe] Duties on a Staff Ride' ASCQ I (1907). pp 643-4. 
108 Ibid pp 110-130. 
109 BA LXXIV (1905), P 123. 
110 Cavalry Studies pp 156-179 
III ANG XLVI (23/9/05), P 895. 
I 11Cavalry Studies pp 208-222. 
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i 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
26 Jan 1906 EComd BAI13 Staff Ride 
27 Feb 1906 NComd BATff Staff Ride 
28 Mar 1906 SComd BA JJ5 Yeomanry Staff 
Ride. 
29 18- Attock Cavalry Staff Ride 
24/3/06 Studies 116 
30 14- Scotland WO Modified Staff . 
19/5/06 279/512 Ride 
31 Jun 1906 Tunbridge BA1l7 Staff Ride 
32 5-8 Jul 8Bde BA 118 Staff Ride 
1906 
33 3-7/9/06 Severn WO Staff Ride 
Valley 279/11 119 
34 Sep 1906 Lake District BA 120 N Comd Staff 
Ride 
35 10-16 Sep S Coast IZI Aldershot Corps 
1906 maritime Staff 
Ride 
36 23- Plymouth BATIZ Coast Defence 
26/9/06 Staff Ride 
37 Sep 06 Ireland BA123 Irish HQ SR 
38 Oct 1906 Scotland BA1Z4 Staff Ride 
39 6-9/11106 Portsmouth BAlz~ Staff Ride 
40 Jan 1907 Wessex Cavalry Skeleton exercise 




42 8-10/4 South Coast 
&13-
18/5/07 
43 6-10/5/07 Chatham 
1\3 BA 76 (13/1/06), p 53. 
114 BA 74 (23/12/05). 
\IS BA 76 (31/3/06), p 361. 
116 Cavalry Studies pp 280-318. 
117 BA 176 (1906), p 648. 
Journal II rather than staff 
126 ride 
WO 279/12 Siege Staff Ride 
WO Naval and 
33/2982 Military Staff 
Tour 
WO 279/15 Siege Staff Ride 
118 BA 76 (27/1/06), P 108 . ' 
119 Also published as a book; FM Wilson's copy is 10 the RUSI Library. 
120 BA 77 (1/9/06), P 245. 
121 Aldershot Army-Corps Staff Tour and Operations 1906. 
122 BA 77 (22/9/06), P 328. 
123 BA 77 (29/9/06), P 356. 
124 BA 77 (22/9/06), P 328. 
11S BA 77 (3/11/06). 














well as staff tour 
Siege Manoeuvres 
later Chatham 
(a) (b) (c) 
44 27- SWales 
3115/07 
45 1907 Cambridge 
46 7- WMidlands 
12110/07 
47 13- Essex 
16/4/08 
48 3-8 Jun Suffolk 
1907 
49 7- Wessex 
16/9/1908 
50 19- Ireland? 
2119/08 
51 26- Midlands 
30110/08 
52 Sep 1908 Ireland 
53 14- Carlow 
17110/08 
54 Nov 1908 Ireland 
55 Nov 1908 Ireland 
56 1909 Quetta 
57 27- Ulster 
30/1/09 
58 1-6/3/09 Berkshire 
59 21-6/6/09 Wilts 
60 20-/3/09 Ireland 
61 14- Ireland 
17/3/10 
62 20- East Anglia 
22/4110 
63 6-9/6/10 Salisbury 
64 19- Wessex 
23/6/10 
127 BA 78 (1/6107), P 621. 






























(e) (f) 1 
Staff Ride held byDSD 
StafIRide Pre Aldershot 
Manoeuvres 
StafIRide Held byCGS 
I 
WO Siege Staff 
Thames Dist staff 
Tour 
Aldershot Corps followed by 
manoeuvres 
IGF's Staff Ride 
Staff Tour Held byCGS. 
validating FSRs 
~de led by IGF 
Medical Staff 
Logistic Staff Led Plumer 
Logistic Staff Developed from 
IGF's September 
Ride 
Siege Staff Ride Quetta 
HQ Staff Ride Anny Medical 
Service 
Cavalry Staff Ride Held by DSD 
2oa " " 44 Held by DSD 
Irish Command 
Staff Ride 
Irish Command Lyttelton Director 
Staff Ride. 
1 sf Cavalry Bde HadanNW 
Staff Tour Europe Scenario 





(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) i (0 
65 
I 
27/6- Northants W0279/36 Aldershot 
117110 Command Staff 
66 14-16110 Yorkshire WO Instructional Tour Also NCOs 5 
& 279/479 3rd West Riding Y&Ls. 
181123/10 Bde 
67 16-20/5- Home WO 279/44 Cavalry Division Led by Allenby. 
1911 Counties Allenb~ Staff Tour Vaughan, Ansell 
Papers 29 and Howell DS 
68 7-10/3111 Canterbury WO 2 Cav Bde Staff Possibly based on 
279/531 ser 66 above. 
69 22- Cheltenham Report Aldershot Much on MT 
25/6/11 MMPs Command Staff resupply 
70 Nov 1911 Quetta Staff Tour Held by Quetta reports 
Orders CIGS arrival of 22 copies 
9/5/12 report on ride 
71 22- Oxford WO 279/533 Aldershot Admin 
25/4/12 Tour 
72 1912 East Anglia WOI06/1453 Aldershot S tafT Anny mans in 
same area 
21- Berks MXPs6 I Division Staff Probably relates to 
23/4113 Tour later Comd Tour 
73 22- BerkslWilts WO 27/508 Ride for 2x Divs Led by IGHF, 
25/7112 Hants IGF report and 2 Cav Bdes represents BEF 
1912 style problem 
74 7-13/6/13 Berks WO 279/51 Aldershot Comd Probably related to 
GS Staff Tour Ser 74 below 
75 23- Berks WO 279/51 Aldershot 
26/6113 Admin Staff Tour 
76 March Eastern EDPs 4 Div Staff 
1914 District V5/11 Exercise 
77 4-5/6114 Aldershot AIR 1/796/ Staff Exercise Involved the RFC 
204/4/956 
It should be noted that almost certainly more occurred. Staff Colleges' tours and rides 
have not been included. The most significant deduction from the two tables is not the 
total but the contrast between the numbers before and after South Africa. 
129 APs 61S BirdlWavelll/1l37. Bird was invited to set a staff tour for the cavalry diVISion 10 1911 






Table 34. Later Careers Camberley DS Before and After South Africa 
Ser Commandant DS Later Career130 i 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 Col HSG Miles 
- Staff SAFF, returned 
Camberley, QMG, Governor 
Gibraltar 1913. 
2 " LtCol GFR DMI South Africa 1900, Col, 
Henderson CB, died 1903. 
3 " LtCol HCC Retired 1903 as Brevet Colonel, 
Walker Commandant Siege Camp Lydd 
1901. 
4 " Lt ColRW Not serving 1914. 
Fleming 
5 " Capt ES Heard GSO 2 and 1 New Zealand, Bde 
Comd 1915,CoI1915. 
6 " Col RCB Lawrence Comd TF Mtd Bde. 
7 Henry Wilson 
initial 131 
- DMO, CIGS, Field Marshal. 
8 " Col JP Du Cane Lt Gen. 
9 " Col GG Aston Maj Gen. 
10 " Lt Col L Stopford Maj Gen. 
11 " Lt Col W Lt Gen. 
Braithwaite 
12 " Maj C Sackville- Maj Gen 1922. 
West 
13 Wilson later Maj G Harper GSO 1 DMO, Lt Gen, Corps 
ComdBEF. 
14 " Lt Col EM Lt Gen. 
Perceval 
15 " Maj G Barrow Lt Gen. 
16 " Maj WFurse Lt Gen. 
17 " Lt Col CRoss Maj Gen. 
18 Wilson last Col JE Gough Brig Gen KIA 1915 on the point 
of taking over a division. 
19 " Maj CG Stewart Col. 
20 " Lt Col R Whigham Lt Gen. 
Before 1899 the posts were really backwaters, even Miles the Commandant was not 
appointed to a senior staff position in the SAFF. 
130 Col (d) based on QALs (various dates). 
III Maj Oen Callwell Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson I (1927), pp 68,74. 
491 
Table 3S Major Manoeuvres in Britain 1890-99. 
The table below lists fonnation sized manoeuvres 
Ser Date Reference Description 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 1890 Hutton lJ1. Cavalry 
2 Autumn 1891 WO 279/1 Manoeuvres Hants 
3 1892 AirlieIJJ Cav bde v cav bde 
4 1893 WO 279/2 2 Div Manoeuvres 
5 1894 W0279/3 Cavalry Manoeuvres 
6 1895 BAI.14 Ireland 
7 1895 BA 1J' Cav Manoeuvres 
8 1895 BA Ijb New Forest Manoeuvres 
9 1896 ANG Jj7 Aldershot 
10 1896 ANGIJH South of Ireland Manoeuvres 
11 1896 ANGJ.1Y New Forest Manoeuvres 
12 1896 ANGI4U Curragh Manoeuvres 
13 1896 BA I4J SE Dist Manoeuvres 
14 1896 BA 141. Aldershot mans T4J 
15 1896 ANGI44 South of Ireland 
16 1897 BHGI4':J Cavalry Concentration 
17 1897 BAI4b Kelly Kenny's mans 
18 1897 BAI41 Aldershot mans 
19 1897 BAl4H Irish mans 
20 1897 BA 14'1 Sussex mans 
21 1898 WO 279/4 Buller v Connaught 
22 1898 ANG1':JU Salisbury Mans 
23 1898 ANGI)I Cav mans 
24 1899 BAI)J. Irish Mans 
25 1899 BA 153 Aldershot mans 
26 1899 BA 154 SPTA Mans 
132 Col Hutton 'The Evolution of Mounted Infantry' EDREV 1(1901). 
133 Anon The Happy Warrior (Winchester 1901),p 45. 
134 BA LV (1317/95). 
135 BA LV (17/8/95). 
136 BA LV (24/8/95). 
137 ANG XXXVII (1117/96). 
138 ANG XXXVII (2517/96). 
139 ANG XXXVII (4/1/96). 
140 ANG XXXVII (4/1/96). 
141 BA LVII (1/8/96). 
142 Ibid. 
143 BA LVII (12/9/96). 
144 ANG XXXVII (2517/96). 
14S BHG III (1897), p 5. 
146 BA LIX (5/6/97). 
147 BA LIX (21/8/97). 
148 Ibid. 
149 BA LIX (4/9/97). 
ISO ANG XL (20/8/98). 
lSI ANG XXXIX (11/6198). 
\s2 BA LXIII (19/8199). 
IS) BA LXIII (2/9199). 
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I 
Manoeuvres Post 1900 
From ~903 manoeuvres generally up to corps level were held each year, with divisional 
and bngade manoeuvres ~eforehand. Major manoeuvres were held in 1904, 1907. 1910, 
1912 and 1913. The total IS far greater than in the period 1890-1899. From 
contemporary accounts manoeuvres became harder with fewer non-tactical halts while 
marches were long. 
Table 36. Covering Fire Pieters and Colenso. 
Ser Pieter's Pieces Infantry Colenso Pieces Infantry 
and Covering Supported at and Covering Fire Supported at 
Fire155 Pieter's 156 Colenso 
(al (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1 4x 4.7" RN 3 Brigades but as 2x4.7" RN guns As Hart's, 
guns attacks were Hil yard's and 
2 8x l2PdrRN sequential pieces lOx 12 Pdr RN*T Dundonald's 
3 6x 5" Hows, were in theory Nil brigades were 
4 4x5" guns able to support Nil attacking more or 
5 6x 2.5"RML each brigade. 157 Nil less at once and 
MtnGuns That the far apart, guns 
6 6x 12 Pdr battlefield was Nil had to be divided. 
RHAguns relatively small The battlefield 
7 42x 15 Pdr made support 30x 15 Pdr guns measures some 5 
guns easIer. miles across, 
8 Two bns,158 Nothing laid Pieter's measures 
Dundonald's down in about half of this. 
brigade + operational 
machineguns orders. 
9 8 Heavy 2 Heavy 
62 Field Pieces 36 Field Guns 
6 Mtn Guns 38 Total 
76 Total 
It should be noted that there were far more HE-capable pieces at Pieter's, further more 
there were howitzers better suited to give support . 
• 1 Taken from Maj Gen Maurice BROHSA II (1907), p 649. Amery states 8. 
Ammunition expenditure was far greater during the Relief than beforehand, Ibid 
Appendix 12. 4.7" RN and 5" guns are regarded as heavy pieces. 
1S4lbid. 
ISS Amery THWSA III (1905), pp 534-5. WO 132/10 'Naval Bde Report of Operations 213/00' states that 
there were also Ix 6", 2x4.7" and lOx 12 Pdrs in the area but not directly supporting the attack. SAD II 
(1901), pp 44-5 suggests that these weapons were used to deceive the Boers. At least one 4.7 supporting 
the attack was platform-mounted and fIring at ranges just over 2000 yards. 
IS6 THWSA II (1902), pp 422,426. . 
IS? This was not apparently intended; Barton bad been told that the attacks were to be Simultaneous, 
RCWSA Evidence II (1903), p 661; SAD 11(1901), p 44. 
lSI '5 Division Operation Order 27/2/00' in Maj Gen Maurice BROHWSA II (1907). P 508. 
493 
Table 37. Artillery South Africa. 
Ser Weapon In SA To SA Mise Totals Remarks 1/6/99159 1/6/99- Wpns 
1/6/02160 1RN161 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 1 15 PdrBL 27 322 6 355 Standard fieldgun 2 6.3" RML 2 
-
- 2 Used Ladysmith How 
3 12PdrRBL 3 
- - 3 
4 RML 7,9Pdr 52 7 
- 59*1 Obsolete, black 
and 2.5" guns powder ammo 5 3 PdrQF gun 7 
-
- 7*1 Ex-coast 
defence 6 Machineguns 46 315 27 1b2 388*1 RN and private 
weapons not 
included 
7 9.45" How 
- 4 - 4 Austrian 
weapons sIege 
train 
8 6" BL How 
- 12 
- 12 8 with siege 
train 
9 5" BLHow 
- 39 
- 39 
10 5" Gun 
- 18 
- 18 
11 4.7" QF Gun 
- 24 18 42 4 guns with 
siege train 
12 12 Pdr QF 12 
- 18 + 4 42*2 64 4 in col (d) for 
CwtGun Elswick Bty 
13 12 PdrBL 6 
- 78 18*3 78 Standard RHA 
CwtGun gun 
14 12.5 PdrQF 4 - 4 CIY Battery 
Gun 
15 PomPoms - 57 - 57*1 + captured 
weapons 
16 76mm - 1 - 1 Private with 
Hotchkiss Gun Colonial unit 
17 9.2" Gun 1 - - 1 Ex coast defences 
18 6" Gun QF 4 4 u 
19 Misc 4*4 3*5 5 
20 6PdrQF 4163 4 
21 Totals of pieces (less seTS 4,5, 6,15 and improvised weapons ser 19 less that 
made at Kimberley) 722 
1S9 Some weapons Colonial. Table derived from RCWSA Appendices (1903). P 191. 
160 Ibid P 192. No RN Weapons included. 
161 Amery THWSA VI (1909), P 469. 
162 RCWSA Appendices (1903), p 190 Table D. 
163 Headlam RA III (Woolwich 1940), Appendix F. Probably ex-coast defences. 
494 
The l?tal in s~. 21 is .unlikely to b~ totally accurate as too many sources have been 
used m comptlmg this Table. But It has been devised to provide data for Table 38' 
comparison and the inaccuracies are unlikely to throw the ratio out significantly S 
*1 Not included in totals at ser 21. . 
*2 some ~ we~pons of slightly different specification and one SB BP gun found at Mafeking. 
*3 CanadIan umt 
:42 Captured at Elandslaagte. 2 other. 75 nun Krupp cap~. Headlam RA III. Appendix F 
5 2 Home made guns. One each at Kimberley and Mafeking. Only the Kimberley weapon is counted in 
Col (t). 
*6 Headlam RA ill P 486; Australian Battery. 
Table 38. To show the Ratio ofField to Heavy Artillery in South Africa 
Ser Indicator Number Ratio Remarks 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1 South Africa Field 544 5:1 
Artillery 5"Howitzer 
2 South Africa 55 treated as field 
Heavy Artillery weapon 
3 Standard Corps 102 102: -
Field Artillery 
4 Standard Corps Nil 
Heavy Artillery 
In the above table the miscellaneous small calibre guns eg sers 4, 5 and 6 in Table 37 
have been ignored as obsolete, as have porn poms and 3 Pdr QFs. These weapons were 
not field artillery. The aim has been to show how pieces used in the became heavier. 
The Siege Train sent to South Africa has been ignored; it was a feature of other 
campaigns and to include it in ser 2 would distort. Sers 3 and 4 above are based on the 
SAFF corps organisation. 
Table 39 Frontage of an Infantry Division in Defence 1898.164 
Ser Designation Strength Frontage Notes 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1 Infantry Division 8072 8072/5= 1614 
Infantry only paces 
2 Infantry Division 9792 9792/5=1958 Less chaplains 
All ranks paces and medical personnel 
3 Infantry Division 9792 1958 Ptaces + 300 
This assumes the 
all ranks + 18 guns yards 65 guns were in the first line. 
. It should be noted that the layout Included conSiderable depth, see Chapter 6 . 
Serials 1 2 and 3 reflect different strengths. For practical purposes the pace as used in 
the field ~an be taken to be one yard. The most important conclusion is that long-range 
Infantry fire exceeded the divisional frontage. 
164 WEs /898 Table LVIII p 149 and a 5 manlpace norm. NB the pace has been taken as equivalent to a 
r:<! though it was slightly less. 
6S FAD /896 P 127 gives a battery frontage as 100 yards. 
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Table 40. To Show Relative Proportion CavalrylInfantry M' E . 
Armies 1901.166 aJor uropean Armies 
Ser Nation Infantrymen per 
cavalryman 
(a) (b) (c) 
1 Austria Hungary 3.8 
2 Russia 4.2 
3 France 4.4 
4 Germany 4.5 
5 Britain 7.7 
Table 41. Relative Strengths! Perimeter Length Ladysmith, Kimberley, Mafeking. 
Ser Town Length Garrison Artillery Ratio Ratio 
Perimeter MileslMen MileslPieces 
(miles) 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1 Ladysmith 14 12,0001C>7 36 x 15 Pdr, 2x 1/860 1/3.5 
4.7" and 4xl2 
PdrRN,2x 
6.3" hows, 




2 Kimberley 11.75 4721 14 RML 7 Pdr 11400 1/1.2 
later 1 x 28 
later PdrRBLhome 
20169 made gun170 11236 110.75 
3 Mafeking 6 miles 1000, 4x7Pdr 11166 1/1.3 
later many RML, 1 x2", 1 
10 miles armed xlPdr, Ix 11100 110.8 
with homemade 
Martini how and 1 SB 
Henrys ML171 
At Ladysmith the artillery was technically far more advanced and its ranges longer, at 
Mafeking and Kimberley the weapons were obsolete, home-made or both. 
166 Col Graves • Lessons from the South African War ... ' USM XXIV ( 190 1 ). 
167 RCWSA Evidence II (1903), pp 152,633, most were regulars and there was far more artillery. 
168 LS Amery THWSA III (1905), P 152 and Oen Maurice BROHWSA 11 (1906).p 489. 
169 B Williams THWSA IV (1906), p540. 
170 Ibid pp 560-2; there were some 450 regular infantry, 2650 were irregulars. 
171 Ibid p 424; 700 were trained though few were regulars, there were also 300 armed Afncans. S.~D I 
( 1902),pp 99-100. They were not used as regular combatants and armed with obsolescent nOes. The 
perimeter was originally 6 miles and was later extended to 10 miles plus, Ibid P 105. 
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Table 42. Commodities sent to South Africa (long tons). 172 
Ser Commodity Tonnage 
(a) (b) (c) 
1 Meat 27,170 
2 Flour 25,000 
3 Hay 574,500 
4 Oats 468,000 
5 Artillery Ammunition 2800113 
Th~ discrepancy between food and forage suggests how providing an adequate animal 
ratIon caused ~ave logi~tic difficulties. It should also be noted that the only commodity 
not pro~uced In vol~e m Sout~ Africa was ammunition. Oats may not have been 
grown In South Africa but meahes were and were used as animal feed. 
Table 43. The SMLE and Martini Henry Compared. 174 
Ser Characteristic Martini-Henry SMLE 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
1 Propellant Black Powder Cordite 
2 Muzzle Velocity 1350 fPs 2050 fps 
3 Magazine None-single shot 10 round 
magazine 
4 Calibre (ins) 0.45 0.303 
5 Introduced 1871 1903 
6 Rifle weight 91bs 8lbs 
7 Ammo weight 1.80zs 1 oz 
8 Loading Round by round 5 round clip 
One of the most significant differences was that between the rifles' trajectories. This is 
hard to represent in a table and can best been seen graphically. 175 
172 THWSA VI (1909), P 404 for all data except ser 5. Some totals I~k ren:wDbly round: 
Commodities purchased in South Africa are not includ~. As no Bnt~sh artdl~ a~umtlon ex~ept for 
very small amounts in the besieged garrisons was made m South Africa. the dlspanty may be WIder than 
the Table suggests. 
173 Lt Gen McNaughton The Development of Artillery in the Great War (nd),p18. 
174 BA Temple and ID Skennerton A Treatise on the British Military MartIni (Burbank 1983). Tnt Bool: 
of Small Arms 1904 (1904). ' 
115 W Greener The Gun and lIS Development (1901). P 612 has a useful companson of tr3Jcctones. 
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Table 44. MT in the BEF's 1914 Establishment. 176 
Ser Type of Unit Cars! lorries! total units in total cars & l Vans total lorries tractors BEFITI vans (cols dxe) 
-(a) -(b) (c) (cots c x e) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
1 CavalryDiv 3 33 1 3 
Ammunition Park 
33 
2 Ammunition Park 5 1 
Independent Cay 
12 1 1 12 
Bde 
Cavalry Div Supply 3 - 159 1 
- 159 
Cohn 
4 Supply Cohn 5 3 39 1 3 39 
Independent Cay 
Bde 
5 CavDiv HQ 16 - 1 16 -
6 5 Independent Cay 5 - 1 5 
-
BdeHQ 
7 Inf Div Ammo Park 5 93 6 30 558 
8 InfDiv Supply 2 41 6 12 246 
Colm 
9 InfDiv HQ 5 - 6 30 -
10 GHQ 16 - 1 16 -
11 GHQ Misc Depts 13 - 1 13 -
and Services 
12 Corps HQ*l 7 - 3 21 -
13 Corps HQ Sigs - 2 3 6 
Coy*1 
14 AnnyTroops 2 24 1 2 24 
SupplyColm 
15 HQIGComms& 5 cars - 1 5 -
HQ Lines of Comms 
Defences 
16 Printing Coy 6 - 1 6 -
17 HQRFC 1 1 1 1 1 
17 Aeroplane Sqn - 24 5 - 120 
18 Total 174 1198 
Notes: 
Motor cycles not included. Col (e) is based on the assumption that the BEF deployed with 3 corps 
and 6 divisions. 
·1 Titled Anny in reference. 
The Gennans mobilised 4000 motor vehicles in 1914 of which some 650 were 4 ton lorries. 178 
Given this low proportion of lorries in the total compared to the British, it seems possible that 
." WE.r. Part I Expeditionary Force 1914 (1914). It should be stressed that the figures arc an estabhshment Ie what 
~ BEF was meant to deploy with, not necessarily what it did. 
n. Bria Gen Edmonds MOFB 1914 I (1922), Appendix 1. 






























»tor cycles are included in the German figure. It should be noted that the British fielded more 
ries in the 6 infantry divisions of the BEF than the Gennans did for both fronts. In comparison 
the Germans, the BEF's 7 divisions had a far higher proportion ofMT. 
ble 45. Distances and Areas in South Africa. 179 
Ser Colony/State Area (square miles) 
(a) (b) (c) 
1 Cape Colony 277,151 
2 Transvaal 113,640 
3 Orange Free State 48326 
4 Natal 18913 
5 Total 458030 
The total compares with the combined areas of France and Germany some 216,000 
square miles. In distance: 
Cape Town to Pretoria 
Cape Town to Kimberley 
Durban to Pretoria 




Britain 113 first line aircraft. 
France 120 first line aircraft. 
Germany 232 first line aircraft. 
Russia 226 first line aircraft. 
Austria-Hungary 36 first line aircraft. 
ven allowing for RN aircraft the British proportion per division was far greater than for any 
mtinental army. 
Altltual RtgistB 1900 ( 190 1 ),p 407. 
D Edftftnn ~.rland and the A ircrajt (Basingstoke 1991 ).p 10. 
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Annex A. Areas for Further Research 
Only I cut on the timber-only I carved on the stone 
"After me cometh a builder. Tell him. I too have kno~!" 
It is said of the Royal Regiment of Artillery that doubling one's hits and ignoring 
the misses is the high way to promotion. This annexe daringly reverses the process, 
ignoring the bulls, if any, and signalling the outers and the shots that are short, wide or 
over the stop-butt. Notwithstanding the verse at the start of the bibliographic section~ 
this thesis has many gaps. For understandable reasons it lacks military context as it 
skirts the tactics of foreign armies. Where comparisons have been made with the French 
and the Germans, as for example in Tables 15,24 and 31, these are particularly 
interesting to this author. But far more remains to be done here. There is an interesting 
project on looking at the influence of foreign armies on British tactics. The SCSI's two 
conferences on French and Gennan influences on the British Army, though stimulating, 
have only scratched the surface. Dr Samuels' Command and Control's comparative 
approach is very interesting, but as Chapter 1 argues, its thesis has a number of flaws. 
Similarly more work is needed on the Japanese effect on the British treatment of human 
factors. 
Further research is required on military education, discipline and training and their 
complex interrelationships. Again comparisons with other armies would be useful. This 
thesis has only examined training in a cursory fashion; detailed analysis of the themes of 
manoeuvres would be useful. There is probably sufficient material for a thesis in this 
whole field. Technology has not been explored as fully as this author would wish. 
There is an important monograph waiting to be written on motorization before 1914. 
Similarly C3 has only been cursorily examined. 
The links between the Anny and civil society in the period are also 
underdeveloped. The question of patriotism and whether there was an alteration in 
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official attitudes to promoting it are less well explored than this author had hoped would 
be the case. This thesis has skirted the wider question of Anny education and its ci,-il 
links. The Akers-Douglas Committee on Officer Education influenced the public 
schools and education. Comparisons with the Royal Navy would illuminate wider 
trends. The establishment of military lecturers at British universities after 1902 is 
another area where more work remains to be done. Here it may be noted that the 
University of London and King's were well to the fore. But this thesis must declare an 
interest since it was written at King's. 
There are other fields needing more study. The very limited examination of 
Army's and the Navy's attitudes to doctrine is interesting, but more remains to be done. 
Dr Gordon's Rules of the Game suggests that attitudes to initiative varied widely 
between the Services, again research is needed. Another broad area for examination is 
the influence of culture on the military. This thesis has touched on the Efficiency 
Movement but an article could be written about the REs and the Movement. I The 
influence of broad ideas such as Social Darwinism, science, the changes in society and 
culture and how they affected the Army is again under-researched. The former 
influenced the offensive stress in tactics at the time. Fortescue suggests that drink was 
becoming less socially acceptable. This probably imprOVed Anny discipline, though 
fines for drunkenness declined slowly. 2 
Military discipline needs more examination; a thesis possibly running through 
from the Victorian era until say 1945 would be invaluable. By studying a relatively long 
period the process of change would be more comprehensible. Another fascinating area 
is the question of military and ann cultures. Understanding unit and regimental cultures 
illuminates areas such as professionalism, attitudes to the Staff College and initiative. 
I GR Searle The Quest for National Efficiency (1971) and The Organisation Society Ru/~J tllld 
UJnstitution. (np nd). Swinton and Ward were two influentIal sap~r members. 
1 JW Fortescue Following the Drum (Edinburgh 1931); Table 7. 
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Further investigation of the LI would possibly shed more light on tactical developments. 
There is an article waiting to be written on the East Yorkshire Regiment and its series of 
able psc officers. Why there should have been such a cluster in this regiment remains to 
be explained. The most notable of them was Coleridge Grove, the Military Secretary. 
There is work to do on the RA and REs. Both had distinctive cultures, both anns were 
very influential in the Army's development. The Engineers were undergoing significant 
change and studying them should illuminate attitudes to technology. By looking at 
regimental, arm and administrative service cultures wider insights into the Anny will 
probably be obtained. For that matter there is more work to be done on the artillery's 
tactical and technical history. 
It of course would be possible continue until the Last Post is played but there are 
more 3rd class shots than marksmen and this thesis has only grazed the periphery of the 
target. But then Kipling has force: 
When 'ar! of your bullets fly wide in the ditch, 
Don't call your Martini a cross-eyed old bitch. 
She's human as you are-you treat her as sich, 
An' she'll fight for the young British soldier. 
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